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Over the past three decades, politeness studies have attempted a scientific 
conceptualisation of politeness and have sought to establish a universal theory applicable to 
all cultures and languages. Recognising that the field has been influenced by modernist 
principles in theory construction, this dissertation engages in a critical reconsideration of 
politeness, setting it in the wider intellectual context of modernity and post-modernity. In 
the first half, it uncovers the assumptions underlying three major theories: Lakoff (1973, 
1975), Leech (1983) and Brown & Levinson (1978[1987]). Lakoff and Leech's theories 
conceive of politeness as pragmatic rules/principles in a framework inherited from 
Saussurean structuralism. These represent a `structure-centred approach', whereas B&L's 
theory can be seen as an `agency-centred approach', concentrating on the actor (agency) 
and borrowing theoretical constructs from `rational choice theory' - indeed B&L's "Model 
Person" is modernity's model of an `autonomous' `rational' `calculative' self. But in late 
modern sociology, the longstanding structure/agency, theory/practice, mind/body, 
objectivism/subjectivism dichotomies have reached an epistemological deadlock, and 
politeness theories now face similar difficulties. 
The dissertation then explores alternative ways of understanding politeness, 
unconstrained by modernist assumptions, and turns to Bourdieu, Goffman and Gadamer as 
`thinking tools'. Bourdieu's `theory of practice' helps to resolve structure/agency and other 
dichotomies, and his habitus provides a healthy alternative to B&L's politeness as `rational 
calculative action'. However, Bourdieu's theory provides too limited a role for `agency' in 
politeness, and here Goffman's socially constructed self in social interaction proves 
complementary. Lastly, modernist politeness theories assume that the Hearer's role is to 
reconstruct the Speaker's intentions passively and here Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
particularly his notions of `prejudices' and `horizons' illuminates a great deal of 
contingency which surrounds the Hearer, vital to a thorough evaluation of politeness. 
Overall, the dissertation moves from a critique of modernist approaches to 
politeness towards a more viable post-modern reconstruction. 
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Introduction 
1. Context of the Problem 
The study of politeness in language has attracted a number of researchers in pragmatics, 
anthropology, sociolinguistics, sociology, social psychology and other disciplines over 
the last three decades. Researchers, trying to avoid confusion with the ordinary 
everyday notion of politeness, i. e. "various ways in which polite behaviour is talked 
about by members of sociocultural groups" (Watts et al. 1992: 3) endeavoured to 
develop a scientific conceptualisation of politeness. Watts et al. (1992: 3-4) termed the 
common parlance usage `first-order politeness' (politenessl) and the scientific analysis 
`second-order politeness' (politeness2) and argued for the need to make a distinction 
between the two. Many researchers have attempted to establish a second-order 
politeness, i. e. a scientific or theoretical construct of politeness and moving on from 
there to produce a universal theory or framework for understanding politeness. 
In 1990, Fraser (1990) identified four different views of politeness 1) the 
Conversational Maxim View (Lakoff 1973,1975; Leech 1983), 2) the Conversational 
Contract View (Fraser and Nolen 1981), 3) the Face-Saving View (Brown & Levinson 
1978 [1987]), and 4) the Social Norm View. More recently, Eelen (2001) in A Critique 
of Politeness Theories, examined nine different researchers who have contributed to the 
theoretical discussions of politeness: 1) Lakoff (1973,1975) 2) Brown & Levinson 
(1987 [1978]), 3) Leech (1983), 4) Gu (1990), 5) Ide (1989), 6) Blum-Kulka (1987, 
1992), 7) Fraser & Nolen (1981), 8) Arndt & Janney (1985,1992) and 9) Watts (1989; 
1992). Many would agree that it is Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown & Levinson 
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(1987 [1978]) who have proposed grand systematic theories of politeness. Others on 
Eelen's list have contributed to the field by offering criticisms of these major theories', 
by attempting modifications of existing theories2 or by expressing different views 
regarding some aspects of politeness. 3 This thesis takes Lakoff (1972), Leech (1983) 
and Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]) as the main objects of investigation, but other 
relevant theorists' views are considered in the discussion. Terkourafi (2005: 237) calls 
these three theories `traditional' views of politeness because they have achieved the 
status of `classics' in the field. Eelen (2001: 23) considers these three theorists to be "the 
founding fathers of modern politeness research". 
On the one hand, the field of politeness studies has flourished. There have been 
special issues focused on politeness in major linguistic journals (e. g. Multilingua 1989 
Vol. 9 Issues. 2/3; Multilingua 2004 Vol. 23 Issues 1/2; Journal of Pragmatics 2003 
Vo1.35 Issues 10/11; Journal of Pragmatics 2007 Vol. 39 Issue 4. ) In 2005, the first 
journal specifically devoted to politeness studies, the Journal of Politeness Research, 
was launched. Watts (2003) counted roughly 1,200 titles in his bibliography of 
politeness and the list has been growing steadily ever since. Among them a number of 
works, particularly Ph. D. theses on politeness, have studied politeness empirically and 
Ide (1989,1999) criticised the emphasis on the strategic aspect of politeness, which is especially 
evident in B&L's theory. She argued that besides the strategic active choice of politeness based on 
`volition', there is another aspect of politeness which is based on `wakimae', which may be translated as 
`discernment'; all speakers are expected to discern and acknowledge their sense of place in relation to 
both the situational context and social hierarchy (1999: 445). 
2 Gu (1990) modified Leech's politeness maxims in the light of the Chinese context and stressed that his 
maxims are morally prescriptive in nature. 3 Blum-Kulka (1992) reconsidered the question of universality. She attempted to "unveil the role of 
culture in negotiating perceptions of politeness (1992: 255)" in the Israeli-Jewish context. Another 
contribution is her Post-Brown & Levinson empirical research in cross-cultural settings. Fraser & Nolen 
(Fraser and Nolen 1981, Fraser 1990) viewed politeness as a matter of keeping the terms and conditions 
of the conversational contract, which is less static and negotiable during conversation, but their view was 
built on Grice's Cooperative Principle in a general sense together with Goffman's notion of face (Fraser 
1990: 232). Arndt & Janney (1985,1992) rejected the `appropriacy based' approach and proposed 
`emotive communication', the communication of transitory attitudes, feelings and other affective states 
(1985: 282). They argue that only interpersonally supportive strategies constitute politeness because it 
acknowledges the hearer's interpersonal face needs. Their approach resembles Brown & Levinson's 
approach. Watts's (1989,1992) major contribution may be his notion of `politic behaviour'. In his later 
book (2003) Watts made alternative enquiries into politeness. I will discuss his social model of politeness 
(2003) in Chapter 4 as one of the postmodern approaches to politeness. 
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have made cross-cultural comparisons based on Brown & Levinson's (B&L's) most 
popular theory. On the other hand, although there have been many criticisms of current 
politeness theories including B&L's theory, there have been very few serious attempts at 
any alternative theoretical enquiry. The field has been flooded with an extraordinary 
number of articles without any major theoretical development. It is high time a serious 
reconsideration of politeness theories was launched. 
In this context, Eelen's book A Critique of Politeness Theories (2001) was 
welcomed as heralding a new breed of politeness studies. Eelen's book was much 
appreciated by researchers like Watts. 4 As a consequence of Watts's reading Eelen's 
work, in 2002, Gino Eelen, Jim O'Driscoll and Richard Watts collaborated in holding a 
colloquium entitled "First-order and second-order politeness: the dispute over 
`modelling' politeness" in the Sociolinguistics Symposium 14, which took place at the 
University of Ghent .5 In this colloquium, Eelen presented a paper: "Conceptualising 
politeness: objectivism versus discursiveness". Watts proposed a `discursive approach to 
linguistic politeness' in Politeness (2003), in which he was no longer aiming at 
establishing a second-order politeness (politeness2) or trying to devise a scientific 
notion of politeness. The focus moved to a dispute over first-order politeness 
(politeness 1)6, i. e. the participants' perceptions of politeness. Watts (2003), inspired by 
Eelen (2001), employed Bourdieu's notion of `habitus' in his new discursive approach. 
Mills in Gender and Politeness (2003) takes a similar approach, in which she employs 
Bourdieu's habitus in conjunction with Lave and Wenger's (1991) notion of a 
° Watts wrote in Politeness (2003: xii): "I was alone and adrift in an ocean of Brown-Levinson's empirical 
work on politeness and was desperately trying to find dry land and a friendly shore. I found the land I was 
looking for in 2001 when I read Gino Eelen's book A Critique of Politeness Theories. " 
5 The colloquium abstract reads "The intention of this colloquium is to face the problem head-on by 
asking whether it might not be more fruitful to take first-order politeness not necessarily as the object of 
politeness theory but at least as the point from which new theoretical and methodological approaches to 
politeness should begin. " It was taken from the symposium programme, which is available on 
http: //users. ugent. be/-sslembro/colloquial ist. html 
6 By discursive dispute over politenessl Watts means determining whether an utterance is evaluated as 
polite or impolite, depends on the interpretation of that behaviour in overall social interaction, which is a 
first-order evaluation by the Hearer (Eelen2001: 45; Watts 2003: 8). 
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`community of practice'. My contention is that Eelen's work (2001) opened the 
possibility of alternative approaches to politeness no longer constrained by modern 
theoretical demands aimed at establishing an objective universal theory, though actually 
Eelen himself did not formulate his arguments in a modernity postmodernity framework. 
Terkourafi (2005: 237), however, rightly refers to Eelen (2001), Watts (2003), and Mills 
(2003) as holding `post-modern' views of politeness, because all three rejected the dual 
premises of the `traditional' views of modern politeness theories (Lakoff (1972), Leech 
(1983) and Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]), i. e. "Grice's Cooperative Principle and 
speech act theory" (Terkourafi 2005: 237) and substituted for them "an emphasis on 
participants' own perception of politeness (politeness! ) and on the discursive struggle 
over politeness" (ibid. ). 
In the 2nd edition of Politeness in Language: Studies in Its History, Theory and 
Practice (2005), Watts (2005) added a newly written article, "Linguistic politeness 
research: quo vadis? ", in which he looked retrospectively at all the contributions in the 
original 1992 edition. Watts then recognised that "all of these criticisms, suggestions 
and hypotheses, some of them tentative, others forceful, point towards radical new ways 
of thinking about linguistic politeness" (Watts 2005: xiii) and that "they reveal - with 
hindsight - the first tentative signs of postmodernist thinking about politeness" (ibid. ). 
7 
In this article, Watts highlights this, using quotations from different authors in the 1992 
book and pointing out that "many of the contributions begin to sound out the feasibility 
of bottom-up discursive approaches which will ultimately lead to a new, postmodernist 
view of politeness" (ibid.: xxx). This article by Watts illustrates the current 
state-of-the-art theoretical discussions of politeness. 
7 Watts (2005: xvii) quotes Scannell (1998: 262), who pointed out that the modernist approach to the study 
of language is "to establish language as an object of knowledge only by uncoupling it from praxis and 
being", and argues that apostmodernist view would see things the other way round. (ibid. xviii). 
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2. Need for this study 
As mentioned above, new attempts to develop alternative approaches to politeness have 
only recently begun and are still at a very early stage. There is thus still a great need for 
further theoretical investigation. Eelen (2001) pointed out various epistemological 
problems of the major politeness theories, but he did not explicitly attribute these 
problems directly to the theoretical assumptions underlying modern academic 
disciplines. It is my contention that all these major politeness theories have been 
influenced by modernist principles that lie behind their theory construction. Therefore it 
is necessary, first of all, to uncover the underlying theoretical assumptions which have 
constrained theory construction and perspectives. This thesis acknowledges the 
contributions of Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) in their exploration of an 
alternative approach to politeness, but takes as its point of departure the necessity of 
laying a theoretical foundation for postmodern approaches as an urgent priority in the 
field of politeness studies. 
3. Understanding of `modernism' in this thesis 
As the theoretical thrust of this thesis is an evaluation of modernist principles in theory 
construction, I will briefly present my understanding of modernism in this Introduction 
to my thesis. The topic will be further discussed in Chapter 3 and in the Conclusion. 
The idea of modernism or modernist thinking takes different forms in different 
contexts, but its roots date back to the Enlightenment, which is characterised by 
`rationality' and 'objectivity'. 8 Descartes, through the dictum Cogito ergo sum ('I think, 
therefore I am'), provided a new foundation for philosophy by elevating the `thinking 
8 The `modern' era is usually associated with the European Enlightenment, which begins roughly in the 
middle of the eighteenth century (Klages 2003). 1 consider `modernism' to be the philosophical and 
epistemological ideas or bases which characterise the `modern' era. I am using `modernist' as an adjective 
form of `modernism'. 
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self' to the centre of the world, while Newton provided the scientific framework for 
modernity by seeing the physical world as a machine, the laws and regularity of which 
could be discerned by the human mind. Modernist thinking assumes that knowledge is 
certain and objective and that the modern knower, who is an `autonomous rational 
subject', claims to have access to neutral dispassionate knowledge from a vantage point 
outside the flux of history (Grenz 1996: 2-4). In the academic context, modernist 
researchers believed in the unity of the scientific method, taking natural science to be 
the model for all sciences (Dow 1992: 142; Delanty 1997: 12). It was assumed that 
reality can be reduced to observable units and that it can be neutrally and objectively 
observed (Delanty 1997: 12). They also endeavoured to search for universal theories, 
independent of history and context (Dow 1992: 149). The knowledge or `truth' produced 
by scientific rationality is expected to lead toward progress (Dow 1992: 149; Klages 
2003). 
Grenz (1996: 68-70) lists `reason' `autonomy', `nature', `harmony' and 
`progress' as principles of the Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers assumed that the 
universe possesses an overarching order and harmony. Autonomous human reason 
became the arbiter of truth having the confidence to understand the foundational order 
of the universe, governed by the laws of nature. These Enlightenment principles became 
the basic tenets of modernist thinking. 
4. Aim of this study and methodology 
The aim of this dissertation is a critical reconsideration of linguistic politeness, setting 
politeness theories into the wider intellectual context of modernist thinking and its 
associated problems. Part I (Chapter 1,2,3) of this thesis will provide a critique of 
modernist approaches to politeness, represented by Lakoff (1973,1975) and Leech 
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(1983) and Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]), thus entitled "Politeness Theories in 
Modernity". Part II (Chapter 4,5) is an attempt to explore an alternative politeness 
approach, unconstrained by these underlying modernist theoretical assumptions, and is 
thus entitled "Politeness beyond Modernity". 
The dissertation is theoretical in nature. As careful investigation of each 
politeness theory is required for the argument, I provide an in-depth exposition of each 
theory, followed by critical engagement. Critiques of these major theories move from 
the sociolinguistics level to a discussion in a wider intellectual context, uncovering 
some of the underlying theoretical and philosophical assumptions behind politeness 
theories. The dissertation inevitably involves arguments and discussions from other 
disciplines, such as sociology, social theory, anthropology, philosophy and hermeneutics. 
The arguments in this dissertation are not data-driven, but one or two vignettes are 
provided for illustrative purposes. 
5. Organisation of the chapters 
In Chapter 1,1 consider Lakoff (1973,1975) and Leech (1983) and in Chapter 2, 
Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]) highlighting both their positive contributions to the 
field and some of their weaknesses/problems. In Chapter 3, I uncover the assumptions 
behind existing contemporary theoretical construction and reconsider these three 
theorists' approaches in a wider intellectual context. I argue that Lakoff and Leech's 
theories conceive politeness as pragmatic rules/principles in a framework inherited from 
Saussurean structuralism. This can be viewed as a `structure-centred approach', whereas 
B&L's theory uses an `agency-centred approach', concentrating on the actor (agency) 
and borrowing theoretical constructs from `rational choice theory'. I also show that 
B&L's Model Person is modelled after modernity's `autonomous' `rational' `calculative' 
Introduction 20 
self. My argument is that, just as in late modern sociology, the longstanding 
structure/agency, theory/practice, mind/body, objectivism/subjectivism dichotomies 
have faced epistemological difficulties, so politeness theories now also face comparable 
difficulties. 
Having identified some of these problematic assumptions in `modern' theories, 
in Part II, I explore alternative ways of understanding politeness. I employ three 
theorists as `thinking tools' for this task. In Chapter 4, I turn to Pierre Bourdieu, a 
French sociologist, who attempted to resolve the dilemma of structure and agency 
through his `theory of practice'. His notion of habitus provides a healthy alternative to 
B&L's politeness as `conscious calculative action'. But Bourdieu's theory provides 
rather too limited a role for `agency' in politeness. In Chapter 5, therefore, I turn to a 
Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman, whose socially constructed self in social 
interaction proves complementary. 
In the Conclusion, I discuss what might prove to be viable for a discipline of 
politeness studies in late modernity. What should `post-modern' politeness studies look 
like? I thus make epistemological explorations towards reconstructing a viable 
`post-modern' approach to politeness. For this task, I turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer, a 
German philosopher who has explored the possibility of a more flexible social science 
which recovers phronesis (practical wisdom) mentioned in Aristotle's Nichomachean 
Ethics through his notion of hermeneutical understanding. Looking into the future, I 
look at the Hearer's interpretation, which will be a major strand of postmodern 
politeness studies. Neither Bourdieu nor Goffman sufficiently explicate the Hearer's 
evaluative practice and perception, particularly `contingency' around the Hearer. 
Gadamer's notion of hermeneutical understanding provides helpful insights in 
elucidating the Hearer's interpretation. 
Part I 
Politeness Theories in Modernity 
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Chapter 1 Lakoff and Leech 
0. Introduction 
This chapter introduces two theorists of politeness: Lakoff (1972,1973,1975,1989, 
1990) and Leech (1983). 1 discuss these two researchers' theories in the same chapter, 
because both of them understand politeness in terms of `pragmatic principles'. They 
both established politeness rules/principles as an extension of Grice's Cooperative 
Principle (1967). Fraser (1990) classifies the views of them both as what he defines as 
the Conversational Maxim View. 
Usually most researchers try to establish theories employing some current 
underlying theoretical framework to which they subscribe. Such theoretical frameworks 
often happen to be those dominant within their discipline at that particular time. These 
dominant frameworks are located within the wider academic discipline of linguistics, 
and I will clarify the researchers' position in relation to them. Such background 
information helps put each theory into its own proper historical perspective within the 
field of linguistics. 
Section 1 of this chapter covers Lakoff's theory and Section 2 covers Leech's 
theory. In Sections 1 and 2, I will first provide an in-depth exposition of each theory and 
then offer a critical evaluation of each. I will also consider their significant contributions 
to the field of politeness studies as well as any perceived weaknesses in their approaches. 
Section 3 evaluates the underlying theoretical frameworks to which Lakoff and Leech 
subscribe. Section 4 concludes the discussion of this chapter. 
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1. Lakoff (1972,1973,1975,1989,1990) 
1.0. Introduction to Lakoff's theory 
Robin Lakoff was one of the first researchers to examine politeness in modern 
linguistics. For this reason, she has been called `the mother of modern politeness theory' 
(Eelen 2001: 2). When Lakoff first presented her theory, the field of linguistics was 
dominated by Chomskyan linguistics, and pragmatics was still in its infancy as a 
discipline. Lakoff, coming from the tradition of transformational grammar, spent much 
time preoccupied with determining sentence acceptability using syntactic analysis alone, 
but she (1972,1973) became convinced that syntactic structure is not the only decisive 
factor: "we need to worry about the context in which utterances were uttered, both 
linguistic and non-linguistic; only by appeal to context could we account for the 
unacceptability under some conditions of sentences, which under other conditions were 
unexceptionable" (1973: 292) [underlining in the original]. In a 1972 paper, she claimed 
that "in order to predict correctly the applicability of many rules, one must be able to 
refer to assumptions about the social context of an utterance, as well as to other implicit 
assumptions made by the participants in a discourse" (1972: 907) and gave some 
examples in several languages. Politeness was one of the areas that she discussed. 
Although she had not yet established any politeness theory, Lakoff expressed her 
earlier ideas about linguistic politeness in her 1972 paper. She recognised that linguistic 
devices for expressing politeness vary from language to language and that what passes 
for politeness in one culture could appear to a member of another culture as either 
slavish or boorish (1972: 910). She, however, assumed that "there is a universal 
definition of what constitutes linguistic politeness: part of this involves the speaker's 
acting as though his status were lower than that of the addressee" (ibid. 911). She 
claimed that "what may differ from language to language, or culture to culture - or from 
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subculture to subculture within a language - is the question of WHEN it is polite to be 
polite, to what extent, and how it is shown in terms of superficial linguistic behavior" 
(ibid. ). After she had examined some cases of politeness in Japanese and English, she 
concluded that, in order to assign correct forms, 
it is essential to take extralinguistic contextual factors into account: 
respective status of speaker and addressee, the type of social situation 
in which they find themselves, the real-world knowledge or beliefs a 
speaker brings to a discourse, his lack of desire to commit himself on 
a position, etc. We cannot hope to describe or explain large segments 
of any given language by recourse only to factors which play a role in 
the superficial syntax: which traditional transformational grammar 
expressly prevents us from doing. (1972: 926) 
Her interest in politeness thus arose from her disbelief in the adequacy of the 
Chomskyan syntax-supreme approach. 
Lakoff discussed linguistic politeness in several of her writings between 1972 
and 1990. She proposed Rules of Politeness in "The Logic of Politeness; or, Minding 
Your P's and Q's" (1973). She discussed Rules of Politeness again with slight 
modifications in Language and Woman's place (1975)9, but the central issue of this 
1975 book is her concern with gender inequality in language use. She questions why 
women are supposed to be more "polite" than men, and why it is considered necessary 
for men to be more "polite" in the presence of women (1975: 64). In the later 1970s and 
early 1980s when Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]) and Leech (1983) were developing 
their own politeness theories, Lakoff did not modify her original rules of politeness, but 
rather elaborated on the topic in "The Limits of politeness: therapeutic and courtroom 
discourse" (1989) and Talking Power. the Politics of Language in Our Lives (1990). 
Below, I will discuss her rules of politeness and her ideas about politeness and evaluate 
9 Language and Woman's place (1975) is widely recognised as an inaugural feminist research on the 
relationship between language and gender. In 2004, this book was republished with annotations by the 
author together with commentaries added by a number of feminist language researchers. Lakoff provides 
comments on her original work (1975) in her Language and Woman's Place: Text and Commentaries 
(2004). See 1.2.1. in this chapter for further discussion. 
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her approach. 
I. I. Lakoff's Rules of Politeness 
(a). Rules of Pragmatic Competence 
Lakoff argues that most language speakers are working on the assumptions of both `the 
philosophical notion of logical presupposition' and `the pragmatic presupposition' 
(1973: 292)10 but she also claims that there are still more complex cases in which the 
sentence "reflects the speaker's attitude toward his social context" (ibid. 293). She 
insists that communication acts are sociological as well as linguistic and that linguists 
need sociologists' input to understand them properly. ' She then argues that "just as we 
invoke syntactic rules to determine whether a sentence is to be considered syntactically 
well- or ill-formed..., so we need to have some kind of pragmatic rules, dictating 
whether an utterance is pragmatically well-formed or not, and the extent to which it 
deviates if it does" (1973: 296). Thus in 1973 she proposed the following brief Rules of 
Pragmatic Competence. 
1. Be clear 
2. Be polite. 
As for the rule of clarity, Lakoff (1973) accepts Grice's (1967) Rules of Conversation 
(Cooperative Principle) (See Appendix 1-A). 12 
'0 The following are some examples of logical and pragmatic presuppositions. 
(1)(a) is logically presupposed by (1)(b). 
(1)(a)The present king of France is bald 
(b) There exists at present a king of France. 
(2)(a) is acceptable only in case (2)(b) is pragmatically presupposed by the normal addressee. 
(2)(a) John has lived in Paris. 
(b) John is still alive. 
Lakoff contends that "if one causes something to happen by linguistic means, whether purposefully or 
not, one is using a linguistic device; and it is within the domain of linguistics that these questions should 
be explored and answered, with help one hopes, from anthropologists and sociologists who have been 
studying these questions for years, and whose studies, we hope to suggest, may be furthered by the use of 
linguistic techniques of analysis, as much as ours may be by theirs" (1973: 293) . 12 Lakoff acknowledges the problems of Grice's rules of conversation: such as how these qualities are 
determined; how much is too much; how relevant is relevant; when a statement is obscure, but she 
overlooks them in this paper (1973: 297). 
Chapter I Lakoff and Leech 26 
Lakoff (1973: 297) recognises that in Grice's view, violations of the rules of 
conversation are not perceived as non-conversations; violations of syntactic rules are 
perceived as non-sentences, but a violation of one rule is seen as allowing precedence to 
another rule. Similarly, Lakoff claims that when Clarity conflicts with Politeness, in 
most cases, Politeness supersedes: it is considered more important in a conversation to 
avoid offence than it is to achieve clarity (1973: 297-8). In most informal conversations, 
the actual communication of important ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and 
strengthening relationships, while in formal situations such as business conversations, 
or academic lectures, the Rules of Conversation tend to be in effect (1973: 298). Thus 
she suggests that some discourses are more politeness-oriented and others are more 
information-oriented. 
(b). Three rules of politeness 
In 1973 Lakoff proposed three rules of politeness. 
RULES OF POLITENESS (1973) 
1. Don't impose. 
2. Give options 
3. Make A feel good - be friendly. 
She rephrased these rules in 1975 as follows: 
1. Formality: Keep aloof 
2. Deference: Give options 
3. Camaraderie: Show sympathy 
Rule 1 "Don't impose" means "Don't intrude into another's business" or 
"Remain aloof" (1973: 298). For example, if we ask a personal question, we apply Rule 
1 and normally ask permission as in "May I ask how much you paid for that vase, Mr. 
Hoving? " but "*May I ask how much is 1+1? " would be pragmatically ill-formed as 
Rule 1 does not apply to such a situation (Lakoff 1973: 298-9). A butler's utterance of 
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"Dinner is served" instead of "Would you like to eat? " is a case of Rule 1. Such use of 
the passive creates a sense of distance between speaker and addressee. 
13 
Rule 2 "Give Options", the rule of deference, may be used alone or in 
combination with either of the other two rules. The speaker shows hesitancy in speech 
and action to make it look as though the option as to how to behave is left up to the 
addressee. In other words, it is to be "indecisive" (1990: 36). For instance, 'hedges' 
14 
leave the addressee the option of deciding how seriously to take what the speaker is 
saying. Thus "John is sorta short" may be, in some contexts, a polite way of saying 
"John is short" (1975: 66). Tag-questions also have a similar function. 
'5 Euphemism is 
another example of Rule 2. Avoiding the direct mention of an offensive concept or 
uncomfortable topic, the speaker employs euphemism and allows the addressee the 
option of determining what he or she is actually hearing (1975: 67). 
16 
Rule 3 is the rule producing a sense of camaraderie between speaker and 
addressee (1973: 301). The purpose of Rule 3 is to make the addressee feel that the 
speaker likes him/her, wants to be friendly with him/her, and is interested in him/her. It 
can be genuine or merely conventional (1975: 67). Lakoff argues that it is possible to 
combine Rules I and 2, to be both aloof and deferential. Similarly the combination of 
Rule 3 and 2, to be friendly and deferential is also possible. But she argues that Rule I 
and 3 are mutually exclusive. You cannot be extending the hand of friendship and 
13 Other examples of Rule I are the use of the formal `you' in those languages which differentiate 
between a formal and an informal `you' such as usted in Spanish or vous in French or the use of titles plus 
names (Mr. Dr. Sir. ). The use of technical terminology by legal or medical professionals (e. g. carcinoma 
instead of cancer) denying their emotional implication and the use of the passive or authorial `we' in 
academic papers are further examples of Rule I in a professional setting (1973: 299). 
14 A `hedge' is a linguistic device by which a speaker modifies the force of a speech act or predicate. 
15 The speaker who says, "It's time to leave, isn't it? " may know what he is talking about, but might use 
such tag-questions not wishing to assert himself at the risk of offending the addressee (1973: 300). The 
effect of the tag here is "to soften the declaration from an expression of certainty, demanding belief, to an 
expression of likelihood (1972: 918)". 
16 For example, "Mr. Oglethorpe passed away last month (=died). " "They are in comfortable 
circumstances (=rich). " (1990: 37) "Excuse me, I have to go to the little girls' room (=defecate)" 
(1973: 301). 
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stepping back aloofly at the same time (1975: 67). The appropriate use of nicknames and 
first name alone and choice of using an informal `You' instead of a formal `You' for 
languages such as French or Spanish can be Rule 3 devices. Backslapping or friendly 
teasing is typical Rule 3 behaviour. Use of expressions like, "y'know", "1 mean" may 
also be Rule 3 devices. 
Interestingly, what Lakoff proposed as Formality, Deference and Camaraderie 
as `rules' of politeness in her articles in 1973 and 1975 are subsequently reintroduced, 
this time described as three basic `strategies' of politeness, namely Distance (previously 
Formality), Deference and Camaraderie in her 1990 book (1990: 35). Yet, she also refers 
to these strategies as `politeness systems' in the same book (ibid. 39). When she uses the 
term `system', she seems to refer to a certain conventional way of using politeness in a 
particular community. In any case, the oscillation between `rules' and `strategies' in her 
1990 book suggests that Lakoff may not have been entirely happy with the use of the 
term `rules'. Lakoff may have picked up the idea of politeness as `strategy' from Brown 
& Levinson's (1987 [1978]) theory of politeness which viewed politeness as `strategies' 
for minimising face-threatening acts. Lakoff's shift from speaking of `rules' to calling 
them `strategies' will be further discussed in 1.2.3. (a). 
(c). Universal rules of politeness and cultural variation 
Though Lakoff claims that the rules of politeness are universal, she recognises that 
customs vary (1973: 303) and claims that the same three rules, which are universal, 
follow different orders of precedence in different cultures or `politeness systems'. 
Lakoff describes what might happen when an American, a German and a Japanese, who 
all want to make a good impression and to be "polite" according to their own standards. 
the American will seem to the others overly brash, familiar and prying; 
the Japanese will seem cloyingly deferential; the Germans will seem 
distant and uninterested in the others to the point of arrogance. So they 
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will part, each thinking the others are thoroughly detestable because of 
individual personality defects. And if each meets other members of the 
other cultures, chances are these first impressions will be reinforced, until 
national stereotypes are formed: Americans are "too personal"; Japanese 
are "too humble"; Germans are "too stiff. " (1975: 70) 
Though there are plenty of participants in these cultures whose rule application may be 
different for various idiosyncratic reasons, Lakoff points out that stereotypical 
behaviour for a German is to emphasise Rule 1, a Japanese Rule 2, and an American 
Rule3 (1975: 70). During this early stage of her politeness studies, Lakoff was already 
recognising diverse cultural tendencies in politeness perception. Though the above 
statement may be labelled as cultural essentialism in the current academic climate, 
many researchers who conducted cross-cultural comparisons of politeness strategies 
using speech acts in the 1980s also saw cultures as dividing factors for different 
understandings and perceptions of politeness. They had an intuition that a particular 
`culture' or `speech community' may be a determining factor and made some similar 
generalisations about the `politeness system' in different cultures. '? 
(d). Language typological differences and politeness devices 
Lakoff (1973) initially viewed clarity and politeness as being opposed to each other, but 
later (1990: 175) recognised that this may not be true in all languages: for instance, the 
two are inseparably interrelated parts of every communication in some languages like 
Japanese. In her 1990 book Lakoff quoted a Japanese linguist Matsumoto (1989) who 
argued that no utterance in Japanese can be neutral with respect to the social context. 
17 Many contrastive studies in 1980s revealed culture-specific features of discourse which can be 
construed as evidence for the claim that speech communities tend to develop culturally distinct 
interactional styles. For instance, Blum-Kulka (1983) showed that in requestive behaviours, higher level 
of directness of Hebrew speakers were found, compared with speakers of English. Tannen (1981) showed 
that speakers of American English to be more direct than speakers of Greek. House & Kasper (1981) 
revealed that German speakers tend to realise requests and complaints more directly than do British 
English speakers. Katriel (1986) investigated Israeli's `dugri' (straight) talk and found that preference for 
such interactional style can be rooted in ideological origin and associated with the problematicity of 
cultural identity. For more examples, see Blum-Kulka, House, Kasper (1989b); Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 
(1984), Blum-Kulka (1987); Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper (1989); Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984); 
Vollmer and Olshtain (1989). 
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English speakers may be able to say "Today is Saturday" to their professor as easily as 
to their friend. Instead, Matsumoto argues that Japanese speakers must always construct 
a sentence that fits into the particular social context. The following are three possible 
variations of "Today is Saturday" depending on the contexts. ' 8 
(I) a. kyoo -wa doyoobi 
today -TOPIC Saturday 
da. 
COPULA-plain. 
b. kyoo -wa doyoobi 
today -TOPIC Saturday 
c. kyoo -wa doyoobi 





Matsumoto (1989 in Lakoff 1990: 174) claims that there is no sharp discrepancy 
between those aspects of communication that are informative and those that are 
interactive, because the interactive relation is encoded and understood as an integral 
part of the information content of the message. In other words, politeness is in no way 
extraneous or optional but forms an intrinsic or mandatory part of the communication in 
such languages. 
Lakoff (1990: 175), recognising that this interactive relationship needs to be 
encoded and embedded in all utterances in languages like Japanese, still views Clarity 
and Politeness as being opposed to each other, at least in Western cultures: "For 
Westerners there is a sharp discrepancy between those aspects of communication that 
are informative - that is, are in keeping with the Maxims of the Cooperative Principle 
and exist for the sake of transmitting factual data about reality - and those that are 
interactive, designed to create or express the feelings of the participants about their 
18 (1a) may be used in expository writing, in newspaper articles, and in casual speech to people with 
whom the speaker has a close relationship. This style cannot be used without conveying additional 
information to someone who is distant or higher in position; for instance, by an employee to his/her boss 
or by a student to his/her professor. (I b) has a wider range of use in speech. The copula desu would be the 
appropriate form in a conversation with a stranger or with an acquaintance who is not a close friend. (1c) 
may be used on formal occasions among adults. A child would not use it, nor would an adult use it when 
speaking to a child (Matsumoto 1989: 209-210). 
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relationship" (1990: 174). Lakoff (1990: 178) maintains that the Cooperative principle 
and rules of politeness exist universally but their specific forms and range of 
applicability are aspects of individual cultures and probably, individual personalities 
and that it is necessary to know not just the rules, but also the meta-rules: to know when 
to be direct and when to be indirect; in a word, how to be polite. She also recognises 
that particular languages' typological features also determine when and how to express 
politeness. 
(e). The discourse genre and the rules of politeness 
In her earlier writing Lakoff (1973: 297-8) claimed that when Clarity conflicts with 
Politeness, in most cases, Politeness supersedes: that is, it is considered more important 
in a conversation to avoid offence than it is to achieve clarity. Lakoff, however, 
encountered cases where this did not apply. In her later writing (1989), Lakoff made 
distinctions between different discourse genres and explained how, in some cases, rules 
of politeness operate in competition with other forms of discourse organisation. Lakoff 
explicitly claims in this paper that "the purpose of politeness is to avoid conflict 
(1989: 101)". 19 Lakoff claims that "discourse genres can be divided into those that are 
explicitly designed for the purpose of communicating information, and those intended 
purely or mainly for interaction itself' (1989: 102). In ordinary conversation (OC), 
adherence to politeness rules is expected. Yet there are some other discourse types, in 
which conflict is an intrinsic element. She examined psychotherapeutic discourse (TD) 
and American courtroom trial discourse (CD). In these contexts, `non-polite' behaviour 
can be systematic and normal, which is quite distinct from being `rude', because 
politeness rules are not expected in such circumstances. Lakoff now suggests that 
19 Another of Lakoff's definitions of politeness in her 1990 book is that "Politeness is a system of 
interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and 
confrontation inherent in all human exchange" (1990: 34). 
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speakers operate not within a simple dichotomy of polite vs. non-polite but with a 
threefold distinction of polite, non-polite and rude (1989: 103). In this distinction, 
`polite' applies to "those utterances that adhere to the rules of politeness whether or not 
they are expected in a particular discourse type"; `non-polite' applies to "behaviour that 
does not conform to politeness rules, used where the latter are not expected"; and `rude' 
applies to "behaviour that does not utilise politeness strategies where they would be 
expected, in such a way that the utterances can only or more plausibly be interpreted as 
intentionally and negatively confrontational" (ibid. ). 
She assumes that in OC it is a convention that participants share power equally 
in terms of turn-allocation and topic-choice (1989: 105). However in TD and CD, a 
power imbalance is unavoidable. For instance in TD, distance politeness is violated 
when a therapist's interpretation becomes intrusive and confrontational and camaraderie 
is violated when a therapist needs to reinforce authority. In CD, experienced trial 
lawyers will be very careful to apply all possible forms of politeness so that one side 
may be favoured by the jury over the other. However, there is occasional systematic 
intentional and non-reciprocal rudeness. It is rule-governed rudeness, not an anomaly in 
a confrontation-favoured system (1989: 123). Thus in both TD and CD, there is a 
unilateral violation of politeness. Having analysed TD and CD, Lakoff concludes that 
"it is necessary to assign discourse types to either informative (clarity) or interactive 
(politeness) genres; and to further subdivide the former into confrontational and 
non-confrontational modes" (1989: 126) because the absence of politeness has different 
meanings in each of these subtypes. 20 Thus, in this later article, Lakoff (1989) 
20 Lakoff discusses other features in CD and TD. For instance, in CD, frequent use of formal address 
terms such as Your Honour, Judge [Last name], elaborate opening and close of each session, the order of 
entering the courtroom, judges' robes all suggest that there is formality of ritual or ceremony in CD. CD 
makes use of conventional public style. On the other hand in TD, conventional intimacy or camaraderie is 
used, because TD is quintessentially private discourse, about private topics. However, the camaraderie of 
TD is conventional, not a sign of true intimacy. 
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recognises that universal Rules of Politeness do not apply in the same way in different 
discourse genres even in the same cultural contexts as she originally proposed in 1973 
and 1975. In other words, later on Lakoff starts to recognise the difficulties of 
establishing and applying the same `universal rules of politeness' to a variety of 
discourse genres. 21 
(D. Women and politeness 
In Language and Women's Place (1975), Lakoff argues that the kinds of politeness used 
by, of and to women do not arise by accident and that they are stifling, exclusive, and 
oppressive (1975: 83). Some think that women cannot follow the rules of conversation: 
that women's discourse is necessarily indirect, repetitious, meandering, unclear, and 
exaggerated - the antithesis of every one of Grice's principles - while of course a man's 
speech is clear, direct, precise and to the point! Lakoff thinks it is idiotic to hold such a 
sexist view. However, she admits that there is a stereotype that "[i]n general and in 
traditional American culture... women will tend to speak with reference to the rules of 
politeness, conversational implicature, and interpersonal exploration; men will tend to 
speak with reference to the rules of conversation and straight factual communication 
(1975: 74). Similarly she observes that in traditional American society, 
women's politeness is principally of the Rule 1 plus Rule 2 type, establishing 
and reinforcing distance: deferential mannerisms coupled with euphemism and 
hypercorrect and superpolite usage. Women's language avoids the markers of 
camaraderie: backslapping, joke telling, nicknaming, slang and so forth. In 
all-female groups, we find devices that recall male intimacy-creating gestures: 
embraces for backslapping, discussion of personal things. But in mixed groups, 
all manifestations of camaraderie disappear; this is really the principal 
problem: why in mixed groups there is nothing identifiable as Rule 3 behavior 
(1975: 79). 
2) Guy Cook (1998a: 140) defines `genre' as follows: "Genres are types of spoken and written discourse 
recognised by a discourse community. Examples are lectures, conversations, speeches, notices, 
advertisements, novels, diaries, shopping lists". Lakoff, however, seems to use the term 'discourse genre' 
for `discourse styles' expected in different situational contexts. 
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She also finds that "men generally feel free to address women by first name alone or 
nickname much sooner in a relationship than a woman feels free to so address a male" 
(ibid. 80). Lakoff claims that "it is the dominant group in a society that establishes 
stereotypes of the other groups and decides which groups, on the basis of these 
stereotypes, are "good" or "bad"" (1975: 74). As members of non-dominant groups, 
females have the choice of denying the stereotype of `lady-like' politeness or 
reaffirming it and extolling it as a virtue. Lakoff is disappointed to discover that the 
latter position has been a strong one; most women tend to reaffirm such stereotypes and 
consider non-aggressiveness to be a virtue (1975: 75). Lakoff (1975) urges female 
readers not to continue to be brainwashed. Language and Woman's Place (1975) is a 
little book of propaganda, in which she speaks to female readers: "If we are aware of 
what we're doing, why we're doing it and the effects our actions have on ourselves and 
everyone else, we will have the power to change" (1975: 83). This book later became a 
seminal book for studies of `language and feminism'. 
As early as the 1970s Lakoff recognised that hegemony, i. e. "forms of power 
which depend upon consent rather than coercion" (Fairclough 2001: 232) exists in 
linguistic practice; women accept or reaffirm that they are expected to be lady-like. 
Lakoff recognised that power relations in society influence or control the use of 
politeness. Different rules of politeness seem to exist for people who are in different 
positions in society and rules seem to be in favour of the dominant. This theme of power 
in politeness will be explored further in Chapter 4 in the discussion of Bourdieu's 
sociology. 
1.2. Evaluation of Lakoff's approach 
Lakoff made a great contribution to the field through her early attempt to formulate 
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rules of politeness as pragmatic rules, although it was not entirely successful. As I will 
suggest below, many of her struggles seem to have arisen from the school of linguistics 
from which she had come and her continuing faithfulness to their approach. I will 
evaluate Lakoff's approach to politeness in relation to her place in linguistics first. Then 
I will point out her contributions to the field and some problems in her approach. 
1.2.1. Lakoff's positioning in linguistics 
Lakoff (1972: 907; 1973: 292) had come from the Chomskyan School. The Chomskyan 
(1965: 4) dichotomy of competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) 
and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations) partly reflects the 
Saussurean dichotomy between langue and parole; both sharing the view that human 
language is seen as a realisation in utterances of the associated abstract linguistic system 
and langue is the core of linguistic inquiry (Jaworska 1998: 75). Langue is the linguistic 
system shared by members of a speech community, which enables them to produce and 
understand specific utterances and text. Parole is applied both to such specific 
utterances and also to the processes whereby the linguistic system is used in the 
production or comprehension of actual utterances/texts. Saussure insists that linguists 
should be concerned mainly with describing the underlying linguistic system (langue) 
for langue is a coherent and analysable object. Similarly, the core subject matter in 
Chomskyan linguistics concerns competence. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999: 469) point out that Chomskyan 
linguistics is a philosophical project within a hybrid of Cartesian and formalist 
philosophy (Chomsky 1966). Chomsky's view of language results from a Cartesian 
concept of mind, as follows: 1) Language is structural. 2) Language is a universal, 
innate, and autonomous capacity of mind, independent of any connection to things in 
the external world. 3) Language must have an essence, something that makes language 
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what it is and inheres in all languages (i. e. Universal Grammar). 4) Language arises 
from an autonomous mental faculty, independently of the body (Lakoff and Johnson 
1999: 471-2). Chomsky claims that every human individual has access to a complete 
linguistic system, as represented in his or her mind by introspection, as native speakers 
have intuitive judgement about the acceptability, ambiguity, usage and other formal 
features of the sentence. Thus for Chomskyan linguists, this mental grammar is the 
primary source of linguistic data (Jaworska 1998: 75). 
Even while Chomskyan linguistics was still dominant in the US, there were 
already some language researchers who valued the importance of language use. 
22 
Robin Lakoff (1972) was aware of such non-Chomskyan strands of language study and 
listed the names of Jespersen, Sapir, Malinowsky, Firth, Nida, Pike, Hymes, Friedrich, 
Tyler etc. She expressed regret that "the idea has not merely been forgotten by 
transformation grammar; rather, it has been explicitly rejected" (1972: 926 footnote 12). 
The early 1970s was a time of serious questioning of earlier theories, particularly the 
syntax-only approach of Chomsky and his followers. Mey (2001: 4) describes this 
period as also being the time of pragmatics in the making. 
Lakoff attempted to establish politeness as pragmatic rules just around this 
period. Lakoff (1973) initially tried to establish universal rules of politeness, following 
the Chomskyan-Saussurean linguistics tradition in which they aimed to establish an 
idealised homogeneous language system. She, however, later recognised that the task 
was not as simple as establishing syntactic rules. For instance, her initial hypothesis that 
`when Clarity conflicts with Politeness, politeness supersedes' (1973: 297-8) could no 
22 Hymes, trying to establish an interdisciplinary field centred around language use, collected articles 
from various fields and published them as Language in Culture, and Society: Reader in Linguistics and 
Anthropology (1964). Later Gumperz and Hymes published another similar collection of interdisciplinary 
works, Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication (1972). Hymes (1972) also 
proposed the notion of communicative competence in opposition to Chomsky's rather narrow notion of 
competence. Various new language-related disciplines (e. g. sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, 
interactional sociolinguistics, conversational analysis) have emerged from this approach of focusing on 
practical language use rather than on a theoretical linguistic system. 
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longer be sustained when she discovered that the same rules of politeness do not work 
for different discourse genres (See 1.1. (e). ). Also her hypothesis does not seem to work 
in languages like Japanese in which politeness concerns are always required. (See 
1.1. (d). ). Lakoff ended up having to modify her rules repeatedly. This will be discussed 
further as I explore some problems in Lakoff's approach in 1.2.3. 
Lakoff's views of language and language study have been in the course of 
change over the past three decades, which may be useful in understanding her position 
in linguistics. Lakoff (2004) recently published a new revised Language and Woman's 
Place, in which she commented retrospectively on her original version (1975). Her 
comments reveal changes in her views. She assumed in the 1970s that some aspects of 
Chomskyan transformational generative grammar (TGG) may reasonably be brought 
into discourse analysis. She was not aware then that extension of the TGG to interaction 
and discourse would become outrageous both to syntactic theorists and to those who are 
not trained as theoretical syntacticians. When TGG linguists spoke of structure `beyond 
the sentence level', they "thought of larger units as concatenations of sentences: S+S+ 
S..., rather than as structures with rules of their own, wholes different from the sum of 
their parts" (Lakoff 2004: 18). 
In the light of the emergence of various methods of language study in 1970s 
and 1980s, 23 particularly study using natural conversational data, Lakoff's method was 
criticised by conversation analysts for not being entirely `empirical'. In response to this, 
Lakoff (2004: 24) claims that the work she wanted to do could not be done without the 
23 Lakoff (2004: 20) mentioned the emergence of non-Chomskyan methods of language study as follows: 
"During the 1970s pragmatics focused attention on the function of sentence-level phenomena rather than 
their form, recasting them as `utterances' rather than 'sentences'.... By the mid-1970s conversation 
analysis had been brought into sociolinguistics. . . 
By the 1980s discourse analysts were examining many 
types of communication, often via analysis of conversations; language in the courtroom, at dinner parties, 
between the sexes, in the workplace.... These analyses made it clear that discourse should be understood 
not as concatenations of S's, but as language directed toward particular interactive and psychological 
purposes". 
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application of mentalistic methods and intuitionist discovery procedures. 24 She argues 
that language study based on empirical data such as conversational analysis alone does 
not allow her to deal with what does not occur in the transcript, therefore it does not 
deal with paradigm gaps. In such cases Lakoff believes that intuition and introspection 
must play a role. Thus as of 2004, Lakoff had insisted that linguistics must have both 
mentalistic and empirical methods at its disposal. 25 
1.2.2. Lakoff's contribution to politeness studies 
Lakoff's contribution to politeness studies often seems to be underestimated by 
scholars analysing politeness today. However, she was the first to theorise politeness in 
terms of universal pragmatic rules, thus known as the `mother of modern politeness 
theory' (Eelen 2001: 2). Lakoff identified key concepts, namely Distance (previously 
Formality), Deference and Camaraderie, which were rephrased and became essential 
concepts in subsequent politeness theories. 26 For instance, Lakoff's Distance (Rule 1) 
and Camaraderie (Rule 3) are reminiscent of `negative politeness' and `positive 
politeness' in Brown & Levinson's (1987 [1978]) theory, which came later. Lakoff 
herself rephrased distance and camaraderie as `negative and positive politeness' in her 
later article (1989: 107). There are many other traces of Lakoff's Rules of Politeness in 
B&L's politeness theory. Some examples (e. g. hedges, tag-question) of Lakoff's 
Deference (Rule 2) politeness are classified as `negative politeness' in B&L's 
framework and others (e. g. euphemism, or being ambiguous) are included in 
24 Mentalism is the belief that mental state and processes are prior and exist independently of behaviour. 
It is the opposite of behaviourism (Cook 1998b: 211). Chomsky (1965: 4) argues that "linguistic theory is 
mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering mental reality underlying actual behaviour". His theory 
of grammar is a model of the speaker's competence, part of the internal structure of his/her mind. Every 
individual has access to a complete linguistic system in his or her mind through intuition. So the 
intuitionist approach is the opposite of an empiricist approach. 
25 This may be because of her conviction that linguistics is the study of language systems. She is 
probably concerned to establish as complete a language system as possible as in formalist linguistics. 
26 The original idea for these concepts may have come from Brown and Gilman's (1960) seminal paper, 
"pronouns of power and solidarity". 
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off-record' strategies . 
27 
Leech (1983) also seems to have gained insights from Lakoff's Rules of 
Politeness. Leech creates some scales as parameters for determining appropriate `tact' to 
a given situation. Leech's `Optionality Scale' and `Indirectness Scale' remind us of 
Lakoff's Politeness Rule 2: Give Options. His `Authority/Power Scale' and `Social 
Distance Scale' seem to be related to Lakoff's Rule I (Distance) and Rule 3 
(Camaraderie). Although Lakoff's three rules of politeness may not cover all possible 
politeness phenomena, they laid a most useful foundation for developing subsequent 
politeness theories. 
Lakoff also contributed to the discussion of `language and power' particularly 
in relation to gender. Cameron, McAlinden and O'Leary (1989) record that because of 
the importance of her book Language and Woman's Place (1975) at a time when the 
field had yet to establish itself, "many later researchers apparently felt obliged to begin 
their own investigation with the so-called `Lakoff hypothesis',,. 
28 She was aware that 
the rules of politeness are not equally available to all interlocutors. She claims that 
women tend to be more polite than men, because they are expected to use so-called 
`women's language' (See. 1.1. (f) and 1.2.1). Lakoff, through observation of women's 
language, recognised the forms of power of the dominant group achieved by consent (or 
acquiescence) of the majority, which then becomes a `common sense' assumption. 
Lakoff's Language and Woman's Place (1975) inspired many researchers in `women 
and politeness' (e. g. Holmes (1995); Beeching (2002); Mills (2003)) and in `language 
and gender' (e. g. Cameron, McAlinden & O'Leary (1989); Coates (2004 [1993]); 
Holmes (1997); Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (2003); Christie (2000); Holmes & Schnurr 
27 Lakoff did not explain why there are just these three rules and how they are related. whereas Brown & 
Levinson (1987: 61) employed the notions of `negative face' and `positive face' as properties of 
interacting participants to explain them: Distance strategies arise from the desire which produces 
`negative face' and Camaraderie strategies arise from the desire which produces `positive face'. 
28 Lakoff's hypothesis is summarised in Cameron, McAlinden and O'Leary 1989: 75-76. 
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(2006)). Researchers in Critical Discourse Analysis today often discuss such 
`hegemony' prevalent in linguistic practices. It is noteworthy that Lakoff was already 
aware of such normalised inequality ingrained in language practice as early as the 1970s. 
Lakoff also pointed out that power and politeness are closely related (1989: 127) through 
examining therapeutic discourse (TD) and court discourse (CD) (See 1. I. (e). ), 
1.2.3. Problems in Lakoff's approach 
(a). The notion of `rules' 
The first problem is the notion of `rules' that she employed initially. As mentioned in 
1.1. (b)., Lakoff does not seem to be entirely clear in what she means by the term `rules'. 
Out of her dissatisfaction with the Chomskyan syntax-supreme approach and its neglect 
of social context (1972: 926), Lakoff proposed her Rules of Pragmatic Competence, but 
she nonetheless employed the notion of `rules' as in the Chomskyan framework 
(1973: 296) and placed her Rules of Politeness in juxtaposition with Rules of 
Conversation (Grice's Maxims). Chomsky employed `principles' and `rules', common 
terms in scientic theory construction. Mey (2001: 68) points out that the chief property 
of a grammatical rule is its ability to predict. The Chomskyan syntactic rules contain all 
the information needed to establish ('generate') the entire set of correct ('well-formed') 
sentences of a language. Thus as far as syntax is concerned, language is rule-generated 
(ibid. ). 
However, such rule construction may only be possible because Chomsky deals 
with idealised language in the mind of the individual (competence). Language in actual 
social action (performance) inevitably brings into play complex extralinguistic 
contextual factors. It seems impossible to establish similar pragmatic `rules' which 
would be capable of predicting every possible situation of appropriateness in social 
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interaction. 29 As already mentioned, Lakoff started to use the term `strategies' instead 
of `rules' in her 1990 book. This suggests that Lakoff herself may not have been entirely 
happy with the use of the term `rules'. However, she also employed the term `politeness 
system' in the same book; and the term `system' suggests that she has not entirely given 
up the notion of `rule'. Her oscillation between `rules' and `strategies' suggests some 
uncertainty about how she views politeness. 
To view politeness as `rules' implies that politeness is subject to the intrinsic 
rules of a language system, i. e. belonging essentially to that language, whereas to view 
politeness as `strategies' implies that politeness is an individual language user's strategy 
which they choose for themselves, i. e. arising from the human language user. In 
formalist linguistics, researchers are interested in establishing language as system 
through `rules' and the actual `language users' are pushed out of the picture in this kind 
of framework. Lakoff initially followed this approach and attempted to explain 
politeness as `pragmatic rules'. However, her subsequent use of `strategies' instead of 
`rules' (1990) seems to indicate that she had began to recognise the limitation of the 
`language as system' approach which sees `pragmatic rules' as part of a language system 
(structure); she began to perceive politeness as the `language users' strategic choice. 
Seeing politeness as `strategies' is a totally different approach to politeness, in which 
`language users' (agency) are the centre of enquiry. Its typical example is Brown & 
Levinson's (1987, [1978]) approach, in which a `language user', the Model Person, is 
the centre of their theory, as we will see in Chapter 2. The two approaches are 
incompatible (one focusing on structure and the other focusing on agency). Lakoff may 
not have recognised this. In fact, when Lakoff started to call Rules of Clarity and Rules 
of Politeness (1973) `clarity and rapport strategies' in her 1990 book, only the 
29 Leech (1983) had similar concern about the use of `rules' and restricted its use to syntax. He employed 
the notion of `principles' in pragmatics. 
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vocabulary shifted from `rules' to `strategies' but it seems that the content of the 
discussion has not been changed. I will discuss the significance of difference between 
two approaches further in Chapter 3. 
(b). Relationship between Rules of Clarity and Rules of Politeness 
The second weakness is Lakoff's claim that clarity and politeness are opposed to each 
other but she had to modify this more than once: when she recognised a more complex 
interplay between two rules through TD and CD (See 1.1. (e). ) and when she discovered 
that in some languages like Japanese there is no sharp distinction between clarity and 
politeness because the two are interrelated parts of every communication (See 1.1. (d). ). 
I argue that the difficulty Lakoff encountered lies in the framework that she chose for 
her theory construction, i. e. Grice's Cooperative Principle (Rule of Conversation) as a 
Rule of Clarity. Lakoff (1990: 168) interprets Grice's framework as follows: 
Grice's major points are these: the basic purpose of talking (of all kinds) is 
the transmission of information; any departure from that is a violation in 
the sense that it requires special explanatory devices, whereas adherence to 
perfect logic does not; logical communication is defined in terms of 
supplying just as much information, no more and no less, as the occasion 
requires, of being truthful, and of being relevant both to the perceived 
purpose of the discourse and to what has been said previously. 
Lakoff considers Grice's CP to be neutral logical standards. She (1990: 168) argues that 
logical communication is ideal and that if an utterance does not meet the logical 
standards set up by the maxims, participants can understand it by performing 
inferencing operations, i. e. conversational implicature. Sarangi and Slembrouck 
(1992: 123) point out that Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) has often been perceived 
as "an `ideal native speaker's situational context', against which the actual realities of 
interactions are to be described and accounted for". Fairclough (1985) claims that for 
the CP to apply in the way Grice defined it, interlocutors must relate as social equals. In 
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other words, "communicators must have the same discoursal and pragmatic rights and 
obligations to take turns and to avoid silences and interruptions, and they must have 
equal control over what for interactional purposes counts as `truthful', `relevant', 
`adequate' and `sufficient' information" (Sarangi and Slembrouk 1992: 125). In taking 
Grice's CP into her framework, Lakoff has subscribed to this `idealised' view of 
conversations inherent in Grice's CP. 
Having built her theory upon Grice's `idealised' Rules of Conversation, Lakoff 
proposes somewhat `idealised' Rules of Pragmatic Competence in which she claims that 
clarity and politeness are simply opposed to each other. However in reality no ideal 
native speaker's situational context actually exists as is assumed in Grice's CP. Only 
after Lakoff had considered various real communicative contexts, did she become aware 
that the relationship between clarity and politeness turned out to be far more 
complicated than in the way she had initially hypothesized, but even her modified 
model (1989) by which she attempted to explain different genres by adding subdivisions 
of confrontational and non confrontation modes seems unsatisfactory. 
(c). Awkward position between `competence' and `performance' 
The weaknesses of Lakoff's theory may be partly attributed to her faithfulness to the 
particular tradition in linguistics from which she came, mainly the Chomskyan tradition 
and the Gricean tradition and her attempts to explain politeness in terms of these 
traditions. Though she used the notion of `rules', I maintain that Lakoff's interest 
actually was most probably in `performance' but she tried to explicate this in a 
theoretical framework intended to explicate `competence', either linguistic or pragmatic. 
Lakoff came to realise that `politeness' involves concepts too complicated for a 
theoretical framework intended to explicate `competence'. She was actually beginning 
to recognise the inadequacies of the theoretical framework that she had been employing 
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in various places. (See discussions in 1.2.3. (a). and 1.2.3. (b). ) From these, she came to 
recognise that it is impossible to establish every aspect of language as a rule-governed 
system and that it is very difficult to explain politeness within the framework of 
`competence'. She challenged Chomskyan formalist linguistics by pointing out its 
inadequacies. Her change of vocabulary from `rules' to `strategies' shows her struggle 
with this framework. Lakoff acknowledged the problems, but she could not abandon the 
tradition of linguistics which deals with an idealised language system in search of an 
alternative framework. This seems to be the ultimate weakness of Lakoff's approach. 
2. Leech (1983) 
2.0. Introduction to Leech's theory 
Developing from his earlier monograph, Language and Tact, in his book on pragmatics, 
Principles of Pragmatics (1983) Leech presented his theory on politeness as the 
Politeness Principle. As Lakoff's first politeness theory was published in 1973 and 
Brown & Levinson's politeness theory (earlier edition) was already available in 
Goody's (1978) Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction, probably 
Leech was already familiar with both theories. 
In Principles of Pragmatics (1983), Leech (1983: 2) first reviews the 
development of linguistics and how the study of language use came to be established as 
a discipline, which provides the background against which Leech's pragmatic theory 
was developed. In the early 1970s, many Chomskyan linguists in the US, recognising 
the limitation of this syntax-only approach, began to claim that syntax could not be 
separated from the study of language usage. Outside this mainstream of American 
linguistics, there were some other influential independent linguists who focused on 
language use: Firth (1890-1960) insisted that language should be studied as part of a 
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social process and Halliday focused on the function of language and developed 
Systemic Functional Linguistics. Other important input came from a group of 
philosophers of language such as Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and Grice (1975,1989), 
who all contributed greatly to the development of pragmatics. Leech (1983) also 
recognises other disciplines of linguistics whose work undermined Chomsky's paradigm, 
such as sociolinguistics, discourse analysis or conversational analysis. 
30 Leech (1983: 4) 
claims that these approaches had focussed attention on "meaning in use rather than 
meaning in the abstract" and have cumulatively shifted the direction within linguistics 
from `competence' toward `performance'. Consequently, in Leech's view, a unified 
account of what language is has been lost. Instead, a pluralism in approach to language 
has emerged. 
Leech's main concern seems to have been the systematization of his own 
model of pragmatics in relation to other sub-disciplines in linguistics such as semantics, 
syntax and phonology. The Politeness Principle was incorporated into this framework 
together with Grice's Cooperative Principle. This section briefly introduces Leech's 
model of pragmatics and discusses his Politeness Principle and politeness maxims and 
then provides an evaluation of Leech's theory in a similar manner to that in Lakoff's 
section, providing an exposition of Leech's Politeness Principles and my evaluation of 
Leech's approach. 
2.1. Leech's Politeness Principles 
(a). Leech's models of pragmatics 
As mentioned earlier, Leech presented his Politeness Principle in his Principles of 
'o "Sociolinguistics has entailed a rejection of Chomsky's abstraction of the 'ideal native speaker/hearer'. 
Psycholinguistics and artificial intelligence place emphasis on a `process' model of human language 
abilities, at the expense of Chomsky's disassociation of linguistic theory from psychological process. Text 
linguistics and discourse analysis have refused to accept the limitation of linguistics to sentence grammar. 
Conversational analysis has stressed the primacy of the social dimension of language study. " (1983: 4) 
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pragmatics (1983). I will briefly introduce his models of pragmatics. Leech (1983: 4) 
views grammar and pragmatics as complementary domains within linguistics and insists 
that it is not possible to understand the nature of language without studying both these 
domains and the interaction between them. Consequently, while still affirming the 
centrality of formal linguistics in the sense of Chomsky's `competence', he argues that 
this must be fitted into a more comprehensive framework, which combines both 
functional and formal explanations. Leech (1983: 5-6) believes that the problem of 
distinguishing `language' (langue) and `language use' (parole) reflects a boundary 
dispute between semantics and pragmatics. 31 Leech (1983: 6-7) suggests three possible 














Figure 1.1. Three views of semantics-pragmatics relationships [title not in the original] (1983: 6) 
In generative semantics in 1970s, there was an effort to assimilate pragmatics to 
semantics, which is called `semanticism' (left in the diagram above). In this view, the 
illocutionary force of an utterance was encapsulated in its semantic structure and 
analysed in its deep structure or semantic representation, such as I state to you that X, I 
order you to Y. The opposite of `semanticism' is `pragmaticism' (right in the diagram 
above), which assimilates semantics into pragmatics. 32 Leech (1983) takes the third 
'! Semantics traditionally deals with meaning as in "What does X mean? ", while pragmatics deals with 
meaning as in "What did you mean by X? " In other words, "meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to a 
speaker or user of the language, whereas meaning in semantics, is defined purely as a property of 
expression in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers, or hearers" (1983: 6). 32 Influential philosophers of language who have been sceptical of traditional approaches to meaning in 
terms of abstract mental properties, i. e. concepts, such as Austin, Searle, Wittgenstein, Alston, take this 
view. For instance, Searle (1969: 17) viewed the theory of meaning as a sub-part of a theory of action; 
thus meaning is defined in terms of what speech acts speakers perform relative to their hearers. 
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viewpoint, `complementarism' (middle in the diagram above). Leech argues his position 
as follows: 
Any account of meaning in language must (a) be faithful to the facts as 
we observe them, and (b) must be as simple and generalizable as possible. 
If we approach meaning entirely from a pragmatic point of view, or 
entirely from a semantic point of view, these requirements are not met, 
however, if we approach meaning from a point of view which combines 
semantics and pragmatics, the result can be satisfactory explanation in 
terms of these two criteria. (1983: 7) 
Leech (1983), then, builds his model of pragmatics on Halliday's (1973) three functions 
of language, i. e. ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. (See Appendix 1-B) 
Halliday tries to integrate all three functions, but Leech understands that the ideational 
function belongs to grammar while interpersonal and textual functions belong to 
pragmatics as in Figure 1.2. Leech uses the term `rhetoric' instead of `function': the 
term `rhetoric' for Leech refers to "the effective use of language in communication" 
(Leech 1983: 15). He also uses `rhetoric' as a countable noun for a set of conversational 
principles related by their functions. He distinguishes between two rhetorics: 
interpersonal rhetoric (an input constraint) and textual rhetoric (an output constraint). 
Pragmatics 
Interpersonal Rhetoric (input constraint) 
Semantics 
Syntax 4 Grammar (ideational) 
Phonolo 
Textual Rhetoric (output constraint) 
Figure 1.2. Function of grammar and pragmatics [title not in the original] (Leech 1983: 58) 
Leech (1983: 59) also builds a process model of language in order to show how 
interpersonal and the textual pragmatics fitted into an overall function of language. (See 
Appendix 1-C) 
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(b). The Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle 
Leech carefully distinguishes between the use of `rule' and `principle' in his theoretical 
framework. Leech (1983: 5) restricts the use of the term `rules' primarily to syntax and 
prefers to use the term `principles'. Leech (1983: 21) claims that the rules of grammar 
are `constitutive rules' and the principles of pragmatics are `regulative rules' borrowing 
Searle's (1969) distinction. 33 Thus he prefers to say that pragmatics is principle- 
controlled but not rule-governed. Leech lists several principles under interpersonal 
rhetoric as in Figure 1.3. 
Maxim of Quantity 
Cooperative Principle (CP) Maxim of Quality 
Maxim of Relation 
Maxim of Manner 
Interpersonal Rhetoric 
Maxim of Tact.... 
Politeness Principle (PP) Maxim of Generosity .... 
Maxim of Approbation.... 




Figure 1.3. Interpersonal Rhetoric [title not in the original] (1983: 16)34 
Leech (1983) is in favour of Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle (CP) and incorporates 
it into his Interpersonal Rhetoric together with Politeness Principles (PP). Leech 
(1983: 16-17) claims that "the rhetoric principles socially constrain communicative 
behaviour in various ways, but they do not (except in the case of `purely social' 
" Searle (1969: 33ff) claims that "conversational principles and maxims are `regulative' rather than 
`constitutive'. The rules of a language (e. g. the rules for forming tag-questions in English) normally count 
as an integral part of the definition of that language, but maxims do not. Hence if one tells a lie in English, 
one breaks one of Grice's maxims (a Maxim of Quality); but this does not mean that one fails in any way 
to speak the English language". (Leech 1983: 8) 
34 See Appendix 1-D for the Textual Rhetoric diagram. 
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utterances such as greetings and thanks) provide the main motivation for talking. 
Cooperation and politeness... are largely regulative factors which ensure that, once 
conversation is under way, it will not follow a fruitless or disruptive path. " 
Leech (1983: 8) employs Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle (CP) with some 
adaptation (See Appendix 1-E). He claims (1983: 80) that the CP helps to account for the 
relation between sense (meaning as semantically determined) and force (meaning 
pragmatically, as well as semantically determined). The CP, however, in itself cannot 
explain why some people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean; and what 
is the relation between sense and force when non-declarative types of sentences are 
being considered. Leech argues that the Politeness Principle (PP) complements the CP 
in such cases. 35 The PP then is "not just another principle to be added to the CP but as a 
necessary complement" (Leech 1983: 89) to the Cooperative Principle (CP). Leech also 
claims that there is a trade-off relationship between the CP and the PP (1983: 82). "The 
CP enables one participant in a conversation to communicate on the assumption that the 
other participant is being cooperative (ibid. )" The CP has "the function of regulating 
what we say so that it contributes to some assumed illocutionary or discoursal goal(s) 
(ibid. )", whereas the PP has "a higher regulative role than this: to maintain social 
equilibrium and friendly relations, and this enables us to assume that our interlocutors 
are being cooperative in the first place" (ibid. ). 36 In other words, unless the speaker is 
polite to the hearer, the channel of communication between speaker and hearer will 
break down. 
's Grice, who proposed the CP, is concerned with the logician's truth or the propositional meaning, 
whereas Leech is more interested in a broader, socially and psychologically oriented application of 
pragmatic principles. Leech claims that politeness becomes important in the latter. (Leech 1983: 80) 
36 This resembles Lakoff's (1973: 297-8) claim that when Clarity conflicts with Politeness, in most cases, 
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(c). Politeness and illocutionary functions 
Leech (1983: 81-82) formulates the Politeness Principle in its negative form as follows: 
`Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite belief' and `Maximize 
(other things being equal) the expression of polite belief'. He considers the positive 
version as somewhat less important. Polite and impolite beliefs are respectively beliefs 
which are favourable and unfavourable to the hearer or to a third party, where 
`favourable' and `unfavourable' are measured on some relevant scale of values. He 
stresses that the real beliefs of the Speaker (S) are not in question, but rather what the 
Speaker purports to believe. 
Leech (1983: 81,83) also makes a distinction between `absolute politeness' and 
`relative politeness'. He mainly deals with `absolute politeness' as a scale, having a 
negative and a positive pole. Some illocutions, such as orders, are inherently impolite, 
and others, such as offers, are inherently polite. `Negative politeness' therefore consists 
in minimizing the impoliteness of impolite illocutions, and `positive politeness' consists 
in maximizing the politeness of polite illocutions. 37 He claims that different kinds and 
degrees of politeness are required in different situations. Leech (1983: 104) classifies 
illocutionary functions into four types, according to how they relate to the social goal of 
establishing and maintaining what he calls `comity'. 
(a) COMPETITIVE: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal; 
e. g. ordering, asking, demanding, begging etc. 
(b) CONVIVIAL: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal; e. g. 
offering, inviting, greeting, thanking, congratulating 
(c) COLLABORATIVE: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social 
" It is important not to confuse Leech's negative and positive politeness with B&L's negative and 
positive politeness. Brown & Levinson's negative politeness and positive politeness are related to their 
concept of face which consists of `negative face' (the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights 
to non-distraction) and `positive face' (the positive consistent self-image or personality claimed by 
interactants). (B&L 1987: 61) Negative politeness is oriented mainly toward partially satisfying 
(redressing) the Hearer's negative face and positive politeness is oriented towards the positive face of the 
Hearer, the positive self-image that he/she claims for himself/herself. (For details of B&L's negative and 
positive politeness, see Ch. 2.1.1. (c)) 
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goal; e. g. asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing 
(d) CONFLICTIVE: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal; e. g. 
threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding 
Leech (1983: 104-5) explains that it is the first two, COMPETITIVE and CONVIVIAL 
which chiefly require politeness. 38 Where the illocutionary function is COMPETITIVE, 
the goal is intrinsically discourteous (e. g. getting someone to lend you money) and the 
Politeness Principle (PP) is required in an attempt to mitigate the discourtesy. The 
second type, CONVIVIAL functions, is, on the contrary, `courteous': politeness here 
takes a more positive form of seeking opportunities for comity. Positive politeness in 
this case means observing the PP i. e. thanking or congratulating when you should do so. 
COMPETITIVE and CONVIVIAL illocution correspond to Leech's negative and 
positive politeness. 
Leech then relates his illocutionary function to Searle's classification of 
illocutionary acts. (Searle's categories of illocutionary acts are summarised in Appendix 
1-F. ) Leech (1983: 107) claims that `negative politeness' belongs pre-eminently to the 
DIRECTIVE or IMPOSITIVE class, while `positive politeness' is found pre-eminently 
in the COMMISSIVE and EXPRESSIVE classes. 
(d). Leech's politeness maxims 
Leech (1983: 132) proposes six maxims related to the Politeness Principle 
which apply to the various illocutionary acts mentioned above. 
1. TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
a) Minimize cost to other; b) maximize benefit to other. 
2. GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
a) Minimize the benefit to self; b) maximize cost to self 
3. APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
a) Minimize dispraise of other; b) maximize praise of other 
4. MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
38 For the third type COLLABORATIVE illocutionary functions, politeness is largely irrelevant. For the 
fourth type, CONFLICTIVE functions, politeness is out of the question, because conflictive illocutions 
are, by nature, designed to cause offence. 
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a) Minimize praise of self-, b) maximize dispraise of self 
5. AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives) 
a) Minimize disagreement between one self and other; b) maximize 
agreement between self and other 
6. SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives) 
a) Minimize antipathy between oneself and other; b) maximize sympathy 
between self and other 
Leech (1983: 133) claims that not all of the maxims and sub-maxims are equally 
important. For example, if you were to compare two maxims, 1. the Tact Maxim appears 
to be a more powerful constraint on conversational behaviour than 2. the Generosity 
Maxim, and 3. the Approbation Maxim than 4. the Modesty maxim. There are some 
general laws: politeness is focused more strongly on the other person than on oneself; 
generally, negative politeness (avoidance of discord) is a more weighty consideration 
than positive politeness (seeking concord); politeness towards an addressee is generally 
more important than politeness towards a third party. Here I will explain the Tact 
Maxim and five scales/factors for measuring politeness in relation to tact. The other five 
maxims, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy will be 
summarised in Appendix 1-G.. 
The Tact Maxim (in impositives and commissives) (Leech 1983: 107-110; 
123-127) is described as a) Minimize the cost to other; b) Maximize the benefit to other. 
The Tact Maxim applies to impositive and comissive categories of illocution, which 
refer, in their propositional content X, to some action to be performed by the hearer or 
the speaker. This action is called A. Suppose X is `You will peel those potatoes'. Then X 
is placed on a Cost-benefit scale. The higher the cost to the hearer, the less polite X is. 
(Cost-benefit scale). Another way of obtaining a scale of politeness is to keep the same 
propositional content and to increase the degree of politeness by using a more and more 
indirect style of illocution (Indirectness Scale). Illocutions tend to be more polite as they 
increase the degree of optionality. (Optionality scale). Beside these, there are two others 
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relevant to politeness that Brown and Gilman (1960) discussed, which can be visualised 
as a two-dimensional graph as in Figure 1.4 below. The vertical axis measures the 
degree of distance in terms of `power' or AUTHORITY of one participant over another. 
This is an asymmetrical measure, so that someone in authority may use a familiar form 
of address to someone who, in return, must use the respectful form. The horizontal axis 






Figure 1.4. Social distance (Leech 1983: 126) 
The often cited choice between familiar and respectful pronouns of address in many 
European languages (e. g. tu or vous in French) is a typical example of this. The degree 
of respectfulness of a given speech situation depends largely on relatively permanent 
personal factors like status, age, degree of intimacy etc as well as on the temporary role 
of one person relative to another. A lecturer can reasonably command a student `Get that 
essay to me by next week' but not `Make me a cup of coffee'. 
Five factors to which Leech drew attention are summarised as follows: 
(S - speaker; H- hearer) 
39 
1. Cost-benefit scale on which is estimated the cost or benefit of the proposed 
action A to S or to H 
cost to H<> benefit to H 
less polite <> more polite 
2. Optionality scale on which illocutions are ordered according to the amount of 
choice which S allows to H 
3. Indirectness scale on which, from S's point of view, illocutions are ordered with 
39 Leech (1983) uses s for Speaker and h for Hearer in his book. For clarity reasons, I have capitalised 
them to S and H. 
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respect to the length of the path (in terms of means-end analysis) connecting 
the illocutionary act to its illocutionary goal 
direct > indirect 
less polite < more polite 
4. Authority/power of one participant over another (vertical axis): status, age (cf. 
Brown and Gilman 1960) 
5. Social distance or solidarity (horizontal axis): degree of intimacy (cf. Brown 
and Gilman 1960) 
Leech (1983: 127) summarises various parameters which influence tact as follows: 
1. the greater the cost of A to H 
2. the greater the horizontal social distance of H from S 
3. the greater the authoritative status of H with respect to S 
4. the greater will be the need for optionality, and correspondingly for 
indirectness, in the expression of an impositive, if S is to observe the 
Tact Maxim 
(e). Metalinguistic politeness 
Leech suggests the above six maxims as Politeness Principles focusing on the content of 
conversation, but politeness is also manifested in the way participants manage or 
structure conversations. Leech (1983: 139-142) pays attention to such devices. For 
instance, speaking at the wrong time (interrupting) or being silent at the wrong time has 
impolite implications. Interlocutors may have to seek permission to speak or to 
apologise for speaking. 
1. Could you tell me what time the bus leaves, please? 
2. May I ask if you're married? 
3. I must warn you not to discuss this in public 
4. We regret to inform you that the aspidistra stands are no longer obtainable. 
(Leech 1983: 139) 
In 1, the speaker tries to engage in conversation with H before reaching the ultimate 
goal of obtaining information. 2-4 are `hedged performatives': The use of "May I ask ? ", 
"I must ..., 
" "We regret... " are mitigations of utterances. When interlocutors stress 
desirability, they may say, "I want to thank you..., " "We are delighted to announce..., " 
or "I must tell how much I admire your... ", whereas interlocutors who bring bad tidings 
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may find it advisable to express both the distasteful nature of their task by saying "I'm 
sorry to have to tell you..., " "We regret to have to inform you...., " or "I must warn you 
that... ". When H is a person of higher authoritative status than S, then giving advice 
may be judged as an imposition, so it requires a preface such as "Could I suggest...? " or 
"Might I just give you a word of advice? " Though the actual advice may be beneficial, 
the speech act of giving advice may violate both the Modesty and Approbation Maxims, 
because it takes for granted that S is superior in knowledge or experience or judgement 
etc. to H. Thus these `hedged performances' are often used as devices of politeness. 
Leech (1983: 139-142) also mentions the polite and impolite implications of 
silence. If someone has been invited to join in a conversation by someone else, silence 
might be a sign of opting out of a social engagement to observe Leech's so-called 
`interpersonal rhetoric principles'. When two or more people who are engaged in 
conversation are joined by an outsider, the newcomer may feel it rude to interrupt the 
conversation, but the participants may feel it rude not to give the newcomer a chance to 
join in. But on other occasions, silence might be most appropriate. Some types of 
conversation merely aim to preserve sociability. Malinowski (1923) called such types of 
behaviour Phatic Communion. 40 Following this, Leech argues for another maxim, the 
metalinguistic Phatic Maxim, provisionally formulated as `Avoid silence' or `Keep 
talking'. It is the need to avoid silence with its implication of opting out of 
communication. So the interlocutor may talk about the weather or say `You've had your 
hair cut'. Such an utterance could be considered to be a violation of the Maxim of 
Quantity, but can be excused by the Phatic Maxim. The Phatic Maxim is more than just 
avoidance of silence, but it serves to extend the common ground of agreement and 
experience shared by the participants. Therefore the choice of subject matter tends to be 
40 "Phatic communion ... is a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of 
words ... words 
in phatic communion ... fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim.... (Malinowski 1923: 315). 
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non-controversial and to concentrate on the attitudes of the speaker rather than on 
matters of fact. Considering the nature of the Phatic Maxim, Leech claims that it might 
be treated as a special case of the Agreement and Sympathy Maxims. 
(/9. Other principles in Interpersonal Rhetoric 
Leech (1983: 142-144) includes other principles such as the Irony Principle and Banter 
Principle (See Appendix 1-H) alongside the Cooperative Principle and Politeness 
Principle in Interpersonal Rhetoric. These principles can only be explained in terms of 
other principles so he calls them parasitic or `second-order principles'. Leech's 
principles and maxims in Interpersonal Rhetoric are summarised in Table 1. E in 
Appendix 1-E. 
2.2. Evaluation of Leech's approach 
Leech (1983) incorporated the Politeness Principle into his grand scale pragmatics 
theory. His proposal of detailed politeness maxims had mixed evaluations (appreciations 
and criticism), as I will show below in my evaluation of his approach. 
2.2.1. Leech's positioning in linguistics 
While Lakoff emerged directly from the Chomskyan tradition, Leech had had more 
diverse exposure to different traditions of linguistics. 41 His exposure to the Hallidayan 
functionalist tradition and to the Chomskyan formalist tradition42 characterises his 
41 Immediately after finishing his MA thesis, Leech was given an Assistant Lecturer post in the 
Department of English Language and Literature at University College London (UCL) in 1962. In 1963, M. 
A. K. Halliday came to UCL as the first full-time Director of the Communication Research Centre (CRC). 
Leech was in close contact with him in 1963-4 as Assistant Director of CRC. Leech wrote later. "At that 
time I was greatly influenced, as were many in the country, by Halliday's linguistic theory, then called 
`scale and category grammar' (Halliday 1961), later renamed `systematic linguistics' or `systemic 
functional grammar'. (Leech 2002: 158)" Halliday advised Leech to take up semantics. While Leech was 
trying to develop his `Hallidayan' semantics, he was given an opportunity to spend a year in the USA as a 
Harkness Fellow (1964-5). Leech decided to study linguistics at MIT. Ironically Chomsky was on leave in 
London at the time! Yet, Leech did have an opportunity to meet him and attended one or two of 
Chomsky's lectures upon his return. (For details see Leech 2002: 158-9). 
42 Leech (2002: 159) retrospectively writes: "Although MIT taught me a great deal, particularly about the 
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approach to pragmatics. Leech (1983: 3) had seen how limiting generative grammar to 
strict formalism meant losing its position as the dominant paradigm in linguistics in the 
1970s and was concerned with how to resolve the issue of grammar and pragmatics. 
Leech (1983: 4) claimed that it is impossible to understand the nature of language 
without studying both these domains and the interaction between them. He also 
recognised that these two approaches to linguistics, formalism and functionalism are 
associated with very different views of the nature of language. (See Appendix 1-J) 
Having recognised the limitation of a purely formalist, abstract approach to the 
study of language, Leech, in his Principles of Pragmatics (1983) presented a new 
framework, which elucidated the functional aspect of language or language use, while at 
the same time affirming the Chomskyan formalist approach to language. Prior to the 
publication of this work, Leech had been working on his version of semantics in the late 
1960s, which developed into his PhD thesis entitled An Approach to the Semantics of 
Place, Time, and Modality in Modern English. His semantics was attuned to the 
generative semantic school (Leech 2002: 160). Subsequently, Leech developed an 
interest in the study of pragmatics in the mid 1970s. In the late 1970's he wrote a 
number of papers discussing where the border or interface lies between pragmatics and 
semantics. Semantics and pragmatics were his main concerns at that time. Leech 
(2002: 163) confessed that the train of thought in his Explorations in Semantics and 
Pragmatics (1980) began in semantics and ended in pragmatics. He felt that 
"pragmatics needed tackling by a separate, full-scale study" (2002: 163). Leech 
endeavoured to build a comprehensive model of pragmatics, which he had been 
developing over the year's in his book, Principles of Pragmatics (1983). His theory of 
politeness, which he developed from his earlier paper Language and Tact (1977) was 
habit of rigorous thought and application of theory, the MIT approach to linguistics was too constraining 
for my taste. Perhaps, I was not caught young enough to imbibe the powerful drink of transformational 
grammar uncritically. " 
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incorporated into his comprehensive theory of pragmatics. 
Leech, having been associated with both approaches, did not find it 
unreasonable to accommodate both formalist and functional approaches in theorising 
pragmatics. Just as he argued for the complementary nature of semantics and pragmatics, 
he also argued for the necessary interrelation of formalist and functional approaches. 
Thus Leech (1983: 76) described his formalist-functionalist view of language as follows: 
"Language consists of grammar and pragmatics. Grammar is an abstract formal system 
for producing and interpreting messages. General pragmatics is a set of strategies and 
principles for achieving success in communication by the use of the grammar. Grammar 
is functionally adapted to the extent that it possesses properties which facilitate the 
operation of pragmatic principles. " 
2.2.2 Leech's contribution to politeness studies 
Leech's major contribution is his attempt to systematize his grand scale pragmatics and 
to incorporate and to account for politeness within that framework. Whereas Lakoff 
struggled to explain politeness using a rather limited notion of `rules' in her 
transformational grammar tradition, Leech, who stressed the interrelation of formalist 
and functional approaches to language in his pragmatics model, explained politeness 
using the notion of `principles' as part of Interpersonal Rhetoric. In Leech's theory 
`principles' are largely regulative factors which socially constrain communicative 
behaviour (See 2.1. (a)). 
Leech's second contribution is his proposal of various politeness maxims: Tact, 
Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy. Fraser (1990: 224) 
describes Leech's approach as "a grand elaboration of the Conversational Maxim 
approach to politeness. " Thomas (1995: 168) comments that if one sees Leech's 
`maxims' not as maxims on a par with Gricean maxims, but as a series of 
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`social-psychological constraints' influencing the choices made within the pragmatic 
parameters to a greater or lesser degree, they could be used as an inventory for 
explaining cross-cultural differences in the perception of politeness and the use of 
politeness strategies. Comparably, O'Driscoll (1996) suggests that the maxim approach 
may be helpful for identifying culture specific maxims. "The creation of maxims is an 
attempt to encapsulate a specific set of characteristics which have been identified as 
being able to shed light on what appears to be essential, and generalise these to hold 
over a wide variety of situations in one particular culture" (O'Driscoll 1996: 29). For 
instance, Gu (1990) developed a set of Chinese culture specific maxims, building upon 
Leech's maxims. 43 
In the discussion of his Tact Maxim, Leech identified three scales with a 
bearing on the degree of tact appropriate to a given speech situation (1983: 123): 1. a 
Cost-benefit scale, 2. an Optionality scale, and 3. an Indirectness scale and two further 
scales which are highly relevant to politeness (1983: 126), 4. Authority/power and 5. 
Social distance. (See 2.1. (d). ) Leech acknowledged Brown and Gilman's (1960) `power' 
and `solidarity' as the source for his last two scales, `authority/power' and `social 
distance'. 
Other researchers also recognise what Leech had identified as five scales and 
incorporated these (in part) into their own theories, though they did not categorise them 
exactly as Leech did. In Lakoff's (1973,1975) theory, the `Optionality scale' was 
treated as one of the politeness rules `Give options' rather than a scale for measuring the 
degree of politeness. All five of Leech's scales were also included in B&L's (1978, 
[1987]) theory although B&L tidied them all up and placed them in different categories. 
The `Indirectness scale' was classified as a large category of Off-Record strategy and the 
43 The development of culture specific maxims out of Leech's maxims, which were probably meant to be 
universally applicable maxims is not without problems. This will be discussed in 2.2.3. below. 
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`Optionality scale' was a `Give options' strategy included under Negative Politeness 
strategies. In other words, they are not scales at all, but are classified as types of 
politeness strategies in B&L's theory. On the other hand, Leech's `Cost-benefit scale', 
`Authority/power' and `Social Distance' seem to correspond roughly to three 
independent variables for measuring the weight of Face Threatening Acts in B&L's 
theory: R (a culturally and situationally defined ranking of impositions), P (an 
asymmetric social dimension of relative power) and D (a symmetric social dimension of 
similarity/difference within S and H) respectively (B&L 1987: 76-77). Thus Leech 
acknowledged various elements in politeness that his predecessors had identified and 
systematised them neatly and incorporated them into his grand scale pragmatics 
theoretical framework. 
2.2.3 Weaknesses of Leech's approach 
(a). The arbitrary nature of principles and maxims 
Unfortunately, there seem to be many more criticisms than appreciations of Leech's 
approach (e. g. Dillon et al. 1985; Brown and Levinson 1987 [1978]; Fraser 1990; 
Thomas 1995; Watts 1992,2003). As suggested, Leech proposed his Politeness 
Principle (PP) as something which complements Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP). 
The first criticism is that it is questionable whether Leech's PP can be considered to be 
on a par with Gricean CP (Dillon et al. 1985: 455). In other words, the CP may be of a 
different order to the PP. For instance, Brown & Levinson (1987: 5) write: "The CP 
defines an `unmarked' or socially neutral presumptive framework for communication; 
the essential assumption being `no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason'. 
Politeness principles are, however, just such principled reasons for deviation". 
The second criticism is that Leech's numerous maxims are not ideal from the 
perspective of the law of parsimony. As Leech intuitively finds other new factors in 
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language use related to politeness or interpersonal rhetoric, he seems to keep adding 
them on to his taxonomy, as if he were able to cover every possible principle or maxim 
he can think of. Thomas (1995: 167) commented that "[i]n theory it would be possible to 
produce a new maxim to explain every tiny perceived regularity in language use.... This 
makes the theory at best inelegant, at worst virtually unfalsifiable. " 
The third criticism is that though Leech tries to classify variety of politeness 
maxims into some kind of hierarchy, the hierarchies of maxims may seem to be rather 
arbitrary. Thomas (1995: 168) points out that some of the maxims may be universally 
applicable and others might be culture-specific and some others such as the Pollyanna 
Principle might be totally idiosyncratic. Dillon et at. (1985) criticises the ad hoc nature 
of Leech's principles and maxims. 
A systematic analysis would provide a more convincing justification for each 
of the principles which Leech proposes. As it is, by trying to justify each one 
individually, Leech appears to be inventing principles ad hoc, the only 
determining factor being the particular utterances which he has chosen to use 
as examples; he provides no real reason why the process could not be 
continued ad infinitum. Why not suggest a Surliness Principle: `Maintain 
distance by being offensive'? Or an Innocuousness Principle: `Keep the 
conversation impersonal; talk about things like the weather'? These would 
account for a variety of utterances not currently handled by Leech's 
principles, and they would leave plenty of room for the invention of new 
principles to cover yet other examples. (Dillon et at 1985: 455-6) 
The fourth criticism is (e. g. Dillon et al. 1985, Thomas 1995) that Leech's 
politeness maxims seem far too arbitrary to be called pragmatic principles and his 
maxims can easily be interpreted simply as a list of cultural specific "social dos and 
don'ts". Gu (1990) developed culture-specific politeness maxims building upon Leech's 
maxims: he modified some of Leech's maxims (Generosity and Tact) and added new 
maxims, the Self-denigration Maxim 44 and the Address Maxim 45 to elucidate 
44 The Self-denigration maxim consists of two submaxims: 'a) denigrate self and b) elevate other'. In 
some East Asian languages like Chinese or Japanese, when the Speaker refers to himself/herself or 
anything related to himself/herself or his/her in-group (e. g. family members), it is customary to use some 
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politeness phenomena in Chinese. Eelen (2001: 10) points out that Leech's Politeness 
Principle is meant to be a pragmatic principle, which is descriptive, whereas Gu 
presents his Chinese politeness maxims as being essentially morally prescriptive and 
socially sanctionable precepts. However, in reality, Leech's maxims can be easily turned 
into culture-specific maxims. 
Just as the classification of maxims seems arbitrary, the classification of the 
scales for measuring politeness may also seem arbitrary. Leech lists all five as if they 
were in the same category: l. a Cost-benefit scale, 2. an Optionality scale, and 3. an 
Indirectness scale, 4. Authority/power and 5. Social distance (1983: 123,126). However, 
the first three seem to be psychologically motivated scales, and the last two may be 
viewed as socially motivated variables. It is not clear from his book whether these five 
scales are relevant to all possible politeness maxims or only to the Tact Maxim. If they 
only relate to the Tact Maxim, are there other corresponding scales for each politeness 
maxim? It seems that some of these scales such as Authority and Social distance would 
appear to be equally relevant to other politeness maxims. . 
The arbitrariness of Leech's maxims may be due to his rigorous efforts to 
systematise politeness as part of his pragmatic theory. The natural course of such 
systematisation is to identify more detailed factors and this ends up in elaborate 
taxonomies. The underlying assumption in Leech's approach seems to be that it is 
possible to systematise language use in neat formats such as principles and maxims just 
as in other social sciences. It raises the fundamental question whether politeness can 
linguistic devices to show self-denigration. Similarly, when the Speaker refers to others, he/she is 
expected to elevate others and show respect (See Gu 1990: 246-248). 
45 The Address Maxim reads "address your interlocutor with an appropriate address term". Gu 
(1990: 248-9) argues that the act of addressing involves a) the Speaker's recognition of Hearer as a social 
specific status or role and b) the Speaker's definition of the social relation between Speaker and Hearer. 
Choice of various address terms is far more complicated in Chinese than in either English or the T/V 
system in European languages. Perhaps that is why Gu set it as a separate maxim (See Gu 1990: 248-252). 
Gu (1990) adds another new principle, a Balance Principle, which is the principle of reciprocation of 
politeness based on the Chinese notion of huänli (Literal translation: return politeness): `If the Speaker is 
polite to the Hearer, the Hearer ought to be polite to the Speaker'. 
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really be systematised into such neatly organised categories. The weaknesses of Leech's 
approach may not be attributed to Leech alone, but they may be no more than the 
general consequences of the quasi-scientific approach expected in social sciences, to 
which Leech subscribed. This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 3, as I will 
re-examine the theoretical assumptions behind Lakoff, Leech and Brown & Levinson's 
theories. 
(b). Association of politeness with Speech Acts 
Another problem with Leech's approach is that in his theory, all the politeness maxims 
are produced in the course of different speech acts. Both Lakoff and Leech based their 
theory on Grice's Cooperative Principle, but Leech (1983) associated politeness with 
particular speech acts or illocutionary goals, whereas Lakoff (1973,1975) did not 
explicitly make such an association in her theory. 46 Leech argued that different kinds of 
politeness are required corresponding to the nature of the speech acts. The underlying 
assumption seems to be that politeness is in operation or needed only when interlocutors 
perform some kind of speech acts. But not all the forms of politeness are needed 
because of particular speech acts. For instance, the choice of T/V system or honorific 
expressions in languages such as Japanese or Korean is not triggered in case of 
performing particular speech acts. 47 
3. Evaluation of the underlying theoretical framework 
behind Lakoff and Leech's theories 
Both Lakoff and Leech embedded Gricean Maxims into their framework and developed 
their politeness theories from there. Leech employs Speech Acts as well as Gricean 
46 Brown & Levinson (1987 [1978]) also associated politeness with the illocutionary force of certain 
acts. which are inherently face-threatening; they see politeness as redressive actions taken in order to 
counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of Face Threatening Acts. 
47 Gu's (1990) additional maxims, Self-denigration Maxim and Address Maxim are also not related to 
particular speech acts. 
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Maxims. In this section, I will evaluate these underlying theoretical frameworks. 
(a). The Logico-philosophical approach to language 
The weaknesses of Lakoff and Leech's approaches may be partly due to the theoretical 
foundation of early pragmatics that Lakoff and Leech adopted in their theory. Early day 
pragmatics initially owed much of its development to so-called `ordinary language 
philosophers' who tried to understand how ordinary people manage to employ language 
and communicate effectively (Thomas 1995: 29). Grice, together with his teacher, J. L. 
Austin, worked at Oxford University in the 1940s and 1950s. The work of both of them 
has become influential in linguistics because their appearance coincided with a growing 
frustration within linguistic studies, mainly deriving from the limitations of truth 
conditional semantics. Austin presented a Speech Act theory and Searle systematised 
and extended Austin's theory over a much wider range of acts. The field of pragmatics 
has flourished for the past four decades and now a wide range of research has been 
included in various journals of pragmatics. 48 However, Verschueren (1999b: 872) 
recognises that there have been "processes of conventionalisation and habit formation in 
ways of looking at language use" and even "incipient tendencies towards the 
construction of an acceptable dogma (ibid. )" within the field of pragmatics. 
Consequently, many researchers in pragmatics today still tend to accept the early 
theoretical foundations of pragmatics as part of the theoretical tradition of the field. 49 1 
48 As major journals in pragmatics, Verscheuren (1999b: 872) lists Journal of Pragmatics, (Elsevier), 
Pragmatics and Cognition (Benjamins) and Pragmatics (International Pragmatics Association) and as 
journals in pragmatics-related fields, he lists Text (De Bruyter), Language in Society (Cambridge), 
Discourse and Society (Sage). 
49 Verscheuren (1999b: 870) critically reflects on the historical development of pragmatics and proposes a 
broader view of pragmatics as "general functional perspective on (any aspects of) language, i. e. an `an 
approach to language which takes into account the full complexity of cognitive, social and cultural (i. e. 
`meaningful') functions in the lives of human being". A similar proposal was made in Verscheuren (1995) 
and he suggested then that for such pragmatics it requires that "linguistics join forces with neighbouring 
disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and even history" (1995: 149). His book, 
Understanding Pragmatics (1999) is written from such a broad perspective of pragmatics, which can be 
seen as what pragmatics should be. 
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list some characteristics of the early pragmatic theories. 
First, having been developed by philosophers, early pragmatics theories tend to 
be based on rationalistic assumptions rather than on empirical findings. Researchers in 
pragmatics assume that they can create linguistic data by accessing an internalized 
language system of their own. Consequently although pragmatics is supposed to deal 
with `performance', i. e. actual improvisational speech production, the examples used in 
pragmatics are often not taken from naturally occurring conversations at all but are 
produced by a native-speaker's introspection. 
Second, action is thought to emanate from an individual who has `intentions' 
and is often conceptualised in terms of the strategies adopted by the individual speaker 
to achieve his/her `goals' or `intentions' (Fairclough 2001: 7). This idea came from 
Grice's (1957 [1989]: 220) claim in 1957 that "A meant something by x" is (roughly) 
equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by 
means of the recognition of this intention. "50 Grice laid the foundation for pragmatics 
that meaning is associated with intention and that understanding an utterance is a matter 
of recognising the speaker's intention behind the utterance. 
When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of 
linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume 
is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less 
like myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions. (Searle 
1969: 16) 
Influenced by Grice's claim (1957), the task of early pragmatics is considered to be 
elucidating the process of how a Hearer successfully comes to recognise a Speaker's 
intentions. 
Third, as in Gricean maxims, early pragmatics tends to deal with utopian verbal 
interaction with cooperative interaction and interlocutors are assumed to have equal 
50 Grice's (1957) seminal paper, "Meaning", Philosophical Review 66,377-388 is reprinted in H. P. Grice, 
Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
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control over its ground rules. (Fairclough 2001: 7) Fairclough writes: 
The individuals postulated in pragmatics... are generally assumed to be 
involved in cooperative interactions over whose ground rules they have equal 
control, and to which they are able to contribute equally. Cooperative 
interaction between equals is elevated into a prototype for social interaction 
in general, rather than being seen as a form of interaction whose occurrence 
is limited and socially constrained. The result is an idealised and Utopian 
image of verbal interaction.... (Fairclough 2001: 7) 
Fourth, although researchers in early pragmatics deal with context in order to 
interpret utterance meaning, because of their rationalistic assumptions, the `contexts' 
discussed in early pragmatics tend to be logical and ideal situational contexts devised by 
researchers themselves for the purposes of theory construction. Speech Act theorists 
interpret utterances in terms of intentionality ascribed to the speaker; they consider the 
`felicity conditions' that make particular speech acts possible. si The underlying 
assumption seems to be that meaning can be established independently of any real-life 
social context. Geis (1995: 13) points out that Speech Act theorists "have based their 
work almost exclusively on their intuitions as to how single, constructed sentences 
isolated from real or (usually) even explicitly constructed contexts might be used". 
Investigation at the level of one particular utterance or speech act may be theoretically 
convenient, but the actual communicative context is always more complicated. However, 
consideration of the speakers' intentions/goals and the ideal situational context, and 
felicity conditions that make speech acts possible is not enough. The meaning of any 
particular utterance is not solely determined by the speaker's intention or goal at the 
time of the act of speaking. Various factors such as the situational context, the social 
relationship of the interlocutors or the cultural context all come into play. Interlocutors 
51 For example, the felicity conditions for Directive (request) that Searle considers are as follows: 
Preparatory condition: H is able to perform A. 
Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A. 
Propositional content condition: S predicts a future act A of H 
Essential condition: Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A (Searle 1979: 44) 
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are constantly caught up in or constrained by different roles they have to play in social 
interaction or the power relations between them and other participants. And these 
relationships are constantly being renegotiated during the social interaction. Geis 
(1995: 13) argues that communicative acts are social and "involve particular factual 
states, social relationships between participants, psychological states and attitudes 
among other things" and that "social features of context play a critical role in the 
differentiation of communicative actions" (ibid. ). 
(b). Universal rationality assumed in Maxims and Speech Acts 
Lakoff and Leech both accepted Grice's maxims as if they were universally accepted 
principles for all linguistic utterances. How can they assume that they are universally 
applicable? What is the source of Grice's maxims? Grice's answer is as follows: "I am 
enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts, undeniable 
though they may be; I would like to be able to think of the standard type of 
conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but 
as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT 
abandon [capitalised in the original]" (Grice 1975: 48). Levinson (1983: 103) comments 
that Grice's maxims are not arbitrary conventions, but rather describe rational means for 
conducting co-operative exchanges and maintains that the maxims derive from general 
considerations of rationality applicable to all kinds of co-operative exchanges. 
`Rationality' is a buzzword in modernist thinking (See Ch. 3 1.1. ). However, Grice 
himself also added this: "a dull, but no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it 
is just a well-recognized empirical fact that people DO behave in these ways; they have 
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so" (Grice 1975: 48). This 
second answer suggests that Grice's maxims also may be little more than a product of 
Grice's own socialisation, and thus may not necessarily express a universal rationality 
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but only a particular local one. Do these maxims successfully serve as universal 
principles shared by all languages and known innately by all human beings? In 1970s 
Keenan (1976) challenged the universality of Grice's maxims by providing counter 
examples that people in Madagascar systematically violate Grice's first maxim (maxim 
of quantity) by not giving information when required. 
Philosophers of language such as Grice, Austin and Searle seem to believe that it 
is possible to make reasonable generalisations by introspection and that their intuitions 
and their findings also have a universal relevance (Duranti 1997: 227). However, the 
principles invoked by these researchers are inevitably bound to their cultural and 
linguistic presuppositions and therefore the universality of these principles is highly 
questionable. As Keenan (1976) challenged the universality of Grice's maxims, some 
linguistic anthropologists challenged the universal assumption of Speech Act Theory. 
Rosaldo (1982), based on her fieldwork among the Ilongots in the Philippines, argued 
that intention and sincerity, which are crucial in Austin and Searle's Speech Acts Theory, 
are irrelevant to the success of speech acts within Ilongot society. Instead successful 
accomplishment of an Ilongot speech act, the tuydek (roughly `command') requires 
particular differences in social rank, which in turn derive from other qualities of persons 
achieved in social action such as a knowledgeable heart (Hill and Irvine 1993: 8). Thus 
Rosaldo argues that people display through language use an understanding of their own 
peculiar ways of being in the world and that a speaker's use of language reproduces a 
particular social system and that speech acts in a society must be seen as part of its 
cultural practices. 
Duranti (1997: 228) observes very different notions of goals of linguistic 
interpretation between speech act theorists and linguistic anthropologists. For Searle and 
other speech act theorists, the goal is to produce a method for arriving at the necessary 
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and sufficient conditions of human communication, felicity conditions and sincerity 
conditions etc. in terms of the mental state of some persons in isolation from relations 
with other persons, whereas for Rosaldo and other linguistic anthropologists, the goal is 
to understand how particular uses of language might sustain, reproduce or challenge 
particular versions of the social order and the notion of person (or self) that is part of 
that order. 
Founders of early pragmatics, who built upon rationalist assumptions, 
endeavoured to establish the principles which were reasonable for rational human 
beings to follow. But the interlocutors are not just `rational' beings. They are `social' 
beings as well as `psychological' beings. Lakoff and Leech inherited the weaknesses of 
early pragmatics. 
4. Conclusion 
Having come from the Chomskyan school, Lakoff extended her grammatical rules to 
rules of Pragmatic Competence. She pioneered the field of linguistic politeness by 
proposing Rules of Politeness as being juxtaposed with Rules of Clarity (Grice's 
maxims). Her efforts to establish politeness as `rules' were not entirely successful as she 
encountered many situations in which her original scheme no longer worked and needed 
revision repeatedly. Lakoff's interest was probably in `performance' but she tried to 
explain this in a theoretical framework intended to explain `competence'. Despite her 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of this framework, she could not abandon it and 
explore an alternative framework. 
Leech's main concern has been to establish a comprehensive framework for 
pragmatics. Leech also proposed his Politeness Principle paralleling Grice's 
Cooperative Principles. Leech associated politeness with particular Speech Acts and 
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provided the relevant politeness maxims for different speech acts (See 2.1. (c)). His 
elaborate taxonomy of politeness maxims was welcomed but was often criticised for its 
inelegance and arbitrariness from the perspective of the law of parsimony. 
Both Lakoff and Leech, building their theory (fully or partially) on the 
Saussurean-Chomskyan tradition, which aimed to establish an idealised language 
system, offered their constructs as the politeness `rules' or `principles' that people 
follow. They also relied heavily on early pragmatics for their theory construction, 
affirming Grice's cooperative principle and establishing their politeness rules/principles 
as its extension. Consequently, Lakoff and Leech inherited various problems inherent in 
early pragmatics. Because pragmatics theory is built upon rationalistic assumptions, the 
situational contexts are devised by theorists for the purpose of theorisation rather than 
taken from empirical data. Focusing on `rules/principles', actual language users were 
virtually disregarded in their framework. In such approaches, which focus on language 
system/structure, there is little place to discuss exactly why language users are 
motivated to use politeness. I will discuss this further in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 Brown and Levinson 
0. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will investigate Brown and Levinson's (1978 [1987]) theory of 
politeness. Brown and Levinson's approach is different from Leech's and Lakoff's 
approaches in many ways. Before discussing B&L's theory, I will highlight the 
differences. 
First, all three theorists employed Grice's maxims in their theories of politeness. 
Lakoff and Leech accepted Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) and proposed politeness 
principles as an extension of Grice's maxims. Brown and Levinson (B&L) also affirmed 
Grice's Maxims as rational and efficient rules of conversation, but they regarded 
politeness as deviation from Grice's maxims. In other words, B&L used the Gricean 
Maxims as a launching pad for the development of their new approach. 
Second, there was a distinct shift of focus from principles of `language use' to 
principles of `social interaction'. Lakoff and Leech, relying heavily on early 
`pragmatics', focused on elucidating the principles governing language use. Lakoff and 
Leech were both concerned with these contextual factors, but the early `pragmatics' 
framework, which was characterised by the `logico-philosophic' approach (Eggins & 
Slade 1997: 24). Such an approach tends to overlook the fact that all communication acts 
must inevitably be social, and therefore fails to accommodate satisfactorily to factors 
such as situational context, the social relationship of the interlocutors and the cultural 
context, which are all essential bases for real communication. B&L, on the other hand, 
are well aware that the use of language and the social relationships of those who speak it 
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are inseparable and claim that "the principles of language usage may be largely 
coincident with discovering the principles out of which social relationships, in their 
interactional aspect, are constructed: dimensions by which individuals manage to relate 
to others in particular ways" (1987: 55). B&L aimed at establishing a theory of 
politeness which provided an explanation not just of the principles of language use, but 
also of the principles of social relationship in interaction. Consequentially, politeness in 
B&L's theory was now no longer discussed exclusively in the `pragmatics' arena. 52 
Third, B&L were committed to establishing `universal' principles of politeness. 
Lakoff and Leech also had aimed to establish universal pragmatic principles of 
politeness, but they included culture-specific elements in their theories without 
indicating clearly which were universal and which were culture-specific. Lakoff's rules 
of politeness were intended to be universal, but she also suggested that the same three 
rules develop different orders of precedence in different cultures or `politeness systems'. 
According to Leech's theory, some maxims may be universally applicable and others 
may be culture-specific but the distinction is not entirely clear. B&L, on the other hand, 
seem to have been committed to establishing a universal theory of politeness, and they 
state explicitly that their aims were to discover "some principles of a universal yet a 
`social' sort" (1987: 56) behind politeness phenomena and to propose a model that 
accounts for "the observed cross-cultural similarities in the abstract principles which 
underlie polite usage" (1987: 57). 
Finally, B&L focused on the interlocutors' motivation for using politeness 
while Lakoff and Leech saw politeness as part of pragmatic rules or principles that 
interlocutors are expected to observe during conversation. Lakoff and Leech did not 
pursue the essential underlying question as to the reason why interlocutors are motivated 
52 `Pragmatics' as discussed here refers to the narrow sense of the field of pragmatics in the 1960s-70s 
developed by philosophers such as Grice, Austin and Searle, and characterised by its logico-philosophical 
approach. 
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to employ polite discourse in the first place. B&L, on the other hand, looked at 
politeness from the perspective of language users themselves and tried to explicate their 
motivation for employing politeness. B&L (1987: 285) introduced the notion of `face' 
borrowed from anthropology and sociology (Durkheim 1915; Goffman 1967) and used 
it as one of the key notions for explaining an interlocutors' motivation for using 
politeness and sought to define politeness as `face-saving strategies'. 
Thus B&L moved on from a pragmatics-based approach and established a 
theory of politeness drawn from a broader perspective of social interaction drawing 
upon anthropology and sociology. Section 1 introduces B&L's theory. Section 2 
provides an evaluation of B&L's theory at two levels, one as a sociolinguistic theory (in 
2.1. ) and the other in the wider cultural and academic context (in 2.2. ). In 2.2., some 
problems surrounding the key notions of B&L's theory and its theory construction will 
be discussed. Section 3 concludes the discussion. 
1. Brown and Levinson's theory (1978 [1987]) 
1.0. Introduction to Brown and Levinson's theory 
Brown and Levinson's Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage was first 
published in Goody (ed. ) (1978) Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social 
Interaction along with two papers on `questions'. This seminal work on politeness has 
dominated the field ever since its publication. In 1987, B&L published the same paper 
as an independent book without any revision, but with the addition of a long 
introduction, in which they highlighted many issues raised by various researchers in the 
nine years since its first publication and attempted to provide supplementary comments, 
clarifications and defences of their original theory against criticisms of it. In this 
introduction, B&L also discussed recent developments in the field of politeness 
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including interdisciplinary studies involving linguistic politeness. It is important to give 
due weight to this introduction added in the 1987 edition as well as to their initial theory 
of politeness in 1978, in order to evaluate the ongoing development of their thinking. 
B&L's main motive in presenting this book is to describe and account for the 
phenomenon of politeness, as they see extraordinary "parallelism in the linguistic 
minutiae of the utterance with which persons choose to express themselves in quite 
unrelated languages and culture" (1987: 55). B&L argue that what they call `rationality' 
is "the only satisfactory explanatory scheme" (ibid. ) for such striking similarities across 
cultures. B&L (1987: 56) list their subsidiary aims in the prologue: 
1) "to identify some principles of a universal yet `social' sort, and in so 
doing provide a possible social candidate for deeper functional 
pressures on the shape of grammars in general" 
2) "to provide an antidote to the under-evaluation in the sociological 
sciences of the complexity of human being", "to draw the attention of 
social scientists to the richness and complexity of the assumptions and 
inferences upon the basis of which humans understand and cooperate 
with one another" and "to demonstrate the role of rationality, and its 
mutual assumptions by participants, in the derivation of inferences 
beyond the initial significance of word, tone and gesture" 
3) to show that "sociolinguistics (to coin a slogan) ought to be applied 
pragmatics" out of their conviction that "to understand sociological 
aspects of language use one must first explore its systematics" 
4) "to rebut the once-fashionable doctrine of cultural relativity in the 
field of interaction" and "to show that superficial diversities can 
emerge from underlying universal principles and are satisfactorily 
accounted for only in relation to them" 
To summarise from the prologue, B&L's main aims are to discover the `universal' yet 
`social' principles of politeness phenomena and to propose a model that accounts for 
"the observed cross-cultural similarities in the abstract principles which underlie polite 
usage" (1987: 57). They hope that this model will also serve as "a reference model for 
culturally specific usage" (ibid. ) and "an ethnographic tool of great precision for 
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investigating the quality of social relations in any society" (ibid. ). B&L (1987: 59) 
attempted to substantiate their claim to universality by presenting data in first-hand 
tape-recordings from three unrelated languages: English (from both sides of the 
Atlantic); Tzeltal, a Mayan language in Mexico; and South Indian Tamil from 
Tamilnadu. This is supplemented by examples drawn from native speakers' 
introspections for English and by elicited data for Tzeltal and Tamil. 
In 1.1., I will provides an in-depth exposition of the theory. As there have been 
many empirical studies based on B&L's theory, in 1.2., 1 will outline some major strands 
of post-Brown & Levinson development. 
I. I. Politeness as universal yet social principles 
(a). The fundamental assumptions of B&L's politeness theory 
B&L's politeness theory is built upon the twin assumptions of `rationality' and `face', 
which are personified in a so-called universal Model Person (MP). The Model Person 
"consists in a wilful fluent speaker of a natural language, further endowed with two 
special properties - rationality and face (1987: 58). " As they define it, `rationality' is "a 
precisely definable mode of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those 
ends" (ibid. ) and `face' is two particular `wants' that MP is endowed with, namely the 
want that his actions be unimpeded by others (negative want) and the want that his 
wants be desirable to at least some others (positive want). B&L (1987: 61) redefined 
`face' as "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself' which 
consists of 
(a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to 
non-distraction - i. e. freedom of action and freedom from imposition 
(b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or `personality (crucially 
including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) 
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claimed by interactants53 
Besides their rather technical definition of `face' as `want', B&L (1987: 61) also note 
that their notion of `face' is "derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the English 
folk term, which ties `face' up with notions of being embarrassed, humiliated or `losing 
face"' and that it is "something that is emotionally invested, that can be lost, maintained 
or enhanced and must be constantly attended to in interaction" (ibid. ). 54 B&L assume 
that people cooperate with one another in maintaining each other's face in interaction, 
that is, "normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and 
since people can be expected to defend their face if threatened, and in defending their 
own to threaten each others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to 
maintain each others' face" (ibid. ). 
(b). Face Threatening Acts (FTA) 
Given these assumptions of the universality of `face' and `rationality', B&L argue that 
certain acts55 intrinsically threaten face, and chose to term these FTA (Face Threatening 
Acts), namely those acts that by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the 
addressee and/or of the speaker" (1987: 65). B&L (1987: 65-68) construct two-way 
classifications of FTA, according to whether positive face or negative face is threatened 
and a two-way classification of when it is mainly the Speaker (S)'s face or the Hearer 
(H)'s face which is threatened, according to the nature of particular FTAs. (See 
53 B&L (1987: 285) state that their notion of positive and negative face is taken from Durkheim's (1915) 
`positive and negative rites' and partially via Goffman. `Negative rite' has an element of preventing undue 
mixing of the sacred and the profane, while `positive rite' positively affirms the sacred representation 
constructed by society or religion. (See B&L 1987: 43-44) 
54 B&L's notion of face consisting of negative and positive wants is actually significantly different both 
from "the English folk term" and from Goffman's notion of face. This will be further considered later (in 
2.2.2 (a) (b) and (c)) in this chapter. 
55 In B&L's definition, `act' means "what is intended to be done by a verbal or non-verbal 
communication, just as one or more `speech acts' can be assigned to an utterance" (1987: 65). Following 
Grice (1971): a communicative act is a chunk of behaviour B which is produced by S with a specific 
intention, which S intends H to recognize, this recognition being the communicative point of S's 
performing B. 
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Appendix 2-A for their four way cross-classification, which "has a complex relation to 
the ways in which FTAs are handled" (1987: 68)). 
(c). Politeness: strategies to minimize face threatening acts 
B&L (1987 [1978]) define politeness as being forms of `redressive' actions taken in 
order to counterbalance the potentially disruptive effect of FTAs. They propose three 
possible types of politeness strategies (positive politeness, negative politeness and 
off-record) (2,3,4 in the diagram below). B&L (1987: 60) argue that the more an act 
threatens S's or H's face, the more S will want to choose a higher-numbered strategy in 
the following diagram. The Speaker (S) may choose to do the FTA baldly without any 
`redressive' action, in case S's need to be efficient or urgent is greater than S's need 
(want) to maintain H's face. B&L define this as bald on record (1. in their diagram 
below). 56 On the contrary, when the risk of face loss is extremely great, a Speaker 
refrains from performing the FTA (5 in their diagram below). 
Circumstances determining 
choices of strategy: 
Lesser 
1. Without redressive action, baldly 
On record 
° 2. Positive politeness 
°° Do the FTA With redressive action 
4. Off record 3. Negative politeness 
wö "y w (\ 
W 5. Don't do the FTA 
Greater 
Fig. 2.1. Possible strategies for doing FTA (Face Threatening Acts) (B&L 1987: 60) 
The three politeness strategies are defined as follows: 
56 Doing an act baldly, without redress, involves performing an FTA in the most direct, clear, 
unambiguous and concise way possible. S does this when the danger of H's face loss is small or in 
circumstances where S and H both agree that the relevance of face demands may be suspended in the 
interest of urgency. 
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Positive politeness (B&L 1987: 70) is oriented towards the positive face of H, the 
positive self-image that he/she claims for himself/herself. "Positive politeness 
`anoints'(`butters up', in contemporary English parlance) the face of the addressee 
by indicating that in some respects, S wants what H wants. -The potential 
face 
threat of an act is minimized by the assurance that in general S wants at least some 
of H's wants (ibid. 70). (See Appendix 2-B for summary of positive strategies. ) 
Negative politeness (B&L 1987: 70) is oriented mainly toward partially satisfying 
(redressing) H's negative face, his/her basic want to maintain claims of territory and 
self-determination. Negative politeness is essentially avoidance-based, and the 
realization of negative-politeness strategies consist in assurances that the speaker 
recognizes and respects the addressee's negative-face wants and will not (or will 
only minimally) interfere with the addressee's freedom of action. Hence 
negative-politeness is characterized by self-effacement, formality and restraint, with 
attention to very restricted aspects of H's self-image, centering on his want to be 
unimpeded. (See Appendix 2-C for summary of negative strategies) 
Off record strategy is to perform an FTA indirectly. The Speaker "must give H some 
hints and hope that H picks up on them and thereby interprets what S really means 
(intends) to say. The basic way to do this is to invite conversational implicature by 
violating, in some way, the Gricean Maxims of efficient communication. 
(1987: 213)". (See Appendix 2-D for summary of off-record strategies) 
(d). Sociological variables for computing the weightiness of an FTA 
B&L (1987: 74) claim that the seriousness of any particular FTA involves the following 
sociological factors in many (and perhaps all) cultures. (S-speaker, H-hearer) 
1. Social distance (D) between S and H (a symmetric relation) 
D is a symmetric social dimension of similarity/difference within which S and 
H stand for the purposes of this act. 
2. Relative power (P) that H has over S (an asymmetric relation) 
P is an asymmetric social dimension of relative power. P(H, S) is the degree to 
which H can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the 
expense of S's plans and self-evaluation. In general there are two sources of P, 
either of which may be authorized or unauthorized - material control (over 
economic distribution and physical force) and metaphysical control (over the 
actions of others, by virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those 
others). In most cases an individual's power is drawn from both these sources, 
or is thought to overlap them. 
3. Absolute ranking (R) of imposition in the particular culture 
R is a culturally and situationally defined ranking of imposition by the degree 
to which they are considered to interfere with an agent's wants of 
self-determination or of approval (his negative- and positive- wants). 
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For each FTA, the seriousness or weightiness of FTA x is computed in the following 
equation (1987: 76). 
Wx=D(S, H)+P(H, S)+Rr 
Wx numeral value that measures the weightiness of the FTAs 
D(S, H) the value that measures the social distance between S and H; 
P(H, S) a measure of the power that H has over S 
Rx a value that measures the degree to which the FTAx is rated an 
imposition in that culture 
(e). Universality and cultural variations 
B&L (1987: 243) claim that "the theory was couched in terms of individual acts, and 
presented a dyadic act-by-act account of strategic interaction". B&L (1987: 244) made 
an a priori universal claim. 
(i) The universality of face, describable as two kinds of wants 
(ii) The potential universality of rational action devoted to satisfy others' face wants. 
(iii) The universality of the mutual knowledge between interactants of (i) and (ii) 
To these a priori claims B&L add a further claim based on observation of the actual use 
of sentences in context: that the seriousness of an FTA is assessed as a complex function 
of three variables, `distance', `power' and `rating of imposition'. In other words the acts 
of individuals represent the gamut of strategies from `bald on record', `positive 
politeness', `negative politeness' to `indirectness' (off-record), depending on situational 
factors determining the Wx (numeral value that measures the weightiness of the FTAs). 
B&L (1987: 243), having built their theory on a universal claim of `rationality' and 
`face' still acknowledge that cultural variations exist, but then they claim that the 
differences lie in `ethos', which they interpret as the affective quality of interaction 
characterizing groups, or social categories of persons, in a particular society. "In some 
societies interactional ethos is generally warm, easy-going, friendly; in others it is stiff, 
formal, deferential; in others it is characterized by displays of self-importance, bragging 
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and showing off (the Kwakiutl as reported by Benedict (1935), the latmul men as 
reported by Bateson (1958) in still others it is distant, hostile, suspicious (the Dobu as 
interpreted by Benedict (ibid. ))" (1987: 243). 
B&L (1987: 244-245) suggest the following apparatus to describe cross-cultural 
variations. 
(i) The general level of Wx in a culture, as determined by the sum of P, D and 
R values. 
(ii) The extent to which all acts are FTAs and the particular kinds of acts that 
are FTAs in a culture 
(iii) The cultural composition of Wx; the varying values (and thus importance) 
attached to P, D and Rx and the different sources for their assessment. 
(iv) Different modes of assignment of members to the sets of persons whom an 
actor wants to pay him positive face, and the extent to which those sets are 
extended; are the relevant persons a highly limited and restricted class, or 
are they (or some of them) an extensive set? 
(v) The nature and distribution of strategies over the most prominent dyadic 
relations in a particular society; are they distributed symmetrically? 
Asymmetrically? in particular configurations? 
B&L assume that types of social relationship are repetitive throughout a society, i. e. 
there is a constancy or a stability in such relationships, which can be assessed by D and 
P in B&L's formula above. Since the assessment of P and D crucially determine Wx 
which in turn regulates the choice of politeness strategy, B&L argue that it is possible to 
generalise about the kinds of politeness that are typically employed by members of that 
society in public. In other words, stability in social relations in any particular culture 
provides the explanation of regularities in interactional strategies. B&L, assuming the 
universality of rationality and face, interpret politeness as an individual's (Model 
Person's) rational action of employing face-saving strategies in dyadic interaction. As 
mentioned earlier, B&L acknowledge that cultural variations arise from the `ethos' of a 
particular society or culture and deal with them in their Wx formula. B&L argue that 
their theory considers "a correlation between D and P levels in a society and the kind 
and amount of face attention" (1987: 244). B&L, however, make sure that cultural 
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(emic) explanations of cross-cultural differences do not supersede explanation in terms 
of universal (etic) social dimension, like D and P in their theory. Understood this way, 
the Model Person in B&L's theory remains a rational independent actor, who freely 
chooses various politeness strategies based on his/her calculation of Wx. As B&L's 
theory was couched in terms of individual acts, I observe that the individual or social 
actor is emphasised and social constraints, which lie in ethos are downplayed as one 
variable for rational calculation of Wx. 57 The social actor and the social structure are 
skilfully separated in B&L's theory. I will return to this discussion later (in 2.1.2. ) in this 
chapter. 
1.2. Post-B&L Development 
The publication of B&L's theory influenced the whole field and inspired researchers to 
carry out a variety of studies. I will introduce some major strands of Post-B&L 
development of politeness studies. Post-B&L studies inherited both the strengths and 
weaknesses of B&L's theory, so they will be evaluated in the next section as part of the 
evaluation of B&L's theory. 
First, there have been a number of empirical studies including comparisons of 
different types of speech acts in various cultural contexts. An important collection of 
contributions on cross-cultural differences in the realisation of speech acts is 
Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies (1989) edited by Blum-Kulka, 
House and Kasper. The researchers in this Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization 
Project (CCSARP) used the Discourse Completion Test (DCT)58 and analysed the 
57 Mills (2003: 101-2) also challenged the assumption that social variables in B&L's theory are stable and 
computable. She argues that they are constantly negotiated during each interaction (See Ch. 4.4.3). 
58 The test consists of scripted dialogues that represent socially differentiated situations. Each dialogue is 
preceded by a short description of the situation, specifying the setting, and the social distance between the 
participants and their status relative to each other, followed by an incomplete dialogue. Respondents were 
asked to complete the dialogue, thereby providing the speech act aimed at (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 
1989b: 13-14). 
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elicited data with the CCSARP coding manual they developed. 59 The development of 
this coding manual accelerated similar cross-cultural comparisons in realisation of 
speech acts. 6° Interlocutors in certain cultures prefer to use more negative politeness 
strategies under the same controlled contextual features or vice versa (cf. B&L 
1987: 243-246). Some cross-cultural empirical studies confirm that the level of 
directness in speech act realisation differs according to culture. For instance, House and 
Kasper (1981) revealed that German speakers tend to realise requests and complaints 
more directly than English speakers. Blum-Kulka (1983) showed that Hebrew speakers 
are more direct in requests than English speakers. Such cross-cultural comparisons have 
remained as popular themes for many PhD theses in politeness studies for the last two 
decades (e. g. Sifianou 1987; Placencia 1991; Spencer-Oatey, 1992; Fukushima 1999; 
Reiter 1999; Intachakra 2001; Economidou-Kogetsidis 2003; Hatipoglu, 2003; Menasan 
2004). 
Second, politeness phenomena have been investigated in different contexts. 
Politeness has become a truly interdisciplinary subject of study, discussed in business 
(e. g. Bargiela-Chiappiani & Harris 1996; Van Waes and van Wijk 2001; Chakorn 2002; 
Jung 2003; White et al. 2004), education (e. g. Li 2000), politics (e. g. Harris 2001) 
judicial studies (e. g. Kurzon 2001), media (e. g. Mullany 1998), medicine (e. g. Lambert 
1996) and translation/interpreting (e. g. Hickey 2001; Krouglov 1999; Monacelli 2005). 
In terms of data collection, corpora of naturally occurring data (e. g. Jung 2003, 
Monacelli 2005) have often been used in many of these studies. 
Third, there has been some research concerning the acquisition of politeness. 
59 Detailed coding instructions are found in Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper (1989a: 273-294) and 
Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984: 196-213) 
60 Requests, (e. g. Blum-Kulka 1987; Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper 1989a; Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 
1984, Sifianou 1992; Rinnert and Kobayashi 1999; Fukushima 1996,1999,2002), apologies (e. g. 
Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984; Vollmer and Olshtain 1989; Obeng 1999; Okamura and Wei 2000; 
Suszczynska 1999; Wouk 2006), compliments (e. g. Mursy and Wilson 2001; Lorenzo-Dus 2001; 
Spencer-Oatey, Ng & Dong 2000; Golato 2003; Yu 2003) and thanks (e. g. Eisenstein and Bodman 1993; 
Kumatoridani 1999). 
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Some studies are on the LI acquisition of politeness through socialisation (e. g. Clancy 
1986; Snow et al 1990; Axia 1993; Ladegaard 2004) and others are on the L2 learner's 
acquisition of pragmatic competences (e. g. Kasper and Blum-Kulka 1993a; Kasper and 
Schmidt 1996; Hinkel 1992). In interlanguage pragmatics, where theoretical and 
empirical foundations derive from cross-cultural pragmatics, researchers have focused 
particularly on the illocutionary and politeness dimensions of speech act performance 
(e. g. Kasper and Blum-Kulka 1993; Olshtain and Weinbach 1993; Takahashi and Beebe 
1993; Trosborg 1995; Gass and Houck 1999; Felix-Brasdefer 2004). There has been a 
focus on "learners' inappropriate speech realization in order to uncover their pragmatic 
knowledge at a given time in their learning process" (e. g. Blum-Kulka, House, and 
Kasper 1989b). Thomas (1983) reveals that even fairly advanced learners fail to convey 
or comprehend the intended illocutionary force of politeness values. 
Fourth, there has been an increasing number of politeness studies on the issue 
of gender (e. g. Holmes 1995,2005; Mills 2002,2003; Hobbs 2003; Kendall 2004: 
SturtzSreetharan 2006), of class (Kleiner 1996; Mills 2004) and of power (Locher 
2004). 
Fifthly and finally, a recent development is consideration of impoliteness (e. g. 
Culpeper 1996; Zamora 2000; Harris 2001; Culpeper 1996; Culpeper et al 2003; 
Bousfield & Locher forthcoming. ). In July 3-4,2006, the very first conference on 
impoliteness/ rudeness "Linguistic impoliteness and rudeness: confrontation and 
conflict in discourse" was held at Huddersfield, West Yorkshire. 
2. Evaluation of B&L's politeness theory 
2.1. B&L's theory as a sociolinguistic theory 
While Lakoff and Leech included politeness as an extension of conversational maxims, 
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B&L understood politeness to be a motivating force for deviating from Grice's maxims. 
As B&L recognised that principles of language use are inseparable from the principles 
of social relationships, they aimed to elucidate `universal' yet `social' principles of 
politeness in their theory. B&L focused on language users and their motivation for using 
politeness. Their theory was the first serious consideration of politeness from a social 
psychological perspective. For a variety of reasons, B&L made a huge contribution to 
politeness studies. Their theory has dominated the field and many empirical studies 
followed which were based upon it. In this section, I will first explore reasons why 
B&L's theory became so popular in the field (in 2.1.1. ). Then I will indicate some of the 
inadequacies of B&L's approach as a sociolinguistic theory (in 2.1.2. ). 
2.1.1. Popularity of B&L's theory 
Since its first publication, B&L's theory has become the dominant theory in politeness 
studies and has been influential not only among researchers of linguistic related 
disciplines such as sociolinguistics or pragmatics, who are drawing more and more upon 
sociology and anthropology, but also among researchers of other disciplines such as 
social psychology or intercultural communication. 61 So why has B&L's theory gained 
such popularity? 
First, the notion of `negative' and `positive' politeness seemed to be 
particularly appealing to many researchers. These two kinds of politeness correspond 
to two sides of face: `negative face': the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, 
rights to non-distraction i. e. freedom of action and freedom from imposition and 
`positive face': the positive consistent self-image or `personality (crucially including the 
61 e. g. Holtgraves 2001, Holtgraves 1997, Holtgraves 1997, Holtgraves 1992, Holtgraves & Yang 1990 
(social psychology); Ting-Toomey 1988, Ting-Toomey, and Kurogi 1998 (intercultural communication) 
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desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants62. 
Many people probably welcomed B&L's two notions of `face-wants' because they could 
relate to or feel resonance with these two fundamental psychological needs. Different 
researchers have acknowledged these two types of interactional needs. Scollon and 
Scollon (1995: 36) expressed it as follows: 
On the one hand, in human interactions we have a need to be involved with 
other participants and to show them our involvement. On the other hand, 
we need to maintain some degree of independence from other participants 
and to show them that we respect their independence. 
Tannen (1989) called these interactional needs `involvement' and `distance' and Scollon 
and Scollon (1983,1995) labelled them as `solidarity' and `deference'. Hirschon (2001) 
used `sociability' and `autonomy' and Janny and Arndt (1992) called them 
`interpersonal face' and `personal face'. These two aspects may not be necessarily two 
aspects of `face' as B&L claimed, but they are probably two fundamental social 
psychological needs or desires common to all human beings. B&L skilfully combined 
these desires with the notion of `face' and created a technical notion of `face-wants' 
Because many were able to identify with these social psychological needs, although 
they may not necessarily agree that they are two sides of `face', I believe that this made 
B&L's `negative' and `positive' face popular. 
Second, B&L's theory construction is clear-cut and suitable for empirical 
studies and cross-cultural comparisons whereas Lakoffs rules of politeness and Leechs 
politeness maxims are not in a format which can be easily tested or applied. Thomas 
(1995: 168) commented that Leech's maxims may be used as an inventory for various 
social-psychological constraints influencing the choices made within the pragmatic 
62 It should be noted that these two types of politeness (politeness by keeping distance from the addressee 
and politeness by being close to the addressee) are not new in B&L's theory. Lakoff (1973), prior to B&L, 
had already mentioned `Distance' (Rule 1): `Don't impose' and Camaraderie (Rule 3): Make A feel good 
- be friendly'; `Distance' (Rule 1) corresponds to `negative politeness' and Camaraderie (Rule 3) 
corresponds to `positive politeness'. 
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parameters (See Ch. ] 2.2.2. ). However, because of the arbitrariness of his categories, 
they are not very suitable for empirical studies. B&L's theory, on the other hand, has 
clear-cut and concise constructs (positive politeness, negative politeness and off-record 
strategies) and this attracted researchers who wished to conduct empirical studies. 
Preference for positive politeness, negative politeness and off-record strategies in B&L's 
theory has been examined by controlling the variables of D(S, H), P(H, S) and Rx (See 
l 
. 
1. (d)., this chapter). Cross cultural comparisons of politeness strategies have also been 
made using the inventory of strategies in B&L's theory and other empirical studies were 
carried out by controlling the variables D, P and Rx. 
Third, B&L 's theory of politeness attracts researchers because of its universal 
claims. If one recollects that the subtitle of their book is `some universals in language 
usage', B&L's intention may not actually have been to create a comprehensive universal 
theory of politeness aimed at explaining all politeness phenomena in all languages and 
cultural contexts. B&L's definition of politeness as `redressive' actions taken in order to 
counterbalance the potentially disruptive effect of face threatening acts may not be the 
one and only possible definition of politeness, but it can be seen as a limited definition 
within their theory in order to explain some seemingly `universal' aspects of politeness 
phenomena. Still, even though the theory may only explicate some universals in 
politeness phenomena, because of its claim to universality, the theory appeals to 
researchers, because it allows them to conduct empirical research testing universal 
applicability. A universal theory and empirical research are buzzwords for modernist 
scientific disciplines. Thus I believe that B&L's theory of politeness has gained 
popularity among many researchers because it fulfilled the requirements of an 
acceptable theory regarded as modern science. I will discuss this issue further in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.1.2. Some inadequacies in B&L's theory 
While many researchers wholeheartedly embraced B&L's theory and carried out various 
empirical studies, others criticised B&L's theory at certain points. Many of their 
criticisms are directed against the basic assumptions of B&L's theory, namely the 
so-called `Model Person', and `face', which were challenged particularly by 
non-Anglo-Saxon researchers, but in this section, I temporarily overlook the criticism of 
major philosophical problems surrounding these key notions or assumptions in B&L's 
theory and instead focus on more descriptive sociolinguistic inadequacies in the theory. 
I will come back to more general philosophical problems with these underlying 
assumptions in 2.2. 
First, B&Ls theory is a Speaker's production model of politeness. In the 
speaker-hearer interactional dyad, in which B&L placed politeness, there should be two 
sides to politeness: the production of particular behaviours by a speaker and the 
corresponding perception and evaluation of those behaviours by a hearer. B&L chose to 
formulate their theory as the Model Person's production model of politeness, seeing 
politeness from the perspective of the Speaker. Consequently, B&L's theory does not 
provide any idea of how the Hearer actually perceives or evaluates politeness. Eelen 
(2001: 96) rightly points out that "politeness is primarily conceptualised as a form of 
speaker behaviour rather than hearer evaluation. " The assessment of the weightiness of 
FTAs is also looked at from the perspective of the Speaker. However, the Speaker's 
intention of expressing politeness is often misinterpreted by the Hearer, because the 
Hearer assesses the Speaker's utterance based upon the Hearer's criteria of assessment, 
which may be different from the Speaker's. The Speaker's intention is not always 
accurately perceived by the Hearer. At times the Speaker may feel like saying to the 
Chapter 2 Brown and Levinson 88 
Hearer, "You've got hold of the wrong end of the stick". In any comprehensive study of 
politeness, the Hearer's perspective ought to be afforded an equally important place to 
the Speaker's and the gap between the intention of the Speaker and the Hearer's 
evaluation of the Speaker's utterance should be considered. 63 
Second, interactants are not just rational beings, as is assumed in B&L 's theory. 
B&L (1987: 71) argue that any rational agent tends to choose the same genus of strategy 
under the same conditions - that is, make the same moves as any other person would 
make under the same circumstances, because they assume that particular strategies 
intrinsically afford certain payoffs or advantages, and the relevant circumstances are 
those in which one of these payoffs would be more advantageous than any other. It is 
assumed here somewhat gratuitously that all human beings tend to make the same 
choices because they are equally `rational'. Kopytko (1995) argues that such deductive 
reasoning in an interaction is untenable, stressing that the Speaker is envisaged as "a 
deterministic device, or an abstract concept devoid of attitudes, personality" (1995: 487). 
B&L seem to have assumed that cultural variations in choice of strategies lie only in 
differences of ethos and that they are all measurable in social variables in Wx (Power, 
Distance and Imposition of FTC, in particular cultures). However, in real life situations, 
besides general cultural variations, we would anticipate some individual variability in 
the choice of strategies even within the same culture or social context. 
There are also differences which might arise from the gender, or class of the 
Speaker and/or the Hearer (Mills 2003, Holmes 1988,1995), which potentially may 
have an enormous impact on the way politeness is expressed. The interactional history 
between any particular Speaker and Hearer built up over previous encounters or their 
respective psychological states might also influence both the Speaker's choice of 
politeness strategies and the Hearer's interpretation of the Speaker's utterances. B&L's 
63 The Hearer's evaluative practice will be explored in the final chapter (Conclusion). 
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MP does not seem capable of accommodating such variations; the MP is endowed with 
rationality and face. B&L focused on the alleged similarities between politeness 
phenomena in unrelated languages across cultures and tried to identify universal 
elements. But striking differences may also be observed even between two interlocutors 
from within the same culture, as well as between those from widely differing cultures. 
Third, B&L v theory deals with short stretches of conversational exchange 
which contain certain `acts'. For B&L, `act' means "what is intended to be done by a 
verbal or non-verbal communication, just as one or more `speech acts' can be assigned 
to an utterance" (1987: 65). Following Grice (1971), B&L also defined that "a 
communicative act is a chunk of behaviour B which is produced by S with a specific 
intention, which S intends H to recognize, this recognition being the communicative 
point of S's doing B" (1987: 286). In any naturally occurring conversation, however, 
interaction consists of a longer stretch of conversational sequence, involving alterations 
of initial communication strategies in accordance with the reaction of the Hearer, repair 
mechanisms etc. 64A single utterance consonant with the Speaker's original intention of 
certain acts is very rare. Thus B&L did not, in fact, adequately explain such naturally 
occurring conversational data. 65 
Fourth, as B&L define politeness as strategies for minimising face-threatening 
acts, their theory is not geared to situations where the face-threats have already taken 
place. Suppose that a Speaker chooses an appropriate strategy which he/she thought 
would minimize the face-threat to the Hearer. Despite the Speaker's polite intention, 
there may be situations in which the Hearer becomes offended, perhaps because the 
64 Conversation Analysts (e. g. Schegloff 1972, Schegloff and Sacks 1973, Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 
1974) analyse longer stretches of conversational sequence with the assumption that "a) interaction is 
structurally organised; b) contributions to interaction are contextually oriented; c) these two properties 
inhere in the details of interaction so that no order of detail can be dismissed, a priori, as disorderly, 
accidental, or irrelevant" (Heritage 1984: 241 quoted in Schiffrin 1994: 236). 
65 B&L admitted this problem in the long preface section, when their paper was independently published 
as a book Politeness: Some universals in language use in 1987. However the main text remains the same 
as the original 1978 paper. 
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Hearer interprets the Speaker's utterance differently from the Speaker's intention. As 
B&L see politeness as strategies for minimising potential face loss, i. e. `preventive 
measures' against possible disruptive relationship caused by face loss, B&L's theory 
fails to deal equally well with the situation once face-loss has already occurred. 
However, there must be utterances aimed at enhancing or restoring the face of the 
Hearer, even though damaging the Hearer's face was never intended in the first place. 
B&L interpret almost all acts as being `face-threatening acts. Even such an act as an 
apology, which could be interpreted as remedial work following disruption of 
relationships, B&L try to understand as a `face-threatening act' and explain what kind of 
face is threatened. B&L, however, did not see it in this way. Some researchers objected 
to such an emphasis upon `threat'. Nwoye (1992: 311) comments that in B&L's theory, 
human interaction becomes "an activity of continuous mutual monitoring of potential 
threat to the faces of the interactants, and of devising strategies for maintaining the 
interactants' faces -a view that if always true, could rob social interaction of all 
elements of pleasure". Schmidt (1980: 104) describes B&L's theory as embodying "an 
overly pessimistic, rather paranoid view of human social interaction. " 
Fifth, in B&L' theory, the Model Person is assumed to be able to make free 
choices of politeness based on computing Wx, the numeral value that measures FTA. 
However, interlocutors are often caught up in asymmetrical power relationships, which 
limit their choice of strategies. B&L consider P (H, S), "a measure of the power that 
H(Hearer) has over S(Speaker) (1987: 76)". Though B&L recognise that Power plays a 
significant role in choosing particular politeness strategies, B&L portray the MP as a 
rational free-agent who can freely claim his/her negative and positive face wants. The 
Power element is perceived as one of the variables for computing Wx but not as a factor 
which disadvantages the interlocutors in their choice of politeness strategies. But in 
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reality the less powerful tend to have far fewer choices of strategies, because they are 
expected to show respect to the powerful. This means that a single hypothesised Model 
Person cannot possibly fully represent both the powerful and the less powerful. Also the 
evaluation of politeness, which B&L failed to explain in their theory, is often not neutral 
either. The dominant person in any society tends to determine what is polite or 
appropriate and the less dominant individual's evaluation may not be able to use the 
same criteria for judgement or assessment at all. Thus, power and politeness are 
inevitably intertwined with each other. Such social and cultural reality is downplayed as 
an external variable for computing Wx because of their theory's emphasis on the 
rational choice of the Model Person. 
Finally, as some researchers (e. g. Culpeper 1996; Eelen 2001) have pointed out, 
B&Ls theory does not include any consideration of im-politeness in their framework. 
Culpeper (1996: 350) argues that, in order for a theory of politeness to be comprehensive, 
it is integral that the topic of linguistic impoliteness should also be addressed. Eelen 
(2001: 102) argues that if face wants were to account for impoliteness in the same way 
as politeness, they would need to include the want not to satisfy one's own face-wants, 
which is a contradiction in terms. Despite acknowledgements that FTAs can be 
performed without redress on some occasions (in urgent situations or when face-threat 
is minimal), B&L's model still does not account for the fact that their concept of face 
wants cannot explain their own non-fulfilment. (ibid. ) Mullany (1999) refers to the case 
of political interviews, where it is not in the interests of participants to pay mutual 
attention to each other's face needs. The centrality of the preservation of face needs in 
B&L's theory means that it does not appear to account for confrontational discourse 
where ignoring the addressees' face needs and attacking their position is a frequent and 
indeed expected occurrence. Failure to pay attention to the face needs of fellow 
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interlocutors does not result in conversational breakdown in political interviews, as 
would be anticipated in B&L's theory. 
2.2. Evaluation of B&L's theory in the wider cultural and 
academic context 
B&L chose to approach politeness from the perspective of individual interactants, and 
proposed a Model Person (MP) endowed with two properties, `rationality' and `face'. 
B&L argued that `rationality' and `face' provide universal motivation for using 
politeness strategies and built their entire theory on these assumptions. For them 
`politeness' consists of redressive actions that the Speaker uses for minimising the 
effects of face-threatening acts. These basic assumptions in B&L's theory, particularly 
the Model Person and B&L's notion of `face' have been criticised by non-Anglo-Saxon 
researchers in particular. They argue that the MP represents a Western individualistic 
construct of `self' and that `face' in B&L's theory is also individualistic, different from 
their notions of `face' and that B&L's politeness does not sufficiently explain the 
politeness phenomena of the interaction in more collectivistic societies such as Japan, 
China, or Nigeria. 
I contend that the difficulty with B&L's theory is not only due to ethnocentric 
theory construction assuming a Western individualistic notion of self, but the problem 
also derives from the philosophical presuppositions of modern theory to which B&L 
subscribe. In the academic climate of post-modernity, the limitation of such theory 
construction has come to be acknowledged. Therefore B&L's theory needs to be 
evaluated not only in the wider cultural context, but also in the wider academic context 
of Modernity-Post-modernity. In this section, I will revisit typical criticisms of B&L's 
Model Person (in 2.2.1. ) and their notion of `face' (in 2.2.2. ) and reinvestigate them 
from the perspective of modernist theory construction. 
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2.2.1. The Model Person in B&L's theory 
(a). Western individualism assumed in B&L's Model Person 
B&L's definition of the Model Person (MP) is brief. The Model Person "consists in a 
wilful fluent speaker of a natural language, further endowed with two special properties 
- rationality and face" (1987: 58). The MP 
in B&L's theory seems to come across as 
being an `autonomous', `rational' and `calculative' self. The MP rationally measures 
social variables in Wx (Power, Distance and Imposition) and chooses those strategies 
which give the highest pay-offs to the individual so that the potential face damage of 
Face Threatening Acts may be minimised. This strategic action of the MP is defined as 
`politeness' in this theory. 
Some (mainly non-Anglo-Saxon) researchers (Ide 1989, Matsumoto 1988, Gu 
1990, Mao1994, Nwoye 1992) have criticised the assumption of Western individualism 
behind B&L's MP. They criticise that in the name of this allegedly `rational' `universal' 
model person, an entirely Western individualistic model of self has been constructed. 
Why is their criticism significant? Because MP's strategic action of politeness in B&L's 
theory could end up being interpreted as `impolite' behaviour in a collectivist society! 
The self in group-oriented or collectivistic societies sees himself/herself as part of one 
or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribes, nation) and emphasises connectedness to 
other members and is expected to give priority to the goals of these collectives rather 
than to his/her own personal goals. To be `polite' in these societies is to maintain 
harmony with others and not to seek one's own goals. It is directly opposite to the MP's 
insistence on satisfying his own individual wants or rationally calculating the highest 
pay-offs as in B&L's theory. From the perspective of a person from collectivistic 
societies, the MP's calculative strategic action aiming for the highest pay-offs is far 
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from being polite, but is regarded as self-seeking and thoroughly impolite behaviour! 
Therefore a different depiction of self leads to a totally different perception of what 
constitutes genuine politeness. What is polite in one society may be considered impolite 
in another. Researchers from collectivistic societies find it impossible to understand 
how such self-seeking, calculative strategic actions aiming for the highest pay-offs can 
be an adequate explanation of true politeness. 
Politeness is perceived very differently in such collectivistic societies due to 
their different model of self. A Japanese researcher Ide (1989) argues that B&L's theory 
focused on volitional strategies of politeness and failed to acknowledge the aspect of 
what she described as wakimae (discernment). 
To behave according to wakimae is to show verbally and non-verbally 
one's sense of place or role in a given situation according to social 
conventions. In a stable society, an individual is expected to behave 
according to the status and the role of various levels ascribed to or acquired 
by that individual. To acknowledge the delicate status and/or the role 
differences of the speaker, the addressee and the referent in communication 
is essential to keep communication smooth and without friction. Thus to 
observe wakimae by means of language use is an integral part of linguistic 
politeness. The closest equivalent of term for wakimae in English is 
discernment (Hill et al. 1986: 347-348). (1989: 230) 
Ide (1989) points out that in Japanese language, politeness as a social marking system as 
demonstrated in honorific systems is always socio-pragmatically obligatory even for 
non-FTA utterance. Thus she argues (1989: 239) that politeness is better explained, not 
as the speaker's volitional choice, but rather as the speaker's observation of 
conventional rules of politeness to show wakimae (discernment). 66 Matsumoto (1988) 
also claims that politeness expressions in Japanese are triggered by social stratification 
rather than by the need for redressing FTAs as B&L claimed. She showed that every 
66 Ervin-Tripp, Nakamura & Goo (1995) discovered that appropriate behaviour in Asian countries such 
as China, Korea, Japan, etc. has to be judged in terms of the relations and mutual obligations of speaker 
and hearer, within their own communities, and not because speaker and hearer mutually want to fulfil 
their face-wants (negative face and positive face) as rights, as in an individualistic society. 
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predicate in Japanese could have an implication of politeness by the choice of 
polite/non-polite forms (as we saw in the examples of various versions of `Today is 
Saturday' in 1.1. (d) in the previous chapter). Matsumoto and Ide are not convinced that 
such typological characteristics of Japanese language, which has explicit devices for 
social indexing (or discerning one's own place in a given social situation, i. e. wakimae) 
can be simply subsumed under one of the negative politeness strategies such as `Give 
deference' in B&L's face-saving theory of politeness, because such linguistic devices 
are used even in non-FTAs and therefore it follows logically that they are not 
exclusively devices for redressing FTAs. 67 
Criticism of such Western ethnocentric constructs of self in modern theory has 
not been directed only at B&L's theory. Interestingly, in many disciplines since the 
1980s there have been similar criticisms that the individualistic conception of 
personhood has been blindly assumed in much Western universal rationalist theory 
construction. In sociology, Hofstede (1980) demonstrated forty nations' cultural 
differences in work-related values using four dimensions: 1) power distance, 2) 
individualism, 3) uncertainty avoidance and 4) masculinity. 68 This seminal publication 
has inspired many researchers in different disciplines to investigate the impact that 
differences such as the individualistic vs. collectivist perception of self may have on 
cognition, decision-making, and interactional patterns. 
In psychology, Markus and Kitayama (1991,1994) made a similar point. They 
67 Several researchers (Fukushima 2002; Usami 2002; Pizziconi 2003; Fukada and Asato 2004) contested 
Matsumoto and/or Ide's arguments and defended B&L's theory. Fukushima (2002) claims that what 
Matsumoto and Ide are discussing are sociolinguistic aspects of the Japanese language and that they are 
not significant pragmatically. Tsuruta (1998 discussed in Spencer-Oatey 2000) argues that B&L's model 
deals primarily with 'illocutionary politeness', whereas Matsumoto's discussion of honorifics deals 
primarily with `stylistic' politeness, each belonging to different `domains' of politeness. 
68 Hofstede's analysis involves samples of more than 100,000 IBM employees in 40 nations. He 
factor-analysed the resulting culture scores of 32 items from each for the 40 national samples and then 
isolated four dimensions of cultural variation: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity. Each of the 40 nations was then assigned four separate scores (out of 100) for each 
dimension. U. S. A. was top in rank in individualism (91) and Great Britain was the third (89), whereas 
Japan was the 22nd (46), therefore placed in the middle of the 40 nations. 
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pointed out that "what psychologists currently know about human nature is based on 
one particular view - the so called Western view of the individual as an independent, 
self-contained, autonomous entity" (1991: 224) and questioned the existence of any 
culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion and motivation, which had often been 
assumed in psychology. They argued that the Asian self, which is `interdependently 
construed' (insisting on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to one another and 
harmonious interdependence with them), is very distinct from the European or US self, 
which is `independently construed' (seeking to maintain their independence from 
others) and that such different individual experiences include cognition, emotion and 
motivation (ibid. ). 69 The ideologies of each construct of personhood are often described 
as `individualism' and 'collectivism'. 70 Many empirical studies followed and different 
scales for measuring individualism and collectivism have been developed (e. g. Triandis 
1995; Singelis 1994). 71 Other researchers from cultural psychology, cultural 
ss However, the polarity of `independent self' and `interdependent self' or the polarity of `individualism' 
and `collectivism' have also been criticised as being too simplistic and deterministic. Lindholm (1997) 
argues that Markus and Kitayama's (1991) claim has logical flaws. The `interdependent self' changes as it 
adjusts to the norm and demands of the social context, so that this self cannot be the controlling agent. So 
he questions: where is the controlling agent? Is a `culture' the controlling agent? Lindholm (1997: 408) 
argues that surely there must be a conscious internal agent monitoring and governing the experience of 
emotion. He argues that differing actions, beliefs and motivations of individuals in the East and West are 
not due to a mysterious `self', but due to reasonable and predictable responses to divergent patterns of 
power and constraint. Spiro (1993: 116) argues that the dichotomy of Western and Eastern self is 
inadequate as an account of such a complex concept of self. He claims that it is more reasonable to think 
that both elements exist in various societies and that they should been seen more as a spectrum of 
tendencies. One or another of these characteristics "is more likely" to be found in one type, rather than the 
other: the difference between them is only one of degree. 
70 Triandis (1995) defines individualism as "a social pattern that consist of loosely linked individuals who 
view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, 
rights, and the contracts they have established with others; give priority to their personal goals over the 
goals of others; and emphasize rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with 
others (1995: 2)". Collectivism is defined as a "social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who 
see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribes, nation); are primarily 
motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectivists; are willing to give priorities to the 
goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members 
of their collectives (1995: 2). " Foley (1997: 266) calls these two polar constructions of personhood as the 
'egocentric individualist concept of the person' and the `sociocentric context dependent conception of 
personhood' 
" Researchers of intercultural communication (Ting-Toomey 1988; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi 1998) 
proposed a Face-Negotiation theory, using the notion of face and the dimension of 
individualism-collectivism to explicate everyday communication behaviour across culture. Ting-Toomey 
& Kurogi (1998: 188) define face as 'social self' and `facework' as "a set of communicative behaviour 
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anthropology and linguistic anthropology (Geertz 1973, Kondo 1990; Rosaldo 1984; 
Shweder and Bourne 1984; Wierzbicka 1993) have also paid considerable attention to 
cross-cultural differences in the construction of personhood. 
The model of a person which is universal and neutral as suggested in B&L's 
theory and in modern psychology seems to have lost the perspective or psychological 
experience of the actual person who functions in a particular society or culture. The 
psychological experiences of those who come from a culture which has a strong 
collectivistic nature seem to be very different from those who come from a more 
individualistic culture. For those who come from a collectivistic culture, the pressure to 
conform to the society is so great and the sanction for not conforming is so imminent 
that they feel that the Western individualistic self, which is able to make rational 
calculations and free decisions, does not adequately represent the psychological tension 
which they experience everyday in their society. A Japanese proverb `deru kui wa 
utareru' (The nail that sticks up will get hammered in! ) depicts the pressure to conform 
to society and the fear of possible social sanction for failing to do so. 72 
(b). B&L's Model Person - modernity's self 
As discussed above, B&L's Model Person has been criticised for being ethnocentric 
assuming the Western individualistic construal of self to be the universal construal of 
self. Though the Western individualistic construct of self appear to be assumed in the 
that people use to regulate their social dignity and to support or challenge the other's social dignity". They 
argue that face and facework are universal phenomena, but how people frame the meaning of face in any 
given situation and how they enact `facework', differs from one culture to another. They argue that 
individualistic (1-identity) cultures and group-oriented (we-identity) cultures use different `facework' 
strategies. 
72 Shimizu (2001) perceives that individualistic and sociocentric elements are in a state of tension, but at 
the same time they complement each other in such a way that to achieve the purpose of each (e. g. to be 
individuated) to make it conditional to the other (e. g., to participate, be part of the collective) (2001: 207). 
Shimizu's depiction of the Japanese self which existentially tries to transcend the tension between 
sociocentric pressures and the urge for individuation is helpful in understanding personhood in a 
collectivistic culture. Much Japanese drama is based on the conflict between social duties (girl, gimu) and 
personal aims and desires. 
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universal Model Person as in various criticisms, I contend that the Model Person was 
meant to be just a model for theoretical purposes and it was not intended to carry any 
particular psychological property or cultural trait. Rather, the Model Person in B&L's 
theory can be traced to `modernity's self', which is presupposed in assumptions in 
modernist theory construction. In fact, the term `rationality', a catchword for modernist 
thinking, is used to justify this Model Person as the representation of all human beings. 
(See Section 3 in the Introduction chapter for the modernist view of man as an 
`autonomous rational subject'. This will be discussed further in I. I. in Chapter 3. ) 
Klages's description below of modernity's self shows a striking resemblance to the 
Model Person in B&L's theory. 
" There is a stable, coherent, knowable self. This self is conscious, rational, 
autonomous, and universal -- no physical conditions or differences 
substantially affect how this self operates. 
" This self knows itself and the world through reason, or rationality, posited 
as the highest form of mental functioning, and the only objective form. 
" The mode of knowing produced by the objective rational self is 
"science, " which can provide universal truths about the world, regardless 
of the individual status of the knower. 
(Klages 2003)73 
Modernity's self is `rational', `autonomous' and `universal' and assumed to know the 
world `objectively' with `rationality'. 
Luntley (1995: 155) points out another characteristic of the modernity's self- 
"[t]he self is constituted by an essence that can be characterised independently of 
contingent historical circumstances; history, culture, social, moral and political 
relationships are all extrinsic possessions of the self, not constitutive of the self'. 74 He 
73 The original source of this is Jane Flax's basic ideas of the Enlightenment in "Postmodernism and 
Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, " in Linda J. Nicholson, (ed. ), Feminism/Postmodernism, Routledge, 
1990, p. 41. Klages' summary contains nine points. I listed the first three which are about the model of self 
in the Enlightenment idea. See http: //www. colorado. edu/English/courses/ENGL2012KIages/pomo. html 
74 This kind of modern concept of the self comes from the philosophical position of metaphysical 
individualism. 
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states that culture, relationship, and social position are all the possessions of self, but the 
modernity's self is not itself constituted by culture, history or its relationship with others. 
I contend that B&L formulated the MP in line with modernity's self model, which is not 
supposed to be constituted by culture, social or moral and political relationship as in the 
above description. 75 The modernity's self may resemble the Western individualistic 
personhood, perhaps because the model was constructed in the academic world in which 
Western individualism has been the dominant discourse. 
Luntley (1995: 164) also describes modernity's self as the calculating satisfier 
of its own desires. The self uses rationality to evaluate "outcomes relative to satisfying 
one desire rather than another" and to produce the greatest pay-off between resources 
expended in undertaking the action and benefit achieved by the action. 
Given an end, such as the maximisation of desire satisfaction, rationality will 
evaluate the means to that end. The rational self turns out to be the 
calculating satisfier of desires governed only by an instrumental rationality 
that measures means-end relationship. (Luntley 1995: 164) 
Our ends are embedded in our desires and they are not subject to rational evaluation. So 
the only thing that rationality can measure is the choice of means to meet our ends 
(ibid. ). This is the model of homo economicus (economical man), the possessor of basic 
desires and drives whose rationality is restricted to the weighing and measuring of the 
satisfaction of achieving one's own desires. I claim that B&L's explanation of `payoffs' 
associated with each of the politeness strategies matches the above description of 
modernity's self model, the rational homo economicus. Indeed, B&L explicitly declare 
that they take in the Weberian term, the most strongly rational zweckrational model of 
75 Alternatively, social constructionists claim that Self cannot be separated from society and is socially 
constituted. The person who is socialised in a particular community becomes inculcated within its social 
structure and this socialisation process influences the person's cognition, emotion, and decision-making. 
Taking this view, it is impossible to produce a coherent model of a culturally- (or socially)-neutral 
"rational" person. 
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individual action rather than a wertrational model (1987: 62). 76 
The idea that the self, who is rational, autonomous, goal-oriented, and calculative, 
makes choices which gives him/her the highest pay-offs is known as a `rational choice 
theory'. This theory derives from modern economics and has become popular in other 
modern social sciences. Scott (2000: 136) summarises the basic points of a rational choice 
theory. 
" Rational choice theory... attempts to explain all social phenomena in terms of the 
rational calculations made by self-interested individuals. 
" Rational choice theory sees social interaction as social exchange modelled on 
economic action. People are motivated by the rewards and costs of actions and by 
the profits that they can make. 
As stated, B&L's Model Person (MP), which is supposed to provide a reference model 
for all cultures, is frequently accused of ethnocentrism and being the product of Western 
individualism. However, my contention is that B&L's MP represents a typical 
modernity's model of self, which is `autonomous' `calculative' and `goal-oriented' as in 
`rational choice theory', which, I observe, B&L adopted as part of their theoretical 
framework. From this point of view, criticism of the B&L model of self can go further 
than pointing simply to its western bias (though that may be true, too). More 
fundamentally, B&L's model of self is tied into their procedures for building a theory, 
and these procedures have a substantial pedigree in much of modern science. In other 
words, modernity's self is an indispensable component in a great deal of modernist 
theory construction, so in this way it is profoundly tied into B&L's theoretical and 
methodological project overall. In Chapter 3,1 will go on to discuss modernist 
76 "Weber distinguished four types of action: traditional, affectual, Zweckrational and Wertrational. 
Traditional actions are those performed simply because they have been performed in the past. Affectual 
actions are those performed simply to express emotion. Zweckrational (instrumental action) is action in 
which the actor not only compares different means to a goal, but also assesses the utility of the goal itself. 
In Wertrational (value rationality), the actor takes the goal as an end in itself and may not even compare 
different means to that goal. " (Abercrombie et al. 2000: 3) 
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assumptions in theory construction extensively as well as its limitations. 
2.2.2. The notion of `face' in B&L's theory 
B&L's theory's other key notion is `face'. B&L claimed that they borrowed their 
concept of `face' from Goffman and the English folk term (1987: 61). However, B&L's 
notion of `face' deviates both from the common English meaning and from the original 
Oriental notion of face, particularly the Chinese and Japanese views of `face'. Various 
researchers (e. g. Matsumoto 1988, Gu 1990, Mao1994, Nwoye 1992, Bharuthram 2003) 
have criticized B&L's notion of face as individualistic, whereas they claim that the 
notion of face in original Chinese thinking77 and in these researchers' societies is much 
more collectivistic. Thus criticisms have focused on the individualistic traits of B&L's 
notion of face, but the real problem, I maintain, is that B&L created their own 
idiosyncratic notion of `face', in which they mixed different definitions of `face'. As I 
observe, B&L's notion of face is not simply a borrowed notion from the normal English 
notion or from Goffman as they claim, but a highly technical notion which they 
deliberately created for the sake of their theory construction and which may not 
necessarily be built on a general consensus of what `face' in common English usage 
actually means. 
In this section, I will unpack B&L's technical notion of `face' and explore what 
elements are embedded in their notion and discuss how B&L's adaptation creates 
problems (in 2.2.2. (a). and (b). ). Then I will look at the generally accepted meaning of 
`face' or the common English understanding of face and show how B&L's technical 
notion of face deviates from it (in 2.2.2. (c). ). 1 will also explore the original Chinese 
" Goffman acknowledges that the original notion of face come from Chinese. OED also records its 
Chinese origin. 
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notion of face from Mao's analysis (in 2.2.2. (d). ) and the notion of `face' from other 
collectivistic cultures (in 2.2.2. (e). ) and compare them with B&L's notion. (I will save 
the discussion on the difference between B&L's notion of face and Goffman's notion of 
face for Chapter 5 where I will discuss Goffman's sociology. ) 
(a). B&L's technical notion of face' 
As discussed, the notion of `face' is a key concept in B&L's theory. It is a very complex 
notion combining various disparate elements. In this section, I will unpack what is 
involved in B&L's complex notion of `face'. 
First, B&L deliberately chose to treat the aspects of face' as basic `want' 
rather than the notion related to `norm or values subscribed to by members of a society'. 
It would have been possible to treat the respect for face as norms or values 
subscribed to by members of a society (as perhaps most anthropologists 
would assume). Instead, we treat the aspects of face as basic wants that 
every member knows every other member desires, and which in general it 
is in the interests of every member to partially satisfy. (1987: 62) 
B&L (1987: 62) explicitly state that this notion of `want' comes from their commitment 
to the Weberian zweckrational (instrumental rationality) model of individual action. In 
this way, as I have suggested, B&L's theory has adopted `rational choice theory', which 
assumes that human behaviour is guided by this `instrumental rationality', as a 
theoretical framework to explain politeness (See 2.2.1 (b)., this chapter). The Model 
Person's choice of politeness is based on rational calculation. The MP, motivated to 
satisfy its own want, aims to achieve the highest pay-offs, in his/her choice of politeness 
strategies. 
Second, B&L listed two social psychological needs and incorporated them both 
into the notion of `want' and called them `negative face' and `positive face'. B&L claim 
that there are two different wants: "the want of every `competent adult member' that his 
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action be unimpeded by others" (negative face) and "the want of every member that his 
wants be desirable to at least some others" (positive face). As already discussed (See 
2. LI., this chapter), these may be identified with two fundamental social psychological 
needs or desires that human beings have as social beings. 
Third, despite their technical notion of face' as `wants' consisting of negative 
face and positive face, B&L went on to define face' as public self-image', which is the 
commonly accepted meaning of face' rather than their technical notion. So B&L might 
have taken the `public self-image' from Goffman (1967: 5), who defined that face is "an 
image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes". B&L deliberately 
combined two quite different notions for the purpose of their theory construction. I will 
discuss this double meaning of `face' further in the next section. 
(b). Double meaning of face' in B&L's theory 
Though B&L's definition of `face' as `want' appears to be an idiosyncratic notion of 
face, B&L claimed that their notion of `face' is derived from Goffman and the common 
English notion. B&L discussed this generally accepted meaning of `face' in a separate 
section, in which they provided the definition of their technical notion of `face'. 
Our notion of `face' is derived from that of Goffman and from the English 
folk term, which ties up face notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, 
or `losing face'. Thus face is something that is emotionally invested, and 
that can be lost, maintained or enhanced, and must be constantly attended 
to in interaction. In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's 
cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being 
based on the mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's 
face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can 
be expected to defend their faces if threatened, it is in general in every 
participant's best interest to maintain each others' face... (1987: 61). 
It seems odd that B&L provide a technical or idiosyncratic definition of `face as `want' 
(consisting of positive face and negative face) (See 2.2.2 (a). above) in their theoretical 
framework, based on the instrumental rationality of human action, zweckrational model 
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(B&L 1987: 62) (See 2.2.1 (b)., this chapter),. and then proceed to add an alternative 
definition of `face', which represents the more commonly accepted notion of `face'. 
Why did B&L need to bring back the more commonly accepted notion of `face' 
after they had created their own particular notion of `face' as `want'? My view is that it 
is because of the notion of `face threat', which is one of the central theoretical 
constructs in B&L's theory. If we adopt B&L's technical definition of `face-wants' alone 
as they are, B&L's theory encounters problems: the rational choice theory, from which 
the notion of `want' was taken assumes an `autonomous rational calculative self' while 
`face threat' assumes the social interdependence of self, that is, individuals are 
susceptible to each other in interaction. Face is threatened because we are afraid of 
losing face, because our self-image or identity is socially dependent on other peoples' 
evaluation. In other words, the self model assumed in the concept of `face threat' is the 
`socially interdependent self' or social constructionist view of self. In order to make 
their argument of `face-threat' work, B&L needed to recover this original notion of 
`face', which assumes individual's mutual vulnerability in social interaction and to 
allow this double meaning of `face' in B&L's theory. 
On the one hand, B&L use a Model Person, who is essentially independent of 
social, cultural or moral relationships just like modernity's model of self, motivated to 
obtain the highest payoffs by `self-ish' rational calculation. Based on this model, B&L 
explain politeness as being motivated by the individual's face-wants. On the other hand, 
B&L also employed the notion of `face threats' as providing the central motivating force 
for social actors to use various politeness strategies. When B&L used the expression 
`face threats', the original and more generally accepted meanings of `face' such as 
`dignity', `honour' or `reputation' had to be employed. When dignity, honour and 
reputations are threatened, it will cause face loss or embarrassment. Face-threat or 
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face-loss is expressed as the sense of being embarrassed or humiliated. This is the 
socially related feeling that individuals need to deal with in interaction. The notion of 
`face' must inevitably involve social relationships or the interaction order that people 
are expected to maintain. 78 The self, then, is intertwined with social expectations. The 
assumption behind the notion of face threat is the socially interdependent or socially 
constructed self. Such usage of `face' in face threats cannot be explained by 
individualistic wants or desires in modernity's self model, which is rational, calculative 
and autonomous and is not constituted by culture, history or its relationship with others 
(See 2.2.1. (b)., this chapter). Therefore B&L needed to employ this double meaning of 
`face' in order to make their theory work. These two self-contradictory notions of `face' 
assume entirely different views of self and thus B&L's theory involves a serious 
theoretical inconsistency. However, this contradiction in B&L's theory may be seen as a 
reflection of a frequent dilemma in sociological theory - how to comprehend social 
action, and whether the motivating force arises from the individual or from society. This 
will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
(c). Difference from the common English usage 
I will now show how B&L's technical notion of `wants' is significantly different from 
what we usually mean by `face' (what B&L call "the English folk term"). The 
following are typical definitions of `face' from various dictionaries. 
Value or standing in the eyes of others, prestige (American Heritage) 
Prestige; dignity (Merriam-Webster); 
The respect and honour of others (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary); 
Reputation: Personal prestige or the respect accorded to somebody by others 
(Encarta World English Dictionary). 
78 `Interaction order' is the term that Goffman employed. I will discuss this further in Chapter 5. 
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According to these dictionary definitions, `face' has to do with `honour', `prestige', 
`dignity' and `reputation'. I maintain that `reputation' or `prestige' is by its very nature 
not something which individuals can claim or earn on his/her own in one brief instant. It 
cannot be built instantly in one single interaction; but has to be built up gradually over a 
period of time through the evaluation of others. It must be dependent on others' or 
society's evaluation over a period of time. However, losing reputation can probably 
happen in an instant if someone carries out some undesirable action or interaction. In 
other words, `face' as `reputation' or `prestige' takes time to build but `face' can be lost 
in a single incident. All the reputation that person has built up over the months or years 
could possibly be lost in an instant. 
As discussed earlier, B&L treated `face' as `wants' that they claim for 
him/herself (1987: 62) consisting of `negative face', and `positive face' by adopting a 
Weberian zweckrational model of individual action based on goal-oriented or 
instrumental rationality. However, `prestige' `dignity' `honour' and `reputation' in the 
above definitions of various dictionaries do not seem to have been obtained by their 
individual's goal-oriented calculative rationality, but rather is accorded by others and by 
society through long-term evaluation of the individual's conduct over a period of time. 
B&L's understanding of `face' as `want' may serve the rational actor model of Model 
Person, but the sense of `face' as socially accorded value or reputation cannot be easily 
integrated with it. B&L's other definition of `face' as `public self-image' does seem to 
employ some of the commonly accepted meaning of `face'. B&L's definition of 
`positive face' may have some resemblance to the common English meaning of face. 
However, B&L's definition of `negative face' seems to differ very considerably from the 
commonly accepted definitions of `face', i. e. "honour', `prestige', `dignity' and 
`reputation'. 
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(d). Difference from the original Chinese notion 
Both Goffman and the Oxford English Dictionary acknowledge that the original notion 
of face comes from Chinese but B&L's theory failed to refer to the original Chinese 
notion of face at all. It is worth exploring the Chinese notion of face and comparing it 
with B&L's notion of face. The word `face' is a literal translation of two Chinese words: 
lien and mien-tsu79 (Ho 1976: 867). "It originally appeared in the phrase `to save one's 
face' in the English community in China and conveyed a meaning of `one's credit, good 
name, reputation'; the phrase `to save one's face' as a whole refers to the ways or 
strategies the Chinese commonly adopted in order to avoid incurring shame or disgrace" 
(The OED 1987 ed. in Mao 1994: 454). Mao (1994: 457) explains two distinct meanings. 
On the one hand, miänzi stands for prestige or reputation, which is either 
achieved through getting on in life (Hu 1944: 45) or ascribed (or even 
imagined) by other members of one's own community (Ho 
1976: 869-870). On the other hand, liän refers to `the respect of the 
group for a man with a good moral reputation"; it embodies "the 
confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character" and it is 
"both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalised 
sanction (Hu 1944: 45). 
Mao (1994: 458) points out that `to lose liän' is a far more serious act than `to lose 
miänzi' because the former amounts to a condemnation by the community for socially 
distasteful or immoral behaviour or judgement (Hu 1944: 45 in Mao 1994: 458). To lose 
miänzi', on the other hand, is to suffer a loss of one's reputation because of a certain 
failure or misfortune; a person who turns poor due to misfortune or fierce competition 
will have lost miänzi but not liän (Ho 1975 in 871 in Mao 1994: 458). Mao (1994: 457) 
claims that it was the meaning conveyed by miänzi which has been incorporated into the 
definitions of face in contemporary English dictionaries as presented in the previous 
section and that the meaning of liän is not mentioned in these dictionaries nor alluded to 
79 Mao (1994) transcribes them as miän_i and liän. 
Chapter 2 Brown and Levinson 108 
in standard discussion of the concept of face. However, Mao (1994: 458) points out that 
while there are different emphases as Hu (1944) has identified, the distinction is not 
categorical and the two characters may be used interchangeably. But one difference 
which remains constant is that liän carries the moral connotation or social judgement of 
character which is secondary in miänzi. 
Mao (1994: 459) summarises two major differences between the Chinese `face' 
and B&L's notion of `face'. The first difference is that "B&L centre their definition 
upon an `individual' - rather than the communal - aspect of face" (1994: 459), whereas 
"Chinese face emphases not the accommodation of individual `want' or `desires' but the 
harmony of individual conduct with the views and judgment of the community" 
(1994: 460). "Chinese face depends upon and is determined by the participations of 
others. To maintain one's Chinese face is, then, to perform a communal act" and 
Chinese face "belongs to the individual or to the self only to the extent that the 
individual acts in full compliance with that face" In other words, it is "not an inalienable, 
God-given right" (ibid. ). 
The second difference pertains to the content of face. B&L claim that face 
consists in `positive face' and `negative face'. The notion of miänzi is in Chinese is "a 
desire to secure public acknowledgement of one's prestige or reputation" (1994: 460). 
When one obtains miänzi, one "wins a recognition not so much of one's claim to 
freedom of action as of one's claim to the respect or prestige of the community" (ibid). 
Then miänzi is similar to English common usage of `face', but is very different from 
B&L's `negative face', which is the individaul's want to be free from external 
imposition. Mao (1994: 461) points that B&L's `positive' face has some resemblance to 
hin because both identify an individual's desire to be liked and to be approved of by 
others. However, as discussed above, liän has a distinctive moral overtone, whereas 
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B&L's positive face does not. Mao (1994) concludes that B&L's notion of face is quite 
different from the notion of Chinese face both in its individualistic nature and lack of 
moral overtone. 
It is not just the Chinese notion of `face' which is different from B&L's notion 
of face. Matsumoto (1988) also points out that for Japanese "[floss of face is associated 
with the perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the 
structure and hierarchy of the group" (Matsumoto 1988: 405). 80 The Japanese notion of 
`face' places significance on communal interdependence. Thus B&L's definition of face, 
particularly `negative face' as the want or desire to defend his/her own territory from the 
encroachment of others does not make sense in the Japanese context. Other researchers 
(e. g. Nwoye 1992, Bharuthram 2003, Lee-Wong 2000) similarly point out the notion of 
`face' in the culture they come from is more communal oriented and deviates from 
B&L's face. 81 
B&L's notion of `face', which consists of negative and positive face may have 
appealed to many researchers, because they could identify with the two fundamental 
social psychological needs or desires, `autonomy' and `sociability' expressed in the 
notions of negative and positive politeness. However, as I discussed, B&L's notion of 
`face' is a technical notion, which deviates not only from the common notion of `face' in 
countries such as China, Japan and Nigeria but also from the common English usage. 
80 Mao (1994: 467) points out that the Japanese concept of facer resembles the Chinese concept of face: 
"both stress the public, communal aspect, and both foreground others' perceptions of whether a given 
relationship has been acknowledged (Japanese), or a given sanction has been secured (Chinese). "In fact, 
the Japanese word for `face', mentsu, comes from Chinese miän_i. 
81 Mao (1994: 471) employs a `deep structure' to explain difference in the notion of face between 
individualistic and collectivistic societies. The underlying forces of B&L's face is a centrifugal force, as 
Anglo-American 'face' spirals outward from individuals' desires or wants and sees the self as the 
initiating agent. The collectivistic society's `face', on the other hand, represent a centripetal force, as 
`face' in these collectivistic societies gravitates toward social recognition and hierarchical 
interdependence. 
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3. Conclusion 
Brown and Levinson moved politeness studies out of the arena of early pragmatics and 
saw politeness as `universal' yet `social' principles. B&L focused on the social actors 
who employ politeness and tried to explain their motivation behind politeness in social 
interaction. B&L hypothesised a Model Person (MP) endowed with the properties of 
`rationality' and `face' and saw politeness as strategies for minimizing Face Threatening 
Acts (FTA). They argued that this MP rationally calculates the seriousness of FTA 
through consideration of three social variables and choose the most appropriate 
strategies which will produce the highest payoffs. 
Major criticisms of B&L's theory have been directed to the theoretical 
constructs, `Model Person' and `face'. Many researchers criticised their theory as 
ethnocentric and reflecting Western individualism. It is important to see beyond the 
ethnocentrism debate and to put B&L's theory into the wider academic context of 
modernity-post modernity theory construction. I argued that B&L's Model Person is a 
modernity's model of self, which is often known as the `rational actor' model. B&L, 
based on Weber's zweckrational action model, explained politeness employing `rational 
choice theory'. The key notions in B&L's theory such as `rationality' `highest payoff' 
`wants' all suggest association with this theory. B&L defined `face' with their technical 
notion of `face-want' to fit into the `rational choice theory', but when B&L employed 
the notion of `face-threat' in their theory they needed to recover the more commonly 
accepted meaning of `face' as `reputation' or positive social value. Thus B&L employed 
a double meaning of `face', each of which assumes different models of self, the former 
assuming a `rational autonomous self' and the latter assuming a `social interdependent 
self'. Consequently B&L's theory contains theoretical inconsistencies. 
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B&L theorised politeness as the product of an individual's strategies arising out 
of rational calculation. There may be societal or social constraints which influence 
individual's action, but in B&L's theory, which focuses on the `individual', such social 
elements are downplayed merely as variables for calculation of Wx. This way, the 
Model Person remains as a rational autonomous actor, who freely chooses various 
strategies based on rational calculation. Theories like B&L's theory, which focus on the 
`individual', cannot explain the social structure adequately. This common difficulty of 
failing to encapsulate both `individual' and `society' together is the classic problem of 
modern sociology known as the `structure' and `agency' dilemma. In the next chapter, I 
will highlight the limitations of theoretical assumptions in relation to these three 
politeness theories discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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Chapter 3 Politeness and modern social theories 
0. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will re-examine the theoretical assumptions behind these politeness 
theories and elevate the discussion to the sociological and philosophical level. It is my 
contention that these major politeness theories were all based upon modernist academic 
assumptions. Section 1 explores some underlying assumptions of the three politeness 
theories. 1.1. shows the modernist assumptions behind politeness theories and 1.2. 
examines the theoretical bases of the three politeness theories (in 1.2.1., those of Lakoff 
and Leech' and in 1.2.2., those of Brown and Levinson). Section 2 shows how they 
reflect two different approaches in social theory. Section 3 highlights the modernist 
assumptions which influenced their theory construction and its limitations and sets the 
stage for Part II of this thesis: "Politeness beyond Modernity". 
1. Some underlying assumptions behind the three 
politeness theories 
1.1. Modernism behind politeness theories 
Politeness, which had been long discussed as an issue of social etiquette or manners, has 
gained renewed interest as a subject for scientific investigation since the 1970s. Just as 
formal linguists are concerned with the status of linguistics as a proper science, 
researchers of politeness have also been concerned with establishing an acceptable 
theory as a modern academic discipline. 
Modernism in academia may be traced back to two main sources. The first is 
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Descartes's attempt to provide a new foundation for philosophy in his famous 
declaration `cogito ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), which has been conceived as 
the absolute, indubitable ground of knowledge since the seventeenth century (Norris 
2000: 26). The second is Isaac Newton, who provided the scientific framework for 
modernity by seeing the physical world as a mechanistic world of laws and regularity 
discernable by the human mind (Grenz 1996: 3). Descartes and Newton directly 
influenced the eighteenth century philosophical movement, the Enlightenment, in which 
the traditional spiritual and religious authority of the state, and especially of the church 
was undermined and `reason', `rationality' and `science' came to be seen as the basis of 
human progress and advancement (Graham, Doherty and Malek 1992: 8). 
The fundamental philosophical notions introduced in this period, later known 
as Cartesianism, have become the hallmark of `modernism' throughout its succeeding 
phases, namely "a belief in the essential order of things; that under the seeming surface 
of the world, of society, there exists a rationality, a basic truth that can be identified and 
harnessed for human good" (Graham, Doherty and Malek 1992: 8). In modernism, we 
are always anxious that we ought to search for the "Archimedean point upon which we 
can ground our knowledge" (Bernstein 1983: 16), because we believe that only on such 
solid ground of rationality and scientific method, can we have a firm and unchanging 
knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. Bernstein named this "Cartesian 
Anxiety" (1983: 16,18,29) and claimed that such anxiety has always been hovering in 
the background of modernism. 82 
82 The origin of this anxiety is found in Descartes's Meditations on the First Philosophy. In the first 
Meditation, Descartes writes: "It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that 
I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed 
on this basis, and from that time, I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid 
myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the 
foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences" (Descartes 
1967: 144). In the second Meditation, he writes: "Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial 
globe out of its place, and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and 
immovable, in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to 
discover one thing only which is certain and indubitable" (Descartes 1967: 149). 
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The main features of Cartesianism are familiar to us because we have almost 
unconsciously accepted them as the foundation of our modernist thinking. Bernstein 
(1983: 115-7) summarises them in seven points 83 
First, Descartes introduces a rigorous distinction between res cogitans 
and res extensa. 84 This distinction is the basis for the sharp separation of 
two types of quasi substance, mind and body.... 
Second, if one is to achieve clear and distinct knowledge, the 1, the 
subject must engage in the activity of intellectual self-purification. By the 
procedure of methodological doubt, I must bracket or suspend judgment in 
everything that can be doubted in order to discover the Archimedian point 
that can serve as a proper foundation for the sciences. I must suspend 
judgement in all my former opinions and prejudices. This is essentially a 
solitary, monological activity (although it is likened to an internal dialogue), 
in the sense that I, in the solitude of my study, can by self-reflection 
discover the groundlessness of former opinions and prejudices. Descartes 
never really doubts that one can achieve this self-transparency and 
self-understanding by proper meditative reflection. 
Third, Descartes understands human finitude in a distinctive way. For 
although we are finite, we are not imperfect.... It is by virtue of this `ample' 
and `unconstrained' free will that I have the capacity to assert or to deny - 
that is, to judge. There is no intrinsic defect or imperfection in my will or 
my understanding.... 
Fourth, truth is primarily ascribed to judgement. Judging is an activity 
of the will, it is always within my power (at least when meditating) to 
withhold my judgment.... It is I who am responsible for making false 
judgements. Because of the exigencies of action and the infirmity of my 
nature I cannot hope to altogether avoid making errors.... 
Fifth, once we discover the Archimedean point that can serve as a 
foundation, then we can build a solid edifice of knowledge by following 
strict rules and Method. These rules can be specified, and they serve two 
closely related functions. They enable use to extend our knowledge 
systematically and they ensure that nothing will be admitted as knowledge 
(and consequently as true) unless it satisfies the rigorous requirements of 
the specified rules. 
Sixth, when justifying claims to knowledge, there should be no appeal 
other than the appeal to reason itself. We must be sceptical about my claims 
to knowledge that are based solely on the testimony of the senses, former 
opinions, prejudices, traditions or any authority other than reason. There 
may be many sources for our coming to know something, but the court of 
appeal to validate claims to knowledge is reason -a reason which is 
universal, not limited by historical contingencies, and shared by all rational 
beings. 
83 Some may be attributed to the interpretation of Descartes's work by later thinkers rather than his own 
original work but nevertheless it became part of Cartesianism. 
84 Res cogitans is the thinking being', i. e. `subject' and res extensa is the physical world' or `world'. 
Here Descartes takes a subjectivist point of view : it is the subject that determines the world around him, 
and not the other way around. 
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Seventh, one of the important consequences of Cartesianism was to 
forge a close link between experience and the senses and to focus almost 
exclusive attention on the epistemological role of experience. Of course, it 
was not due solely to Descartes that the senses have been thought of as the 
primary source of experience. This is also fundamental to the empiricist 
tradition. But despite major differences between rationalists and empiricists 
in their understanding of the senses and their contribution to knowledge, 
both traditions are dominated by an epistemological interest in the senses 
and experience. 
Given these seven points, it should be clear why Descartes is so 
suspicious of any claim to knowledge that is based upon appeals to 
authority, tradition and opinions. We even find here the seeds for the typical 
Enlightenment contrasts between reason and tradition, reason and authority, 
reason and superstition. 
Cartesianism provided the foundation of modernism, that is, the conviction that 
knowledge is not only certain (hence `rational') but also `objective' and that the modern 
`knower' is able to view the world as an unconditioned observer - that is, to survey the 
world from a vantage point outside the flux of history (Grenz 1996: 4). Modernist 
thinkers are also confident that they can devise a `method' of investigation that 
facilitates the discovery of those truths that were absolutely certain. The fundamental 
assumption that human beings can achieve objective understanding of the world is 
rooted in Descartes's essential distinction between res cogitans, `thinking being' and res 
extensa, `the physical world'. 
Over time not only natural sciences but all academic disciplines tried to 
establish themselves on this Cartesian foundation, largely characterised by rationalism, 
scientism, empiricism and positivism. Positivism, a favoured methodology of 
modernism, developed by August Comte (1798-1857), sought to develop universal laws, 
whereby actual or real events in the world are explained in a deductive fashion by 
universal laws that assert definite and unproblematic relationships. Comte argued that 
the scientific, `positive' method based on observation, comparison, experimental and 
quantitative methods should be extended to the study of politics and society and he 
became the founder of `sociology'. Positive sociology treated social facts as hard, 
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objective reality. Jones (2003: 35) summarises the guiding principle of positivist science 
as "if something exists in nature, it has been caused by something else in nature". 
Wainwright (2000: 2) points out three key points of positivism. "First, positivists limit 
scientific ontology to the observable.... Second, positivists operationalise theory: rules 
link theory with observation. Third, positivists equate regularities and predictions with 
causations and explanation. " 
These modernist frameworks take different forms but they all share the key 
elements that makes them `modern'. Grenz (1996: 40) describes the modern worldview 
as follows: "Foundational to the modern outlook is the assumption of an objective world 
around us. The modern worldview assumes that reality is ordered and that human reason 
is capable of discerning this order as it is manifested in the laws of nature. " Graham, 
Doherty and Malak (1992: 10) suggest that modernism is characterized by "a 
commitment to the search for the underlying order in society; an implicit acceptance of 
the desirability of identifying a `master' narrative, a totalising discourse which will 
embrace a universalistic understanding of society". 
With underlying modernist academic assumptions always in the background, 
the mainstream of politeness studies has been directed towards the construction of a 
universal theory or framework for understanding politeness. As I have already argued, 
researchers of politeness have avoided accepting commonsense notions of politeness, a 
range of culture-specific `social norms', i. e. `first-order politeness' (politenessl) and 
instead endeavoured to produce a scientific conceptualisation of politeness, i. e. 
`second-order politeness' (politeness2)85. More specifically I have shown how Lakoff 
(1973,1975), and Leech (1983), in systematising politeness as pragmatic 
rules/principles, and Brown & Levinson (1978,1987) in establishing politeness as 
universal and social principles, endeavoured to make their theories credible as modern 
85 This distinction was first proposed in Watts et al. 1992: 3-4. 
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academic theories. The `autonomous' `self-determining' model of self portrayed in the 
Model Person in B&L's theory reflects the Enlightenment view of man current at that 
time. Much Post-B&L empirical research also exemplifies the same quasi-scientific 
approach, which has been favoured in modern academic disciplines. The next 
subsections (1.2) elucidate the theoretical bases of these three major politeness theories. 
1.2 The Theoretical bases of three politeness theories 
1.2.1. Lakoff and Leech -a Structure-centred approach 
Lakoff and Leech's theories, which saw politeness as pragmatic principles/rules 
(Lakoff's Rule of Politeness; Leech's Politeness Principle) had their roots in Saussurean 
structuralism which made the `idealised language' (langue) the object of study. It 
focused on the orderly aspect of language, structure or language system neatly divided 
into sub-disciplines such as morphology, syntax, phonology or semantics. Lakoff (1973, 
1975) and Leech (1983) viewed politeness as a set of pragmatic rules or principles of 
language. I will call Lakoff's and Leech's approach to politeness a structure-centred 
approach to politeness, because both are largely influenced by structuralism which 
focuses on the structure or the language system in their theoretical framework. 
Saussurean structuralism, primarily significant in linguistics, was later applied 
to sociology and anthropology (e. g. Levi-Strauss). "In sociology `structural' refers to a 
relatively stable point of reference of any system under consideration" (Williams 
1992: 227). Structuralism is often classified together with Functionalism, because both 
focus upon structure and system (See Fig 3.2 in 3. (a)., this chapter). 86 Functionalism in 
anthropology (e. g. Malinowski, Radcliff-Brown) 87 also focuses on a stable social 
86 Barnard (2000: 120) points out similarities between structuralism and functionalism: both are 
concerned with relations between things but the difference is that structuralists are generally interested in 
structures of society itself whereas functionalists aim to find order within social relations. 
87 Some of Radcliffe-Brown's followers did not object to the term `functionalism' but others took to the 
labels `structural-functionalist' or `structuralist' to distinguish their work from Malinowski. Furthermore, 
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system within society. "For anthropologists and sociologists, the point of functionalist 
investigation was to identify the standardized habits that maintained the social organism 
in a condition of dynamic equilibrium - the `more or less stable social structures' 
regulating individual's relations to one another... " (Kuklick 2002: 247). In 
functionalism, "social actions are not to be explained by the immediate meaning they 
have for individual actors, but they are to be explained by the functions they serve for 
wider social groups" (Holmwood 2005: 88). Elements of both structuralism and 
functionalism (or structural-functionalism) can be traced back to the work of Emile 
Durkheim. 88 
1.2.2. B&L's theory - An Agency-centred approach 
(a). Action Theory 
Brown & Levinson made some deliberate decisions for the sake of theory construction. 
Whereas Lakoff and Leech focused on politeness as rules of language use, B&L focused 
on individual acts of politeness in dyadic act-by-act interaction. 89 B&L developed the 
notion of a Model Person (MP) endowed with two special properties `rationality' and 
`face' for purpose of their theory construction and defined `politeness' as being a 
speaker's strategic acts aimed at minimizing potential face-threats. As discussed, the MP 
represents modernity's model of self, which rationally calculates the highest payoffs to 
satisfy its face-wants. B&L argued that based upon such calculation, the MP chooses to 
use `positive', `negative' politeness or `off-record' strategies when performing face- 
threatening acts (FTA) 
the term `British structuralist' was used in the 1950s to distinguish the Radcliff-Brown school from the 
French structuralism of Levi-Strauss. 
8S Durkheim argues that the existence of phenomena or the production of actions is not to be explained 
by its direct efficient causes, but rather by its indirect effects in relation to an environment or its functions. 
(Holmwood 2005: 89) 
B9 B&L (1987: 243) claim that "the theory was couched in terms of individual acts, and presented a dyadic 
act-by-act account of strategic interaction". 
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In contrast to Lakoff and Leech's structure-centred approach, I will call B&L's 
theory an agency-centred approach to politeness because it focuses upon the social 
actors (agency) in terms of the Model Person. In modern sociological theorisation, such 
an approach is called an action theory. The term action theory "covers a variety of 
theoretical schools90, which tend to focus on the individual - the human actor - as their 
key unit of analysis" (Kaspersen 2000: 21). In action theory, human beings are 
considered to be "unique in that they act on the basis of subjective motives, values and 
intentions" (ibid. 22) and understanding human beings is the key to understanding 
society. Jones (2003: 17-18) points out that action theory stresses the need to concentrate 
on the micro-levels of social life, the way particular individuals interact with one 
another in individual social encounters, rather than on the macro-level, the way the 
whole structure of society influences the behaviour of individuals. Action theorists often 
recognise that human action is voluntary and assume that it is a product of a conscious 
decision to act. What we actually do is the result of choosing to act in one way rather 
than another. Thus many action theories emphasise the intentionality of human action. 
90 Ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism (SI) and rational choice theory are different examples of 
action theories. Ethnomethodology is interested in the mutually shared social order, which is believed to 
be constantly being produced in our actions, including in our conversation with each other. The social 
order is created via our actions, where we apply a range of methods, procedures and practices. Garfinkel 
maintains that consciously or unconsciously, we are continually applying ethnomethodology, which is the 
method people apply in informal contexts. By studying conversations, they try to understand the social 
order. (Kaspersen 2000: 22-23) Symbolic interactionism argues that social life is literally the `interaction 
of humans via the use of symbols'. Jones (2003: 103) points out that SI theorists are interested in "the way 
in which humans employ symbols of what they mean in order to communicate with one another" and "the 
effect that the interpretations of these symbols have on the behaviour of parties during social interaction". 
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(b). Characteristics of rational choice theory 
Many action theorists look for the motivations behind actions. For such explanations, B&L 
chose a `rational choice theory', based upon Weber's zweckrational model of individual 
action. (See Ch. 2 2.1. (b)). In this subsection, I will examine and evaluate the `rational 
choice theory' that B&L adopted. 
Scott (2000: 126-13 1) summarises the basic tenets of `rational choice theory'. 
First, it adopts a methodological individualism, i. e. that "complex social phenomena can 
be explained in terms of the elementary individual actions of which they are composed" 
(Scott 2000: 127). Proponents of methodological individualism assert that "individuals 
are the only kind of reality with the necessary and sufficient causal power capable of 
generating social phenomena" (Parker 2003: 13). A `rational choice theory' attempts to 
explain all social phenomena in terms of rational calculations of self-interested 
individuals (Scott 2000: 136). 
In rational choice theories, individuals are seen as motivated by the wants or 
goals that express their 'preferences'. They act within specific, given 
constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the 
conditions under which they are acting. At its simplest, the relationship 
between preferences and constraints can be seen in the purely technical terms 
of the relationship of a means to an end. As it is not possible for individuals to 
achieve all of the various things that they want, they must also make choices 
in relation to both their goals and the means for attaining these goals. Rational 
choice theories hold that individuals must anticipate the outcomes of 
alternative courses of action and calculate that which will be best for them. 
Rational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to give them the 
greatest satisfaction. (Scott 2000: 127-128) 
Second, some rational choice theories such as George Homans's pioneering 
version (1961) were inspired by `conditioning' as in Skinner's behaviourism, which 
assumes that human behaviour is motivated by the rewards and punishments that are 
encountered. Human motivations are more complex than those of animals who may do 
anything for food; humans may seek rewards such as approval, recognition, love or 
money, but Homans argues that the basic mechanism is the same (Scott 2000: 128). In 
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behaviourism it is assumed that human behaviour can be studied in purely external and 
objective terms, ignoring human internal mental states. Other rational choice theorists 
did not even discuss psychological bases, but simply assume it as a starting point that 
humans act as if they were fully rational. Overall, rational choice theories do not dig 
very deeply into individual psychology (Scott 2000: 129). 
Third, following the economic model, rational choice theory sees social 
interaction as `social exchange'. "Economic action involves an exchange of goods and 
services; social interaction involves the exchange of approval and certain other valued 
behaviours" (Scott 2000: 129). In other words, social interaction is "motivated by the 
pursuit of `profitable' balance of rewards over costs [emphasis added]" (ibid. ). 
Barnes (1990: 34-35) points out two fundamental problems inherent in 
methodological individualism, which B&L's theory also inherited. The first is its 
inability to explain the existence of collective action. Individualism, in its tenets, denies 
`collectives' as autonomous decision-makers. The fundamental reason for the first 
problem is then not that rational actors are self-regarding but rather that they operate 
independently (ibid. 29). Barnes writes a scenario for individualism. 
In a nutshell, individualism assumes that an agent in a social situation will 
operate as follows: she will independently take stock of the situation; 
rationally calculate in the light of what she knows how each available action 
is liable to affect the situation; note which action is likely to be the most 
effective in furthering her goal; and enact that action accordingly. Where the 
individual is egoistic, goals will be self-serving and actions will be 
self-interested. Such a hypothetical individual, because it is commonly 
postulated in economic theories of human behaviour, is sometimes referred 
to as manifesting "economic rationality". (1995: 13) 
Genuine collective actions by rational actors or economically rational (ER) individuals91 
are theoretically impossible (Barnes 1995: 29). In the framework of individualism, 
91 ER is another name for the 'rational' 'autonomous' 'calculative' self. The social actor in `rational 
choice theory' is termed in various ways such as `rational actor', 'homo economicus' or `economical 
rationality' (ER) individual. 
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collective action or action resulting in the collective good is induced only by coercion, 
the prospect of private loss or gain, or analysed in terms of rational, utility maximizing 
individuals. Applying Barnes' point to B&L's theory, with methodological individualism 
it is difficult to explain why ER individuals, who independently calculate their own 
benefit, should be interested in satisfying the `face want' of others. B&L appear to have 
resolved the problem of `methodological individualism' by bringing in the notion of 
`face threat', but as I argued earlier (See Ch. 2 2.2.2. (b)), they did not do it successfully 
because the notion of `face threat' assumes a model of selves who are socially 
interdependent or socially vulnerable to one another, which is contradictory to the 
expected behaviour of the ER individual. 
The second problem of methodological individualism is the problem of knowledge 
(Barnes 1995: 34-35). In order to act as an ER individual, he or she has to be knowledgeable, 
but such knowledge cannot be taken as given. Consider a new member who has just arrived 
in the world with little cognitive ability and who is about to acquire language, knowledge 
and culture from scratch. Rationality requires mastery of a repertoire of symbols and 
references to a body of knowledge, neither of which new members possess. Fundamental 
difficulties arise if such a new member is treated as an ER individual. Newly arrived 
members in any society are inevitably incompetent members. They cannot be rational in 
quite the same way that existing members have become. There is an awkward problem of 
whether to act on the basis of what is already known or to learn more about the situation 
from experience first. How far is learning a rational action? The activities of new members 
and in particular learning activities, pose a challenge to any social theory based on 
methodological individualism. Brown and Levinson portray their Model Person as "all 
competent adult members of a society" (1987: 67). This suggests that B&L are aware of this 
intractable problem. By using the words `competent' and `adult', they seem to be trying to 
avoid this problem and assume they are only dealing with `fully rational' and 
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`knowledgeable' individuals. B&L's theory is theoretically incapable of explaining the 
learning process of rationality necessary for politeness, because rational choice theory, 
which they adopted, is built upon methodological individualism and therefore inherits all 
the epistemological problems, which go with this social theory. 
2. Two approaches in modern social theory 
(a). Structure/agency dualism in modern sociology 
In 1.2. in this chapter, from their theoretical bases, I classified Lakoff and Leech's approach 
as a `structure-centred approach', based on structuralism and Brown & Levinson's 
approach as an `agency-centred approach', based on action theory. Each theoretical 
framework represents reality from one perspective, but not from the other. It is a form of 
the classic dualism problem, namely the structure/agency dualism of modern sociology 
and anthropology. Kaspersen (2003: 31) draws a helpful diagram. 
Functionalism/Structuralism: 
Structure/system The social structure/system determines the 
actor's behaviour and possibilities for 
action. 
Actor 
Sociology's primary object of inquiry: the social structure/system 
Action theory: 
Actor 
The social structure is composed of the 
sum of many individuals' actions. 
Structure 
Sociology's primary object of inquiry: the individual 
Fig. 3.1. The actor-structure relationship in traditional sociological theory (Kasperson 2000: 3 1) 
Jones (2003: 141) points out that the aim of structuralism is "to bring about the `death 
of the subject"' or "to `de-centre' the subject. " Structuralism discards the "conception 
Chapter 3 Politeness and modern social theories 124 
of actor/agent/member/subject as the source of meaning and the architect of a 
consciously created social reality" (ibid. 142). In Saussurean structuralism, for instance, 
a system of language (langue) exists independently of its users as an `idealised system' 
while the role of `agency' (actor) tends to be disregarded. Having adopted a 
structure-centred approach, Lakoff (1973,1975) and Leech (1983) were unable to 
accommodate `agency' (language users) effectively into their politeness theories (See 
Ch. 1 4. ). In the next two sections I discuss difficulties in the structure-centred approach 
and in the agency-centred approach and from there the weaknesses of Lakoff's and 
Leech's theories and of B&L's theory. 
(b). Difficulties in the structure-centred approach 
Manifest difficulties have been observed in the structure-centred approach to sociology, 
which also appear in Lakoff and Leech's approach to politeness. First, human beings 
tend to be viewed as mere puppets controlled by their social system without any 
independent will of their own. Besides Lakoff and Leech's approach, the traditional 
social norm approach to politeness may also be regarded as a structure-centred 
approach. When politeness is viewed as controlled by pragmatic rules/ principles or as 
social norms, human actors have little choice but to follow these pragmatic rules or 
societal prescribed norms. Lakoff, who initially saw politeness as `rules', later 
oscillated between `rules' and `strategies' in defining politeness. This oscillation might 
suggest she was attempting to accommodate the actor's (agency's) perspective into her 
theory, recognising the limitations of a structure-centred approach (See Ch. I 1.2.3. (a). ). 
Leech did recognise various social psychological elements involved in politeness, but 
he could only incorporate them within his taxonomy of maxims: tact, generosity, 
approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy (See Ch. ] 2.1. (d). ). Both Lakoff and 
Leech focused on politeness as rules/principle within language rather than considering 
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the language users. The `subject' (agency) was inevitably displaced in Lakoff and 
Leech's theories because of their structure-centred approach. 
Second, as the structure-centred approach to politeness emphasizes the 
importance of structure or system, there is a tendency to generalise politeness in terms 
of a particular society (e. g. Greek politeness, Chinese politeness) or community (e. g. 
Middle class politeness, Working class politeness). For instance, Lakoff (1973: 303) 
claims that the rules of politeness are universal, but the same three universal rules, have 
different orders of precedence in different cultures or `politeness systems'. In such an 
approach, there is a danger of taking an essentialist view of culture or community (See 
Ch. ] 1.1. (c). ). 
Third, researchers, who take a structure-centred approach, investigate the 
structure (or the politeness system within a particular culture) as something fixed and 
stable which maintains society. This makes it difficult to explain the inevitable 
modifications to culture or changes in politeness systems that take place over the course 
of time. 
Thus in the structure-centred approach, politeness is viewed as rules/principles 
of language system or structure. The major assumption is that there are generalisable 
principles which can be established. As the focus is upon the structure or system, 
language users tend to be neglected in this kind of approach. 
(c). Difficulties in the agency-centred approach 
On the other hand, the agency-centred approach, which sees actor/agent/subject 
as the source of meaning and the architect of social reality, has the difficulty of 
accounting for the connection between action theory and the significance of structure. 
The actors in action theory are assumed to be able to choose to act according to their 
own wills. But not all aspects of politeness involve an actor's conscious intention or 
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strategies. When a Japanese sociolinguist, Ide (1988; 1989; 1992) criticised B&L's 
theory because it focused on volitional strategies of politeness and failed to 
acknowledge the aspect of wakimae (discernment), she may not have realised that this is 
an inevitable weakness of an agency-centred approach. Ide (1989) argued that the use of 
the honorific verb form in Japanese is the socio-pragmatic equivalent of grammatical 
concord, operating just as automatically as grammatical concord, independent of the 
speaker's rational intention (1989: 242) (See Ch. 2 2.2.1. (a)). Having adopted an 
agency-centred approach, B&L classified such uses of honorific forms as a `Giving 
deference' strategy, one of the negative politeness strategies. Similarly the use of `sir' by 
a lower status person, the choice of second person pronouns and address terms is treated 
as no more than a realisation of `Give deference' in B&L's theory. Ide (ibid. ) argued that 
this type of politeness is behaviour based on wakimae (discernment), that is discerning 
his/her own relative position within society (or structure) and acting appropriately. I 
maintain that B&L's theory focused on volitional strategies, and failed to acknowledge 
the whole aspect of wakimae, because of its agency-centred approach. In such an 
approach, the aspects of politeness, which involve wakimae, reflecting a particular 
social structure is difficult to explain. 
Another evidence of the difficulty of accommodating `structure' in 
B&L's agency-centred approach to politeness is its treatment of social variables. The 
Model Person (MP) endowed with rationality and face-wants calculates the highest 
payoffs and chooses strategies for minimizing face-threats between the Speaker (S) and 
Hearer (H). The social variables that B&L suggest are Social Distance between Speaker 
and Hearer (D), the relative Power of Hearer and Speaker (P) and the Absolute ranking 
of imposition in the particular culture (R). It is assumed that the MP, which is modelled 
after an autonomous rational calculative self, is able to take those social variables into 
consideration and make free choice of implementing appropriate politeness strategies by 
Chapter 3 Politeness and modern social theories 127 
rational calculation. In B&L's agency-centred approach, those social variables which 
come from social structure are downplayed as social variables for computing Wx, the 
numeral value that measures FTA. In reality, however, no social actor anywhere is ever 
completely autonomous, but is always caught up in various social relationships, which 
are often asymmetrical. (See Ch. 2 2.1.2. ) Furthermore, not all politeness behaviours are 
strategically implemented by rational calculation; some of what we do as polite 
behaviour is something we do pre-reflectively after we have been habituated to do so 
through the socialisation process. I will discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
I have tried to show above that the problems inherent in the structure-centred 
and agency-centred approaches to politeness are a reflection of the classical dilemma 
between `structure and agency' in sociology. I argue therefore that we need a new 
framework, which overcomes this structure/agency dichotomy and encompasses both 
aspects of politeness, encapsulating together both a `structure-centred' approach and an 
`agency-centred' approach. 
3. Modernist theory construction and its limitations 
(a). Various dualisms in modernist theory construction92 
We have observed that modernist theory construction is based on the Enlightenment 
assumption that there is a foundational order within the whole universe and its 
optimistic confidence that autonomous human reason can obtain dispassionate 
knowledge of such an order. This modern academic project is characterised by 
rationalism, scientism, positivism, and universalism (See ]. 1., this chapter). The direct 
result of modern academic projects is various dualisms. 
First, there is the objectivism/subjectivism dualism. Descartes stressed a 
thinking rational subject and every other thing in the world is seen as the object of the 
92 1 call theory construction based on modernist principles `modernist theory construction' in this thesis. 
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self's knowledge. The result of the Cartesian view was a subject/object dualism in 
modernism. What is known as objectivism and subjectivism dualism at the philosophical 
level becomes a structure and agency dualism at the sociological level. 
93 (See the 
diagram below. ) 
The philosophical level 
Dualism: Objectivism Subjectivism 
The sociological level 
Dualism: Structure/System A enc /Social actor 
Sociological Orientation Structuralism/ Functionalism Action theory 
Fig. 3.2. The dualism problem in philosophy and sociology (adapted from Kaspersen 2000: 27) 
Objectivism focuses on the object (in this case, society) and sees action as a direct, 
unmediated response to external factors such as the micro-structure of interaction or 
macro-level cultural, social or economic factors. Subjectivism focuses on the subject (in 
this case, the social actors) and tends to conceptualise action as a simple outgrowth from 
internal factors such as conscious intentions and calculation of the subject (social actors). 
(Swartz 1997: 8). 
Second, there is mind/body dualism. Descartes identified the mind with 
consciousness and self-awareness, i. e. the seat of intelligence. Descartes is known to 
have formulated the mind/body problem in the form in which it still exists today. 
94 The 
93 Historically, some major sociological theorists, such as Durkheim, have emphasized social structure as 
shaping the actions of individuals in society, while other theorists such as Weber stressed the role of 
voluntary action by individuals as having the capability to change structures. The former stresses 
`structure' and the latter stresses `agency'. 
94 The typical image people have about mind/body dualism is that the mind is moving the body like a 
puppet, giving directions to the muscles as the puppet master pulls the strings (Calhoun 2000: 706). 
Crossley (2001: 22) unpacks this mind/body dualism revealing that the popular view is that mind is in 
effect identified with the brain. Many people take this view as a relatively safe option for answering 
philosophical questions. Crossley (2001) points out that "we tend to assume, following Descartes, that 
there is a single space, place or thing called `the mind' which executes all of our mental processes and/or 
otherwise contains them" (ibid. 25) because "the brain is the main `thing like' structure that we know of 
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resultant assumption is that the mind controls the body like a puppet, giving directions 
to the body. Rational, calculative mind is at the centre of the Model Person's decision 
making in B&L's theory. 
Third, theory/practice dualism emerged as the result of the assumption that 
there is a universal theory and that practice is the application of theory, a form of 
rule-following. Saussurean langue/parole and Chomskyan competence/performance are 
good examples of such dichotomy. 
These dualisms have been at the roots of the modernist theory constructions, 
which Lakoff, Leech and B&L inevitably inherited. In exploring a new alternative 
approach to politeness, unconstrained by modernist thinking, it is necessary to 
overcome these problematic theoretical dualisms. 
(b). Doubts about the modernist project and the emergence of 
postmodernism 
Our three major politeness theorists, like other modernist researchers, suffering from 
Cartesian Anxiety, were committed to scientific conceptualizations of politeness and 
thus endeavoured to establish a universal theory. Consequently they inherited modernist 
theory construction. Theorists generally have oscillated between `structure' and `agency' 
in attempts to capture the nature of politeness. The assumptions behind modernism, 
which have in the past been requirements for many modern academic enterprises, are 
now increasingly brought into question. Politeness theories have exhibited signs of a 
similar deadlock to those in modern social science. Recently many modern academic 
enterprises are being reexamined and alternative approaches termed "postmodern" are 
suggested. In the same way, it is necessary to deconstruct the problematic assumptions 
of modern theory construction in current politeness theories and explore an alternative 
approach to politeness in this postmodern or late-modern academic climate. 
which could fit the bill" (ibid. ). "The brain-identity theory and the neuroscience and folk psychology 
depend upon one another in order to make claims about `mental matters"' (Crossley 2001: 26). 
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Postmodernism challenges modernist optimism in its search for universal truth 
and rationality and questions the progress inherent in modernism. The most widely 
known presentation of philosophical postmodernism is the position set out by 
Jean-Francois Lyotard in his book The Postmodern Condition (1984). Lyotard points 
out that once upon a time, it was possible to believe that Enlightenment thinking is the 
grand-narrative or `metanarrative'95. Lyotard argues that we can no longer believe in the 
Enlightenment grand-narrative stating that "scientific knowledge does not represent the 
totality of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in competition and 
conflict with, another kind of knowledge" (Lyotard 1984: 7). In the postmodern climate, 
different narratives exist and these narratives are strictly incommensurable. He explains 
this by employing Wittgenstein's `language games'. 
Wittgenstein, taking up the study of language again from scratch, focuses 
his attention on the effects of different modes of discourse; he calls the 
various types of utterances he identifies along the way ... 
language games. 
(Lyotard 1984: 10) 
Lyotard claims that like all human discourse, scientific rationality is a form of human 
linguistic activity (language game). Though it once legitimized modern society and 
modern academia, it is now losing its power. There are many language games and it is 
impossible to presume to judge between them on grounds of justice and truth (Norris 
2000: 29), because according to postmodernism's new understanding, scientific 
knowledge is not a compilation of objective truths but a collection of research traditions 
born by particular communities of inquirers (Grenz 2000: 56). In other words, it is a 
language game that is played in the scientific community and legitimized within that 
community. 
Terkourafi (2005: 238) points out that the work of Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) 
95 A metanarrative is "a story that wants to be more than just a story, that is to say, one which claims to 
have achieved an omniscient standpoint above and beyond all the other stories that people have told so 
far" (Norris 2000: 28). 
Chapter 3 Politeness and modern social theories 131 
and Watts (2003) reflect a `postmodern' view of politeness, because these three 
theorists are no longer aiming at establishing a universal theory of politeness but 
instead emphasize heterogeneity in judgements about politeness and consider the role 
of the addressee as being of paramount importance. I agree with Terkourafi's 
assessment that these theorists have initiated this postmodern turn in politeness studies. 
Unlike modern politeness theorists, who endeavoured to establish a universal theory, 
these researchers consider politeness phenomena in particular situational or social 
contexts as an important object of study. 96 Eelen recovers our focus on `first-order' 
politeness. Mills uses the notion of `communities of practice' to claim a local 
understanding of politeness. Watts uses the term `discursive' politeness to refer to 
situated politeness. Watts (2005) in "Linguistic politeness research: quo vadis? " 
acknowledges that the field is moving in a postmodern direction, although Eelen (2001) 
and Mills (2003) did not discuss their views explicitly in the modern/postmodern 
context. In my view, however, none of these researchers have dug sufficiently deeply 
into the modern/postmodern epistemological problems in the field of politeness. It is in 
this area, that I hope to make some contribution. 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have re-examined the theoretical assumptions behind Lakoff, Leech 
and B&L's theories at the sociological and philosophical level. These researchers 
endeavoured to reach a scientific conceptualization of politeness and the construction of 
a universal theory of politeness to meet the demand of the modernist academic 
framework and thus inherited different dualisms in modernist theories. Yet these 
96 It may not be a coincidence that the theme of the Third International Symposium on Politeness 
between 2-4 July 2007 was "Situated Politeness". In politeness studies, some seem to be shifting from a 
modernist grand-narrative approach to politeness to a postmodern approach focusing on small situated 
narratives. 
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modernist assumptions in social science have been increasingly brought into question in 
recent years. It is time to focus attention on new postmodern politeness studies.. These 
politeness theorists have oscillated between structure-centred and agency-centred 
approaches in attempting to elucidate politeness: and thus I labeled Lakoff and Leech's 
theory a `structure-centred approach' and B&L's an `agency-centred approach'. It is 
therefore necessary to find a more embracing alternative framework which can 
encapsulate both structure and agency. This is where I begin the second half of the 
thesis "Politeness beyond modernity". 
Part II 
Politeness beyond Modernity 
The second half of the thesis (Part II) will explore alternative ways of explaining 
linguistic politeness, employing three new theorists as `thinking tools' for this task of 
discovering alternative ways of looking at politeness in the postmodern academic 
climate. In Chapter 4, I will turn to Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, who 
attempted to transcend this dilemma of structure and agency. In Chapter 5, I will 
borrow insights into everyday social interaction from Erving Goffman, a Canadian 
sociologist. In the Conclusion, I will bring together insights from the critical discussion 
of Bourdieu and Goffman and sketch out an alternative framework for politeness. The 
postmodern reconstruction of politeness studies involves questioning the scope of 
science after modernism has been delimited within the narrow scope of scientific 
rationality. Hans-Georg Gadamer, a German philosopher, the third theorist, provides the 
possibility of a more flexible social science which recovers "phronesis" (i. e. practical 
wisdom) originally expounded in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics guides us into the path of reconstructing postmodern 
politeness. 
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Chapter 4 Bourdieu's sociology: 
Overcoming the 'structure'/'agency' dilemma 
0. Introduction 
1 have argued so far that all three politeness theories under discussion became enmeshed 
in the structure/agency dualism problem and that they are all products of modernist 
academic enterprise. Coincident with the emergence of alternative postmodern thinking 
and postmodern theoretical approaches, there have been new directions in politeness 
studies, initiated by Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003). Their aim is no longer 
a scientific conceptualization of politeness (second-order politeness) or formulation of a 
universal theory. Having recognised that evaluation of what is polite is disputable, their 
focus now is on participants' own evaluation of politeness (first-order politeness). 
In this chapter, I turn to a French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. Section 1 
explains why I turned to Bourdieu for an alternative approach to politeness and how his 
main concerns relate to the same problems we have faced in modern politeness theories. 
Section 2 introduces Bourdieu's sociology. Section 3 shows how linguistic politeness 
may be understood in Bourdieu's framework. Section 4 summarises what Bourdieu 
could provide as alternative approaches to politeness. Section 5 investigates how 
postmodern politeness theorists, Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) 
appropriated Bourdieu in their theorisation. Section 6 discusses the weaknesses of 
Bourdieu's theory of practice in relation to politeness studies. Section 7 concludes the 
discussion of this chapter. 
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1. Bourdieu's main concern and various problems in 
modern politeness theories 
1.1. Why Bourdieu? 
Why turn to Bourdieu when exploring alternative approaches to politeness? In chapter 3, 
I discussed various problematic dualisms - the structure/agency dilemma, theory/ 
practice and mind/body - inherent in modern theory construction. Lakoff (1973,1975), 
Leech (1983) and Brown & Levinson's theories (1978 [1987]) inherited the same 
problems. Particularly solving the structure/agency dilemma has been a longstanding 
preoccupation in modern sociology. Pierre Bourdieu is a sociologist who made this 
structure/agency issue central to his sociology. He was also concerned with other 
dichotomies found in modernist theory such as theory/practice, and mind/body dualisms. 
Bourdieu took drastic measures in his sociology in an attempt to resolve these problems. 
Having faced similar problems in politeness studies, I turn to Bourdieu as my first 
`thinking tool' in order to explore alternative ways in which politeness can be elucidated. 
In the next two sections, I revisit various dualisms that Bourdieu endeavoured to 
overcome. 
1.2. The structure/agency (objectivism/subjectivism) problem 
Bourdieu discusses the problem of structure/agency in terms of the objectivism/ 
subjectivism problem. He had struggled with this issue in exploring ways to make sense 
out of his own ethnographic materials. In his early career, Bourdieu tried to accept the 
`objective' structuralism of Levi-Straus. 97 Bourdieu started as a self-taught 
97 Levi-Strauss's structuralism is an application of Saussurean structuralism to anthropology. In 
Elementary Structures of Kinship, he explicitly compares his anthropology objectives with those of 
phonological linguistics and argues that linguists and social scientists `do not merely apply the same 
methods, but are studying the same thing' (1969: 493). Through structural linguistics, he discerned 
`fundamental and objective realities consisting of systems of relations which are the products of 
unconscious thought process' (Levi-Strauss: 1968: 58 discussed in Giddens 1987: 198). 
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anthropologist during his service with the French Army in Algeria98 in the 1950s and 
returned to Paris in 1960. He then worked as an assistant to a French sociologist, 
Raymond Aron during which time he came into contact with Levi-Strauss's 
structuralism. After Bourdieu had employed a structuralist paradigm in some of his 
early work, he gradually began to realise the limits of objectivism. Bourdieu wrote: 
Objectivism, which sets out to establish objective regularities (structures, 
laws, systems of relationships, etc. ) independent of individual 
consciousness and will, introduces a radical discontinuity between 
theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. (1990b: 26) 
'Objectivist'sociology explains the structuring of action as the result of external forces 
but it fails to explain why human individuals engage in actual practical action that takes 
social structure into account. Structuralist approaches in linguistics and anthropology, 
including Lakoff and Leech's politeness theories, also suffer from a similar problem; 
they do not actually explain the reasons why social actors or language users are 
motivated to follow rules of politeness (See Ch. 1 4. ). 
On the other hand, `subjectivist' sociology sees actions as a simple outgrowth 
from internal factors. It assumes that social life is entirely dependent on the subjective 
consciousness of the actors such as conscious intentions and calculations as in the 
rational-actor model of human actions. As discussed in Chapter 2, Brown & Levinson 
subscribed to the rational actor model. Bourdieu pointed out the problem of rational 
action theory". 
[The rational choice theory] presents a normative model of what the agent 
should be if he wants to be rational (in the scientist's sense) as a description 
of the explanatory principle of what he really does. This is inevitable when 
one chooses to recognize no other principle of reasonable actions than 
rational intention, purpose, project, no other explanatory principle of the 
agent's actions than explanation by reasons or by causes which are efficient 
as reasons, enlightened self-interest (and the utility function) being, strictly 
9% This came out as a book Sociologie de L'Algerie (1958) 
99 What is known as `rational choice theory' is called `rational action theory' in Bourdieu's literature. 
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speaking, nothing other than the agent's interest as it appears to an impartial 
observer... (Bourdieu 2000: 140). 
Bourdieu identifies "two complementary fallacies": on the one hand, objectivism, which 
holds that the action is the mechanical effect of the constraints of external causes; and 
on the other, subjectivism, which holds that the agent acts consciously, and, with full 
understanding, the action being the product of a calculation of chances and profits 
(Bourdieu 2000: 138). Bourdieu (1990b) shows how problematic this dichotomy is in 
social science. 
Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most 
fundamental, and most ruinous, is the one that is set up between 
subjectivism and objectivism. The very fact that this division constantly 
reappears in virtually the same form would suffice to indicate that the 
modes of knowledge which it distinguishes are equally indispensable to a 
science of the social world that cannot be reduced either to a social 
phenomenology or to a social physics. (1990b: 25) 
Bourdieu's main theoretical project was to develop a sociology which would transcend 
this objectivist and subjectivist dichotomy. Bourdieu's attempt to overcome the 
structure/agency dilemma is best summarised in The Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(1977) and The Logic of Practice (1990b). 
Bourdieu finds another problem concerning objectivism. As part of objectivism 
social scientists tend to think of social reality in its totality as though they were totally 
outside the social situation they analyse. The underlying assumption is that there is a 
complete and potentially permanent logical order already existing behind society or 
culture, and social scientists have only to decipher it. Bourdieu disagrees with this idea 
and finds such a totalizing view problematic. 
Objectivism constitutes the social world as a spectacle presented to an observer 
who takes up a "point of view" on the action, who stands back so as to observe 
it and, transferring into the object the principles of his relation to the object, 
conceives of it as a totality intended for cognition alone, in which all 
interactions are reduced to symbolic exchanges. This point of view is the one 
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afforded by high positions in the social structure, from which the social world 
appears as a representation.. . and practices are no more than "executions".... (Bourdieu 1977: 96) 
These objectivist social scientists were trying to establish a totalizing view as though 
they were detached spectators for the sake of claiming objectivity. However, in actual 
fact, social actors cannot see the whole of society from outside but can only see it from 
his or her particular position within it. Therefore Bourdieu argues that social scientists 
who take practice seriously must also look at society through the lens of what actual 
social actors are experiencing. Bourdieu attempts to capture this in his `theory of 
practice' (See 2.1., this chapter). In my view, modern politeness theories have also had a 
similar problem in establishing an objective theory. In an alternative approach to 
politeness, we should take practice seriously and try to understand politeness through 
the lens of actual language users. 
1.3. Theory/practice and mind/body dichotomies 
Bourdieu was also concerned about other dichotomies found in modernist theory 
construction, some of which have existed in Western thought since the time of Aristotle. 
One is a theory/practice dichotomy. It encourages the view that practice is a mere 
application of theory, a form of rule-following. This dichotomy has been observable in 
linguistics. Saussurean langue/parole and Chomskyan competence/performance are 
good examples of such dichotomies. I have pointed out in Chapter 3 that Leech's and 
Lakoff's endeavour to establish politeness as pragmatic rules/principles was inspired by 
the Saussurean linguistics tradition which aimed to establish the `language system'. 
Bourdieu points out the weakness of Saussurean structuralism. 
... 
Saussurean linguistics privileges the structure of signs, that is, the 
relations between them, at the expense of practical functions, which are 
never reducible, as structuralism tacitly assumes, to functions of 
communication and knowledge. The limits of Saussurean objectivism are 
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never more clearly visible than in its inability to conceive of speech and 
more generally of practice other than as execution, within a logic which, 
though it does not use the word, is that of the rule to be applied. 
Objectivism constructs a theory of practice (as execution) but only as a 
negative by-product or, one might say, waste product, immediately 
discarded, of the construction of the system of objective relations. 
(Bourdieu 1977: 24) [emphasis in the original] 
Under the pretence of drawing methodological distinctions, Saussure made substantive 
assumptions about language. However, the actual language practice in the real world 
cannot simply be explained as the application of an idealised language system, `langue'. 
Bourdieu strongly opposed this dualism of `langue' and `parole', which separates an 
idealised language system from actual language practice. 10° 
Another dualism that modern politeness theories inherited from modernist 
thinking was a mind/body dualism. The Cartesian supremacy of `reason' placed the 
`mind' in a superior position to the `body'. Turner (1984: 2) writes that "much of 
sociology is still Cartesian in implicitly accepting a rigid mind/body dichotomy... " 
Chomsky's `mentalism' inherited this Cartesian basis. Chomsky was "concerned with 
discovering a mental reality underlying actual behaviour" (Chomsky 1965: 4) and 
claimed that "linguistic theory" should "contribute to the study of human mental 
processes and intellectual capacity" (ibid. 46) 101. Lakoff and Leech accepted 
Chomskyan mentalism in their framework. Brown & Levinson also accepted the 
Cartesian supremacy of `reason' and chose a `rational actor' model for the Model 
Person (MP); they argued that choice of the best politeness strategies is made based on 
MP's rational calculation or computing of Social distance (D) between S and H; 
Relative power (P) that H has over S and Absolute ranking (R) of imposition in the 
particular culture. (See Ch. 2 1.1. (d)) Bourdieu rejected such mind/body dualism, which 
has been so prevalent in modernist thinking and attempted to achieve a `mindful 
10° Bourdieu's view on language and language use will be discussed further in 3.1. in this chapter). 
10' See footnote 24. 
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embodiment' in his sociology. 
2 Bourdieu's Sociology 
2.0. Introduction to Bourdieu's sociology 
Bourdieu endeavoured to overcome the dichotomies of objectivism/subjectivism, 
structure/agency, theory/practice, and body/mind, which continue to exist in the 
epistemological frameworks of modern social science, by means of his innovative 
approach, in his `theory of practice'. As politeness studies also faced similar problems 
(See Ch. 3 1.2 and 2. ), Bourdieu's sociological project which attempt to resolve these 
problems may potentially offer new possibilities for politeness research as well. 
Bourdieu's notion of habitus is popular among researchers in various disciplines but it is 
sometimes taken out of context for researchers' convenience. For instance, habitus is 
not a notion which stands alone but is meant to be understood together with its related 
concepts of `field' and `capital'. Postmodern politeness researchers, Eelen (2001), Watts 
(2003) and Mills (2003) also made use of Bourdieu for their alternative approaches to 
politeness. However, in my view, their interpretation of Bourdieu needs critical 
reconsideration, which I will discuss later in this chapter (Section 5) as I discuss the 
`appropriation of Bourdieu' by recent politeness scholars. 
For fair treatment of Bourdieu's sociology, in this section (Section 2), 1 will 
outline what I believe to be fundamental in Bourdieu's sociology. In 2.1., 1 will discuss 
what he tried to achieve in his `theory of practice' and in 2.2., I will expound his notion 
of `habitus', which is central to his `theory of practice'. In 2.3., I will show some 
advantages of understanding politeness in terms of habitus. In 2.4., I will discuss how 
`field' and `capital' are related to `habitus' and in 2.5., I will explain how other related 
notions such as `doxa' `misrecognition' and `symbolic power' are essential in 
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understanding his sociology and important for understanding the issue of politeness and 
power. 
2.1 Bourdieu's `theory of practice' 
Aiming to transcend dichotomies such as objectivism/subjectivism (structure/agency), 
theory/practice in social science, Bourdieu argues for a social science which focuses on 
the doings of the actors, who always possess some practical knowledge of their world 
even if they cannot articulate it. Bourdieu calls this a `theory of practice'. In his `theory 
of practice' he endeavours not only to encapsulate both structure and agency but to 
show how they are inseparably related. Though it is termed a `theory', Bourdieu's 
`theory of practice' is different from a theory in positivist sociology (Bourdieu 
1990b: 52). He tries to elucidate what the social actors actually experience in society 
rather than attempting to establish a totalizing view of society (See 1.2., this chapter). 
Bourdieu's theory of practice is sometimes termed `thinking tools'. Wacquant asked 
Bourdieu during an interview with him, "you cannot deny that there is a theory in your 
work, or to be more precise, a set of "thinking tools".... of wide - if not universal - 
applicability" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 160) and Bourdieu agreed with Wacquant 
and provided the following explanation. 
... these tools are only visible through the results they yield, and they are 
not built as such. The ground for these tools.. . 
lies in research, in the 
practical problems and puzzles encountered and generated in the effort to 
construct a phenomenally diverse set of objects in such a way that they 
can be treated, thought of, comparatively. (ibid. ) 
Bourdieu considers the logic of research as being "inseparably empirical and 
theoretical [Italics in the original]". `Theory' for Bourdieu is not a theory for the sake of 
'theory'. 102 Bourdieu's `theory of practice' is a `thinking tool' in a sense that it enables 
102 Bourdieu (1992) says, "For me theory is not a sort of prophetic or programmatic discourse which 
originates by dissection or by amalgamation of other theories for the sole purpose of confronting other 
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one to understand and deal with practical or empirical problems and difficulties and it is 
produced by and always oriented towards a task (Webb et al. 2002: 47). By using a 
`theory of practice, he shuns the kind of `theoreticist theory', which has been seen as the 
prerequisite for positivist social science. Bourdieu writes: 
The theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to positivist materialism, 
that the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and, 
contrary to intellectualist idealism, that the principle of this construction is 
the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is 
constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions 
(Bourdieu 1990b: 52). 
In order to explicate this social actor's practice, Bourdieu has coined many 
concepts such as `habitus', `field' or `symbolic capital' in his theory of practice. The 
central notion is habitus. Bourdieu said that he used these concepts as a kind of 
`shorthand' within the research procedure. 
The function of the concepts I employ is first and foremost to designate, in 
a kind of shorthand within the research procedure, a theoretical stance, a 
principle of methodological choice, negative as well as positive. 
Systematization necessarily comes ex post, as fruitful analogies emerge 
little by little, as the useful properties of the concept are successfully tried 
and tested. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 161) 
Though he may have initially used these concepts as a kind of `shorthand', Bourdieu 
tried and tested his notion of `habitus' across different areas and managed to explicate 
different sociological phenomena using the same notions of `habitus' or `field' 
throughout his academic career: e. g. Education and pedagogical practice are discussed 
in La Reproduction. Elements pour une theorie du systeme d'enseignement with 
Jean-Claude Passeron (1970, in English 1977); social class in La distinction (1979, in 
English 1984); the academic world in Homo Academicus, (1984, in English 1988) and 
linguistic practice in Language & Symbolic Power (in part 1982, in English 1991). 103 In 
such pure `theoreticist theories' " (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 161). 
103 1 give the original French titles to show chronological development. In the bibliography, I included 
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other words, Bourdieu's major concepts within his theory of practice did not change 
over the years. 
2.2. Habitus 
(a). Social life as a game 
Bourdieu argues that when we perform practical tasks we are not necessarily following 
rules. Bourdieu does not believe that rules or structures can sufficiently explain our 
practices as Lakoff or Leech have attempted to do. Nor does Bourdieu accept the idea 
that human action can be reduced to goal-oriented conscious rational calculation as is 
assumed in Brown & Levinson's theory. In order to convey his understanding of social 
life, Bourdieu employs the metaphor of `(athletic) game' like, for example, rugby which 
he played himself. Games are strategic and tactical. Players cannot play a game simply 
by comprehending the rules. As team games always require improvisation, it requires a 
constant awareness of and responsiveness to one's opponents or fellow team members, 
anticipating their next moves. There are a variety of possible approaches to each game 
and to each moment in the game. 
The good player, who is so to speak the game incarnate, does at every 
moment what the game requires. That presupposes a permanent capacity for 
invention, indispensable if one is to be able to adapt to indefinitely varied 
and never completely identical situations ... 
(Bourdieu 1990a: 63) 
He argues that in order to play effectively in any particular game, we need not only an 
understanding of the rules, but a practical appreciation of the game, a sense of how to 
play. Players must have practical knowledge, the non-theoretical knowledge that builds 
up as a result of actually playing in a game. These non-theoretical skills all require a 
huge amount of learned knowledge which cannot be put into words. 
Bourdieu claims that human activity also involves a combination of discursive 
English translations of these books. 
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awareness and unconscious skills as in a game. We learn practical abilities not 
by 
following the rules but through repetition. We can only do it well when it becomes 
habitual. Bourdieu called such an embodied sense or capacity that each player has of the 
game `habitus'. Bourdieu points out that compared with sports games, in which the field 
(the pitch or board on which it is played, the rules and the outcome at stake, etc) is 
clearly seen, the game of social life is less explicit. 
... 
in the social fields, which are the products of a long, slow process of 
automatization, and therefore, so to speak, games `in themselves' and not 
`for themselves' one does not embark on the game by a conscious act, one 
is born into the game with the game ... 
(1990b: 67) 
(b). Habitus as a feel for the game, practical sense 
Players must have a sense of the necessity and logic of the game. Habitus is the sense of 
the game. Bourdieu calls it `feel for the game' (1990b: 66,1990a: 61). It is "the practical 
mastery of the logic or of the immanent necessity of the game -a mastery acquired by 
experience of the game, and one which works outside conscious control and discourse 
(in the way that, for instance, techniques of the body do)" (Bourdieu 1990a: 61). It is 
"social game embodied and turned into a second nature. Nothing is simultaneously freer 
and more constrained than the action of the good player" (ibid. 63). 
Having a feel for the game is having the game under the skin; it is to master in 
a practical way the future of the game; it is to have a sense of the history of 
the game. While the bad player is always off tempo, always too early or too 
late, the good player is the one who anticipates, who is ahead of the game. 
Why can she get ahead of the flow of the game? Because she has the 
immanent tendencies of the game in her body, in an incorporated state: she 
embodies the game. (Bourdieu 1998: 80-81) 
Bourdieu also calls habitus a `practical sense'. Bourdieu (1990b) explains this as 
follows: 
Practical sense is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world which 
presupposes no representation either of the body or of the world, still less of 
their relationship. It is an immanence in the world through which the world 
imposes its imminence, things to be done or said, which directly governs 
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speech and action. It orients `choices' which, though not deliberate, are no 
less systematic, and which, without being ordered and organised in relation 
to an end, are none the less charged with a kind of retrospective finality. 
(1990b: 66) 
This practical sense, which is an embodied sensibility, makes possible practical 
improvisation in the social game. Anticipation in social games is not merely a conscious 
choice but something we do pre-reflectively. It is a product of `practical sense' of a 
particular social game. "This sense is acquired beginning in childhood, through 
participation in social activities" (Lamaison & Bourdieu 1986: 112). It is "the product of 
the work of inculcation" (Bourdieu 1977: 85). Through the approval or disapproval of 
parents and of others around us, we develop a characteristic way of generating new 
actions, of improvising the moves of the game of our lives. Much of the socialization 
process is experienced in bodily terms, as parts of who we are and of how we exist in 
the world. 
(c). Habitus as systems of durable, transposable dispositions 
Bourdieu has various definitions of habitus. In The Logic of Practice he defines it as 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed 
to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 
`regulated' and `regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to 
rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organizing action of a conductor. (Bourdieu 1990b: 53) 
It might be helpful to break down this long complicated definition into different 
characteristics. First, habitus is systems of durable, transposable dispositions. By 
disposition, Bourdieu means "a system of cognitive and motivational structures" 
(Bourdieu 1990b: 53). He says that this disposition is durable and transposable. Second, 
habitus generates practices. In other places Bourdieu writes that habitus is "an acquired 
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system of generative scheme" (1990b: 55) or "the durably installed generative principle 
of regulated improvisation ... 
[which produces] practices" (1977: 78). Third, practices 
generated by habitus are always adapted to the situation. Habitus generates an infinite 
number of practices but yet the practices are always within the constraints and limits 
required by social conditions that are relatively unpredictable. In other words, habitus 
tends to generate all the `reasonable', `common-sense' behaviours (and only these) 
which are possible within the limits of the objective regularities of particular social 
conditions, and which are in accordance with the specific logic of the particular field 
(Bourdieu 1990b: 55). Thus habitus has an "infinite yet strictly limited generative 
capacity" (1990b: 55). Fourth, habitus unconsciously or pre-reflectively generates 
practice, i. e. "without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends (Bourdieu 1990b: 53") 
or "without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor" (Bourdieu 
1990b: 53). In other words, "The habitus is a spontaneity without consciousness or will, 
opposed as much to the mechanical necessity of things without history in mechanistic 
theories as it is to the reflexive freedom of subjects `without inertia' in rationalist 
theories" (Bourdieu 1990b: 56). Habitus is the source of the series of "moves which are 
objectively organised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic 
intention" (Bourdieu 1977: 73). Fifth, the actions generated by habitus are always 
regulated, i. e. appropriate to the situation though they are not the product of obedience 
to rules. 
(d). Habitus as social order inscribed in bodies, bodily hexis 
Bourdieu claims that "[t]he relation to body is a fundamental dimension of the habitus 
(Bourdieu 1990b: 72)". He understands the body as form of engagement with the world: 
"practical sense is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world" (Bourdieul990b: 66). 
Brown & Levinson's Model Person was endowed with `rationality' and `face' but 
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Bourdieu (2000: 138) argues that "social agents are endowed with habitus, inscribed in 
their bodies". The notion of habitus "illuminates the circular process whereby practices 
are incorporated within the body, only then to be regenerated through the embodied 
work and competence of the body" (Crossley 2001: 106). According to Bourdieu, 
through socialization, we are inculcated in our mind and the social order is inscribed in 
our bodies. While modernist thinking was haunted by the Cartesian mind/body dualism, 
Bourdieu provides a healthy alternative in understanding in the mind/body relations - 
bodily and cognitive dimensions of habitus are integrally related. Through the notion of 
habitus, Bourdieu has overcome the body/mind dichotomy (Crossly 2001: 161). 
Bourdieu employs the word `hexis' to explain the `embodiment' of habitus. 
This word hexis "is used to signify deportment, the manner and style in which actors 
`carry themselves': stance, gait, gesture, etc. " (Jenkins 2002: 75). Webb et al. (2002: x) 
describes bodily hexis as "the physical attitude and dispositions which emerge in 
individuals as a result of the relationships between particular fields and individuals' 
habitus". Bourdieu explains the `embodied' nature of habitus as follows: "the principles 
em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot 
be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit" 
(Bourdieu 1977: 94). 
(e). Habitus as embodied history 
Bourdieu also claims that the habitus is historically constituted and reconstituted. 
the habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices - more history - in accordance with the schemes generated by 
history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, 
deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought 
and action, tends to guarantee the `correctness' of practices and their 
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit 
norms. (Bourdieu 1990b: 54). 
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Habitus is acquired by individuals through experience and explicit socialisation in early 
life. The whole of life and subsequent experience is a process of adjustment of 
subjectivity with objective reality (Jenkins 2002: 79-80). Habitus is a product of both 
individual and collective history. Webb et at. (2002: 44) explain that habitus is a product 
of an individual's cultural history that are internalised and continue with us across 
different contexts. Through socialisation, individuals have internalised social structure 
as embodied history, habitus. Habitus enables us to respond to different contexts in 
different ways allowing for improvisation, but our actions are always largely regulated 
by where (and with whom) we have been in a culture or society. "The habitus - 
embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history - is the 
active presence of the whole past of which it is the product" (Bourdieu 1990b: 56). 
Bourdieu incorporated time into his `theory of practice' by using the notion of 
habitus, internalised structure as embodied history. "To restore to practice its practical 
truth", he argues, "we must therefore reintroduce time into the theoretical representation 
of a practice, which, being temporally structured, is intrinsically defined by its tempo" 
(Bourdieu 1977: 8). Bourdieu writes: 
The habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered 
by history. The system of dispositions -a past which survives in the 
present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself 
present in practices structured according to its principles, an internal law 
relaying the continuous exercises of the law of external necessities 
(irreducible to immediate conjunctual constraints) - is the principle of 
continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world 
without being able to give them a rational basis. (Bourdieu 1977: 82) 
Habitus is not only itself the product of history but also produces more history by 
generating practices. Habitus tends to confirm and reinforce what was present in the 
past and perpetuate it into the future. Thus habitus is a principle of continuity. 
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2.3. Some advantages of understanding politeness in terms of 
habitus 
I have only looked at the notion of habitus in Bourdieu's theory of practice. but habitus 
alone, in my view, offers a very different approach towards understanding politeness in 
contrast to modern politeness theories. Brown & Levinson explained politeness as 
strategic action, resulting from conscious rational calculation. Lakoff and Leech 
conceived politeness to be pragmatic rules/principles that speakers are expected to 
observe. In Bourdieu's theory of practice, politeness would instead be explained in 
terms of habitus. t04 As discussed earlier, habitus is described as a `practical sense', `a 
feel for the game', a `system of durable transposable disposition', `embodied history', 
and `social order inscribed in bodies'. We have acquired our habitus through our 
socialisation, i. e. learning how to behave appropriately occupying different positions in 
different social spaces since childhood. When we face new social situations, we are 
already predisposed to act in certain ways. We act strategically, but without consciously 
being strategic and we do not feel constraints, but our actions fall within the limits of 
what the social situation requires. It might be useful at this point to briefly mention 
some advantages of understanding politeness in terms of habitus. After I expound other 
essential notions in Bourdieu's theory of practice, I will summarise what Bourdieu 
could provide for an alternative approach to politeness in Section 4. 
First, Bourdieu 's theory of practice overcomes the dichotomies between society 
(structure) and individuals (agency) or objectivism and subjectivism. Bourdieu writes: 
Through the habitus, the structure of which it is the product governs, not 
along the paths of a mechanical determinism, but within the constraints and 
limits initially set on its inventions. This infinite yet strictly limited 
generative capacity is difficult to understand only so long as one remains 
locked in the usual antimonies - which the concept of habitus aims to 
104 Sometimes it seems difficult to demarcate linguistic habitus out of general habitus. As Bourdieu 
explains in his notion of bodily hexis, paralinguistic behaviour and other bodily features are often 
inseparable from linguistic practice. 
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transcend - of determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity, 
consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society. Because 
the habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products - thought, 
perceptions, expressions and actions - whose limits are set by the 
historically and socially situated conditions of its production, the 
conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from creation 
of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of 
conditions. (1990b: 55) 
Politeness theories, like modern sociology in general, face structure/agency 
(objectivism/subjectivism) problems. As I have suggested, Lakoff and Leech were 
structure-centred while B&L were agency-centred. Both approaches partially explained 
politeness but were trapped in the objectivism/subjectivism dualism. Through the notion 
of habitus, Bourdieu transcended the dichotomy of objectivism/subjectivism. The 
notion of habitus allows us to explain politeness without falling into the total 
determinism of objectivism or into the total freedom of subjectivism. Habitus also 
portrays human actors as being neither totally conditioned by system or structure nor 
being totally free to exercise creativity without any structural constraint. The notion of 
habitus allows us to encapsulate both elements of these dichotomies, i. e. structure and 
agency, determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity, consciousness and 
unconsciousness in understanding politeness. However, politeness does not have to be 
interpreted as conscious rational action as in B&L's theory. Habitus allows us to explain 
that acts of politeness are sometimes conscious but at other times quite unconscious and 
more pre-reflexive. 
Second, an alternative approach to politeness using Bourdieus theory of 
practice transcends the theory/practice dichotomy. Many disciplines including 
linguistics unconsciously accepted a theory-practice formula as the basic assumption of 
modern scientific theorisation. Lakoff, Leech and B&L all inherited the theory/practice 
dualism. They all aimed to establish a theory which they presumed would explain 
practice as its application. Bourdieu opposed the idea that theory always precedes 
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practice. He refused to establish a `theory' in the positivist sense. and proposed the 
`theory of practice', which does not split theory from practice. An alternative approach 
to politeness does not aim to establish a theory from which practice must follow as its 
execution, but directly attempt to elucidate `practice' itself. That means that we 
elucidate politeness as actual interlocutors perceive it. The aim is not longer to establish 
a meta-narrative of what some universal notion of politeness might be. 
Thirdly, understanding politeness in terms of habitus allows us to overcome the 
mind/body dualism which has long existed in modernist academic theories. Modernist 
theories tend to focus on cognitive aspects assuming that human cognition guides the 
action. A good example is the rational choice theory that B&L adopted: its underlying 
assumption is that rational calculation guides all human action. Bourdieu, however, 
gave `body' an important place in his theory of practice. We have "a quasi-bodily 
involvement in the world" (Bourdieu 1990b: 66) through socialisation. Body has become 
the repository of an ingrained disposition to generate certain actions, and certain ways 
of behaving. The habitus is inscribed in the body and forms a dimension of bodily hexis. 
The body is the site of incorporated history. (See 2.2 (d), this chapter) Understanding 
politeness in terms of habitus helps us to overcome the mind/body dualism and have 
amore balanced understanding of mind and body. Habitus, the practical sense of what is 
appropriate has become embodied in us through our socialisation. People do not 
produce appropriate actions by rational calculation as described in `rational choice 
theory' but rather through habitus, they are predisposed to act appropriately. 
Fourthly, Bourdieu incorporated `time' or `historicity' into his theory of 
practice through the notion of habitus, which is an embodied history - "past which 
survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future" (Bourdieu 1977: 82). 
Neither the structure-centred approach nor the agency-centred approach were able to 
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incorporate time into their frameworks satisfactorily. Leech and Lakoff, who saw 
politeness as pragmatic rules/principles could not accommodate time into their theory. 
The time element does not come into play either in B&L's theory. This is partly due to 
the presuppositions to which these theorists subscribed, that modern social sciences 
ought to be timeless, ahistorical or universal in their approach. On the other hand, 
Bourdieu could incorporate time into his theory of practice through the notion of 
habitus: habitus, the practical sense which has been instilled into the body as a living 
memory pad, i. e. embodied history, will produce and reproduce actions, which are 
matched to the demands of particular situations. Blommaert (2005a: 223) also 
acknowledged the inclusion of time in Bourdieu's sociology using the expression, 
"historical embeddedness of habitus". Action is generated by habitus, embodied history, 
nurtured or inculcated through long time socialisation. Historicity is an essential 
element in understanding politeness, because our sense of what is appropriate is not 
based on universal rationality as modernists claim, but it is an embodied history of the 
particular social structure into which we were inculcated. Bourdieu's theory of practice 
has overcome the Cartesian Anxiety that the truth can be only observable from some 
alleged vantage point outside of the flux of history. This is one of the significant 
elements of a postmodern approach to politeness, which I will discuss in the Conclusion 
(the final chapter of this thesis). 
2.4. Field and capital 
Bourdieu's habitus is not uniform throughout society. As these particular situations vary, 
habitus senses what is appropriate and generates different yet appropriate actions 
accordingly. Bourdieu uses the notion `field' to explain this. In this section. I will 
introduce the notion of `field' and `capital', which are concepts related to `habitus' in 
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Bourdieu's theory of practice and discuss their relevance for politeness studies. 
(a). Field as a site of struggle 
Bourdieu employs the notion of field into which different social activities are 
organized. ' 0' Bourdieu describes a `field' as follows: 
In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or configuration, 
of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively 
defined, in their experience and in the determinations they impose upon 
their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential 
situations (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or 
capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are 
at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions 
(domination, subordination, homology, etc. ). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 97) 
Jenkins (2002: 85) explains this complex notion of field in much simpler terms. It is "a 
structured system of social positions - occupied either by individuals or institutions - 
the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. " It is also "a system of 
forces which exist between these positions; a field is structured internally in terms of 
power relations" (ibid. ). Bourdieu explains that "[i]n highly differentiated societies, the 
social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, 
i. e. spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are 
specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 97). This social microcosm is called `field'. The field can be cultural, political, or 
educational etc. and each field is defined by virtue of its content and has its own 
distinctive logic and stakes at play. 
Bourdieu also explains field using `game'. Field is "a space in which a game 
takes place [espace de jeu], a field of objective relations between individuals or 
institutions who are competing for the same stake" (Bourdieu 1984b: 197 quoted in Moi 
los Bourdieu believes that the reality of social world needs to be analysed in relational terms. "[t]o think 
in terms of field is to think relationally [Italic in the original]" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96). 
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1991: 1021). "We have an investment in the game, illusio106 (from ludus, the game): 
players are taken in by the game, they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, 
only to the extent that they concur in their belief. .. 
in the game and its stakes" (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992: 98). 107 
Positions in the field are determined by the distribution of different kinds of 
capital. Bourdieu uses the analogy of games of cards to explain the notion of capital. 
We also have trump cards, that is master cards whose force varies 
depending on the game: just as the relative values of the card changes 
with each game, the hierarchy of the different species of capital 
(economic, social cultural symbolic) varies across various fields. (ibid. ) 
In other words, possession of capital makes a difference by occupying a position of 
power in particular fields. Therefore people are "concerned with the preservation or 
improvement of their positions with respect to the defining capital of the field" (Jenkins 
2002: 85). Bourdieu mentions four kinds of capital: 1) economic capital - material 
wealth in the form of money, stocks and shares, and property, 2) social capital - various 
kinds of valued relationships with significant others, 3) cultural capital - knowledge, 
skills and other cultural acquisitions, as exemplified by educational or technical 
qualifications or forms of language, and 4) symbolic capital - accumulated prestige, or 
honour. Various types of capital can be exchanged for other types of capital. In other 
words, all capital is mutually `convertible'. 
Bourdieu designed his concept of field as a site of struggle. It is a social arena 
within which struggles take place over specific resources or access to them (Jenkins 
2002: 84). If the field is a site of struggle, what is at stake? Moi (1991: 1021) answers: 
106 Webb et al (2002: xiii) explain illusio as follows: "the fact of being caught up in and by the game, of 
believing that the game is worth playing and recognising its stakes. A politican, for example will 
demonstrate illusio by believing that the political field constitutes the `only game in town"'. 
107 Each `field' involves different games and each social game requires a different feel for the game. 
Habitus as a feel for the game senses what is possible, impossible and probable for individuals in their 
specific locations in a stratified social order (Swarts 1997: 106). 
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"[g]enerally speaking, any agent in the field may be assumed to seek maximum power 
and dominance within it. The aim is to rule the field, to become the instance which has 
the power to confer or withdraw legitimacy from other participants in the game" (Moi 
1991: 1021). Bourdieu defines legitimacy as follows: "[a]n institution, action or usage 
which is dominant, but not recognized as such, that is to say, which is tacitly accepted, 
is legitimate" (Bourdieu 1984b: 110 in Moi 1991: 1021). Bourdieu sometimes uses 
market as an alternative to the notion of field (e. g. Bourdieu 1991: 66-89). As arenas of 
struggle, fields are regulated by a relationship between supply and demand. The notion 
of market allows vocabulary like `capital' in explaining the competitive nature of the 
field (Jenkins 2002: 87). 
(b). Practice as the product of encounter between `habitus' and `field' 
Bourdieu claims that a particular practice should be seen as the product of an encounter 
between an individual's habitus and a particular field, which are `compatible' or 
`congruent' with one another. Individuals are already predisposed to act in certain ways, 
because they are the product of particular life histories which are preserved through 
their particular habitus-es. As stated, B&L subscribed to rational action theory, which 
explains social actions as the product of conscious rational calculation. Bourdieu says 
that rationality does not explain them. He argues that each field generates its own 
specific habitus, "a system of disposition adjusted to the game [of the field]" (Bourdieu 
1984b: 34 quoted in Moi 1991: 1021). Individuals need to be "ready to play the game, 
equipped with the habitus which enables them to know and recognize the immanent 
laws of the game, the stakes and so on" (Bourdieu 1984b: I10 quoted in Moi 1991: 1021). 
In Distinction (1984a: 101), Bourdieu expresses the relationship between habitus, 
capital and field in the form of an equation: 
[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice 
Chapter 4 Bourdieu's Sociology 156 
Bourdieu claims that "practice cannot be deduced either from the present conditions 
which may seem to have provoked them or from the past conditions which have 
produced the habitus.. [but from their] interrelationship.... "(1990b: 56). 108 Bourdieu 
explains linguistic practices as an encounter of habitus and linguistic market (field), 
which I will discuss further in Section 3. 
Modern politeness researchers were preoccupied with establishing universal 
principles of politeness. Brown & Levinson assume that `rationality' is "the only 
satisfactory explanatory scheme" (B&L 1987: 55) for such task. (See Ch. 2 1.0) In 
Bourdieu's sociology, practice is seen as the product of encounter between habitus and 
field. As the field and positions which individuals take in the field vary, what is 
expected as polite/impolite behaviour will also vary. Bourdieu's theory of practice 
accommodates a heterogeneous sense of appropriateness. Bourdieu's understanding that 
linguistic practice is the product of encounter between habitus and field, allows us to 
explain heterogeneous notions of politeness/impoliteness, which works well for the 
postmodern approach to politeness, which no longer aims to establish one grand 
narrative. The same utterance can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the 
fields and the positions that the particular individual takes in the field. 
2.5. Doxa, misrecognition, symbolic power 
`Doxa', `misrecognition' and `symbolic power' are other important notions in 
Bourdieu's theory of practice, which are particularly useful in explaining the relation 
108 Bourdieu argues that the distinctive life-styles which are characteristic of people of a particular social 
class are defined objectively and sometimes subjectively in and through their mutual relationships. He 
explains class distinction with the notion of class habitus, which is "the internalized form of class 
conditions and of the conditioning it entails" (1984a: 101). For instance, the experience of working class 
and middle class children differs on account of the capital possessed by their families and opportunities 
and constraints this generates. This is then registered corporeally as part of their class habitus (Crossley 
2001: 98). 
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between politeness and power. The notion of doxa, misrecognition and symbolic power 
explains how the sense of what is appropriate is geared to what is advantageous to the 
dominant group in any particular society. 
(a). Doxa and misrecognition 
Most people take themselves and their social world somewhat for granted, because the 
acquisition of habitus is historical to the extent that the `rules of the game' are 
incorporated, becoming, as we say, second nature. Bourdieu refers to this using the 
word `doxa'. 
Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice 
between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal 
taking-for-granted of the world that follows practical sense. Enacted belief, 
instilled by the childhood learning that treats the body as a living memory pad, 
an automation that `leads the mind unconsciously along with it'.... Practical 
sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes and 
body automatisms, is what causes practices, in and through what makes them 
obscure to the eyes of their producers, to be sensible, that is, informed by a 
common sense. (Bourdieu 1990b: 68-69) 
Doxa is the taken-for-granted, preconscious understanding of the world and our place in 
it. Bourdieu (1977) compares doxa with `orthodoxy' and `heterodoxy'. Orthodoxy is 
"straight, or rather straightened opinion-exists only in the objective relationship which 
opposes it to heterodoxy, that is, by reference to the choice - heresis, heresy - made 
possible by the existence of competing possibilities and to the explicit critique of the 
sum total of the alternatives not chosen that the established order implies" (Bourdieu 
1977: 169). Orthodoxy and heterodoxy are the right (+) or wrong (-) opinions, which 
delimit `the universe of possible discourse'. On the other hand, doxa is in `the universe 
of the undisputed', which lies totally outside of `the field of opinion or universe of 
discourse (or argument)'. The following diagram illustrates this well: 
Chapter 4 Bourdieu's Sociology 158 





i Jniverse o discourse 
(or argument) 
Fig. 4.1. Doxa, Orthodoxy, and Heterodoxy [title not in the original] (Bourdieu 1977: 168) 
Calhoun (2000: 711) describes doxa as "felt reality, what we take not as beyond 
challenge but before any possible challenge". He also points out that doxa appears to us 
as simply the way things are, but in fact it is a socially produced understanding. 
Doxa also implies misrecognition. Misrecognition is a partial and distorted 
understanding of things in the world that are systematically distributed through habitus. 
So it is undisputedly misrecognised as legitimate. Bourdieu (2000) writes: 
The agent engaged in practice knows the world.. . too well, without 
objectifying distance, takes it for granted, precisely because he is caught up in 
it, bound up with it; he inhabits it like a garment. . . or a 
familiar habitat. He 
feels at home in the world because the world is also in him, in the form of 
habitus (Bourdieu 2000: 142-3) 
We feel so comfortable within our roles within the social world that they seem like our 
second nature and we forget how we have actually been produced as particular kinds of 
people (Webb et al. 2002: xiv). Another definition of misrecognition is "the process 
whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form 
which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder" (Bourdieu and Passeron 
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1977: xiii). The unanimity of doxa is "the absolute form of recognition of legitimacy 
through misrecognition of arbitrariness since it is unaware of the very question of 
legitimacy, which arises from competition for legitimacy and hence from conflict 
between groups claiming to possess it" (Bourdieu 1977: 168). Understanding politeness 
in terms of habitus has overthrown the modernist foundation of rational judgment 
endorsed by Descartes and Kant. The notion of doxa highlights that habitus, our sense 
of appropriateness, is a socially produced understanding and a felt reality and has 
become second nature through our socialisation and no matter how distorted our 
understanding of the world may be, we misrecognise it as legitimate and at the root of 
misrecognition, there is symbolic power. 
(b). Symbolic power, symbolic violence 
Bourdieu (1977: 169) points out that dominant groups or classes have an interest in 
defending the integrity of doxa. What characterises socialisation into a habitus is 
actually the imposition primarily of dominant modes of expression or ways of seeing 
the world. Through our habitus, we misrecognise what is dominant as being legitimate. 
This representation of legitimacy contributes to the exercise and perpetuation of power 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977: 5). Thus power is seldom exercised as overt physical 
force, but instead it is transmuted into a symbolic form. Bourdieu calls this symbolic 
power, which is an `invisible power' which is `misrecognised' as such and thereby 
`recognised' as legitimate (Thompson in Bourdieu 1991: 23). Sometimes it becomes 
symbolic violence, when it becomes "the imposition of systems of symbolism and 
meaning (i. e. culture) upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as 
legitimate. This legitimacy obscures the power relations which permit that imposition to 
be successful" (Jenkins 2002: 104). As long as it goes on being accepted as legitimate, 
culture adds its own force to such power relations, and contributes to their systematic 
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reproduction (ibid. ). 
Bourdieu claims that education or `pedagogic action' is the most powerful force 
for reproducing power relationships, because learning is an `irreversible process' 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977: 43-44) in which a child plays a mostly passive role. 
`Pedagogic action' entails `pedagogic work', which is 
a process of inculcation which must last long enough to produce a durable 
training, i. e. a habitus, the product of internalization of the principles of a 
cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after PA [pedagogic action] has 
ceased and thereby perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalized 
arbitrary (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977: 31). 
The notion of cultural arbitrary109 above frequently appears in Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Cuture (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977), which is also an important 
notion. Webb et al. (2002: x) explains cultural arbitrary as follows: "the differential 
power relations pertaining to our culture have no necessary basis but are rather 
arbitrarily constructed to reflect the interests of dominant groups". Jenkins (2002: 105) 
writes that "[b]ehind all culture lies the arbitrary sanction of `pure de facto power'. 
Bourdieu uses the term `symbolic violence' to describe this "imposition of particular 
systems of symbolism and meaning (i. e. culture) upon groups or classes in such a way 
that they are experienced as legitimate" (Jenkins 2002: 104). The legitimacy obscures 
the power. Bourdieu claims that "all pedagogic action (PA) is, objectively, symbolic 
violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power" 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977: 5). 
Motivated by the modernist theory requirements of objectivity and rationality, 
modern politeness theorists endeavoured to establish a rational objective principle of 
politeness. However, Bourdieu's notions of doxa, misrecognition and symbolic power 
reveals that the sense of what is appropriate is not actually `neutral' or `objective' as 
109 `Cultural arbitrary' is Bourdieu's technical term. Bourdieu's translator seems to have used the word 
`arbitrary' (normally an adjective. ) as a noun here. 
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modernist researchers wished it to be, but is rather `biased' toward the dominant group 
in society. Commonly more respect and polite behaviour is expected toward the 
dominant or ruling class in society by the less dominant and not vice versa. Bourdieu's 
symbolic power helps to elucidate the interrelation between power and politeness. ' 10 
3. Linguistic politeness in Bourdieu's framework 
Bourdieu was very concerned with language and dealt with linguistic practice in his 
theory of practice. Bourdieu even explicitly discusses `politeness' or `tact' in some of 
his works. His works focusing on language were published as Language and Symbolic 
Power (1991). In this section, I will first introduce Bourdieu's view of language and of 
language practice in general (in 3.1., ) and in 3.2., 1 will discuss how he deals with 
`politeness' in his theory of practice. 
3.1 Bourdieu's view of language and of language practice 
Bourdieu discusses his views on existing approaches to language and language practice 
such as the Saussurean/Chomskyan view of language as an idealised language system, 
Austin's Speech Act Theory and Interactionist Approach. Through interacting with these 
authors, he presents his own ideas about language and language practice. 
(a). Legitimate language, normalized language 
As discussed in 1.3. Bourdieu criticises the Saussurean focus on an idealised linguistic 
system (langue) as the main object of linguistic study. "Saussure resolves the question 
of the social and economic conditions of the appropriation of language without ever 
needing to raise it" (Bourdieu 1991: 43). Similarly, he criticises Chomsky as follows: 
10 Lakoff's claim that women are expected to be more polite than men and that women and women 
embrace this as a virtue (See Ch. 1 1.1. (f). ) can be explained well by Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power. 
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Chomsky has the merit of explicitly crediting the speaking subject in his 
universality with the perfect competence which the Saussurean tradition 
granted him tacitly: `Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an 
ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, 
who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such 
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, 
shifts of attention or interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in 
applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance" (Bourdieu 
1991: 43-44). 
Bourdieu sees that "Chomskyan `competence' is simply another name for Saussurean 
langue" (Bourdieu 1991: 44) and rejects both the Saussurean view of langue and 
Chomsky's competence, in which language practice is treated as the execution of an 
abstract linguistic system (See 1.2., this chapter). Instead Bourdieu claims that language 
practice results from, and is moulded by, those relationships of power and inequality 
which are pervasive features of all human societies. 
Saussure and Chomsky treat `idealised language' as neutral, and make it an 
object of linguistic study. What is considered as idealised language i. e. a normative 
model of correct usage, is in Bourdieu's view, nothing but a particular set of linguistic 
practices, which have become the dominant and legitimate language determined by 
existing social-historical conditions. In this sense, it may be called `victorious language' 
(Thompson in Bourdieu 1991: 5). Bourdieu views the legitimation of language as a 
political act. A certain variety of a language is usually regarded as the standard language 
in any country and others are treated as mere dialects. Similarly, particular language(s) 
come to be recognized as official language(s) in a country where more than one 
language is spoken. Hanks (2005: 76) described the legitimation of language as follows: 
"Standardization and legitimation sanctions a certain way of speaking, rewarding some 
while silencing others. The effect is to intimidate and censor speech without any 
discrete act of intimidation or censoring". 
Bourdieu claims that it is the education system which plays a decisive role in 
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the process which leads to the construction and legitimation of an official language, just 
as pedagogic actions play a significant role in reproducing power relations in society 
(Bourdieu 1991: 48). Recognition of the legitimacy of the official language is "not an 
intentional act of accepting a `norm"' but it is "inscribed, in a practical state, in 
dispositions which are impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow process of 
acquisition, by the sanction of the linguistic market" (Bourdieu 1991: 51). In other 
words, we submit to symbolic power without even realizing it, because we are already 
predisposed to accept it through our habitus. Just as there are legitimate languages, there 
are legitimate usages. Bourdieu argues that we have learned to recognize certain usages 
as legitimate usages within our habitus. Then what we recognise as appropriate usage is 
not something universally recognised as being that way, but the particular language 
usages came to be recognised as appropriate in a particular community or society. 
Individuals who went through socialisation in that community, have learned to 
recognize it within habitus. 111 
(b). On Austin's Speech Act Theory 
As stated in earlier chapters, modern politeness theories have been influenced by 
Speech Act Theory. Leech and B&L specifically used Speech Act Theory in their 
theoretical framework. Bourdieu initially evaluated Austin positively because of his 
consideration of the social conditions necessary for communication: Austin recognises 
that the efficacy of performative utterances is inseparable from the existence of an 
`institution' which defines the conditions (such as the place, the time and the agent). 
So-called felicity conditions must be fulfilled in order for an utterance to be effective. ' 12 
'11 1 will discuss this further in the Conclusion chapter as I discuss the perception or evaluation of 
politeness. 
112 Austin claims that certain utterances perform actions as in the case of `I do' in a marriage ceremony or 
I name this ship Queen Elizabeth'. For such sentences (performatives) to be `felicitous', they must be 
uttered by an appropriate person in accordance with some conventional procedure. Austin termed these 
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However, Bourdieu initially commented that Austin left the way open for others to think 
about speech acts purely in linguistic terms (Thompson in Bourdieu 1991: 9). In 
Bourdieu's view, 
[t]he real source of the magic of performative utterances lies in the mystery 
of ministry, i. e. the delegation by virtue of which an individual - king, priest, 
spokesman - is mandated to speak and act on behalf of the group, thus 
constituted in him and by him. More precisely, it lies in the social conditions 
of the institution of the ministry, which constitutes the legitimate 
representative as an agent capable of acting on the social world through 
words, by instituting him as a medium between the group and the social 
world. [underlining added] (Bourdieu 1991: 75) 
He argued that "Austin's account of performative utterances cannot be restricted to the 
sphere of linguistics" (Bourdieu 1991: 73). He pointed out that many linguists who read 
Austin dismissed the fact that `felicity conditions' are social conditions "in order to 
return to a narrowly linguistic definition that ignores the market effect" (ibid. 73). In 
Bourdieu's view, `social conditions' means social-historical conditions of language use. 
Bourdieu criticised the inadequacies of Austin's account in his earlier work on language 
which led some linguists who read Austin not to appreciate fully the implication that the 
conditions of felicity are primarily social conditions. In later writing, however, Bourdieu 
corrected his arguments by pointing out that Austin was probably fully aware of the 
social conditions of performative utterances and that his criticism should have been 
aimed at the formalist readings which have reduced Austin's socio-logical indications to 
analysis of pure logic (1990a: 28-29). 113 In any case, Bourdieu wanted to stress the 
social-historical conditions of language use. 
`felicity conditions' (See Levinson 1983: 229). 
113 "In this respect, I would like to take this opportunity to correct the impression I may have given of 
Austin in my work on language. In fact, if people read Austin properly, and he is one of the philosophers I 
most admire, they would notice that the essential aspects of what I tried to reintroduce into the debate on 
the performative were already said, or suggested, there. " (Bourdieu 1991: 28-29). 
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(c). On the Interactionist approach 
Bourdieu also criticised the `Interactionist' approach for several reasons. Bourdieu does 
not mention particular theorists by name. Interactionism usually refers to the Symbolic 
Interactionism associated with Herbert Blumer and the Chicago School (Chicago 
sociology department). Erving Goffman, who obtained his doctorate at Chicago, also 
represents Symbolic Interaction ism. 114 `Interactionists' look closely at actual social 
interaction, because they believe that culture develops out of the way people act toward 
one another in a way that involves both purpose and meaning. They focus on small 
levels of social interaction (between individuals or small groups) and for this reason, are 
called `micro-level social analysts'. Bourdieu does not agree with the linteractionist 
approach despite their focus on an analysis of actual social practice, i. e. social 
interaction. 115 He argues that Interactionists tend to reduce relations of power to 
relations of communication, but in Bourdieu's view, power relations depend on the 
material and symbolic power accumulated by the agents (or institutions) involved in 
these relations (Bourdieu 1991: 167). 
Bourdieu's criticism of the Saussurean/Chomskyan and Interactionist 
approaches seems to be related to structure/agency problems. The former tends to 
emphasise structure/system at the expense of decentring agency (social actors or 
language users). The latter tends to focus on social actors' strategies in the immediate 
114 Some of the guiding premises of Symbolic Interactionism are as follows: Interactionists assume that 
people are conscious and self-reflexive beings who actively shape their own behaviour. They believe in a 
voluntaristic image of human behaviour. Interactionists conceive of society as a fluid but structured 
process. This process is grounded in individual's abilities to assume each other's perspectives, adjust and 
coordinate their unfolding acts and symbolically communicate and interpret these acts. To understand 
people's social acts, then, we need to use methods that enable us to discern the meanings they attribute to 
these acts. Interactionsts believe it is essential to understand those worlds of meaning and to see them as 
the individuals or groups under investigation see them. (from Sandstrom, et al. 2001: 218-9) 
115 He argues that the Interactionist approach "fails to go beyond the actions and reactions, apprehending 
their directly visible immediacy" and is "unable to discover that different agents' strategies are strictly 
dependent on their positions in the structure of the distribution of linguistic capital, which can in return be 
shown to depend, via the structure of changes of access to the educational system, on the structure of 
class relations" (Bourdieu 1991: 64). 
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communication but fail to see the macro structural issue. 
3.2 Politeness in Bourdieu's theory of practice 
In this section, I show how Bourdieu dealt with linguistic practice in his theory of 
practice and how `tact' or `politeness' is discussed in his account of linguistic practice. 
(a). Linguistic exchange as relations of symbolic power 
Bourdieu (1991) explained linguistic exchange in terms of economic concepts such as 
capital, market and profit. 
Linguistic exchange - the relation of communicating between a sender and a 
receiver, based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the 
implementation of a code or a general competence - is also an economic 
exchange which is established within a particular symbolic relation of power 
between a producer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer 
(or a market), and which is capable of producing a certain material or 
symbolic profit. (Bourdieu 1991: 66) 
Bourdieu claims that linguistic exchanges are not merely information exchanges but 
"are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or 
their respective groups are actualized" (Bourdieu 1991: 37). The value and impact of the 
utterance depends on the relation of power in any particular market. The same discourse 
may carry different value in different markets. For instance, the more formal the market 
is, the more imperative is the use of legitimate language, because it is over-ruled by the 
dominant, i. e. by the holders of legitimate competence authorized to speak with 
authority (Bourdieu 1991: 69). 
We have learned to produce a determinate form of speech in a determinate 
market. This learning process occurs "through exchanges within a family occupying a 
particular position in a social space and thus presenting the child's imitative propensity 
with models and sanctions that diverge more or less from legitimate usage" (Bourdieu 
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1991: 82). The primary market is the family and other markets include the school. 
Bourdieu explains how we have learned our linguistic habitus. 
The system of successive reinforcement or refutation has thus constituted in 
each one of us a certain sense of social value of linguistic usages and of the 
relation between the different usages and the different markets, which 
organizes all subsequent perception s of linguistic products, tending to endow 
it with considerable stability. -This 
linguistic `sense of place' governs the 
degree of constraints which a given field will bring to bear on the production 
of discourse, imposing silence or a hyper-controlled language on some people 
while allowing other the liberties of a language that is securely established. 
... 
The sense of value of one's own linguistic products is a fundamental 
dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one occupies in the social 
space. (Bourdieu 1991: 82) 
`The sense of place' in the above description shows how social structure has been 
internalised in one's habitus, which puts some constraints on speech construction. But 
linguistic habitus also "tends to function as a practical sense of the acceptability and the 
probable value of one's own linguistic productions and those of others in different 
markets" (Bourdieu 1991: 77). Linguistic production is affected by anticipation of 
market sanctions. Bourdieu explicitly writes that this practical sense of acceptability has 
no resemblance to any form of conscious rational calculation toward the maximization 
of symbolic profits as in rational action theory (Bourdieu 1991: 77). 116 Linguistic 
habitus encourages one to take account of the probable value of discourse during the 
process of production, which is a kind of "self-censorship - the concessions one makes 
to a social world by accepting to make oneself acceptable in it" (Bourdieu 1991: 77). We 
will look at this censorship more closely in the next section. 
116 Bourdieu criticises rational action theory (RAT) for forgetting the minimum economic capital 
necessary for an `actor' to perceive and seize the potential opportunity for rational calculation. RAT 
liberally grants its abstract `actor' all the capacities - the art of estimating and taking chances, the ability 
to anticipate through a kind of practical induction, the capacity to bet on the possible against the probable 
for a measured risk, the propensity to invest, access to economic information etc. -, but these can only be 
acquired under definite social and economic conditions. RAT also assumes the existence of a universal, 
pre-constituted interest, and is thoroughly oblivious to the social genesis of historically varying forms of 
interest. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 124-5) 
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(b). Utterance - an encounter between linguistic habitus and market 
Just as Bourdieu sees practice as a product of the dialectical relation between habitus 
and field, he sees every utterance as an encounter between the linguistic habitus, and the 
linguistic market. 
On the one hand, there are the socially constructed dispositions of linguistic 
habitus, which imply a certain propensity to speak and to say determinate 
things (the expressive interest) and a certain capacity to speak, which 
involves both the linguistic capacity to generate an infinite number of 
grammatically correct discourses, and the social capacity to use this 
competence adequately in a determinate situation. On the other hand, there 
are the structures of the linguistic market, which impose themselves as a 
system of specific sanctions and censorships. (Bourdieu 1991: 37) 
"In this encounter between the linguistic habitus and market..., it is the speaker's 
anticipation of the reception which his/her discourse will receive (its `price') which 
contributes to what is said and how" (Jenkins 2002: 154). Speakers implicitly and 
routinely modify their expressions in anticipation of their likely reception. The speakers' 
assessment of the market conditions and the anticipation of the likely reception of his or 
her linguistic behaviour operate as internalised constraints on the very process of 
production. Bourdieu claims that all utterances are to some extent euphemised in order 
to produce what meets the demands of a certain market. 
Discourses are always to some extent euphemisms inspired by the concern to 
`speak well', to `speak properly', to produce the products that respond to the 
demands of a certain market; they are compromise formations resulting from 
a transaction between the expressive interest (what is to be said) and the 
censorship inherent in particular relations of linguistic productions (whether 
it is the structure of linguistic interaction or the structure of a specialized 
field), a censorship which is imposed on a speaker or writer endowed with a 
certain social competence, that is, a more or less significant symbolic power 
over these relations of symbolic power. (Bourdieu 1991: 78-79) [emphasis in 
the original] 
In Bourdieu's view, utterances are always a compromise between what we ourselves 
actually want to say and what has to be censored by the demand of the market. Behind 
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such self-censorship of speech there is symbolic power. 
(c). Politeness or tact - euphemisation, self-censorship 
As utterance is a product of the encounter between linguistic habitus and a linguistic 
market, "[t]he definition of acceptability is found not in the situation but in the 
relationship between a market and a habitus" (Bourdieu 1991: 81). Speakers always 
censor their own utterance considering the market conditions at the time of production 
and modify or euphemise their expressions anticipating their likely reception in the 
market. Bourdieu explicitly discusses `tact' or politeness in terms of censorship and 
euphemism. He writes: 
What is called tact or adroitness consists in the art of taking account of the 
relative positions of the sender and the receiver in the hierarchy of different 
kinds of capital, and also of sex and age, and of the limits inscribed in this 
relation, ritually transgressing them, if need be, by means of euphemization. 
The attenuation of the injunction, reduced to zero in `Here', `Come' or 
`Come here', is more marked in `If you would be so good as to come this 
way'. The form used to neutralize `impoliteness' may be a simple 
interrogative ('Will you come? "), or a doubly delicate negative question 
('Won't you come? '), which acknowledges the possibility of refusal. 
(Bourdieu 1991: 80) 
How does Bourdieu explain politeness? It consists in the art of taking account of the 
relative positions and market conditions, if necessary, by means of euphemization. We 
are predisposed to exercise this censorship through our habitus. Bourdieu claims that all 
utterances are "the product of a compromise between an expressive interest and a 
censorship constituted by the very structure of the field in which the discourse is 
produced and circulates" (Bourdieu 1991: 137). In other words, all utterances are to 
some extent self-censored and euphemised. Bourdieu points out that in some markets 
such as the higher-society market, a higher degree of censorship may be needed than in 
some others (Bourdieu 1991: 85), but censorship is commonly operative in all linguistic 
production. In other words, some degree of politeness concern is present in every 
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utterance. 
4. What Bourdieu could provide for an alternative 
approach to politeness 
Bourdieu has provided alternative new ways of understanding politeness and resolved 
many problems in modern politeness theories. Bourdieu opposes the Saussurean/ 
Chomskyan tradition of seeing language as an `idealised language system', to which 
Lakoff and Leech largely subscribed. Bourdieu claims that what is considered to be 
`idealised language' is a particular language practice which is misrecognised as 
legitimate and this usually serves the advantage of the dominant groups in society, 
which Bourdieu calls symbolic power. Bourdieu was concerned with actual `language 
practice' rather than with an `idealised language system'. Bourdieu sees utterance as the 
product of the encounter between habitus and market. Speakers through habitus censor 
their own utterances and euphemise them considering the market condition at the time 
of production. Bourdieu explicates politeness in terms of this censorship and 
euphemism and argues that all utterances are to some extent euphemised. Thus for 
Bourdieu, politeness is operative in every single linguistic production while Brown & 
Levinson (1987) argued that politeness describes strategies that people use when they 
encounter Face Threatening Acts (FTA) and wish to minimise their counter-effect. 
In section 2.3,1 have already shown how Bourdieu's notion of habitus has 
overcome problems in modern politeness theories and provided some advantages. I will 
recapitulate them and discuss further advantages that Bourdieu's theory of practice 
provides in order to discover alternative ways of understanding politeness. I have 
pointed out the following earlier. 
1. Bourdieu' theory of practice has overcome objectivism/subjectivism (structure/ 
agency) dilemma that impeded Lakoff, Leech and Brown & Levinson. 
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2. Bourdieu's theory of practice transcended the theory/practice dualism. 
3. Bourdieu did not subscribe to the Cartesian supremacy of mind over body and 
has overcome the body/mind dualism Through the notion of habitus, embodied 
sensibility, Bourdieu provided new way of explaining action, which is not 
necessarily led by the mind's cognitive activity. 
4. Bourdieu incorporated `time' into his `theory of practice' through the notion of 
habitus as embodied history -a "past which survives in the present and tends to 
perpetuate itself into the future" (Bourdieu 1977: 82). 
5. While B&L and other theorists aimed to establish some kind of universal 
principle of politeness, which works for all cultures and languages alike, 
Bourdieu 's `theory of practice' accommodates the idea that heterogeneous 
appropriateness is expected in different `fields'. 
Adding to these five points, 
Sixth, Bourdieu 's theory of practice recognises the asymmetry of power which 
exists in linguistic practice. Lakoff (1975) recognised that gender inequality exists in 
language practice: women are expected to behave more politely than men. So legitimate 
language for men does not seem to be necessarily the legitimate language for women. 
Despite her recognition of such inequality, Lakoff could not accommodate heterogeneity 
in her `universal' pragmatic rules. Neither Leech nor B&L dealt with such issues in their 
theories. Bourdieu, on the other hand, recognised that such asymmetry of power exists 
in linguistic practices, but he did not particularly discuss gender inequality. 117 
Asymmetry of power may come from many sorts of differences. The practical 
competence of speakers is not uniformly distributed through a society. "The constitution 
of a linguistic market creates the condition for an objective competition in and through 
which the legitimate competence can function as linguistic capital" (1991: 55). 118 
117 Bourdieu does speak of `sexual division of labour'. He observes that bodily differences contribute to 
this division and they seem to accept this as their bodily hexis. (Bourdieu 1990: 72) 
118 For instance, the more formal the situation is, the more likely it is that the dominant linguistic 
competence will function in a particular market as linguistic capital procuring symbolic profit (Bourdieu 
1991: 70). Different speakers possess different quantities of linguistic capital and the distribution of 
linguistic capital is related to the distribution of other forms of capital (economic capital, cultural capital 
etc. ) which define the position of an individual within social space. Differences in terms of accent, 
grammar and vocabulary also are indices of the social positions of speakers and reflections of the 
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Seventh, Bourdieu recognises that legitimate and appropriate practice is 
determined by the practice of those who are dominant. Bourdieu claims that "[a]ll 
linguistic practices are measured against legitimate practices, i. e. the practices of those 
who are dominant" (1991: 53). The dominant always have advantages as they possess 
more linguistic capital and the less dominant accept it or misrecognise it as legitimate 
practice (symbolic violence) (See 2.5. (b), this chapter). Then what seems to be 
accepted as polite behaviour is the dominant group's view legitimised by symbolic 
power. Lakoff (1975: 74) recognised this hegemonic reality present in language practice: 
"it is the dominant group in a society that establishes stereotypes of the other groups and 
decides which groups, on the basis of these stereotypes, are "good" or "bad". Lakoff 
pointed out women not only accept such stereotypes for women's behaviour legitimised 
by the dominant group, i. e. men, but also embrace it as a virtue (See Ch. 1 1.1. (e). ). 
Leech and B&L seemed to be oblivious to such factors or did not seem explicitly to 
discuss them. 
5. Appropriation of `Bourdieu' by recent politeness 
scholars 
Three recent politeness researchers appropriated Bourdieu's sociology in their new 
approach to politeness. As far as I am aware, Bourdieu was first discussed in politeness 
studies by Eelen (2001). Watts (2003) and Mills (2003), who were much influenced by 
Eelen's work, also employed Bourdieu, and particularly his notion of habitus, in their 
discussion. Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) all received inspiration from 
Bourdieu's notion of habitus, for explaining `production' as regulated by structure but at 
quantities of linguistic and other capital which they possess. The more linguistic capital that speakers 
possess, the more they are able to exploit the system of differences to their advantage (Thompson in 
Bourdieu 1991: 18). 
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the same time allowing for the creativity of individuals. However, I am not sure whether 
some of their interpretations of Bourdieu's sociology always reflect Bourdieu's original 
arguments. These scholars seem to have hybridized, modified or altered the original 
notion of habitus to some extent for their new approach to politeness. The parts they felt 
needed modifying may reflect the limitations or shortcomings of Bourdieu's theory of 
practice. 
In 5.1., 5.2., and 5.3., 1 will show how Bourdieu has been understood by Eelen 
(2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) and appropriated in their works. ' 19 Then, in 5.4., 
I will summarise how these theorists modified or altered some of Bourdieu's arguments 
in order to make them congruent with their new alternative models of politeness. 
5.1. Eelen's (2001) appropriation of Bourdieu 
Eelen is one of the first researchers to seriously re-examine the epistemological 
problems of the major politeness theories. As I mentioned in the Introduction of this 
thesis, Eelen (2001) heralded a new breed of politeness studies by introducing several 
significant new insights into the field. 120 Eelen's work has stimulated other subsequent 
researchers such as Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) and pioneered a new era in politeness 
studies. Having pointed out the problems of Parsonian structural functionalism, by 
which, he assumes, politeness theories are influenced121, Eelen turned to Bourdieu's 
119 Due to the scope of this thesis, I will only expound that part of their models/theories which might 
have relevance to Bourdieu. 
120 Eelen's major contributions may be summarised as follows: First, Eelen demonstrated that previous 
researchers' focus have been upon the speaker's production of politeness (2001: 96) and the hearer's 
evaluative behaviour had been markedly missing from the theoretical models (2001: 104). Second, he 
pointed out the conceptual bias toward the polite end of the polite-impolite distinction (2001: 98), which 
resulted in scarcity of research into impoliteness or rudeness. Third, he pointed out how problematic is the 
distinction between first-order (politeness 1) and second-order politeness (politeness2) (2001: 43-7,241-2). 
Fourth, he recognised that issues of society and the individual are fundamentally important in 
understanding politeness. 
121 After his metatheoretical analysis of current politeness theorists, Eelen (2001) sets out to sketch an 
alternative approach in his fifth chapter. Based on Glyn William's claim in Sociolinguistics: 
sociolinguistic critique (1992) that there is a structural functionalist undercurrent in most contemporary 
sociolinguistic research traditions, Eelen makes the assumption that "[a]lthough Parsons is never 
Chapter 4 Bourdieu's Sociology 174 
notion of habitus. 
In (a)., I will first show how Eelen's interpreted habitus and then in (b)., I will 
discuss Eelen's misinterpretation of the notion of `discursive over the representation of 
reality expressed in one of Bourdieu. 
(a). Eelen's interpretation of habitus 
Eelen, in A Critique of Politeness Theories (2001) employed Bourdieu's ideas in several 
contexts. Based on Bourdieu's theory of practice, Eelen (2001: 221) argues that 
politeness should be studied as a `practice'. "Although the analytical temptation may be 
great to construct some sort of overall system of politeness from variable and often 
contradictory empirical information, politeness should first and foremost be regarded 
and studied as a practice" (Eelen 2001: 22 1). Eelen then draws on Bourdieu's notion of 
habitus. However, Eelen's understanding of habitus seems to be somewhat different 
from Bourdieu's. Eelen (2001) expounds habitus as follows: 
The social and material condition prevalent in individual and collective 
history creates certain predispositions, which function both as enabling and 
constraining forces, defining a set of practical possibilities which actors 
unconsciously draw in structuring their behaviour. As such, habitus outlines a 
social mechanism that caters for regulated behaviour without the need for 
positing some external objective regulating force. It captures a process of 
structured or collective individuality.. .a 
halfway house between pure 
mechanistic collective objectivism and pure creative individualist 
subjectivism. (Eelen 2001: 221-2) 
Eelen interprets the present action generated by habitus as `a halfway house between 
pure mechanistic collective objectivism and pure creative individualist subjectivism'. 
Eelen (2001) also describes present action as `the middle position' or `intersection 
mentioned by any of the politeness theories under discussion, many characteristic traits of Parsonian 
Structural Functionalism can be recognized in their conceptual make-up (2001: 188)" and elucidates 
Talcott Parsons' Structural Functionalism. I agree that Lakoff and Leech's theory exhibits characteristics 
of structural functionalism, which is why I classified them as a structure-centred approach in chapter 3. 
However, as I have argued earlier, B&L's theory is an agency-centred approach as their theory focuses on 
the Model Person (the social actor) and adopts rational choice theory in their theory construction. 
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between present circumstances and past circumstances'. 
An important factor in accomplishing this middle position is historicity. In a 
radical interpretation, habitus even is historicity, as it describes how past 
experience mediated present action, creating a new experience which mediates 
both (the meaning and influence of) past experiences as well as further future 
action. In this way, present action becomes the intersection between present 
circumstances and past circumstances, or the transformation of present 
conditions by past experiences, i. e. by past action, which itself was the 
mediation of past conditions by anterior experience, and so on. (Eelen 
2001: 222) 
Eelen's terms `halfway house', `middle position' and `intersection' does not seem to 
capture Bourdieu's notion of habitus correctly. Bourdieu (1990: 56) also described 
habitus within a temporal framework (See 2.2. (e), this chapter). However, Bourdieu did 
not actually separate past, present and future but saw them as a continuity realised in 
habitus, which is `the principle of continuity and regularity'. 
The system of dispositions -a past which survives in the present and tends 
to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices 
structured according to its principles.... - is the principle of continuity and 
regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able 
to give them a rational basis. (Bourdieu 1977: 82) 
As habitus is the principle of continuity, the past survives in the present and the present 
is perpetuated into the future through habitus. Furthermore, habitus is `embodied' 
history: "[T]he habitus - embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so 
forgotten as history - is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product" 
(Bourdieu 1990b: 56). Eelen has not drawn on this embodied aspect of habitus. 
Eelen also interprets habitus as `a starting position from which people structure 
their action'. This shows more clearly how Eelen's interpretation is different. 
Habitus should not be interpreted as weaker or less strict kinds of rules or 
norms; it does not `tell' people how to behave, it does not even `make them 
do' anything at all. It merely defines a starting position from which people 
structure their actions, and describes the principle by which this position 
evolves through time, always renewing itself with every additional social 
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act (Eelen 2001: 222). 
Eelen's (2001) understanding of habitus as `a starting position from which people 
structure their action' gives the impression that individuals are free to structure their 
action from habitus. Eelen's next account also suggests this: "[a]s the social mechanism 
involved operates primarily on the individual level, such macro-social phenomena are 
essentially a matter of the individual actor's perception and reactions. The adoption of 
depreciation of behavioural practices depends on individuals' perception of the linguistic 
field and their current and aspired places in it. " (Eelen 2001: 228) Eelen also writes: "The 
individual creates his or her own history, but not randomly: he or she is influenced by 
past-conditions-turned-into-action as well as by present conditions" (Eelen 2001: 222). In 
all these interpretations, Eelen (2001) seems to assume a greater freedom for human 
agency (social actor) than Bourdieu actually did. In other words, Eelen's view seems to 
be moving in the direction of subjectivism. 
Let us revisit Bourdieu's widely quoted definition of habitus: 
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate 
and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at 
ends or an express mastery of operations necessary in order to attain 
them (Bourdieu 1990b: 53). 
Swartz (1997: 103) explains that the term `disposition' is the key to understanding 
Bourdieu's habitus: its two essential components are structure and propensity. Swartz 
(1997) explains the two central features of habitus: "structured structures" and 
"structuring structures" as follows: 
Habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external 
structures are internalized. As a result internalized dispositions of broad 
parameters and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a particular 
group in a stratified social world develop through socialization. Thus on the 
one hand, habitus sets structural limits for action. On the other hand, habitus 
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generates perception, aspiration, and practices that correspond to the 
structuring properties of earlier socialization. (Swartz 1997: 103) 
Swartz also points out that "habitus is fairly resistant to change, since primary 
socialization in Bourdieu's view is more formative of internal disposition than 
subsequent socialization experiences. There is an ongoing adaptation process as habitus 
encounters new situations, but this process tends to be slow, unconscious and tends to 
alter fundamentally the primary disposition" (Swartz 1997: 107). 
Eelen (2001: 227) also wrote that "a notion of politeness based on habitus is 
also able to account more naturally for social change and evolution. " However, 
Bourdieu's sociology is not good at explaining social change. Bourdieu's project is 
often called `genetic structuralism'. Calhoun (2000: 708) explains this as "a sociology 
that uses the intellectual resources of structural analysis, but approaches structures in 
terms of the ways in which they are produced and reproduced through action. " Calhoun 
(1995) evaluates Bourdieu's sociology as follows: "Bourdieu's theory is at its best... as a 
theory of reproduction, and at its weakest as a theory of transformation. In this it shows 
its structuralist roots" (1995: 142). Eelen (2001: 222) also emphasized that present 
behaviour is based on "creative transformation of present conditions from a position 
based in past experience". While Eelen wishes to emphasize `creative transformation', 
Bourdieu's focus is more on `reproduction'. Bourdieu's habitus, being a disposition 
"makes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent 
in the particular conditions of its production - and only those" (Bourdieu 1990b: 55). 
Eelen draws on Bourdieu's habitus but his interpretation of habitus is different 
from Bourdieu's. To summarise the points, first, Eelen's terms `halfway house', `middle 
position' or `intersection' does not capture the habitus, which is the principle of 
continuity: the past survives in the present and the present is perpetuated into the future. 
Second, Eelen gave more freedom to agency that Bourdieu actually did. Third, Eelen 
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argued that notions of politeness based on habitus are able to account for social change 
and evolution. However, while Bourdieu's theory works well as a theory of 
reproduction, it is weakest as a theory of transformation. Eelen's interpretation of 
habitus stressing creative transformation is not entirely accurate. 
(b). On the notion of `discursive struggle over politenessl' 
Another misinterpretation of Bourdieu's work is found in the notion of "a struggle over 
the representation of reality". Eelen (2001) used this phrase in Bourdieu's work to point 
out that "the same stretch of behaviour is not always unanimously evaluated as polite or 
impolite". 122 Eelen reclaimed the simple reality that there is a dispute over first-order 
politeness, ignored in modern politeness theories, because of its focus on attempting to 
establish a scientific theory of politeness. It was a significant claim, which led 
subsequent postmodern researchers such as Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) to claim that 
politeness is fundamentally discursive in nature. However, the passage that Eelen used to 
back up his arguments does not support this. 
Eelen is aware that conceptualization of politeness2 was needed to deal with 
politeness as a proper social science and that researchers of politeness studies had been 
preoccupied with scientific conceptualisation of politeness (politeness2). 
Since the aim of social science is to capture, understand and explain 
(aspects of) social reality, it seems self-evident that politeness2 should 
concern the scientific conceptualization of the social phenomenon of 
politeness in the form of a theory of politenessl. By means of such a 
theory we should be able to understand how politeness1 works, what its 
functionality is, what it `does' for people and for society in general. (Eelen 
2001: 43). 
122 Eelen revisited Ide et al. 's (1992) study of commonsense notions of `politeness' among Japanese and 
Americans and highlighted that in this study, American informants disagreed amongst themselves as to 
the appropriateness of the evaluation of `polite' in the majority of the situations and that the Japanese 
informants' judgements are unanimous in only 2 situations. Through this study, Eelen (2001: 45) reminded 
us that "alternative interpretations coexist" and he argues that "a struggle over the representation of reality 
is taking place within politenessl". 
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Eelen (2001: 44) argues "[a]lthough politenes2 should no doubt be about politenessl, the 
concepts developed in a theory of politeness should be able to explain the phenomena 
observed in politenessl. They should provide a view of politenessl `at one remove', 
grasping the phenomenon in its totality, revealing its inner workings and its 
functionality. " (Eelen 2001: 44) Eelen, reminding us of the non-unanimous nature of 
politenessl evaluation in actual situations, argues that such reality (i. e. that judgement is 
not always unanimous) must be incorporated into politeness2 (Eelen 2001: 45-46). 
Eelen uses the phrase `struggle over representations of reality' (ibid. 45) or 
`struggle over reality' (ibid. ) or `reality as a struggle' to refer to the non-unanimous or 
disputable nature of evaluation of politeness by ordinary people. Eelen claims that he 
has taken this notion from Bourdieu. Later researchers, for example, Watts (2003) used 
the phrase `discursive struggle over politeness 1' in his book Politeness, which describes 
the acknowledged fact that there are many disputed interpretations of politeness by lay 
people. I agree that the evaluation of what is polite or is not polite is always disputable. 
However, the phrase `struggle over representation of reality' in Bourdieu's essay did not 
mean what Eelen thought it means. Let us look at the passages that Eelen cited. 
Eelen (2001: 37) claims that "classificatory politenessl should not be regarded 
as a neutral or objective categorization of behaviour, but is intimately connected with 
(social) values. " Quoting Bourdieu: "[... ] practical classifications are always 
subordinated to practical functions and oriented toward the production of social effect 
(Bourdieu 1991: 220)", Eelen claims that politenessl is trying to achieve a social aim. 
Eelen (2001: 44-45) then quotes another passage from the same essay in order to explain 
the `struggle over the representation'. 
One can understand the particular form of struggle over classifications that is 
constituted by the struggle over the definition of `region' or `ethnic' identity 
only if one transcends the opposition that science, in order to break away 
from the preconceptions of spontaneous sociology, must first establish 
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between representation and reality, and only if one includes in reality the 
representation of reality, or more precisely, the struggle over representations, 
in the sense of mental images, but also of social demonstrations whose aim it 
is to manipulate mental images (and even in the sense of delegations 
responsible for organizing the demonstrations that are necessary to modify 
mental representations. (Bourdieu 1991: 221) 
These quotations are from Bourdieu's essay entitled "Elements for a Critical Reflection 
on the Idea of Region" in Language and Symbolic Power (1991), in which he discusses 
the notion of region, more generally of `ethnic group' or `ethnicity' (which is a 
euphemism for `race'). From the rather convoluted translation of this long passage, 
Eelen (2001: 45) points out that the concept of ethnic/regional identity is part of the 
struggle over the representations of reality, by which Eelen means that there are many 
different disputable representations. Eelen interprets this passage as Bourdieu's warning 
that scientific study should fully acknowledge such disputed representations of reality. 
Eelen (2001: 45) then applies this reasoning to politeness2 and argues that politeness2 
should incorporate the non-unanimous or disputable nature of politeness 1 evaluation. 
However, what Bourdieu is discussing here, in my understanding, is an 
extension of his main arguments concerning symbolic power, symbolic violence, and 
misrecognition to the issue of identity and representation. Another quotation clearly 
shows this. By `struggle over ethnic identity', Bourdieu (1991) means 
a particular case of different struggles over classification, struggle over the 
monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know 
and to recognize, to impose the legitimate definitions of the divisions of the 
social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. What is at stake here 
is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through principles of 
di-vision which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish 
meaning and a consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity 
and unity of the group, which creates the reality of the unity and the identity 
of the group. (1991: 221) 
When scientific discourse is dragged into the very struggle over classification, it 
inevitably uses such symbolic potiver. Bourdieu claims that the weapons used in 
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scientific discourse are `objective' criteria. 
... 
in symbolic struggles over cognition and recognition, so-called `objective' 
criteria, the very ones which are well known to scientists, are used as 
weapons: they designate the characteristics on which a symbolic action of 
mobilization can be based in order to produce real unity or the belief in 
unity.. . which ultimately, and 
in particular via the actions of impositions and 
inculcation of legitimate identity (such as those actions performed by the 
school or the army), tends to generate real unity. (Bourdieu 1991: 225-6) 
Thus through `struggles over classification', Bourdieu was not saying that there are 
many disputed interpretations by lay people. Rather Bourdieu is declaring that what is at 
stake here is the symbolic power of scientific discourse which governs the sacred 
frontiers or exercises quasi-divine power over the vision of the world (Bourdieu 
1991: 227-8). Then Bourdieu's focus here is not on lay members' various choices of 
classification as Eelen claims, but on symbolic violence which makes the dominant view 
legitimate and makes lay members misrecognise it as natural in the name of scientific 
discourse using `objective' criteria as weapons. If I apply Bourdieu's argument here to 
the politeness discussion, the passage shows that what scientific discourse defines as 
politeness (politeness2) is nothing but what is determined and legitimised as being 
polite by the dominant group through its exercise of symbolic violence. 
This misuse of the phrase `struggle over reality' by Eelen has had some serious 
effects. Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) built their models based on this "discursive 
struggle over politeness 1, i. e. over the ways in which (im)polite behaviour is evaluated 
and commented on by lay members" (Watts 2003: 9) and they also associated the 
`discursive struggle' with Bourdieu. For these three theorists, this discursive struggle 
over politeness l is the central argument supporting their new approach to politeness. 
Here I am not disagreeing with the reality of the `discursive struggle over politeness 1' 
that Eelen (2001) pointed out. In fact, I also believe that the participants' own 
perceptions of politeness (politeness 1) and the disputable nature of politeness should be 
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emphasised in any alternative approach to politeness. I am only pointing out that 
unfortunately Bourdieu did not actually discuss this in his essay on identity and 
representation (Bourdieu 1991: 220-228) as Eelen was arguing. Yet, subsequent 
researchers followed Eelen and continued to quote Bourdieu as their source for 
`discursive struggle over politeness', when Bourdieu was discussing a quite different 
issue, namely, symbolic power in this essay. 
5.2. Watts's (2003) appropriation of Bourdieu 
Watts, who initially made the distinction between first order politeness (politenessl) and 
second order politeness (politeness2) (Watts, et al. 1992: 3), inspired by Eelen (2001), 
argues in his 2003 book Politeness that "[a] theory of second-order (im)politeness or 
(im)politeness2 does not take adequate account of the evaluative moment in real verbal 
interactions, when participants display their awareness of salient social behaviour, which 
they may or may not designate as 'impolite' or 'polite... (Watts 2003: 24). After three 
decades of searching for a scientific conceptual i sation of politeness and endeavouring to 
establish a universal theory of politeness, Watts now declares that "the 'real' object of 
study is politenessl (first-order politeness), which means that it will not be possible to 
define a universal scientific concept of (im)politeness which can be applied ... to all 
human societies" (ibid. ). Watts, extending Eelen's (2001) interpretation of Bourdieu's 
ýstruggle over representation', calls it the "discursive struggle over politenessl (Watts 
2003: 9) and stresses the necessity of taking both speaker and the hearer adequately into 
consideration (Watts 2003: 23). 
In (a)., I will briefly introduce Watts's new politeness model, which is called 
`social model of (im)politeness' and then in (b)., I will evaluate his treatment of 
Bourdieu in his model. 
Chapter 4 Bourdieu's Sociology 183 
(a) Watts'social model of (im)pofiteness 
Watts developed his 'social model of politeness' out of three sources: 1) 
inspiration from Werkhofer's analogy between 'politeness' and 'money' 1 23 , 2) 
Bourdieu's 'theory of practice' and 3) Watts' own notions of 'emergent network' and 
'latent network'. Watts first explains Bourdieu's key notions, i. e. habitus, field, capital, 
doxa and symbolic power, and then turns to Werkhofer's comparison of politeness with 
money. In Watts's social model of politeness, Werkhofer's analogy of politeness as 
money are used as the notion compatible with Bourdieu's sociology. Watts brings in 
economic terms such as market or capital from Bourdieu's sociology to explain terms 
value, exchange, currency and conversion from Werkhofer's comparison with money. 
Watts (2003: 151) suggests that "the exchange of goods between individuals or groups 
has always been predicted on roughly equivalent values placed by each individual or 
each group on the goods received and given. A surrogate good, i. e. money is assumed to 
represent symbolically the value of one part of the exchange, which can be exchanged 
with goods that might represent a higher value. The surrogate good or money can be 
called currency. One form of currency can be converted into another in a different 
market. 'Linguistic politeness' is a surrogate good, thus can be seen as currency. (ibid. ) 
Watts (2003: 151-2) claims that in order to acquire linguistic capital different 
resources are necessary such as language varieties (e. g dialect, sociolect, regional 
standard, national standard), skilled use of various communicative media (e. g. 
handwriting, typewriting, computer literacy, forms of oral media such as face-to-face 
123 Werkhofer compares linguistic politeness to money. Politeness is, like money, a mediating force 
between individuals. Due to its social and historical constitution, this medium carries certain functions 
and during the course of history, it turns into power. Though socially constructed, politeness may 
motivate and structure courses of action, feeding into social processes. In this sense politeness is `standing 
between' or `mediating' between the individual and society. For details see Werkhofer 2005 [1992]: 190. 
Werkhofer lists Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money (1900) and Polanyi's `market economy' as the 
inspiration behind his analogy of' 'money'. He makes no reference to Bourdieu's sociology. 
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interaction, telephone communication etc. ). These resources help people to function over 
a range of communicative genres and discourse activity types. He argues that "acquiring 
the habitus to function optimally in a social field and to manipulate forms of capital in 
different marketplaces entails the development of an understanding of politic behaviour, 
including linguistic behaviour, appropriate to an ongoing social interaction in which the 
individual is involved [emphasis added]" (Watts 2003: 152). 
The third source Watts uses for his social model of politeness is his own 
concept of `emergent network' and `latent network'. Watts (2003: 154) claims that the 
socio-communicative verbal interaction entails establishment, reestablishment and 
reproduction of social links between the interactants, which emerge during the 
interaction. Watts calls these networks of social links emergent networks. Watts 
(2003: 154) argues that "as participants in social interaction, we can directly experience 
the construction of emergent networks and can effect the ways in which they are 
constructed. " He claims that researchers "can observe how the network has emerged in 
social interaction and relate them to the social network that has already been constructed 
as part of ... the objectified structures and mode of 
behaviour which individuals have 
gained through previous interaction" (ibid. ). 124 These social networks as objectified 
structures are called latent networks (Watts 2003: 154). Watts calls unmarked 
appropriate behaviour, i. e. behaviour which is in a state of equilibrium, `politic 
behaviour'. Watts (2003) incorporates `politic behaviour' and Bourdieu's habitus into 
his own `emergent network' and `latent network'. 
Part of the habitus of an individual will be knowledge of the latent 
networks in which s/he functions (or could potentially) function). The 
mode of functioning in those networks is equivalent to the politic 
behaviour characterising an interaction in a specific social field whenever 
the latent network is reactivated in new emergent network. Clearly, an 
124 Watts's theory of emergent network is still not complete. Watts (2003: 155) writes that he still needs to 
resolve the issue of when an emergent network can be said to be terminated, i. e. what is its duration. 
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individual's habitus is built on the basis of the reciprocal construction of 
politic behaviour in all members of the network. I shall argue that there is 
always a tendency to construct the politic behaviour of social interaction in 
latent network as being in the state of equilibrium. The notion of 
equilibrium is ... an 
idealised state that it is necessary for an individual to 
adopt as part of her/his habitus. (Watts 2003: 155) 
Watts interprets Bourdieu's habitus in terms of his notion of `politic behaviour': "an 
individual's habitus is built on the basis of the reciprocal construction of politic 
behaviour in all members of the network" (ibid. ). He argues that there is always a 
tendency to construct `politic' behaviour in the latent network. (For further details of 
Watts's model, see Appendix 4-A). 
(b) Evaluation of Watts's treatment of Bourdieu 
Following Eelen (2003), Watts has made a great contribution through his attempt to 
construct an alternative approach to politeness. In this section, I want to acknowledge 
his contribution but at the same time highlight those places where I do not entirely agree 
with Watts in his approach, especially in relation to his treatment of Bourdieu. Having 
been inspired by Eelen (2001), who emphasized that politeness evaluation is ultimately 
open to dispute, Watts (2003) no longer aimed to "describe and/or explain what types of 
human social behaviour are polite" (Watts 2003: 160). Instead, in his model, Watts 
(2003: 160,162) aims to account for when and why individual users of language classify 
some utterances as 'polite' and others as 'impolite'. He also aims to account for "the 
effects of any structure open to interpretation as 'polite' on the social equilibrium of the 
interaction" (2003: 162). With a "postmodernist discursive focus on linguistics" (Watts 
2005: xiv), Watts argues that "a serious consideration of lay persons' evaluations of 
polite behaviour" (ibid) is necessary in his alternative approach to politeness. As 
mentioned earlier, Watts constructed his 'social model of politeness' (2003) or his model 
of 'relational work' (2005) using 1) inspiration from Werkhofer's analogy of 'money', 
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2) Bourdieu's 'theory of practice' and 3) Watts' own notions of 'emergent network' and 
'latent network'. 
Particular treatments of Bourdieu, which do not seem exactly to reflect 
Bourdieu's original ideas may have their origin in Eelen's (2003) interpretation of 
Bourdieu. Following Eelen's interpretation of the phrase 'struggle over reality' as 
-struggle over politenessl evaluation', Watts (2003) developed the notion of "discursive 
struggle over politenessl, i. e. regarding the ways in which (im)polite behaviour is 
evaluated and commented on by lay members" (Watts 2003: 9). Watts made the 
endeavour of accounting for this 'discursive struggle over politeness V the project for his 
postmodernist politeness studies. Earlier in this chapter (See 5.1. (b)) I pointed out that 
Eelen (2001) seems to assume more freedom of human agency (social actor) than 
Bourdieu. I perceive a similar tendency in Watts' understanding of Bourdieu, too. Watts 
writes: "Bourdieu's theory of practice suggests that what is interpretable as (im)polite 
depends on the linguistic habitus of the individual and the linguistic capital that s/he 
manipulates" (2003: 160). Watts sees 'habitus'as a "predisposition to act in specific ways 
in specific situations" (Watts 2005: xlii, Locher & Watts 2005: 11). Watts (2003: 162,215) 
argues that the evaluation of certain utterances as polite or impolite is linked to the 
exercise of power in emergent social networks. Watts (2003: 216) claims that power is 
negotiated among participants in emergent networks and that the linguistic expression of 
politeness is intricately tied up with the exercise of power. This interpretation of power 
resembles the 'interaction i sts' who tend to reduce relations of power to relations of 
communication as discussed in 3. L(c) in this chapter. 
Bourdieu also discusses power but for Bourdieu, power is not something which 
can be negotiated in emergent networks, as Watts claims. For Bourdieu, power is the 
historical product of a long-term struggle. Parker (2000: 46) describes it as the "historical 
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products of long processes of struggle in which the dominant have consolidated their 
hold of advantage and instituted mechanism.. . of 
`symbolic violence"'. Parker explains 
this further. 
The historical process has been long enough for the dominated and the 
dominant to have developed their respective cultures, which contain the 
accumulated expectations, presumptions, techniques and defences which 
have been found to work for them. The dominant have learned how to 
maintain their advantage and the dominated have learned how to defend 
the little they have in the way of possessions and self-respect. Where the 
exercise of power has become naturalized and routinized in symbolic 
form, with its characteristic `euphemization', Bourdieu's picture of 
habitus as durable, transposable and overwhelmingly reproductive in its 
effects is at its most plausible. (Parker 2000: 46) 
Through the habitus, the practical sense, `feel for the game', social actors' behaviours 
and utterances are self-censored and euphemized so that they may be matched to market 
conditions. Bourdieu claims that `politeness' consists in this art of taking account of the 
relative positions of speaker and hearer and market conditions, if necessary, by means of 
euphemization (Bourdieu 1991: 80) (See 3.2. (c)., this chapter). Thus Bourdieu also 
discusses the connection between `politeness' and `power' but rather differently from 
Watts. Through the act of censorship and euphemization, social actors are caught up in 
symbolic power. Bourdieu explains the nature of symbolic power as follows: 
Symbolic power -a power of constituting the given through utterances, of 
making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of 
the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an 
almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is 
obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the 
specific effect of mobilization - is a power that can be exercised only if it is 
recognized, that is misrecognized as arbitrary. (Bourdieu 1991: 170) 
In this passage, Bourdieu (1991: 170) claims that symbolic power is "a power that can be 
exercised only if it is recognised'. According to Bourdieu, through the habitus, we are 
inculcated into accepting the reality of the world, advantageously to the dominant, as 
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`the given' or what we feel to be our `second nature'. Bourdieu used doxa to explain 
this: habitus is a felt reality, and is outside the realm of opinion or universe of argument 
(See 2.5. (a)., this chapter). Watts (2003) claims that individuals are able to exercise or 
negotiate power in emergent social networks, whereas Bourdieu (1991) claims that 
individuals are predisposed to censor their own utterance through habitus and to 
reproduce the structure in which the dominant maintain their advantage. This difference 
may also come from a greater freedom of agency in relation to structure than Watts 
assumed. 
Watts (2003: 160) writes: "Bourdieu's theory of practice suggests that what is 
interpretable as (im)polite depends on the linguistic habitus of the individual and the 
linguistic capital that s/he is able to manipulate". Bourdieu argues that people who have 
experienced similar socialisation tend to intemalise a similar social structure, thus it 
results in having similar habitus, 'the sense of perception, appreciation and action'. In 
Distinction (1984a) Bourdieu explains the class habitus - how people in a similar social 
class tend to develop similar tastes, sense of perception and appreciation. For the same 
reason, if two individuals have a very different primary socialisation, their respective 
habitus, which is 'the sense of perception and appreciation and action' will also be very 
different. Depending upon their respective social position, people from the same broader 
society may have very different socialisations. We are familiar with Shaw's play 
Pygmalion (1913) or My Fair Lady (1964), a subsequent film based on Pygmalion, in 
which Professor Henry Higgins, made a bet with his friend to transform a Cockney 
flower girl, Eliza Doolittle, into a refined society lady by teaching her how to speak with 
an upper class accent and by training her in upper class etiquette. By training her 
linguistic skills and social manners to match the upper class, Professor Higgens tried to 
give her cultural capital (which includes linguistic capital) that she needed to survive in 
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upper class circles. Obviously Eliza's natural behaviour before her training would have 
been judged as entirely `inappropriate' in upper class society due to their difference in 
habitus. 
Watts (2003) sees `politic behaviour' as being in a state of equilibrium: 
"Clearly, an individual's habitus is built on the basis of the reciprocal construction of 
politic behaviour in all members of the network. -The notion of equilibrium is ... an 
idealised state that it is necessary for an individual to adopt as part of her/his habitus" 
(Watts 2003: 155. ). However, according to Bourdieu, habitus tends to vary depending on 
their past socialisation and capital which the social actors have in the specific field, and 
what is perceived to be appropriate tends to vary. Then the notion of equilibrium or 
'idealised state' that Watts (2003) used may not be an appropriate term. I would rather 
see Bourdieu's habitus as the particular arbitrary sense that we have acquired through 
socialisation and that we all carry along as our dispositions. Though it is arbitrary, 
because we experience it as our second nature, we misrecognise that 'our' practical 
sense or sense of perception/judgement is legitimate. When two different habitus-es 
clash, the dominant person's habitus may be considered as being legitimate and there is 
the balance of power in the hegemonic reality that the dominant's view is seen as being 
legitimate and to which the dominated gives consent. If there is equilibrium in 
Bourdieu's theory of practice, I argue that it must be this peculiar balance of power 
between the dominant and the dominated, which itself is symbolic violence. 
Watts employed Bourdieu's habitus in his new approach to politeness. However, 
Watts, like Eelen, assumed more freedom of human agency that Bourdieu actually did in 
his interpretation of habitus. His understanding of power is also different from Bourdieu. 
While Bourdieu stressed symbolic power, Watts saw power as something that can be 
negotiated in emergent network. This second point may be also attributed to more active 
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agency role that Watts assumed. 
5.3. Mills's (2003) appropriation of Bourdieu 
Sara Mills has written extensively on 'feminism and linguistics', and 'feminism and 
post-colonial theory'. She draws her arguments from various thinkers and social 
theorists, particularly Michel Foucault. She is also a prolific writer in the field of 
politeness and a leading member of the Linguistic Politeness Research Group. Gender 
and Politeness (2003) is one of her recent works (2002,2003,2004) which deal with 
issues such as 'gender and politeness' and 'class and politeness'. Mills (2003: 2-3) 
classifies herself as a Third Wave feminist linguist, who, being critical of Second Wave 
linguistics which focused on 'women's language' as a homogeneous entity, takes an 
anti -essentialist viewpoint. Thus in Gender and Politeness, she does not simply 
generalise and assume that males and females speak differently but aims to produce a 
more context-based model of gender, where gender construction is constrained by its 
negotiations with suppositions of community rules and stereotypes of what is regarded 
as appropriate. 
In (a)., I will first introduce Mills' approach to politeness and then in (b). I will 
evaluate her treatment of Bourdieu in her approach. 
(a). Mills's approach to politeness 
Mills uncovered various problems in modern politeness theories particularly in B&L's 
theory before she spelled out her own approach. For instance, Mills criticises B&L's 
theory's assumption that speakers have clear intentions which can be unproblematically 
decoded by the hearer. (2003: 90) She also questions B&L's use of practical 
rationality/cost benefit analysis (2003: 92-93), though she has not specifically identified 
their underlying sociological theory, that is, `rational action theory' as I have done in 
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this thesis. Mills also challenges various misleading assumptions about social variables 
in B&L's theory, i. e. these social variables are manifest to all participants and equally 
salient to all (2003: 102); such power relations and social distance are stable throughout 
conversation (2003: 101); these social variables are simplistic ignoring many other 
factors (2003: 103). Mills then argues that "a large part of politeness is judged by 
speakers to be necessary because of social constraints or ideologies/discourses which 
speakers have internalised as their own values, but which in fact are those hypothesised 
of the dominant group" (2003: 91). This has considerable resemblance to Bourdieu's 
habitus. In fact, in Gender and Politeness, Mills draws upon Bourdieu's habitus in 
conjunction with Wenger's (1998) 'Community of Practice (Cop), 
125 
, but, as she 
claims, both in critically modified forms. 
Wenger (1998: 6) claims that "we all belong to communities of practice. At 
home, at work, at school, in our hobbies - we belong to several communities of practice 
at any given time. " CoP was initially presented as a social theory of learning126 but as 
Barton and Tusting (2005: 3) point out, CoP "has had an immediate appeal and 
perceived usefulness across a range of situations" and has been used in many disciplines 
in various ways. They find the original concept of CoP as described by Wenger slippery 
and elusive and difficult to pin down. (2005: 6)127 Wenger's (1998) CoP has been 
influential in feminist linguistics since Eckert & McConnell's papers in 1992,1998, 
125 Originally developed by Lave & Wenger in 1991 as a central idea in situated approaches to learning. 
"The starting point for the idea of a community of practice is that people typically come together in 
groupings to carry out activities in everyday life, in the workplace and in education. Such groupings can 
be seen as distinct from the formal structures of these domains. (Barton and Tusting 2005: 1-2)" These 
groups are characterised by three aspects; mutual engagement, joint enterprise and shared repertoire. 
Participation in communities of practice becomes the fundamental process of learning (Situated learning). 
(Wenger 1998: 73) 
126 Wenger claims that "learning is an integral part of our daily lives (1998: 8). " and "it is part of our 
participation in our communities and organisation" (ibid. ). 
127 Lave and Wenger (199 1) used legitimate peripheral participation by which they "wanted to broaden 
the traditional connotation of the concept of apprenticeship - from a master/student or mentor/mentee 
relationship to one of changing participation and identity transformation in a community of practice" 
(Wenger 1998: 11)". Wenger (1998) later described CoPs in terms of the interplay of four fundamental 
dualities - participation vs. reification, designed vs. emergent, identification vs. negotiability and 
local vs. 
global. 
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1999 (cf. 2003). However, Mills (2003: 3) argues that even "Eckert & McConnell's 
'modified' notion of CoP is insufficient to describe the complex negotiations between 
individual speakers and the various linguistic communities of which they are members, 
simply because that model views that interaction as governed largely by constraints". 
Mills is concerned with "the negotiation that takes place between individual speakers 
and their community of practice and the wider society" (2003: 3) and believes that 
Bourdieu's habitus, particularly as modified by Eelen (2001) is useful in capturing this. 
Mills explicitly claims that she is using Bourdieu's habitus as modified by Eelen (2001). 
In the next section, I will evaluate how she interpreted and appropriated Bourdieu in her 
new approach to politeness. 
(b). Evaluation ofMills's treatment of Bourdieu 
Mills (2003: 36) interprets Bourdieu's habitus as "a flexible system of behaviours which, 
when engaged with by individuals, perform a structuring role without being 'invented' 
by a single agent or institution". Mills (2001: 36), quoting Eelen, interprets that the 
present range of linguistic behaviour of individuals is based on the "creative 
transformation of present conditions from a position based in past experience" (Eelen 
2001: 222). Like Eelen (2001) and Watts, Mills also seems to allow more freedom to 
agency, but, in her case she explicitly states that she deliberately chose the modified 
version of Bourdieu suggested by feminist linguists. Mills (2003: 54 in endnotes) reveals 
that feminists working with Bourdieu's model of language were not happy with his 
fairly passive representation of the speaker. Mills also notes that Bucholtz (1999: 205) 
recognises that Bourdieu sees language practices as 'primarily reproducing existing 
social arrangements' and proposes a modified version of Bourdieu's work which 
stresses the role of individuals as agents in constructing their own sense of identity in 
relation to particular communities of practice. 
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Interestingly, Wenger, who originally proposed the notion of CoP, is also not 
happy with the limited role of agency in Bourdieu's sociology. Wenger acknowledges 
Bourdieu as a prominent theorist, but does not directly draw his ideas from Bourdieu 
(1998: 281-2). 
Bourdieu... argues that practices are generated from an underlying structure, 
which he calls habitus. In my argument, the habitus would be an emerging 
property of interacting practices rather than their generative infra-structure, 
with an existence unto itself. This position is closer to Giddens's notion of 
structuration..., but with practices as specific contexts for the 
knowledgeability of actors. (Wenger 1998: 289) 
Wenger also modifies habitus and gives it a more active role of agency. He claims that 
this position is closer to Giddens in his `structuration theory' 128. It seems that not only 
Eelen, and Watts but also Mills, Bucholtz and Wenger all allowed more active agency 
role in their frameworks than Bourdieu himself claimed in his theory of practice. 
However, altering Bourdieu's sociology by allowing more freedom to agency would 
have damaging consequence upon Bourdieu's theory of practice. I will discuss this in 
section 6, in which I will also contrast the two different ways in which Giddens and 
Bourdieu attempted to resolve structure/agency. 
There are other texts which indicate that Mills' version of habitus differs from 
Bourdieu's original notion. Mills discusses Bourdieu's habitus in relation to 
`community of practice' as follows: 
Drawing on Bourdieu's (1991) notion of habitus, I argue that this sense of 
appropriateness is one which varies slightly from speaker to speaker; so that 
rather than appropriateness being imposed by society, or by the speech 
community of practice or class or even by the context, appropriateness is 
something which each individual has to work out, by assessing their own 
status in relation to other participants in the community of practice, and by 
assessing what they think the context demands. This means they constantly 
have to assess their own position and identity/role within the group in order to 
evaluate what is appropriate for them and others, and to assess whether they 
are going to abide by these rules or flout them (Mills 2003: 71). [emphasis 
128 For further explanation on Gidden's structuration theory, see Appendix 4-B. 
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added] 
Mills, in the above description, suggests that each individual has to 'work out' 
appropriateness by taking into consideration his/her position in relation to others in the 
CoP and the demand of the context. This shows the differences between Mills and 
Bourdieu. Again it seems that these differences arise from the way in which they view 
the role of agency in both frameworks. The phrase 'work out' in the above description 
seems to imply that there is some conscious evaluating process and also some mindful 
action based on evaluation involved. But as we have seen, Bourdieu sees particular 
practices as the product of a dialectical encounter between an individual's habitus and a 
particular field. In his view, individuals are already predisposed to act in a certain way 
as field requires because they had been inculcated to do so through their socialisation. 
Habitus in Bourdieu's sense refers to an embodied sensibility. So the censorship or 
euphemisation through habitus that Bourdieu discusses is not so much a cognitive 
judgement that an individual makes on the spot as the 'feel for the game' that has been 
inculcated as bodily hexis through past socialisation. Bourdieu's notion of habitus has 
embedded historicity , which generates practice. This means that actual practice also has 
historicity embedded within it. Blommaert (2005b: 127) described it as being "long 
history condensed in single human activities". Bourdieu claims that "[t]he relation to 
body is a fundamental dimension of the habitus" (Bourdieu 1990b: 72) (See 2.2. (d), this 
chapter). Habitus, as 'a feel for the game', self-censors production and generates 
utterance matched to the market conditions. This 'bodily' element of habitus is absent 
from Mills's discussion of habitus. 129 
Having adopted both 'communities of practice'(CoP) and habitus, Mills seems 
to run into another problem. CoP seems to be a convenient notion because it enables her 
129 This was also the case in Eelen's work (See 5.1. (a)., this chapter) 
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to avoid essentialism and accommodate different norms, appropriateness, and power 
relations by dealing with them in different communities of practice. 
The notion of community of practice can provide a framework for analysing 
the complexity of judging the utterance as polite or impolite, and by analysing 
individual assessments of stereotypes we can see that within different 
communities of practice individuals may perform their gendered, raced and 
classed identities in different ways. (Mills 2003: 159) 
Mills, using CoP, claims that "[p]oliteness should be seen as a set of strategies or verbal 
habits which interlocutors set as a norm for themselves or which others judge as the 
norm for them, as well as being perceived as a socially constructed norm within a 
particular community of practice" (2003: 109). Mills writes that "Bourdieu argues that 
speakers act as if there were linguistic and behavioural norms circulating within 
society" (2003: 36). This may be a problematic interpretation of Bourdieu, because 
Bourdieu's theory of practice begins with the rejection of structuralism, which primarily 
discusses society in terms of societal norms and rules. Mills disagrees with 
society-based norms but argues for community-of-practice based norms instead (2003: 3, 
9,109,135,159) and she assumes that negotiation takes place for such norms. Mills 
hybridizes hahitus and CoP and reintroduces the notion of norms as community- 
of-practice based norms. Bourdieu's habitus generates regulated improvisation, but not 
as a result of conscious rule-following. Mills's interpretation does not leave room for 
such improvisation. Furthermore, Mills seems to single out the notion of habitus and 
does not incorporate the notion of 'field' or 'capital' into her arguments. 130 As I have 
shown, practice, as a dialectical encounter of habitus andfield and how capital is related 
to it, is fundamental to Bourdieu's theory of practice. 'Community of practice' in Mills's 
framework seems to be a replacement for Bourdieu's 'field'. 
Mills employed a modified Bourdieu's habitus allowing more freedom to 
130 Mills (2003) did mention `cultural capital' on a few occasions where `class' was discussed (See 
2003: 47,23 5-6). 
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agency with Wenger's CoP. By reintroducing community-of-practice based norms, 
Bourdieu's habitus lost the `embodied' element which allows regulated improvisation. 
Bourdieu's habitus needs the notion of field to explain practice and that was also lost. 
5.4. The Modification, alteration, and hybridization of 
Bourdieu's theory of practice 
Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) all received inspiration from Bourdieu's 
notion of habilus, for explaining 'production' as being both regulated by structure while 
at the same time allowing creativity to individuals. However, they modified, altered his 
original notion of habitus or sometimes hybridised it with other notions for their new 
approaches to politeness. Modification or alteration of the notion of habitus has resulted 
in misinterpretation of some aspects of Bourdieu's theory of practice. In this section, I 
will discuss some of the consequences which arise from doing so. 
Eelen's (2001) interpretation of Bourdieu's habitus which allows a more active 
role to agency was followed by Watts (2003). Mills (2003), Bucholtz (1999) and 
Wenger (1998) all intentionally reinterpreted habitus allowing more freedom to agency. 
This modification has serious consequences. If Bourdieu's sociology is altered to 
something close to agency-centred sociology as researchers such as Eelen, Watts, Mills, 
Bucholtz and Wenger have proposed, the backbone of Bourdieu's theoretical framework 
which encapsulates both 'structure' and 'agency' will be lost, which I believe, is 
symbolic power (See 2.5. (b)., this chapter). Bourdieu suggests that our own practices 
obscure the legitimating aspect of power, which justifies inequality. Through our 
habitus, we believe or misrecognise that this is the normal way of the world and 
perpetuate structures from the past into the future. There is no coercion but there is 
hegemony, i. e. symbolic power if we use Bourdieu's term. I contend that symbolic 
power exists at the very heart of politeness practice, too. Our own production or 
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utterances are to some extent always self-censored and euphemised through habitus in 
favour of the dominant. We misrecognise and accept the hegemonic reality through 
habitus, embodied sensibility. Watts's (2003: 216) understanding of power as being 
negotiable among participants in emergent networks may be one result of more freedom 
given to agency. In Watts's view, evaluation of politeness has to do with power 
negotiation in emergent networks, whereas what Bourdieu (1991) discusses is symbolic 
power, the hegemonic reality that people do not recognise and accept as normal, which 
cannot be simply negotiated during social interaction. For Bourdieu, power is the 
product of long historical processes of struggle in which the dominant have 
consolidated their hold, and their advantage has been legitimised. (See 5.2. (b)., this 
chapter). Parker (2000: 39) describes Bourdieu's project as 'structuration through power'. 
Looking from the other angle, it is this emphasis of power in his Bourdieu's project 
which made agency less powerful. Then the limited role of agency in Bourdieu's theory 
of practice can be seen as a weakness, which I will discuss in the next section. 
I contend that Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) engaged in 
modification, hybridization and alteration of Bourdieu's theory of practice, because they 
had anticipated Bourdieu's theory of practice providing more than it was able to do for 
their projects. As Terkourafi (2005: 237) pointed out, Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and 
Mills (2003) all shifted their emphases from establishing a universal theory of 
politeness to the participants' own perceptions of politeness (politenessl). Eelen's 
misinterpretion of the `struggle over representations' in Bourdieu's essay was used as 
the source of inspiration for Eelen, Watts and Mills to focus on `struggle over 
politenessl' in their postmodern approach to politeness. Perhaps they needed some 
constructs to explain how individuals make various different judgements about 
politeness in terms of their own production and assessment of others' utterances. 
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Bourdieu's habitus explains the genesis of production. However, the actual process of 
how practice is generated is hardly discussed at all in Bourdieu's theory of practice. 
Bourdieu hardly discussed the Hearer's evaluative practice. (See further discussion in 
the Conclusion chapter). Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003), who aimed to 
elucidate this process, stretched Bourdieu's theory of practice in order that they might 
be able to elucidate this process. 
6. Weaknesses of Bourdieu's theory of practice 
Despite the great contribution that Bourdieu's theory of practice provided towards an 
alternative approach to politeness, Bourdieu is unable to provide all the answers to all 
our problems. Postmodern politeness researchers modified and altered Bourdieu's 
theoretical concepts and hybridised them with other notions perhaps partly for the 
theorists' own convenience and partly in order to cover up some weaknesses in 
Bourdieu's sociology. I have shown in the previous section (5.4. ) that such ventures 
resulted in losing the crux of Bourdieu's theory of practice. Thus I would rather 
acknowledge the limitations of Bourdieu's framework for my exploration of alternative 
approaches to politeness, rather than alter Bourdieu's original theoretical concepts. In 
this section, I will point out these weaknesses of Bourdieu's theory of practice in 
relation to understanding politeness. 
The first weakness is the limited role of agency in Bourdieu's theory of 
practice. That is why postmodern researchers, Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills 
(2003) altered Bourdieu's original notion of habitus and allowed more freedom to 
human agency. It is not only Bourdieu who made the structure/agency problem the main 
focus of the project. Giddens also tried to resolve this problem through his `structuration 
theory' (See Appendix 4-B for further discussion of structuration theory). Parker 
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(2000: 52) called Gidden's project 'structuration through knowledgeable persons as 
opposed to Bourdieu's project, which he called 'structuration through power' (ibid. 39) 
(See 5.4., this chapter). Even in their project of encapsulating both structure and agency, 
I observe some remaining tendencies toward either structure or agency: Giddens's 
structuration seems to be inclined toward agency through his focus on social actor's 
knowledgability whereas Bourdieu's theory of practice seems to be inclined toward 
structuralism as he tries to explain production and reproduction of structure through 
habitus. Bourdieu's focus on reproduction of social structure resulted in a limited role 
for agency. Bourdieu's approach might appeal especially to non-Anglo-Saxon 
researchers, because structural constraints on individuals are more salient in the 
collectivistic tendencies in their society. Personally, having come from East Asia, I can 
intuitively empathise (and resonate) with Bourdieu's position. However, if instead I had 
had my primary socialization in an individualistic society, I might have been very 
dissatisfied with the limited role given to human agency, just as Eelen (2001) and Mills 
(2003) have allowed human agency more freedom. Modernist theoretical positions 
presupposed an unbiased neutral position of the researcher, based on Descartes's 
assumption that the thinking being (res cogitans) can have dispassionate knowledge 
about the world (res extensa) without being influenced (cf. Ch. 3 I. I. ). However, in 
reality, as long as we are all the product of socialisation, we inevitably tend to have 
biases, which I consider positively as 'perspectives'. I believe that in any 'postmodern' 
academic discipline, in which the Cartesian assumption is questioned, this should be 
taken seriously. I will come back to this issue in the Conclusion chapter. Parker 
(2000: 105) points out that in Bourdieu's sociology, "[p]osition and dispositions are so 
tightly combined that the person and the social self become indistinguishable. Persons 
pursue objectively structured collective interests informed by their habitus in a highly 
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predictable and predominantly reproductive fashion. This limits the scope for 
innovation or acting against type. " Thus in Bourdieu's framework, there is not much 
freedom for agency, and no personality or emotion expressed in such models of agency. 
Second, Bourdieu's theory of practice is good at explaining the production and 
reproduction of structures through actions, but it fails to explain the changeability or 
transformation of structure adequately. (See Appendix 4-B) Practice generated through 
habitus, "systems of durable, transportable dispositions" (Bourdieu 1990b: 53), which 
are matched to the demand of the market, are produced and reproduced. The habitus is 
"a product of history and it produces - more history - in accordance with the scheme 
generated by history" (1990b: 54). Bourdieu's sociology has been called 'genetic 
structuralism' (Calhoun 2000: 708). 1 observe some weaknesses of structuralism still in 
Bourdieu's theory of practice. Calhoun (1995: 142) commented that "Bourdieu's theory 
is at its best ... as a theory of reproduction, and at its weakest as a theory of 
transformation". (See 5.1. (a)) Structuralism is weak in explaining changes or 
transformation. 
Third, as Bourdieu's interest is the genesis of practice, or the mode of 
generation of practices, his focus is on the Speaker's self-censorship in his linguistic 
production. Bourdieu does not explicitly discuss the Hearer's evaluative practice. 
However, in Reproduction. - In Education, Society and Culture (1977c) Bourdieu defines 
habitus as "system of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action" (1977c: 
40) and in Distinction (1984a), Bourdieu makes an association between habitus and 
taste. It implies habitus can possibly be interpreted as the basis for the Hearer's 
evaluative practices, though it was not his primary focus. However, the question 
remains: can Bourdieu's habitus sufficiently explain the Hearer's evaluative practices? 
This issue will be taken up in the Conclusion chapter. 
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Finally, Bourdieu's field, market and capital tend to view human beings as an 
achievement of social/economic success. Humans in Bourdieu's theory of practice seem 
to be economically motivated and being concerned with increasing their capital or 
converting one capital to another kind of capital. Habitus also provides individuals with 
class-dependent, predisposed ways of relating to and categorising both familiar and 
novel situations (Shilling 2003: 113). Explaining human motivation for their behaviour 
in terms of class, capital and market seems to be economic reductionism. It may be 
difficult to explain various aspects of social interaction including politeness by 
discussing human beings in such terms. 
7. Conclusion 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I turned to Bourdieu seeking some 
resolution to the dilemma of structure and agency in our politeness theories, namely the 
dilemma of the structure-centred approach (Lakoff and Leech) and the agency-centred 
approach (Brown & Levinson). This is because Bourdieu makes these very problems his 
main theoretical concern and his solution emerged as his theory of practice. Bourdieu's 
theory of practice was not only capable of resolving these problems but also provided 
many advantageous understandings. 
Bourdieu provided some resolution to the structure/agency dilemma and other 
dualisms such as theory/practice and mind/body dualisms. Bourdieu's notion of habitus 
as bodily hexis is significant because it indicates that practice is not necessarily always 
led by the mind's cognitive activity. Bourdieu's view of practice as a dialectic encounter 
between habitus and field provided ways of accounting for a diverse `sense of 
appropriateness' resulting from encounters between different habitus, field and different 
positions in the field. Accommodating a heterogeneous sense of appropriateness, 
Chapter 4 Bourdieu's Sociology 202 
Bourdieu's theory of practice is not caught up in rational universal principles like other 
modernist thinkers. Bourdieu also revealed that asymmetry of power exists in linguistic 
practice. He recognised that legitimate and appropriate practice is determined by the 
practice of those who are dominant. Thus what is considered as universally accepted 
politeness is a product of reproduction of structure, which is advantageous to the 
dominant. Yet individuals are inculcated to believe in this reality without questioning it, 
which Bourdieu calls symbolic power Bourdieu incorporated 'time' into his 'theory of 
practice' through the notion of habitus. Habitus, a feel for the game or practical sense 
acquired through socialisation is an embodied history, "past which survives in the 
present perpetuate itself into the future" (Bourdieu 1977: 82). Lakoff, Leech, and Brown 
& Levinson could not incorporate time into their understanding of politeness partly 
because they were constrained by the modernist approach which aimed to establish a 
timeless, universal principle. Bringing a historical perspective into the understanding of 
politeness is a great advantage. ' 31 
It is important to recognise that Bourdieu's notion of habitus is not meant to 
be a scientific construct created for a scientific model. After Bourdieu had difficulties in 
explaining what he observed in his ethnographic fieldwork through structuralist analysis, 
he needed an explanation to connect structure and social actors' practice. ' 32 A Japanese 
anthropologist Tanabe (2003: 100-101,118) described Bourdieu's habitus as a 
mysterious `black box', which internalises structure and generates individual's practices 
matched to the market conditions, whereby structure is reproduced. Tanabe 
(2003: 100-101) points out that it is still not clear how practice is generated through 
131 1 will discuss the issue of historicity further in the Conclusion chapter. 
132 Bourdieu states: I wanted to account for practice in its humblest forms - rituals, matrimonial choices, 
the mundane economic activity of everyday life etc. - by escaping the objectivism of action understood as 
a mechanical reaction 'without an agent' and the subjectivism which portrays action as the deliberate 
pursuit of a conscious intention, the free project of a conscience pursuing its own ends and maximizing its 
utility through rational computation" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 121). 
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habitus and that it may be known from the effect or outcome of the practice. Michel de 
Certeau (1998 [1984]: 58) sees Bourdieu's notion of habitus as an 'assumed reality' 
rather than an 'observed reality': Bourdieu was interested in "the mode of generation of 
practices" (de Certeau 1998: 58) and he employed the notion of habitus as a 
'hypothetical construct' or 'hypothetical metaphor' to explain the practical sense, which 
is improvised yet regulated, creative yet matched to the conditions in the field. Bourdieu 
himself declares that the concepts in his theory of practice are 'shorthand' within his 
research process (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 161) (See 22.1.. this chapter). De Certeau 
(1998: 58) also calls the notion of habitus a 'theoretical metaphor'. It is important to 
remember that Bourdieu was hesitant to call his theory of practice 'a theory' and 
presented it as a 'thinking tool'. 
Despite many advantages, Bourdieu's theory of practice also has certain 
inevitable weaknesses. One of such weaknesses is the very limited role given to human 
agency. Another weakness is that Bourdieu's emphasis on class, capital, and market tend 
to focus on certain aspects of human beings within a social hierarchy. However, people 
in social interaction are far more complex than they are portrayed in Bourdieu's theory 
of practice. Bourdieu does not pay attention to the social psychological aspect of human 
interaction. For a fuller picture of agency to explain the complexity of politeness, 
Bourdieu's framework may be insufficient. As a second thinking tool, I will turn to 
Goffman who will provide us with a richer understanding of social interaction. I hope 
that Goffman's notion of self and his sociology of social interaction will compensate for 
the limitations identified in Bourdieu's framework. 
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Chapter 5 Goffman's Sociology: 
Self in Social Interaction and Interaction Order 
0. Introduction 
In chapter 4, in search of a solution to the problematic dichotomy of structure-centred 
and agency-centred approaches to politeness, I turned to Bourdieu, who proposed his 
theory of practice as a way of overcoming this structure/agency dichotomy. In his theory 
of practice, Bourdieu elucidated actual practice without being trapped in either 
objectivism or subjectivism. However, this was all achieved at the expense of 
minimising the focus on 'agency'. Farnell (2000: 413) alleges that Bourdieu's theory of 
practice provides "an essentially ungrounded and mind-less notion of human action that 
is restricted to habituated practices" and claims that "although Bourdieu's theoretical 
resources allow him to include talk about the body, he is unable to include 'talk'from 
the body". The notion of agency in Bourdieu's theory is indeed limited: it is mainly 
associated with positions in particular fields' 33 
In this chapter, I turn to Goffman's sociology as the second 'thinking tool'. 
Why turn to Goffman? Bourdieu's framework has a limited role for agency and was 
insufficient to provide an explanation of the complexity of politeness and little attention 
133 Interestingly, Bourdieu's notion of 'sense of place' (Bourdieu 1991: 82) resembles Ide's (1989) notion 
of wakimae (discernment). Bourdieu speaks of a "fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the 
place which one occupies in the social space" (Bourdieu 1991: 82). Ide (1989: 23) claims that "[tlo behave 
according to wakimae is to show verbally and non-verbally one's sense of place or role in a given 
situation according to social conventions (1989: 230). " In her view, individuals are expected to 
"acknowledge the delicate status and/or the role differences of the speaker, the addressee and the referent 
in communication (ibid. )" and "to behave according to the status and the role of various levels ascribed to 
or acquired by that individual (ibid. )" She claims that "to observe wakimae by means of language use is 
an integral part of linguistic politeness. (ibid. )" Ide (1988; 1989) argues that B&L's theory focused on 
volitional strategies of politeness and failed to acknowledge the aspect of wakimae (discernment). She 
seems to have recognised that B&L were 'agency-centred' and neglected the 'structure' aspects of 
politeness. 
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is given to the social psychological aspect of social interaction. On the other hand, 
Goffman elucidates face-to-face interaction by focusing on agency, i. e. the participants 
in interaction. The second reason for turning to Goffman is that Goffman's notion of 
'face' has already been employed as a central notion in Brown & Levinson's theory, but 
as discussed in Chapter 2, Goffman's original notion of 'face' was altered into B&L's 
technical notion 'face-want' in order to fit in with the rational choice theory that they 
employed. As I will show in this chapter, Goffrnan's original notion of 'face' in the 
context of 'interaction ritual' is a much richer concept and it is vital to recover this 
ýritual' aspect associated with Goffman's notion of face. Thirdly, besides 'ritual', 
Goffrnan used other metaphors, i. e. 'drama' and 'game' to elucidate the complex nature 
of social interaction. All three metaphors are virtually indispensable elements in 
exploring politeness. Gofman's unusual method of elucidating various dimensions of 
social interaction employing these three different metaphors in his sociology shows that 
he is not motivated by the modernist demand of 'rationality' and 'objectivity' (I will 
discuss this further in 1.2.4). Then Goffman's sociology seems to exemplify a possible 
alternative approach which goes beyond modernism. 
Fourthly, Goffrnan also attempted to encapsulate both structure and agency in 
his sociology, even though he did not make it his main project as Bourdieu did. 
Goffman took a very different approach to ethnography than that of Bourdieu. While 
Bourdieu put the ethnographic data into a larger social panorama and explained how 
social structure is reproduced through habitus in an individual's practice, Goffman 
focused on face-to-face social interaction and engaged in the detailed study of 
interactional data. In other words, Bourdieu adopted a macro perspective while 
Goffman was concerned with micro level social interaction between individuals. These 
two different perspectives prove to be complementary to each other. 
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Section 1 presents Goffman's sociology of everyday life. Goffman's 
understanding of self is fundamental to his sociology, which I explore first. Then I 
introduce Goffman's metaphors of social life as drama, ritual and game, and show how 
each metaphor highlights different aspects of social interaction. Then I discuss how 
politeness fit into his elucidation of social interaction. Section 2 discusses Goffman's 
notion of 'face' and 'facework. Though Brown and Levinson claim that they borrowed 
their notion of 'face' from Goffman and the English folk notion, their reinterpretation of 
'face' as 'face want' is a distortion of Goffman's sociology of social interaction and his 
understanding of self I hope to show this as I introduce Goffman's notions of 'face'and 
'facework'. As part of the conclusion, Section 3 discusses how Bourdieu and Goffman 
complement each other as possible alternative ways of elucidating politeness 
1. Goffman's sociology of everyday social life 
1.0. Introduction to Goffman's sociology 
Goffman may be seen as the quintessential sociologist of 'everyday social life' 
(Branaman 1997: xlv). Fine and Manning (2000: 457) suggest that Goffman can hardly 
be considered a conventional social theorist, because in the thirty years of his academic 
career, he never, like many other sociologists, attempted to develop an overarching 
theory of society. His contribution was mainly through elucidating various social 
interactions as well as through his insights into self, social interaction, and social order. 
He also focused on deviance and inequality in social interaction. Goffman viewed 
'social life' as drama, ritual and game. As he oscillated between these three metaphors, 
Goffman tried to draw attention to both the manipulative and the moral aspects of social 
life (Branaman 1997: xlvi). His insights have influenced linguists who value the view of 
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language as social practice. 134 Fine and Manning (2000: 466) distinguish six 
components of Goffman's work: 1) pre-dramaturgical writings, 2) extended 
metaphorical investigations, 3) analysis of social aspects of mental illness, 4) sustained 
enquiry into the organization of everyday behaviour referred to as 'interaction order', 5) 
later investigation into the 'framing' of social encounters, and 6) analysis of language 
and social interaction. This order is roughly chronological, but some aspects of his work 
such as 'interaction order' are present all along, from his original doctoral dissertation 
right through to his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association 
(which was his last manuscript). I will focus on 2) and 4) of the above components and 
discuss politeness in these particular contexts. 
Politeness concerns how individuals present themselves to others. Watts, Ide 
and Ehlich (1992) point out that 
[t]he study of politeness focuses directly or indirectly on the presentation, 
maintenance and even adjustment of a concept of the "presentation of self' 
(cf. Goffman 1959) in the course of social interaction, on the historical 
growth of culturally specific patterns of behaviour, and on the distribution 
of status and power in social groups. (Watts et al. 1992: 1) 
Goffman's understanding is based on a socially constructed and socially interdependent 
self. I will discuss this in I. I. Then in 1.2., 1 will introduce Goffman's three metaphors 
of social interaction (drama in 1.2.1., ritual in 1.2.2. and game in 1.2.3). After 
summarising the multifaceted nature of social interaction in 1.2.4., 1 will discuss how 
politeness relates to these metaphors in 1.3. 
114 Goffman, not being a linguist himself associated with Searle, who developed Speech Act Theory, at 
Berkeley in the early 1960's and later with sociolinguists, Labov and Hymes in the University of 
Pennsylvania. His later writings, Frame Analysis (1974), Forms of Talk (1981) and "Felicity's Condition" 
(1983), have made significant contributions to communication theory, sociolinguistics, and discourse 
analysis. His influence in linguistics can be traced in Sacks and Schegloff, two leading proponents of 
Conversational Analysis today, who were both Goffman's students. 
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1.1 Goffman's understanding of self 
(a). Seyas a social product 
Goffman assumes that "when an individual appears before others he will have many 
motives for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation" 
(1990[1959]: 26). These motives are very different from those of the 'rational 
autonomous, independent, and calculative self' assumed in 'rational choice theory', 
which aims to achieve the highest payoffs. Goffman argues that any self in the presence 
of others, is always concerned about maintaining their own self-image judged by their 
performance, and therefore, is constantly engaged in impression management. Goffman 
(1990) writes: 
When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take 
seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to 
believe that a character that they see actually possesses the attributes he 
appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences 
that are implicitly claimed for it... In line with this, there is the popular 
view that the individual offers his performance and puts on his show `for 
the benefit of other people'. (Goffman 1990[1959]: 28) 
Behind this understanding of self as a product of performance lies Goffman's 
dramaturgical metaphor. 135 
A correctly staged and performed character leads the audience to impute a self 
to a performed character, but this imputation - this self - is a product of a 
scene that comes off and is not a cause of it. The self, then, as a performed 
character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose 
fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is dramatic effect 
arising diffusely from a scene that is presented... (Goffi-nan 1990 [1959]: 
244-5) 
Goffman sees self not as the cause of his/her action but rather as a product of his/her 
performance in social interaction. It is evident that Goffman's view of self is very 
different from the `rational autonomous self' assumed in the `rational choice theory' that 
135 Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor will be further discussed in 1.2.1 in this chapter. 
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Brown & Levinson adopted. Goffman acknowledges the distinction between persons 
themselves and roles which they may choose to play, writing in Frame Analysis: 
There is a relation between persons and role. But the relationship answers 
to the interactive system - to the frame - in which the role is performed 
and the self of the performer is glimpsed. Self, then, is not an entity 
half-concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for managing 
oneself during them. Just as the current situation prescribes the official 
guise behind which we will conceal ourselves, so it provides for where and 
how we will show through, the culture itself prescribing what sort of entity 
we must believe ourselves to be in order to have something to show 
through in this manner. (1974: 573-4) 
In any theatre production, there has to be a playwright, a producer, an actor and a part. 
Burns (1992: 107) explains Goffman's notion of self using this theatre metaphor. 
[t]here is a social self ("producer") which measures the appropriateness of 
the individual's role to the social position in which it is fixed ("part"), and 
also adjusts the distance between them - i. e. the degree to which it seems 
rewarding to measure up to performance of the role at its most typical 
("actor"). But there is also an inner "I" which distinguishes between his 
self-image and the misconceptions of himself which he feels his behaviour 
must be sowing among others, or retreats even from the self-image into 
wondering "is this really me? " It manages the social self. [emphasis in the 
original] 
Any individual person, performing the different roles expected, inevitably serves as the 
manager of a kind of holding company of multiple selves (Goffman 1961b: 90). Central 
to maintenance of self is the preservation of territories of the self. The inverse of the 
territories of self is discussed in Asylum (1975). The condition of the mental patient is 
one in which the territories of self are most miniscule and control over them nearly 
non-existent. Goffman shows how self is entangled with institutionally based supports 
and constraints. Asylum suggests that attachment to self can be itself a source of 
mortification for individuals confined within oppressive institutions. 
As presented in various passages above, Goffman sees 'self' as a socialproduct. 
Branaman (1997: xlvi) explains that the self is a social product in two senses. 
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First, it is a product of the performances put on by individuals in social 
interaction. There is no essence that exists inside an individual, waiting to 
be given expression in social situations. Rather, the sense of self arises as a 
result of publicly validated performances. Yet, secondly, even though 
individuals play an active role in creating these self-indicating performances, 
they are generally constrained to present images of themselves that can be 
socially supported in the context of a given status hierarchy. (Branaman 
1997: xlvi) 
(b). The two selves thesis 
Goffman stresses that social life has both moral and manipulative aspects. As social 
beings, people are concerned with living up to the many moral standards of the social 
world. But as performers, they are "concerned not with the moral issue of realizing 
these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that 
these standards are being realized" (Goffman 1990[1959]: 243). Fine and Manning 
(1992: 44-8) called this his "two selves thesis": one self is a public performer giving 
carefully managed impressions and the second self is a cynical manipulator hidden 
behind the public performance (Fine and Manning 2000: 469). Branaman (1997) 
explains these two selves neatly. 
Goffman suggests that individuals are not entirely determined by society 
insofar as they are able to manipulate strategically the social situation and 
others' impressions of themselves, fashioning themselves in much the same 
way as they would a character in a theatrical production. Yet, on the other 
hand, Goffman emphasizes that individuals are not able to choose freely the 
images of self they would have others accept, but rather are constrained to 
define themselves in congruence with the statuses, roles and relationships 
they are accorded by the social order. (Branamanl997: xlvii) 
In this 'two selves thesis', Goffman offers a way of accommodating both structure and 
agency in social interaction: social actors are compelled to perform various roles as the 
situation requires (the structure aspect) but at the same time are capable of performing 
strategic and deliberate action (the agency aspect). In Goffman's project of structuration, 
the role of agency was not limited as it was in Bourdieu's theory of practice. In our 
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alternative approach to politeness we need to overcome structure and agency. Both 
Bourdieu and Goffman succeeded in doing so and Goffman's approach which pays 
close attention to the agency or the social actor complements Bourdieu's approach. 
1.2 Goffman's three metaphors of social interaction 
Goffman did not present his sociology of everyday social life as a grand coherent theory, 
based on philosophical extrapolations. Manning (1992: 2) points out that although 
Goffman attempted over many years to develop a general theory of face-to-face 
interaction, he remained extremely sceptical about the possibility of discovering such a 
general theory. To Goffman, social life seems to comprise somewhat contradictory 
elements. Through detailed ethnographic observations, Goffman came up with three 
very different metaphors of social life: drama, ritual and game to elucidate social 
interaction. These three metaphors depict brilliantly the different elements involved in 
social interaction. 
1.2.1 Social interaction as drama 
(a). Co present gatherings 
Goffman presents a theatrical metaphor of social interaction in The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life (1990[19591), "Role distance" (1961) and Where the action is (1969). 
Giddens (1987) called Goffman 'the theorist of co-presence'. He was not interested in 
various small groups such as family or kinship groups. Instead, he was interested in 
co-present gatherings. Goffman provides the conditions of co-presence as follows: 
"Persons must sense that they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are 
doing, including their experience of others, and close enough to be perceived in this 
sense of being perceived" (1963: 17). Goffman claims that expressive coherence is 
required of socialized selves; we have variable impulses with moods and energies that 
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change from one moment to the next, but when we are in the presence of others, we do 
not allow ourselves to be subject to ups and downs but are expected to give a perfectly 
consistent performance at every particular moment (1990[1959]: 63-4). Goffman claims 
that "when the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to 
incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society" (1990[1959]: 
45). In other word, "[a] performance is 'socialised', moulded, and modified to fit into 
the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is presented" 
(1990[1959]: 44). 
Goffman (1990[1959]: 78-9) discussed the relationship between socialisation 
and performance. Through our socialization we have been schooled in reality, so we can 
properly manage our real routine. When we move into a new position in society and are 
given a new part to perform, we already have in our repertoire a large number of bits and 
pieces of performance that will be required for and adapted into a new setting. 
"Individuals will already have a fair idea of what modesty, deference, or righteous 
indignation looks like" (1990[1959]: 79) Through socialization an individual may not 
have had opportunity to learn many specific details of a single concrete part but may 
have learned enough pieces of expressions so that he/she can 'fill in' and manage any 
part in a performance (ibid. ). Goffman recognises that there are different ways of playing 
roles in different social or cultural settings. 
It is commonplace to say that different social groupings express in different 
ways such attributes as age, sex, territory, and class status, and that in each 
case these bare attributes are elaborated by means of a distinctive complex 
cultural configuration of proper ways of conducting oneself. (1990 
[1959]: 81) 
Kate Fox (2005: 13) in her popularised anthropology book, Watching the English 
provides a tangible example: "The first thing we notice when we go on holiday or 
business abroad is that other cultures have 'different ways of doing things', by which 
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we usually mean that they have rules about, say, food, mealtimes, dress, greetings, 
hygiene, trade, hospitality, joking, status-differentiation, etc. which are different from 
our own rules about these practices. " 
Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor of social life has many resemblances to 
Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Through socialisation, we have been prepared for the 
various roles we are expected to perform. Acting requires improvisation and our past 
embodied sense of how to act in various settings allows us to perform a new part 
without much difficulty. As we have each been socialised in different cultural and social 
settings, how we perform a particular role is heavily influenced by our performance 
practice in socialisation. Different social situations require different ways of acting just 
as Bourdieu wrote of the requirements of different market conditions. Both Goffman 
and Bourdieu recognised the micro and macro aspects of social interaction. Bourdieu, 
however, seems to have been viewing externally how macro structure is reproduced 
through habitus in agency whereas Goffman seemed to focus more on micro aspects of 
social interaction - how self (agency) manages to enact various socially expected roles. 
Goffman's close look at face-to-face interaction enabled him to have insights into the 
psychological dynamics of participants in social interaction. 
(b). Interaction as a team performance 
Where two people are co-present, people perform. Goffman (1990[1959]: 83) argues 
that it is a limited view to understand 'interaction' from understanding the presentation 
of an individual performer because interaction involves the fostered and sustained 
cooperation of more than one participant. Therefore Goffman (1990[1959]: 85) takes a 
'performance team' or 'team' as the basic unit in understanding performance in social 
interaction. 'Team' here refers to a group of individuals who cooperate in staging the 
same routine. Goffman (1990[19591: 85) also writes: "if our special interest is the study 
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of impression management, of the contingencies which arise in fostering an impression, 
and of the techniques for meeting these contingencies, then the team and the 
team-performance may well be the best units to take as the fundamental point of 
reference. " 136 
A team-mate is "someone whose dramaturgical cooperation one is dependent 
upon in fostering a given definition of the situation" (Goffinan 1990[1959]: 88). While a 
'team-performance' is in progress, "each team-mate is forced to rely on the good 
conduct and behaviour of his fellows, and they, in return, are forced to rely on him. 
There is, then, perforce, a bond of reciprocal dependence linking team-mates to one 
another. (ibid. )" If an interaction is treated as a dialogue between teams, it might be 
convenient to call one team the performers and the other team the audience (ibid. 97). A 
team-mate must also endeavour to maintain the line during a performance (ibid. 94). ' 37 
Deviance may destroy the credibility of the entire performance. When a member of the 
team makes a mistake in the presence of the audience, the other team-members do not 
punish the offender until the audience is no longer present. For instance, in an 
authoritarian organization like an army, in which a team of superordinates maintain the 
show of being right every time, one must not show hostility or disrespect towards any 
other superordinates in front of a member of the subordinate team (ibid. 94) Public 
dressing down is not acceptable even in ordinary company offices. 
Even if members of a team have a different formal status and rank in a social 
establishment, they are still expected to cooperate in maintaining a given impression 
through the mutual dependence created by membership of the team (Goffman 
136 Goffman (1990[1959]: 87) claims that when a performer even guides his private activity in 
accordance with incorporate moral standards, he may associate these standards with a reference group of 
some kind by creating a non-present audience for his activity. "[A]n individual may be his own audience 
or may imagine an audience to be present (1990[1959]: 87). " 
13 ' Goffman used the notion 'linC in The Presentation of Seýf in Evetyday Life without an explicit 
definition (1990[1959193,95). From the context, it seems to mean *a projected definition of the situation' 
(11990[1959]: 108). This notion was developed in 'face-work' in Interaction Ritual. See 2.1. (a)., this 
chapter. 
Chapter 5 Goffman's Sociology 215 
1990[1959]: 88). In large social establishments, where many different status grades exist 
during a particular interaction, participants of many different statuses may align 
themselves into two or more teams (1990[1959]: 95). For instance, in a Japanese 
company, a section head, kacho, during the interaction with his section members, may 
act as their superior but the moment a department head, bucho comes into a room, he 
aligns himself with his section and presents with them a show for the benefit of the 
bucho. Goffman's notion of 'team' enables us to understand social position as a fluid 
notion which may be modified as a performer aligns himself/herself with different 
teams during interaction. (See Appendix 5-A for another example that shows the 
multiple roles that one person has to play and the multiple teams with whom he has to 
align himself during interaction. ) 
Seeing 'performance team' or 'team' as a basic unit for understanding 
performance in social interaction, Goffman provides a very different picture of self in 
social interaction from the Model Person in B&L's theory, which was independent, 
autonomous and calculative. Goffman claims that self in team performance require 
mutual cooperation with team-mates. A bond of reciprocal dependence linking 
team-mates to one another is essential in social interaction drama. Self in social 
interaction needs to be mutually dependent to perform well in social drama. Bourdieu 
explains that the appropriate action is a product of the encounter between habitus and 
field, but he does not explore the social actors' team effort going on in each social 
encounter as Goffman does. I believe that this is one strength of Goffman's microscopic 
approach which pays more attention to social actors or agency and yet at the same time 
without focusing particularly on a single actor but rather on a team performance. 
Politeness requires not just the practical sense of censoring your own action or 
utterance depending on your own positions in the field as Bourdieu emphasises but 
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mastery of practical know-how of how to conduct a team performance appropriately. 
Again Goffman complements Bourdieu in this respect. 
Front and back region behaviour 
In explaining social life as drama, Goffman distinguishes between front and back 
regions (front and back stage). The front region is the place where the performance is 
actually given and the back region is the place where the performance of a routine is 
prepared (1990[1959]: 231) "The performance of an individual in a front region may be 
seen as an effort to give the appearance that his activity in the region maintains and 
embodies certain standards" (Goffman 1990[1959]: 110). He classifies these standards 
into two groupings. 
One grouping has to do with the ways in which the performer treats the 
audience while engaged in talk with them or in gestural interchanges that 
are a substitute for talk. These standards are sometimes referred to as 
matters of politeness. The other group of standards has to do with the way 
in which the performer comports himself while in visual or aural range of 
the audience but not necessarily engaged in talk with them. I shall use the 
term 'decorum' to refer to this second group of standards, although some 
excuse and some qualifications will have to be added to justify the usage. 
(Goffman 1990[1959]: 110) 
Goffman explicitly mentions 'politeness' here. A performer always maintains certain 
standards in front of the audience. Politeness refers to the standards that the performer 
must maintain while he/she is engaged in talk or some other interchange with the 
audience in the front region. When the performer is in visual or aural range of the 
audience, but not necessarily engaged in talk with them, the performer still maintains 
certain standards, which Goffman somewhat arbitrarily calls 'decorum'. 138 In other 
words, his 'decorum' is "the requirements of the kind not related to handling of others in 
conversation" (1990[1959]: 110). By 'Politeness', on the other hand, he means the 
138 Goffman subdivides decorum into moral requirements and instrumental requirements. See Goffman 
1990 [1959]: 110. 
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standards that the performer maintains while he/she is engaged in talk with the audience. 
Back-stage is usually located at one end of the place where the performance is presented 
and is "the place where the performer can reliably expect that no members of the 
audience will intrude" (1990[19591): 116). When the performer is back-stage, he/she can 
interrupt his/her performance momentarily and relax. 
Goffman thus claims that politeness and decorum are requirements while the 
performer is front-stage. By contrast, backstage language or behaviour allows what 
might well be considered potentially offensive behaviour when the actor is up on front 
stage. 
The backstage language consists of reciprocal first-naming, cooperative 
decision-making, profanity, open sexual remarks, elaborate griping, 
smoking, rough informal dress, 'sloppy' sitting and standing posture, use of 
dialect or sub-standard speech, mumbling and shouting, playful 
aggressivity and 'kidding', inconsiderateness for the other in minor but 
potentially symbolic acts, minor physical self- involvement such as 
humming, whistling, chewing, nibbling, belching and flatulence. 
(1990[1959]: 129) 
Performers in social drama move between front stage and back stage and adjust their 
utterances and behaviour accordingly. Goffman claims that politeness is concerned with 
a performer's behaviour in the front region. Some behaviour, perfectly acceptable 
backstage, could be deemed offensive when frontstage. Traditionally the distinction 
between formal/informal situations has often been used in discussion of politeness. 
Lakoff argued that different rules of politeness are expected in different discourse 
genres (See Ch. 1 1. L(e). ). Goffman's front and back regions are useful notions in 
analysing politeness. Interlocutors can be moving between frontstage and backstage in 
the same situations andfront and back region allows more fluidity than notions such as 
genre or formal/informal situations. 
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(d). Some moral obligations for the performers 
Goffman claims that "when two teams present themselves to each other for purposes of 
interaction the members of each team tend to maintain the line that they are what they 
claim to be; they tend to stay in character" (1990[1956]: 166). 139 He discusses certain 
attributes that team members must have for successfully staging a character. "If a team 
is to sustain the line it has taken, the team-mate must act as if they have accepted certain 
moral obligations" (1990 [1959]: 207). Goffman discusses defensive measures that 
performers should take to maintain their own show against any possible performance 
disruption or incidents caused by the misconduct of team-mates. 140 Performers must 
make sure that team members observe the expected moral obligations. 
For instance, team members must maintain dramaturgical loyalty. They must 
not betray the secrets of the team when between performances (1990 [1959]: 207). Also 
"members of the team must not exploit their presence in the front region in order to 
stage their own show .... They must be willing to accept minor parts with good grace and 
perform enthusiastically whenever, wherever, and for whomever the team as a whole 
chooses" (1990[1959]: 208). A recent personal experience may illustrate the requirement 
of dramaturgical loyalty that Goffman claims. Some months ago, I invited a friend of 
mine to dinner, because she was interested in sending an application to live in the 
postgraduate residence in which I currently live. I showed her around various facilities 
and we went down to the communal kitchen as I had promised to cook dinner for her 
that evening. As I was cooking dinner, she started to befriend various people who were 
also cooking there. She became good friends with one Indian lady. Before I had finished 
my cooking, my friend sat down with this Indian lady and started to eat with her. When 
"9 The notion of "a line" will be expounded in 2.1. (a). 
140 Goffman discussed defensive measures used by performers and protective measures used by the 
audience and which the performers take in order to make it possible for the audience to employ protective 
measures. They are all part of the art of impression management. 
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I finished my cooking, it became very awkward and my friend suddenly said to the 
Indian lady and me, "Oh, we can all eat together, no? No problem right? " I personally 
found this behaviour of hers extremely impolite. Dramaturgical loyalty explains this 
well. She was my invited guest and she was supposed to be loyal to her role as my guest 
but she was seduced by the audience and started to run her own separate show. Mutual 
fulfilment of moral obligations in team work is essential in performing an interaction 
drama appropriately. Failure to maintain dramaturgical loyalty could lead to an 
evaluation of being impolite. Politeness, then, requires team efforts where each 
maintains the moral obligations expected in order to sustain the team performance. 
B&L's theory focused on the Speaker's choice of politeness strategy at the individual 
level. Goffman's approach of taking 'team' as a basic unit of analysis (cf. 1.2. L(b). this 
chapter) was new and unique. (See Appendix 5-13 for other moral obligations of team 
members) 
I -,,. The standards expected of the performers on 
front stage f, I 
Goffman argues that self is a product of performance. Evaluation of one's performance 
might be at the same time the evaluation of that person's character. Failure to perform to 
the standards expected when the performer is on front-stage, results not only in 
disruption in social interaction but also in negative evaluation of the person him/herself 
performing the role. Therefore individuals as performers are concerned with living up to 
the various moral standards involved in the drama of social life. Goffman defines 
'politeness' as the standards that the performer on front stage maintains while he/she is 
engaged in talk with the audience (1990[1959]: 110). 
These standards that Goffnan discusses are far broader than those which 
Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]) use in defining `politeness'. B&L assume that 
certain acts (e. g. request, disagreement) are intrinsically face-threatening and 
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4politeness' consists of 'redressive' actions taken in order to counterbalance the 
potentially disruptive effect of face threatening acts (FTA). Goffman, on the other hand, 
seems to argue that social actors performing on front stage are constantly at risk of 
losing face or experiencing embarrassment if they fail to meet the expected standards, in 
other words, the possibility of face loss depends on how you perform your role. In 
Goffman's thought, social self as performer and the sense of self image are intertwined. 
Face loss or face threat is not related to the intrinsic nature of particular acts but rather 
to the quality of performance of the social actors, i. e. how the social actors carry out the 
dramatic performance of social interaction. Any performance by social actors, failing to 
perform to the standards expected in social interaction, may cause face loss on the part 
of the performer and/or audience. Goffman argues that politeness is the concern of 
performers when they are on the front stage. As discussed in chapter 4, Bourdieu also 
recognised that politeness concern is commonly present in all linguistic production, as 
all utterances are to some extent euphemized as the product of the relationship between 
habitus and field. Again Goffman's sociology is compatible with Bourdieu's theory of 
practice and complements Bourdieu giving closer attention to the social actors 
themselves. 
1.2.2 Social interaction as ritual 
(a). Durkheim's religious ritual translated into interaction ritual 
Another metaphor of social interaction that Goffman employs is ritual., 41 Goffrnan's 
notion of 'face' and 'face-work', which has been discussed by many politeness 
researchers, was originally part of this metaphor of social interaction as ritual. In this 
section, I will discuss the origin of his ritual metaphor and two different kinds of 
14 1 Goffman's ritualistic metaphor of social interaction is expressed in four essays in Interaction Ritual 
(1967) - "On Face-work (1955)", "Nature of Deference and Demeanour (1956)", "Embarrassment and 
Social Organization (1956)", "Alienation from Interaction (1957)" - as well as in Behaviour in Public 
Places (1963) and Relation in Public (1971). 
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ceremonial activity, 'deference' and 'demeanour'. 'Face' and 'face-work' will be 
discussed separately in Section 2. Durkheim (1915) believes that society is at its core a 
moral reality: a ritual is a mechanism by which moral sentiments are produced or 
shaped into specific social forms. Durkheim argues that in a secularised [western] 
society, 'individualism' has become a religion; 'individualism as religion' in modern 
society is the worship of the human personality, the social person. 142 Goffman 
(1967: 45) argues that the very capacity and propensity to be bound by moral rules and 
to become a social construct is part of universal human nature. 
Goffman, following Durkheim's (1915) ideas, suggests that the Durkheimian 
notion regarding primitive religious ritual could be translated into concepts of deference 
and demeanour in everyday social interaction. In the last paragraph of "the Nature of 
Deference and Demeanour" (1967) Goffman writes: 
Many gods have been done away with, but the individual himself 
stubbornly remains as a deity of considerable importance. He walks with 
some dignity and is the recipient of many little offerings. He is jealous of 
the worship due him, yet, approached in the right spirit, he is ready to 
forgive those who may have offended him. Because of their status relative 
to his, some persons will find him contaminating while others will find they 
contaminate him, in either case finding that they must treat him with ritual 
care. Perhaps the individual is so viable a god because he can actually 
understand the ceremonial significance of the way he is treated, and quite 
on his own can respond dramatically to what is proffered him. In contacts 
between such deities there is no need for middlemen; each of these gods is 
able to serve as his own priest. (1967: 95) 
Durkheirn claims that in secularised society, gods may not be worshipped any more but 
instead human individuals are regarded as though they were gods and treated with 
ceremonial rituals. 
142 Durkheim, in the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915: 73) "The human personality is a 
sacred thing; one dare not violate it nor infringe its bounds, while at the same time the greatest good is in 
communion with others. " 
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(b). Demeanour and deference 
Goffman delineates two basic components of ceremonial activity: demeanour and 
deference. Demeanour refers to "that element of the individual's ceremonial behaviour 
typically conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing, which serves to express to 
those in his immediate presence that he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable 
qualities" (1967: 77). It is the way an actor presents himself with 'sacredness' in the 
co-present situation. Goffman gives examples of attributes of individuals who have 
proper demeanour in [American middle-class] society. 
In our society, the "well" or "properly" demeaned 143 individual displays 
such attributes as: discretion and sincerity; modesty regarding self, 
sportsmanship; command of speech and physical movement; self-control 
over his emotions, his appetites, and his desires; poise under pressure and 
so forth (1967: 77)". 
Goffman comments that individuals cannot establish their own demeanour by claiming 
that they possess it. "Demeanour involves attributes derived from interpretations others 
make of the way in which the individual handles himself during social intercourse" 
(1967: 78). However, the individual cannot instantaneously be accorded evaluation as a 
'well-demeaned' person from one social interaction. It is the cumulative outcome of 
practices over a period of time. Goffman (1967: 77) points out that a good demeanour is 
often associated with proper socialisation which also does not happen instantaneously. 
Thus good demeanour, which is closely related to the self image, is only achievable as 
an accumulation of others' evaluations of the person as well-demeaned over a period of 
time through different social interactions. 
The second basic element in ceremonial activity is deference: Deference is a 
ritual behaviour directed towards others (the recipients) as an expression of respect for 
143 .a wcll-demeaned' person refers to a person who has a proper demeanour. This is an archaic usage 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary and it is confusing because 'to demean' in modern English 
usage is U cause a severe loss in the dignity and respect for somebody. ' But I have kept Goffman's use of 
the word as it seemed appropriate to do so. 
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their 'sacredness'. Goffman defines deference as "that component of activity which 
functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a 
recipient of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, 
extension or agent" (1967: 56). Such activities "represent ways in which an actor 
celebrates and confirms his relation to a recipient" (1967: 56-7). Deference behaviour 
tends to be honorific and politely toned, conveying appreciation of the recipient that is 
in many ways more complimentary to the recipient than the actor's true sentiment might 
warrant (Goffman 1967: 60). 
Goffman defines two kinds of deference: avoidance ritual and presentation 
ritual. Avoidance ritual refers to "those forms of deference which lead the actor to keep 
at a distance from the recipient and not violate ... the "ideal sphere" that lies around the 
recipient" (1967: 62). Avoidance of using other's personal names as a system of 
deferential stand-off arrangement is an example of avoidance ritual. In general one 
tends to avoid a person of high status out of deference to him. Another example of 
avoidance ritual is not to bring into discussion matters that might be painful, 
embarrassing, or humiliating to the recipient (1967: 65). The second kind, presentation 
ritual refers to "acts through which the individual makes specific attestation to 
recipients concerning how he regards them and how he will treat them in the on-coming 
interaction" (1967: 71). "While avoidance rituals specify what is not to be done, 
presentational rituals specify what is to be done" (ibid). Goffman gives salutations and 
the giving of compliments as examples of presentation ritual. Thus the avoidance ritual 
involves keeping the 'ideal sphere' between each individual, while the presentation 
ritual is enacted through an individual's specific attention towards a recipient 
concerning how he or she regards them. 
Goffman recognises that "different societies and subcultures have different 
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ways of conveying deference and demeanour, different ceremonial meanings for the 
same act, and different amounts of concern over such things as poise and privacy" 
(1967: 85). "The gesture of deference expected by members of one society have 
sometimes been incompatible with the standards of demeanour maintained by members 
of another" (1967: 82). He gives an example of the difficulty in diplomatic relations 
between Britain and China during the nineteenth century caused by incompatible 
standards of deference and demeanour (Douglas 1895: 291-96 in Goffman 1967: 82). 
Different ways of conveying deference and demeanour may be well explained by 
Bourdieu's bodily hexis. Through socialisation into a particular family, community 
or/and society, people acquire particular ways of conveying deference and demeanour, 
which become part of their hahitus. Again Bourdieu and Goffman complement each 
other, as both suggest that people acquire particular ways of social interaction through 
their own socialisation. 
(c) Goffman's avoidance and presentation rituals and B&L's theory 
As discussed in chapter 2, B&L (1987: 43) stated that their distinction between negative 
and positive politeness had been borrowed from Durkheim's distinction between 
negative and positive rites and they also acknowledged the 'ritual' character of 
politeness stressed by Goffman. In chapter 2,1 discussed B&L' problematic notion of 
'face' (See Ch. 2 2.2.2. (b)), but I saved the discussion of its deviation from Goffman's 
understanding of face until now. B&L's negative and positive politeness bear some 
resemblance to Goffman's avoidance ritual and presentation ritual, but the content is 
quite different. Goffman's two rituals of deference are performed not out of the 
individual's wants as B&L claimed, but rather out of respect or deference for each 
other's dignity. The central meaning of 'face' in Goffman's notion, has much to do with 
human dignity, which is consistent with English common usage. Face is threatened 
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when human dignity is threatened. B&L's actual interpretation of 'face' as 'face-want' is 
a weakened reduction of the rich notions of human dignity and honour, expressed by 
Goffman as 'interaction ritual'. 
Furthermore, Goffman points out that "individuals may desire, earn and 
deserve deference, but by and large he is not allowed to give it to himself, being forced 
to seek it from others" (1967: 58). Goffman points out that this is why individuals need 
to enter into interaction and relationship with one another. Goffman adds that "[i]f the 
individual could give himself the deference he desired there might be a tendency for 
society to disintegrate into islands inhabited by solitary cultish men, each in continuous 
worship at his own shrine" (1967: 58). Thus at the heart of Goffman's notion of 
deference, there is assumed the socially interdependent self, which requires others to 
give and to receive deference. In other words, Goffman affirms intersubjectivity, rather 
than modernity's notion of self, adopted by B&L which begins with the individual 
suhject. 
1.2.3 Social interaction as a game 
The third metaphor Goffman uses to elucidate social interaction is game. 144 Goffman 
observes the interplay of ritual and game-like aspects in social interaction. Goffman's 
notion of 'face' represents the ritualistic aspect of social life. Interlocutors protect, 
defend, and maintain face in social interaction to preserve a ritual order or equilibrium. 
However, Goffman also recognises the game-like aspect of this ritual. Interlocutors are 
playing games in maintaining ritual order as "a kind of player in this ritual game who 
144 Both Bourdieu and Goffman employed the analogy of games. They spoke of different kinds of games 
and expressed different things through use of various game analogies.. Bourdieu's 'game' referred to an 
athlete's serious play as team games played in a court, or on a pitch, like basketball or rugby, through 
which he discussed habitus, practical sense, feel for the game, or embodied sensibility, which cannot be 
put into words. Goffman, on the other hand, speaks of games that are played seated around a table such as 
chess or bridge (1961: 8,27). Goffman seems to have tried through employing his metaphor of 'games' to 
highlight the competitiveness, and cunning of the players as well as fun, excitement or fear in playing 
games. 
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copes honourably or dishonourably, diplomatically or undiplornatically, with the 
judgmental contingencies of the situation" (1967: 31). Goffman (1967: 31) argues that 
"as players of the ritual game they have to lead themselves into duels". Goffman 
(1967: 32) argues that there is a distinction between the value of a hand drawn at cards 
and the capacity of the person who plays it. Similarly, "even though it appears that once 
a person has gained a reputation for good or bad play, this reputation may become part 
of the face he must later play at maintaining" (ibid. 32). Then while it takes time for a 
person to gain a reputation, in order to retain that reputation, the individual must keep 
alert in playing his ritual game so that his face may not be lost. 
Goffman describes various types of games such as 'character contests' 
(1967: 240), and 'expression games' (1969: 4). Character is the capacity to maintain 
composure in the face of challenge (1967: 217) but one can also say that character can 
be gained by putting oneself on the line and making a good showing (1967: 237). 
'Character contests' are interpersonal disputes over whose status claims or conceptions 
of proper treatment of self and others will be allowed to prevail (1967: 24 1). So it is a 
moral game in social interaction and seen as ritual. 'Expression games' are games of 
how one may successfully control giving away information during interaction. In 
face-to-face interaction, a great deal of information is released whether the subject 
(speaker) likes it or not. For instance, a person's appearance and manner can provide 
information about their gender, age, social class, occupation, competencies and intent 
(Goffman 1967: 5). It is not the official purpose of social interaction but can be very 
significant in every social situation: "one participant will be an observer with 
something to gain from assessing expressions, and another will be a subject with 
something to gain from manipulating from this process" (Goffman 1969: 81). 
Sometimes a participant leaks certain information intentionally in order that it may be 
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observed. How to control such information strategically through their expression 
becomes a game (Goffman 1967: 10). Branaman (1997: lxxii) describes the seriousness 
of the expression game. The possibility of the subject's faking, or pretending to fake, 
leaves the observer in a state of uncertainty as to the reality of the subject's moves and 
"the possibility that the observer may penetrate the subject's show leaves the subject in 
a state of uncertainty as to how his moves are being interpreted by the observer. " 
Goffman (1969: 81) maintains that such game aspects are a part of almost 
every social interaction. In 1.1. (b), I mentioned that social life has both moral and 
manipulative aspects. Social interaction as a game involves much of the latter aspect by 
engineering a convincing impression in public performance. Here is the interplay 
between the game and drama aspects of social interaction. B&L emphasised the 
strategic aspects of politeness in their study. Goffman's game metaphor also recognises 
this strategic aspect inherent in social interaction but Goffman's multiple metaphors 
allow him to express that politeness also displays elements of drama and ritual. His use 
of metaphors allowed him to elucidate the multifaceted nature of social interaction. 
1.2.4. The multifaceted nature of social interaction 
As discussed in the previous three subsections, Goffman employed three different 
metaphors, drama, ritual and game to elucidate social interaction. Goftman 
demonstrated that these seemingly very different pictures are all part of the enigmatic 
nature of social interaction. Social interaction as performance is simultaneously an 
expression of deference to the social order that is ritual as well as a move in a strategic 
game. Social actors strategically craft their performances, and courses of action, but at 
the same time aim to be viable members of a morally cohesive social order. On one side, 
the performance of morality requires strategy. On the other side, ritual order constrains 
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their strategic moves and performances (Branaman 1997: lxxiii). Goffman's brilliance is 
revealed in his elucidation of this multifaceted nature of social interaction using these 
apt and interesting metaphors. 
As I have shown, Lakoff, Leech and Brown & Levinson endeavoured to 
construct theories which would meet the demands of the modernist academic enterprise. 
Early pragmatics theories, upon which Lakoff and Leech built their own theories, are 
based on rationalistic assumptions (See Ch. I 3. (a). ) Levinson (1983: 103) comments that 
Grice's maxims derive from general considerations of 'rationality' applicable to all kinds 
of co-operative exchanges. In such approaches, social interactions tend to be reduced to 
matters of 'intentions' and 'acts'. Brown & Levinson moved beyond early pragmatics 
and turned to Durkheim's anthropology and Goffiman's notion of 'face', searching for 
new theoretical constructs to explain politeness. B&L, however, demythologized 145 the 
original notion of Goffman's 'face', eliminated the ritualistic elements and reinterpreted 
it as 'face-want' to meet modernist epistemological demands of 'rationality' and 
'objectivity'. By contrast, Goffinan's sociology is not motivated by such modernist 
assumptions characterised by scientific rationality. In fact, the elucidation of social 
interaction using his three different metaphors is a long way from scientific rationality. 
The concepts that Goffman discusses in his sociology such as *ritual' and 'moral 
obligations', are not favourite notions that modernist researchers have chosen to use in 
their theory construction. Thus I contend that Goffman's sociology of social interaction 
is not a theory constructed to meet such modernist assumptions but rather the fruit of 
reflection on his painstaking naturalistic observations and ethnographic studies in 
various places over the years. While modernist social scientists are driven or haunted by 
the Cartesian Anxiety that they ought to establish a unifying universal principle to meet 
14 5 The word 'demythologize' comes from the German theologian, Rudolf Bultmann who 
demythologized Christian teaching in the New Testament and reinterpreted doctrines in terms of 
existential and individualistic meanings. 
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modernist theoretical requirements, Goffman seems to have been convinced that such 
approaches would not do justice to the multifaceted complex nature of social interaction 
that he observed through his ethnographic fieldwork. Thus rather than establishing a 
'grand narrative' of social interaction, Goffman elucidated the enigmatic nature of social 
interaction in a unique way through these triple metaphors. Goffman may not have 
intended to adopt a postmodern approach, but his approach definitely goes beyond the 
assumptions of modern theory construction. I will discuss this further in the Conclusion 
chapter. 
1.3. Politeness as commitment to interaction order 
To conclude Section 1, concerning Goffman's sociology and his three metaphors of 
social interaction, I propose a broader view of politeness as commitment to 'interaction 
order'. Goffman was expected to give the Presidential address for the American 
Sociological Association in 1982 but his illness, stomach cancer, was so advanced that 
he was unable to deliver this paper in person. The title was 'The interaction order', 
which was published posthumously as an article in the American Sociological Review. 
In some ways, this article is the culmination of his study of social interaction. Goffman 
explains the interaction order as follows: 
No implications are intended concerning how "orderly" such activity 
ordinarily is, or the role of norms and rules in supporting such orderliness 
as does obtain. Yet it appears to me that as an order of activity, the 
interaction one, more than any other perhaps, is in fact orderly, and that 
this orderliness is predicted on a large base of shared cognitive 
presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints. -The 
workings of the interaction order can easily be viewed as the 
consequences of systems of enabling conventions, in the sense of the 
ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code or rules of syntax 
of a language. (Goffman 1983: 5) 
Goffman (1983: 5) claims that even "individuals who systematically violate the norms of 
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the interaction order may nonetheless be dependent upon them most of the time, 
including some of the time during which they are actively engaged in violating them". 
It is through his concept of 'interaction order' that Goffman was able to 
encapsulate both structure and agency. In structuralism, the underlying assumption is 
that that it is the social structure/system, which is external, which determines the actor's 
behaviour 
. The 'interaction order' that Goffman discusses is not the external structural 
constraint upon individuals as is characteristic of structuralism. Rawls (1987: 141) 
writes: 
Goffman presents a picture of constraints on interaction which are internal 
to interactional scenes. He paints a picture wherein social order and 
meaning require a particular interactional relationship between individual 
and group. Actions do not acquire their meaning primarily through a 
relation to external ends but rather through a commitment to the internal 
ends of the interaction order. For Goffman the performance requires 
commitment even for the simplest of interactions. 
All meaningful relationships of co-presence are characterised by this mutual 
commitment to the interaction order. This mutual commitment is fundamental to any 
social interaction. Having rejected structuralism, Goffman did not go on to subscribe to 
the opposite notion that individuals constitute social structure. Such an idea is 
impossible because self is not a fixed notion: Goffman viewed self as the product of 
social interaction (See 1.1. (a)., this chapter). Commitment to the interaction order is 
treated as moral obligation. Goffman (1959: 13) writes that "society is organized on the 
principle that any individual who possesses certain social characteristics has a moral 
right to expect that others will value and treat him in a correspondingly appropriate 
way". Individuals are committed to the interaction order in order to have their social 
selves maintained because failure to do so puts their self at risk. Rawls (1987: 136) 
comments that Goffman offered a unique way of resolving the dichotomy of structure 
and agency "via the idea of an interaction order which is constitutive of self and at the 
Chapter 5 Goffman's Sociology 231 
same time places demands on social structure". 
What then exactly is politeness in Goffman's sociology? Goffman did mention 
politeness or tact in different places in his work, so it is not easy to pinpoint exactly how 
he defines politeness. As I have already argued, in The Presentation of Seýf in Everyday 
Life, Goffman (1990[1959]: 110) wrote that the standards that the performer on front 
stage maintains while he/she is engaged in talk with the audience are sometime referred 
to as matters of politeness. Performers are expected to maintain the moral standards 
involved in the drama performance of social interaction. Dramaturgical loyalty and 
discipline are some of the attributes expected during performances. It is vital for 
performers to sustain the standards of conduct expected. Failure to perform to the 
standard expected potentially results in the negative evaluation of the person 
himself/herself because social self is the product of a scene. 
In Interaction Ritual, Goffman (1967: 49-50) discussed rules of conduct as 
guides for action, which infuse all areas of activity. Rules of conduct impinge upon 
individuals as obligations, establishing how an actor is morally constrained to conduct 
himself, and also indirectly as expectations, establishing how others are morally bound 
to act in regard to him. What is one person's obligation is another's expectation. 
Goffman argued that ritual requirements in social life may be called ceremonial rules, 
which "guide(s) conduct in matters felt to have secondary or even no significance in 
their own right, having their primary importance - officially anyway - as a 
conventionalized means of communication by which the individual expresses his 
character or conveys his appreciation of the other participants in the situation" 
(1967: 54). 
He argued that most actions guided by rules of conduct are performed 
unthinkingly. Only when his routines are blocked, may a person discover that his own 
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little neutral actions have all along been consonant with the proprieties of his group and 
that his failure to perform them has become a matter of shame and humiliation. 
Similarly a person takes for granted his expectations regarding others and only when 
things go unexpectedly wrong, does he suddenly discover that he has grounds for 
indignation. Goffman pointed out that failure to perform has psychological effects, 
because Goffman saw that whether individuals choose to abide by the rules of conduct 
or to break them is closely related to their sense of self. Goffman's ritual metaphor 
explains how individuals engage in ceremonial behaviour during social interaction. 
Ceremonial behaviour such as deference and demeanor are expected because "the self is 
in part a ceremonial thing, a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care 
and in turn must be presented in a proper light to others. As a means through which this 
self is established, the individual acts with demeanor while in contact with others and is 
treated by others with deference" (Goffman 1967: 91). These are ritual rules of conduct 
(obligations and expectations) in social interaction - in which the self must be honoured 
as a sacred object. I contend that these ritual requirements are also part of the concern of 
politeness. 
What Goffman signifies by various terms such as 'ground rules for a game', 
'traffic rules of interaction', 'ground rules of interaction', 'the standards' and 'rules of 
conduct' in various publications all seem to point to the 'interaction order'. All the 
participants in co-present situations are committed to the 'interaction order'. As the 
nature of social interaction seems complex when expressed in terms of these three 
different metaphors, the nature of the 'interaction order' has different dimensions. 
Sometimes, it is expressed as performing the expected role of being a good team-mate, 
keeping dramaturgical loyalty and discipline, performing ceremonial duty or ritual 
requirements. Commitment to the interaction order would involve all these. These may 
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be seen as 'moral obligations' but at the same time 'strategic play in the game'. I 
contend that this complex commitment to the interaction order is, in effect, what we call 
politeness'. 
Goffman's use of 'rules' as in 'rules of conduct', 'ground rules' of interaction 
reminds us of Lakoff's and Leech's structure-centred approach of seeing politeness as 
pragmatic rules/principles. Goffman's notion of 'strategic game' is reminiscent of B&L's 
agency-centred approach of viewing politeness as 'strategies to minimize face threat'. 
Goffman managed to encapsulate both elements in his 'interaction order'. However, for 
Goffman, maintaining one another's face is a ritual requirement, as the self must be 
honoured as a sacred object in social interaction, something which B&L eliminated in 
their rationalistic theoretical framework. In the following section, I will discuss 
Goffman's notions of 'face' and 'face-work'. 
2. Goffman's notion of face and face-work 
As discussed earlier, in politeness studies, 'face' was an important notion in B&L's 
theory. Though B&L claimed that they borrowed Goffman's notion of 'face' for their 
theory, their interpretation of 'face' as 'face-want' deviates both from the English folk 
notion and from the Chinese notion of 'face' (Ch. 2 2.2.2. ). 1 have saved discussion of 
Goffman's notion of 'face' until this chapter. Earlier in this chapter I pointed out that in 
B&L's understanding of face, Goffman's underlying assumption about self as 
fundamentally a 'social product' is obscured and the ritual elements in social interaction, 
which are the basis for 'face' are lost. In this section, I expound Goffman's account of 
'face' and 'face-work', both of which relate to the ritualistic aspect of social life, 
mainly expressed in Interaction Ritual (1967). 146 Some discussion of 'face-work' may 
146 Brown & Levinson's limited interpretation of Goffman's 'face' has been criticised by several 
researchers (Werkhofer 1992, Mao 1994 (in the Chinese context), de Kadt 1998 (in the Zulu context)). 
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overlap with that of 'face', but I will first expound Goffman's notion of 'face' in 2.1. 
and then Goffman's 'face-work' in 2.2.1 will contrast them with B&L's understanding 
of 'face' and 'face threat' where appropriate. 
2.1. 'Face' in Goffman's work 
(a). Goffman's definition offace 
Goffman defines 'face' as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for 
himself by the line others assume he has during a particular contact" (1967: 5). He also 
claims that "[flace is an image of self.. delineated in terms of approved social attributes" 
(ibid. ). B&L's (1987: 6 1) definition of 'face as "the public self-image that every member 
wants to claim for himself' seems to have some resemblance to Goffman because the 
same term 'the self-image' is used in both definitions, but the content is quite different. 
In order to understand Goffman's first definition, one needs to understand what 
Goffman means by 'line'. 
Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in 
face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these 
contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line - that is, a 
pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which he expresses his view of the 
situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially 
himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find 
that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has 
more or less wilfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their 
response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have 
possibly formed of him. (Goffman 1967: 5) 
According to the above, a line is "a pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which he 
expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, 
especially himself. " Once the participant in interaction takes a line, it means he/she has 
taken a stand and everybody expects him/her to maintain the social attributes delineated 
More recently Bargiela-Chiappini (2003) reconsidered Goffman's notion of *face' in her article "Face and 
politeness: new (insights) for old (concepts). 
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by the line. So, 'face' reflects the line assumed by others during interaction based upon 
the participant's verbal and non-verbal behaviour. The participant's 'face' is his/her 
self-image delineated in terms of approved social attributes based on the line he/she 
takes during interaction. Watts (2003: 103-7) pointed out how Brown & Levinson's 
notions of face deviated from Goffman's: In Goffman's case, a "'member' makes a 
claim for positive social value which is constrained by the line others interpret him to be 
taking during the course of interaction" (Watts 2003: 104). Thus, the "social value is 
dependent on the other 'members' and it can change from one moment to the next. It is 
an image of the self constructed in accordance with social attributes approved by others, 
and it may be unstable and changing. " (ibid. ) By contrast, Watts points out that B&L 
"seem to be thinking of the self as a stable core of values lodged somewhere in the 
individual" (Watts 2003: 105). Watts also suggests that "the Brown-Levinsonian 
'member'... appears to have already constructed, prior to the interaction, a self-image 
that s/he wants to be upheld by society" (ibid). 147 The next passage shows how 
Goffman's face depends on others' evaluation of the participants several lines. 
A person may be said to have or be in or maintain face when the line he 
effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is 
supported by judgments and evidence conveyed by other participants, and that 
is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in the 
situation. At such times the person's face clearly is something that is not 
lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the 
flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events 
are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them. (Goffman 1967: 
6-7) 
When the line the participant effectively takes presents his/her image that is internally 
consistent, i. e. supported by judgement and evidence conveyed by other participants and 
confirmed through impersonal agency's in the situation, he/she has or is in or maintains 
147 Among postmodern politeness researchers, only Watts (2003) has turned to Bourdieu in their new 
approach to politeness. Neither Eelen (2001) nor Mills (2003) discussed Goffman in their work. Watts 
(2003) gave his own definition of 'face' and 'face-work' and incorporated them into his theoretical 
framework. (See Appendix 5-C for details. 
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face. Thus 'face' depends on judgement and evidence conveyed by other participants. 
Goffman also claims that "the person's face clearly is something that is not lodged in or 
on his body, but rather something that is diffused, located in the flow of events in the 
encounter" (ibid. 7. ). Goffman also writes: 
While his social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his 
security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be 
withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it. Approved 
attributes and their relation to face make of every man his own jailer; this is a 
fundamental social constraint even though each man may like his cell. 
(Goffman 1967: 10) 
So Goffman affirms that social face is "on loan ... from society" (1967: 10) and the 
participant is expected to conduct himself in a way that is worthy of it. Otherwise that 
particular face is withdrawn. If a particular social encounter is not a first time encounter, 
there may be a past history of encounter between these particular participants. Then a 
line may be carried on from the past encounter to the current encounter and may have 
implications for any future encounter. In order to maintain face, i. e. the positive 
self-image, the participant must continue to maintain that line over a series of 
encounters with other participants. Goffman's face depends on evaluation of others as 
he writes that "[a]pproved attributes and their relation to face make of every man his 
own jailer" (ibid). The fundamental difference may be that Goffman's notion of 'face' 
assumes a socially interdependent self, while B&L's theory assume an independent 
autonomous self. 14 8 Based on these different self models, B&L interpret 'face' as being 
associated with individualistic want, whereas Goffman's notion of 'face' assumes 
inter-subjectivity and interdependence. Furthermore, there is historicity involved in 
Goffman's notion of 'face', while rational calculative action in B&L's theory does not 
14 8 The English folk notion 'face' that I discussed in Ch. 2 2.2.2. (c). is also something accorded by others 
and society through long-term evaluation of the individual's conduct over a period of time, which is 
consistent with Goffman's notion of 'face'. 
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include any time element in their theoretical construct. 
(b). Characteristics of Goffman's face 
In this section, I will highlight some characteristics of Goffman's face, which proves to 
be different from B&L's interpretation of 'face'. 
First, Goffman's face involves emotions, while B&L's 'face' is rationally 
-oriented as they interpreted 'face' as 'face-wants' in rational choice theory. Goffman 
writes: 
A person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face 
which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face: his "feelings" 
become attached to it.... If events establish a face for him that is better than 
he might have expected, he is likely to "feel good"; if his ordinary 
expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will "feel bad" or "feet 
hurt". In general, a person's attachment to a particular face, coupled with 
the ease with which disconfirming information can be conveyed by himself 
and others, provides one reason why he finds that participation in any 
contact with others is a commitment. A person will also have feelings about 
the face sustained for the other participants, and while these feelings may 
differ in quantity and direction from those he has for his own face, they 
constitute an involvement in the face of others that is as immediate and 
spontaneous as the involvement he has in his own face. (1967: 6) 
A person is emotionally concerned with his/her own face and has feelings about other 
people's face. Such a person described in Goffman's "face" is totally incompatible with 
B&L's "cognitive, individualistic interpretation of 'face"' (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003: 
1455) based on the rational actor model. There is no place for emotions in their kind of 
model. 
Secondly, as individuals are emotionally involved concerning their face; 
maintaining face is directly connected with their emotional security. Goffman explains 
the emotional state of the person when he/she is in face, in the wrong face and out of 
face. 
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A person may be said to be in wrong face when information is brought 
forth in some way about his social worth which cannot be integrated, even 
with effort, into the line that is being sustained for him. A person may be 
said to be out offace when he participates in a contact with others without 
having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are expected 
to take. [emphasis in the original] (1967: 8) 
When a person senses that he is inface, he typically responds with feelings 
of confidence and assurance. Firm in the line he is taking, he feels that he 
can hold his head up and openly present himself to others. He feels some 
security and some relief-as he also can when the others feel he is in 
wrong face, but successfully hide these feelings from him. When a person 
is in wrongface or out offace, expressive events are being contributed to 
the encounter which cannot be readily woven into the expressive fabric of 
the occasion. Should he sense that he is in wrongface or out offace, he is 
likely to feel ashamed and inferior because of what has happened to the 
activity on his account and because of what may happen to his reputation 
as a participant. Further he may feet bad because he had relied upon the 
encounter to support an image of self to which he has become emotionally 
attached and which he now finds threatened. [emphasis added] (ibid. ) 
Thus Goffman writes that when a person is inface, he/she feels emotionally secure and 
confident, whereas when a person is in the wrong face or out of face, he/she feels 
ashamed and embarrassed because of what may happen to his/her reputation as a 
participant and finds his/her image of self now threatened. In Ch 2 2.2.2. (b), I argued 
that when dignity, honour and reputations are threatened, it will cause face loss or 
embarrassment. 149 Goffman's notion of 'face', like the English folk notion of 'face' 
supports this, but B&L's 'face-want' is unable to explain this. 
Thirdly, Goffman claims that participants in social interaction are expected to 
sustain a standard of consideration for others as well as maintaining their own 
self-respect. 
Just as the members of any group are expected to have self-respect, and also 
he is expected to sustain a standard of considerateness; he is expected to go 
to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present, and he 
is expected to do this willingly and spontaneously because of emotional 
identification with the others and with their feelings. In consequence, he is 
149 Scheff (2006) evaluates Goffman's analysis of the importance of emotions for understanding social 
existence and the emotional-relational grounds of intersubjectivity positively and elaborates on them as a 
possible new paradigm for social science. 
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disinclined to witness the defacement of others. -The combined effect of 
the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness is that the person 
tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own 
face and the face of the other participants (ibid. 10- 11) 
Goffman claims that the participant is expected to go to certain lengths to save the face 
of others present as well as his/her own and does this spontaneously because he/she is 
emotionally identified with others. Goffman here assumes a 'socially interdependent 
self. Brown & Levinson tried to mix their technical notion of 'face' as 'face-want' 
with this kind of (Goffmanean) 'face', which assumes mutual vulnerability. However, 
as argued in Ch. 3 1.2.2. (b), 'methodological individualism', presupposed in the rational 
choice theory adopted by B&L, does not support such collective or altruistic action. 
The 'rational actor' is assumed to be self-seeking and goal-oriented, an autonomous 
rational calculative self. This double notion of 'face' in B&L's theory, assuming two 
incompatible self models, does not work. 
Fourthly, Goffman's face involves moral obligation to maintain the line and 
the line maintained by and for a person during social interaction is not what he/she 
wants to claim freely but is of a legitimate institutionalized kind. Goffman writes: 
The line maintained by and for a person during contact with others tends to be 
of a legitimate institutionalized kind. During a contact of a particular type, an 
interactant of known or visible attributes can expect to be sustained in a 
particular face and can feel that it is morally proper that this should be so. 
Given his attributes and the conventionalized nature of the encounter, he will 
find a small choice of lines will be open to him and a small choice of faces will 
be waiting for him. (1967: 7) 
Thus the person's choice of line in any particular situation is constrained by society or 
community. An interactant feels that it is morally proper to act in such ways. This 
'moral' nature reminds us of the original Chinese notion of face. (See Ch. 2 2.2.2. (d)). 
Goffman (1967: 6) also writes: "[o]ne's own face and the face of others are constructs of 
the same order; it is the rules of the group and the definition of the situation which 
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determine how much feeling one is to have for face and how this feeling is to be 
distributed among the faces involved. " Goffman's notion of 'face' is far from the 
individualistic want that the Model Person wants to claim as in B&L's theory, but is 
rather collectivistic and structure-centred in the sense that the participant must maintain 
the line in a way expected within the particular society/community. 150 
To summarise the discussion in this section, Goffman's notion of face is 
incompatible with B&L's technical notion of 'face' as individual's 'face-want'; 
Goffman's notion of face, which assumes the socially interdependent self has quite 
different characteristics from B&L's notion of 'face-want', which assumes a rational 
autonomous self, which may be summarised as follows: 
1. Goffman's face involves emotions. How a person maintains his/her face is 
closely related to his/her emotional security and confidence. The self, 
emotionally attached to his/her self-image and concerned with his/her 
reputation as a participant, usually maintains his/her face and that of other 
participants in order to avoid embarrassment. 
2. Goffman claims that participant is expected to be considerate about others'Jace 
as well as protecting his/her own face. Maintenance of one's ownface and that 
of others present during an encounter is expected as part of the moral social 
code. Then it is considered a mandatory responsibility rather than 'wants' that 
B&L say that individuals claim. 
3. Maintaining one's own face and that of others is not only a mandatory 
responsibility but of utmost importance to the social self. Failure to maintain 
one's ownface potentially puts oneseýf at risk. 
4. It is moral obligation for the participant to maintain the line as prescribed in 
each particular society or community. 
150 Different societies follow different methods by which individuals are expected to maintain their own 
face. "As an aspect of the social code of any social circle, one may expect to find an understanding as to 
how far a person should go to save his face. Once he takes on a self-image expressed through face he will 
be expected to live up to it. In different ways in different societies he will be required to show self-respect, 
abjuring certain actions because they are above and beneath him, while forcing himself to perform others 
even though they cost him dearly. (Goffmanl967: 9) 
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2.2 Goffman's face-work 
Goffman develops his notion of face-work to explain different measures that a person 
takes to maintain their behaviour in order to be consistent with his/herface. 
By face-work I mean to designate the actions taken by a person to make 
whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to counteract 
"incidents" -that is, events whose effective symbolic implication threatens 
face. Thus poise is one important type of face-work, for through poise the 
person controls his embarrassment and hence the embarrassment that he 
and others might have over his embarrassment. Whether or not the full 
consequences of face-saving actions are known to the person who employs 
them, they often become habitual and standardized practices; they are like 
traditional plays in a game or traditional steps in a dance. Each person, 
subculture, and society seems to have its own characteristics repertoire of 
face-saving practices. It is to this repertoire that people partly refer when 
they ask what a person or culture is "really" like. (Goffman 1967: 12-13) 
Summarising from the above: 
1) Face-work designates actions taken by people to make what they are doing 
consistent with theirface. 
2) Face-work serves to counteract face -threatening incidents or events. 
3) Poise is an important type offace-work and through poise the person controls 
his embarrassment. 
4) How one performs face-saving acts often becomes habitual and standardized 
like traditional play in a game. 
5) Each person, sub-culture and society has its own characteristic pattern of 
face-saving practices. It is almost equated with what that person, sub-culture 
or society is actually like. 
The notion of face -threatening acts in B&L's theory probably derived from the above 
account of face-work in Goffman's Interaction ritual. However, I find a significant 
difference between the two: B&L argued that "certain acts intrinsically threaten face, 
and are thus called FTA (Face Threatening Acts), namely those acts that by their nature 
run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker" (1987: 65). 
Goffman, however, writes about the incidents or events which threaten face but does not 
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insist that certain acts are intrinsically face-threatening. In Goffman's approach it is not 
the acts in themselves which are face-threatening, but rather that if a social actor fails to 
maintain the line assumed during a particular encounter, that encounter results in the 
incident or event which threatens face. 
In the above account of face-work, I find an interesting similarity to Bourdieu's 
theory of practice. The habitual aspects of face-saving acts in Goffman's writing, remind 
us of Bourdieu's habitus. B&L tried to explain politeness as being generated rational 
cognitive decisions made by rational actors, but Bourdieu's notion of habitus and what 
Goffman refers to as 'habitual practices' both suggest that face-saving acts are more of a 
habitual nature, which they have acquired as embodied practice through socialisation or 
through having performed various roles in social drama. 
I find another similarity between Goffman and Bourdieu in the following 
passage, where Goffman writes: 
The members of every social circle may be expected to have some knowledge 
of face-work and some experience in its use. In our society, this kind of 
capacity is sometimes called tact, savoir-faire, diplomacy, or social skill. 
Variation in social skill pertains more to the efficacy of face-work than to the 
frequency of its application, for almost all acts involving others are modified, 
prescriptively or proscriptively, by consideration of face. (1967: 13. ) 
It is noteworthy here that Goffman argues that "almost all acts involving others are 
modified, prescriptively or proscriptively, by consideration of face (1967: 13)". This idea 
is very similar to Bourdieu's censorship and his idea that all utterances are euphemised 
to a certain extent. Bourdieu discusses 'tact' in terms of euphemisation or censorship. 
(See Ch. 4 3.2. (c)) Goffman also claims that the capacity to modify our acts or utterances 
by consideration of face is 'tact', 'savoir-faire', 'diplomacy' or 'social skill'. Thus 
Goffman and Bourdieu alike both argue that tact or politeness is a kind of modification 
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or euphemisation, applied in all acts and utterances. 15 1 However, unlike B&Us theory, 
in which politeness is understood to be operative only when a person performs 
face-threatening acts (See Ch. 4 3.2. (c), Bourdieu and Goffman have argued 
convincingly that politeness is operative in all acts and utterances. 
3. Conclusion 
As Bourdieu's theory of practice, which was my first thinking tool for exploring an 
alternative approach to politeness, had a limited role for agency and little attention was 
paid to the social psychological aspects of human action, in this chapter, I turned to 
Goffman, who made a careful study of the participants in interaction, hoping that 
Goffman's sociology of everyday social interaction would complement Bourdieu's 
theory of practice. In concluding this chapter, I will first summarise Goffman's major 
contribution to politeness studies (in 3.1. ) and then I will show how Bourdieu and 
Goffman complemented each other in constructing a possible alternative approach to 
politeness (in 3.2. ) 
3.1. Goffman's contribution to politeness studies 
Goffman's sociology provided a model of self, which is very different from B&Us 
Model Person. Goffman saw self as being socially constructed. Goffman's self is very 
much concerned with its own social value in social interaction. Individuals cannot claim 
social value by themselves but it must be granted by others. Goffman's notion of 'face' 
is qualitatively different from the face-want that individuals want to claim just for their 
own benefit. Participants in interaction are emotionally concerned with their own face 
as well as that of other participants. The notion of 'face' assumes intersubjectivity. 
151 Though both saw politeness as a kind of modification, I see the difference in focus between the two: 
Bourdieu focuses on euphemisation by the taking into consideration relative positions and market 
conditions, while Goffman focuses on modification of acts by consideration of face. 
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Goffman not only acknowledged that his sociology did not meet the orthodox 
methodological standards of modern sociology, but also was critical of the kind of 
sociology which attempted to mimic the natural sciences, which aims to establish a 
unifying universal principle. Goffman used three metaphors drama, ritual and game to 
elucidate the complex and enigmatic nature of social interaction. Goffman's approach is 
surprisingly postmodern for not having been motivated to meet those modernist 
theoretical demands characterised by 'rationality' and 'objectivity'. 
In each metaphor, Goffman discussed moral obligations that participants in 
co-gathering must keep, which he described as 'standards', 'ground rules of a game' or 
'traffic rules of interaction'. In his final speech manuscript in 1982, Goffman used the 
term 'interaction order' to culminate in what he had observed in his lifetime study of 
face-to-face interaction. Maintaining the 'interaction order' is sometimes expressed as 
performing an anticipated role, being a good team-mate in performance, upholding 
dramaturgical loyalty, and at other times performing ritual requirements in the 
interaction ritual. The 'interaction order' incorporates 'moral obligations' but at the 
same time involves 'strategic play in the game'. I argued that politeness is best 
understood as commitment to the 'interaction order' in Goffman's sociology. 
3.2. How Bourdieu and Goffman complement each other 
After employing Bourdieu's and Goffman's sociology, I have discovered that 
they have enough common ground to be more or less compatible with each other. In this 
section, I will show how they complement each other. Both Bourdieu and Goffman 
elucidated politeness successfully in the interplay between structure and agency 
although they approached politeness from different angles. Bourdieu argued that all 
utterances are in some way a 'compromise' of what an individual wants to say and what 
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he/she is able to or allowed to say in the particular field. Bourdieu's explanation of 
politeness as euphemisation or censorship may appear to be a kind of structural 
constraint upon individuals, but the individuals often do not feel it as a constraint, 
because through socialisation, structure had been internalised and embodied in the 
individual as habitus, "the system of structured, structuring dispositions (Bourdieu 
1990b: 52)". 
Goffman saw politeness as an individual's commitment to the interaction order. 
Social actors, in maintaining the interaction order, must perform various roles as 
situations require in the drama and meet various ritual requirements in interaction, 
while at the same time they must make strategic moves in a game. Goffman argued that 
commitment to the interaction order is 'moral obligation', which may appear to be 
society's constraint upon individuals. The individual cannot afford not to maintain the 
interaction order, because the self is ultimately a product of social interaction and an 
individual's self-image depends upon how others evaluate him/her based on maintaining 
his line during social interaction. This means that politeness is not an option but an 
absolute requirement for anyone who wishes to maintain his/her self-image. Goffman, 
however, also stressed that commitment to the interaction order becomes the 'game' that 
social actors play (which allows agency-centred aspect of social interaction), and that 
they play this game seriously and strategically because their social self and public 
self-image are at stake. 
Although Bourdieu and Goffman are not particularly identified as postmodern 
researchers, both their sociologies exhibit some characteristics which go beyond modern 
social science. First, neither Bourdieu and Goffman aimed to establish any universal 
unifying principle, which has been the main motivation for modernist researchers. 
Instead Bourdieu and Goffman both accommodated plural notions of politeness. 
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Bourdieu, who elucidated politeness as euphernisation and self-censorship operative in 
utterance production through habitus, recognised that a different sense of 
appropriateness would be expected depending upon the field or positions of social 
actors in thefield. Bourdieu also acknowledged that as individuals go through different 
types of socialisation, habitus, the structured disposition would also vary. Inevitably 
there would be different perceptions of what is polite by different people. Even among 
individuals who have grown up in the same society or community, depending upon the 
capital that a person has and the particular position that he/she holds in the particular 
field, different self-censorship or euphemisation might be expected. Similarly, Goffman 
also pointed out that there are different expectations with regards to the ways that 
individuals maintain the interaction order: social actors are expected to act out different 
selves for different social scenes and use different repertoires in performing face-work. 
This practical knowledge and these skills have been acquired through actual experience 
of various social scenes. As I argued earlier, politeness is 'the commitment to the 
interaction order' that individuals are expected to maintain. Goffman also 
accommodated plural notions of politeness as he acknowledged that there is cultural or 
sub-cultural variability in the way they maintain this order, because the ground rules of 
social interaction vary. 
Secondly, modernist thinkers are convinced that the modern subject's rational 
dispassionate mind is the key to objective truth and thus placed rationality at the centre 
of their theorisation. Consequently, body is not considered to be a main theoretical 
concern in modern social science. Both Bourdieu and Goffman, however, did not insist 
upon the supremacy of mind over body, but rightly recognised and recovered the 
importance of body in their sociology. Bourdieu showed how the relation to body is a 
fundamental dimension of the habitus. Bourdieu's habitus also shows his notion of doxa 
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also suggesting that practical sense cannot be reduced to cognition. which is the 
taken-for-granted, preconscious understanding of the world - "[p]ractical sense, social 
necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes and body automatisms, is 
what causes practices, in and through what makes them obscure to the eyes of their 
producers, to be sensible, that is, informed by a common sense. (Bourdieu 
1990b: 68-69)". Whatever the society into which individuals are socialised, the habitus 
they have acquired has becomes doxa, a taken-for-granted, preconscious understanding 
of the world. The perception of politeness is also doxa, felt-reality, practical sense, 
which does not separate body and mind. Goffman also recognised that social interaction 
involves embodied practical knowledge. Goffinan considers that speech behaviour and 
bodily behaviour are inseparable from each other, as he writes: "utterances must be 
presented with an overlay of functional gestures" (Goffman 1964: 136) Encounter in 
co-gathering is embodied engagement. Individuals have acquired such complex 
practical ways of how to maintain the interaction order through socialisation, which 
Goffman explained in his three metaphors. Thus such practical knowledge of 
maintaining the interaction order involves corporeal aspects as well as cognitive ones, 
and it is only through experiencing various social scenes, that social actors acquire such 
practical embodied knowledge. 
Thirdly, while modernist social scientists endeavoured to establish a 'theory' 
from which 'practice' can be explained as its application or execution, Bourdieu and 
Goffman attempted to elucidate 'practice' itself through ethnographic fieldwork. It was 
through reflection on ethnographic field data, that Bourdieu proposed his 'theory of 
practice' as a thinking tool that enables one to understand and deal with practical 
problems. Bourdieu commented that the various concepts that he used are a kind of 
'shorthand' within the research procedure (See Ch. 4 2.1. ), which De Certeau (1998: 58) 
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called a 'theoretical metaphor'. Goffman also elucidated the somewhat enigmatic 
multi-faceted nature of social interaction through his three marvellous metaphors, 
drama, ritual, and game Goffman observed, analysed and elucidated the orderliness in 
social interaction, i. e. the interaction order, but he did not see this orderliness "as 
manifestation of the structure of kinship or power relationships" (Burns 1992: 33) as 
structuralists did. Through ethnographic fieldwork, Goffman genuinely observed that 
there is orderliness in everyday social behaviour, which he called the 'interaction order' 
and he endeavoured to elucidated its multi-faceted nature through his three metaphors. 
Fourthly and finally, both Bourdieu and Goffman recognised that what seems 
to be accepted as universal or legitimised as normal is often closely related to power. 
Bourdieu argued that what is felt to be normal has very much to do with what has been 
legitimised as natural, which is usually favourable to the dominant class in that society. 
Goffman also recognized that such legitimised power (hegemony) exist in social life. 
He maintains that individuals must maintain the line, but the line is of a legitimate 
institutionalized kind, thus they are expected to maintain the line in a way expected 
within the particular society/community (See 2. L(b)., this chapter). As the self-image is 
directly linked to how one maintains the line, individuals have no choice but consent to 
this hegemonic reality. 152 Similarly, Bourdieu argued that what is claimed as universal 
in academia is often a product of the symbolic power of scientific discourse which 
exercises a quasi-divine power over the vision of the world (Bourdieu 1991: 227-8) (cf. 
Ch. 4 5.1. (b). ) and is a reflection of what is considered as being normal within the 
dominant Western academic community. 153 
152 Social interaction is centred around so-called 'normal' people and yet such hegemony is always there 
but it is not so obvious unless people who do not fit into that category come into the picture. In Stigma 
(1963), Goffman explored the situation of those persons who are unable to conform to standards that 
society calls 'normalý. 
153 Lyotard (1984) also pointed out that what has been considered to be a grand narrative in modernist 
academia is the legitimation of scientific discourse which is assumed to be the only acceptable discourse 
in the language game of the modern academic community. 
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Having gained insights from Bourdieu and Goffman, in the final chapter 
(Conclusion), I ask finally whether politeness studies are still viable as an academic 
discipline. Then I will make epistemological explorations towards reconstructing a 
viable 'post-modern' approach to politeness. At this point, as the third thinking tool, I 
will bring in Hans-Georg Gadamer, a German philosopher who has explored the 
possibility of a more flexible social science which recovers the phronesis (practical 
wisdom) described in Aristotle's Nichornachean Ethics. 
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Conclusion: Looking into the future 
0. Introduction 
In Part I of this thesis, I argued that Lakoff, Leech, and B&L all endeavoured to 
establish universal principles of politeness, because they built their theories upon the 
modernist assumption that there are standards of rationality, which are genuinely 
universal and not subject to historical or temporal change. The quest for such universal 
principles has been a main concern within modern academia, which Bernstein (1983) 
termed Cartesian Anxiety (See Ch. 3 1.1. ). The outcome of such modernist theory 
construction were various dualisms - objectivism/subjectivism, structure/agency, 
theory/practice, and body/mind (See Ch. 3 3. (a). ). In Part 11 of the thesis, I explored 
alternative ways of elucidating politeness employing Bourdieu and Goffman as 
'thinking tools'. Both exemplified an alternative social science unconstrained by the 
tenets of modernist theory construction. 
Drawing from them, in this concluding chapter, I will offer epistemological 
suggestions for reconstructing some viable postmodern approaches to politeness. 
Section 1 delineates the kind of social science we need for postmodern approaches to 
politeness. Section 2 makes an attempt to touch upon one unresolved but essential issue 
for postmodern approaches to politeness, that is, the evaluation of politeness by the 
Hearer. Section 3 considers the agenda for politeness studies in the future. Section 4 
provides a final summing up. 
I. Towardspostmodern approaches to politeness 
Following postmodern challenges to modernist assumptions in many social scientific 
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disciplines, I ask a fundamental question for politeness studies. Can politeness be 
analysed using a framework based on scientific rationality? In constructing viable 
postmodern politeness studies, my contention is that we must overcome our Cartesian 
Anxiety (Bernstein 1983: 16,18,29) in order to make an epistemological exploration 
towards a more open and flexible social science not driven by modernist thinking. 
For this task, I turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer, a German philosopher, as my 
third and final thinking tool. The reason why I turn to Gadamer as my third thinking 
tool is that Gadamer applied himself to this very problem. He was critical of modern 
social sciences distorted by Cartesianism and argued that a proper understanding of the 
whole range of social disciplines requires us to recognise an essential hermeneutical 
dimension. Gadamer (1900-2002) was a German philosopher, best known for his 
magnum opus Truth and Method (1960, first English translation in 1975), and he was 
highly influenced by his teacher, Martin Heidegger, in his philosophical thinking. 
Gadamer discussed the 'understanding' of art, written literature, Biblical, philosophical 
or legal texts in his writings, but his hermeneutics can be extended to enlighten 
interpretive activity more widely. Lawn (2006: 9) writes: 
... hermeneutics is involved in all acts of understanding.... what 
happens 
when we interpret a text is what happens when we seek to understand 
anything in our cultural social world be it the meaning of life or the more 
mundane interpretation of everyday objects, ideas and situations... 
interpretation is not a special activity confined to the unravelling of 
difficult texts, it is an aspect of all forms of human understanding. 
In fact, Gadamer's philosophic hermeneutics 154 has already brought about a new 
hermeneutical turn in the social sciences. (e. g. Gadamer 1987, Heller 1989, Rabinow & 
Sullivan 1987a, 1987b). 
Gadamer argues that human sciences deal with practical wisdom (Phronesis), 
which is qualitatively different from scientific knowledge. In I. I., I will delineate 
154 "The Greek term hermýneuein, meaning to interpret, is the root from which the word hermeneutics is 
derived. "(Lawn 2006: 45) 
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phronesis-oriented social science. In 1.2., 1 will discuss Gadamer's 'hermeneutical 
understanding' which is essential to phronesis-oriented social science. Both provide 
epistemological guides for postmodern approaches to politeness. Then in 1.3., 1 will 
show how Gadamer's hermeneutics and phronesis-oriented social science are both 
compatible with Bourdieu and Goffman and goes further, providing what these authors 
could not for postmodern approaches to politeness. 
1.1. Phronesis-oriented social science 
Before exploring alternative social science, I will highlight the disparity between the 
Anglo-American and the German understanding of the nature of social science. In the 
Anglo-American tradition, intellectual disciplines fall into a trichotomy of natural 
sciences, social sciences and humanities, while on the European Continent, they are 
categorised into a dichotomy between Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) and 
Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) (Bernstein 1983: 35). Bernstein points out that 
[i]n the main Anglo-American tradition - at least until recently - the 
overwhelming bias has been to think of social sciences as natural sciences 
concerning individuals in their social relations. The assumption has been 
that the social sciences differ in the [sic] degree and not in kind from the 
natural sciences and that ideally the methods and standards appropriate to 
the natural sciences can be extended by analogy to the social sciences. 
(ibid. ) 
Perhaps the scientific conceptual isation of politeness in modern politeness studies is 
partly due to this classification of social science as similar in kind to the natural sciences. 
However, in the German tradition, from which Gadamer comes, "there has been a much 
greater tendency to think of the social disciplines as forms of Geisteswissenchaften 
sharing essential characteristics with the humanistic disciplines" (ibid. ), which include 
philosophy, psychology, history, sociology etc. It is my contention that any postmodern 
approaches to politeness should be placed within a broader category of 
Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences), which allows a humanities element. 
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Even in Germany, however, human sciences suffer from an inferiority complex 
in comparison with the natural sciences, and there have been attempts to elevate human 
sciences to the standard of natural sciences. (e. g. Dilthey; See 1.2. for further 
discussion). But Gadamer refused such attempts and defended human sciences as 
disciplines fundamentally different. Gadamer (2004: 310-321) resorted to Aristotle's 
practical philosophy to support his argument. In The Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, 
Aristotle identified different qualities or intellectual virtues related to truth, episteme, 
phronesis and techne. Episteme may be translated as 'scientific knowledge'. Aristotle 
himself described the nature of episteme as follows: 
We all conceive that a thing that we know scientifically cannot vary; 
when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our observation.... An 
object of scientific knowledge.... is eternal, for everything existing of 
absolute necessity is eternal.... a man knows a thing scientifically, when 
he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain way, and when the first 
principles on which that conviction rest are known to him with certainty. 
(Aristotle 1996: 147-148; 1139b) 
Flyvbjerg points out that episteme corresponds to 'the modern scientific ideal' which 
has become dominant in modernist academia. 
Episteme corresponds to the modern scientific ideal as expressed in natural 
science. In Socrates and Plato, and subsequently in the Enlightenment 
tradition, this scientific ideal became dominant. The ideal has come close 
to being the only legitimate view of what constitutes genuine science, such 
that even intellectual activities like social science, which are not and 
probably never can be scientific in this sense, have found themselves 
compelled to strive for and legitimate themselves in terms of this 
Enlightenment ideal. (Flyvbjerg 2001: 56) 
Gadamer argues that human sciences, unlike natural science built upon episteme, stand 
closer to phronesis, another of Aristotle's intellectual virtues. Gadamer (2004: 312) 
writes: 
... the distinction that Aristotle makes between moral knowledge (phronesis) and theoretical knowledge (episteme) is a simple one, 
especially when we remember that science, for the Greeks, is represented 
by the model of mathematics, a knowledge of what is unchangeable, a 
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knowledge that depends on proof and that can therefore be learned by 
anybody. A hermeneutics of the human science certainly has nothing to 
learn from mathematical as distinguished from moral knowledge. The 
human sciences stand closer to moral knowledge than to that kind of 
"theoretical" knowledge. They are "moral sciences. " Their object is man 
and what he knows of himself as an acting being. And this kind of 
knowledge of himself does not seek to establish what is. An active being, 
rather, is concerned with what is not always the same but can be different. 
In it he can discover the point at which he has to act. The purpose of his 
knowledge is to govern his action. [emphasis in the original] 
Aristotle's phronesis may be translated as 'prudence', 'practical wisdom' or sometimes 
'moral knowledge'. Phronesis is "commonly understood to mean especially that kind of 
wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual" (Aristotle 1996: 152; 1141b). 
The conduct of one's own affairs requires consideration. 'Prudent' persons are those 
who are wise in their own affairs (ibid. 1996: 153; 1141b). Phronesis "stands opposite to 
intelligence ... prudence [phronesis] deals with the ultimate particular thing, which 
cannot be apprehended by scientific knowledge, but only by perception (ibid. 154; 
1142a)". Flyvbjerg (2001: 57) summarisesphronesis as follows: 
The person possessing practical wisdom (phronesis) has knowledge of how 
to behave in each particular circumstance that can never be equated with or 
reduced to knowledge of general truths. Phronesis is a sense of the ethically 
practical rather than a kind of science.... in Aristotle's original description 
of phronesis, one might get the impression that phronesis and the choice it 
involves in concrete circumstances are always good.... Choice must be 
deemed good (or bad) in relation to certain values and interests in order for 
good and bad to have meaning. 
He further writes: 
Phronesis thus concerns the analysis of values - "things that are good or 
bad for man" - as a point of departure for action. Phronesis is that 
intellectual activity most relevant to praxis. It focuses on what is variable, 
on that which cannot be encapsulated by universal rules, on specific cases. 
Phronesis requires an interaction between the general and the concrete; it 
requires consideration, judgement, and choice. More than anything, 
phronesis requires experience. (ibid. ) 
Bernstein (1983: 146) contrasts episteme and phronesis: episteme (scientific knowledge) 
is the "knowledge of what is universal, of what exists invariably, and takes the form of 
Conclusion: Looking into the future 255 
scientific demonstration", whereas phronesis is "the form of reasoning appropriate to 
praxis, which deals with what is variable and always involves a mediation between the 
universal and the particular that requires deliberation and choice" (ibid. ). 
Gadamer also distinguishes phronesis (moral knowledge) from techne 
(technical knowledge). 
We learn a techne and can also forget it. But we do not learn moral 
knowledge, nor can we forget it. We do not stand over against it, as if it 
were something that we can acquire or not, as we can choose to acquire an 
objective skill, a techne. Rather we are always already in the situation of 
having to act ... and hence we must already possess and be able to apply 
moral knowledge. (Gadamer 2004: 315) 
Gadamer (2004: 318) points out that techne is "particular and serves particular ends" 
whereas phronesis "has no merely particular ends but pertains to right living in general" 
and "always requires self deliberation. " (ibid. ) Phronesis "can never be knowable in 
advance like knowledge that can be taught. " (ibid. ) Phronesis, then, is the "knowledge 
that has to respond to the demands of the situation of the moment" (ibid. 319). Thus "a 
knowledge of the particular situation ... 
is a necessary supplement to moral knowledge" 
(ibid. 3 19). 115 
As discussed earlier, modern scholars, haunted by Cartesian Anxiety, are led to 
believe that acceptable academic enterprise has to be rational and scientific, i. e. 
episteme-based. Similarly, in the 1970s when politeness studies first emerged as a new 
field, modern politeness theorists struggled to explain politeness within an 
episteme-based framework, i. e. to conceptualise politeness as though it was science or 
155 Another characteristic of phronesis that Gadamer also points out is that phronesis, unlike techne, 
requires an understanding of other human beings. Aristotle calls it synesis, i. e. 'sympathetic 
understanding' or 'fellow-feeling'. Gadamer (1975) writes: "It appears in the fact of concern, not about 
myself, but about the other person. Thus it is a mode of moral judgement... The question here, then, is not 
of a general kind of knowledge, but of its specification at a particular moment. This knowledge also is not 
in any sense technical knowledge.... The person with understanding does not know and just as one who 
stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with the 
other and undergoes the situation with him" (Gadamer 1975 quoted in Bernstein 1983: 147). (1 used the 
different translation of Gadamer's work because the meaning is clearer in this version). Thus Phronesis 
has a practical communal character. Someone with understanding is prepared to consider the particular 
situation of the other person. Techne does not have such character. 
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to establish second-order politeness (politeness2). However, as I observed, politeness 
probably has never been and will never be something which can be reduced to 
knowledge of general truth (episteme) built on timeless, eternal, first principles. After 
all, politeness must have been discussed as a kind of 'practical wisdom' by ordinary 
people before politeness studies emerged as a new scientific field back in the 1970s. 
My proposal for a postmodern approach to politeness, then, is to redeem phronesis into 
the social sciences, in our case, into the field of politeness studies, as Gadamer urged. 
Flyvbjerg (2001: 61) also identifies the problems in modern social science as 
having arisen because we have been failing to recognise the difference between 
episteme, techne andphronesis. 
Today's researchers seldom make explicit which one of these three roles 
they are practicing. The whole enterprise is simply called "science", even 
though we are dealing with quite different activities. It is often the case 
that these activities are rationalized as being episteme even though they 
are actually techne orphronesis. 
Flyvbjerg (2001: 60) argues that "every well-functioning society was dependent on the 
effective functioning of all three intellectual virtues - episteme, techne, and phronesis - 
in, respectively, science, crafts and ethics. " Aristotle emphasized that phronesis is 
crucial among them. "If a man have the one virtue of prudence [phronesis] he will also 
have all the moral virtues together with it (Aristotle 1996: 161; 1144b). Flyvbjerg's 
proposal for alternative social sciences was also that we should redeem phronesis into 
these disciplines as it had relied upon episteme for a long time, stating that "it is not in 
their role as episteme that one can argue for the value of the social sciences. In the 
domain where the natural sciences have been strongest - production of theories that can 
explain and predict accurately - social sciences have been weakest" (2001: 61). He 
maintains that "in their role as phronesis, the social sciences are strongest where the 
natural sciences are weakest". 
The problem is that we have been imbued with this episteme-oriented approach 
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for so long that we do not even know where and how to begin this phronesis-oriented 
approach to politeness as an academic field of study. However, when we reflect upon 
our daily lives, we have been exercising phronesis (practical wisdom) all along in 
different areas of our lives. In Truth and Method, Gadamer delineates 'hermeneutical 
understanding', which is essentially phronesis-oriented, as the essential mode of 
understanding central to the human sciences. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics 
guides us further inphronesis-oriented social science. 
1.2. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics 
Gadamer presented his position regarding human sciences in a debate against Dilthey 
who employed the 'method' of hermeneutics as the way to make human sciences more 
credible and raise them to a standard equal to natural sciences. Gadamer refuted Dilthey 
based on his ontological understanding of our existence, which became the foundation 
of his philosophical hermeneutics. I will first discuss Gadamer's argument in this 
debate and then introduce his hermeneutical understanding, which has inspired many 
social science disciplines and opened new possibilities for social science. Gadamer's 
hermeneutics provides further insights in my exploration of postmodern approaches to 
politeness. 
(a). Gadamer against Dilthey on human sciences 
Hermeneutics is best known as a field of study of the general principles of Biblical 
interpretation. With the emergence of German romanticism and idealism, hermeneutics 
extended its field and turned philosophical. This shift was initiated by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, and others. Hermeneutics has now been extended 
from its original use in describing the interpretation of texts to the wider interpretation 
of all human acts and products including history and human life. (Inwood 2004: 268) 
Gadamer's hermeneutics expressed in his Truth and Method (1960; English trans. 1975) 
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was partly a response to Dilthey's hermeneutics. 
Dilthey (1833-1911) began to find in hermeneutics a foundation for 
Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences). Considering that human sciences suffered 
from an inferiority complex in comparison with the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften), Dilthey attempted to save human sciences by means of a 
hermeneutic 'method'. The fundamental problem for Dilthey was historicity or 
historical consciousness (Grondin 2003: 65-66). Dilthey posed the problem of historical 
consciousness in methodological terms: historicity is so invasive that only a rigorous 
methodology is able to contain its effects. He claimed that because we are aware of this 
historicity, we are able, to a certain extent, to get away from its influence and study 
history objectively. In other words, Dilthey claimed that by adopting a reflective distant 
attitude toward historicity, we are not only conscious but self-conscious, we can achieve 
some measure of historical objectivity (Weinsheimer 1985: 153). Thus Dilthey 
attempted to ground the objectivity of interpretation upon the transcendence of the 
interpreter's present cultural and historical situation. Put in different words, Dilthey 
tried to elevate human sciences back onto an Enlightenment standard through his 
hermeneutical method. But in the process of doing this, Dilthey implicitly accepted the 
Cartesian ideal of 'Method' and 'objective knowledge'. 
Gadamer, on the other hand, questioned whether this reflexive awareness of 
history can indeed succeed in objectifying, to the full extent, its historical determination. 
Gadamer claimed that 'historical consciousness' is more a mode of 'being' than 
'knowledge' (Grondin 2003: 66-68). This claim was influenced by Heidegger's notion 
of Dasein, which is sometimes translated as "Being-there" or "Being-here" (Da means 
"here" or "there", Sein is "to be"). Heidegger used the concept of Dasein to uncover the 
primal nature of "Being" (Sein), ontological being. Dasein is always a being engaged in 
the world. The fundamental mode of being is a coherence of being-in-the-world, which 
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cannot be subsumed under subjectivity or objectivity. In Heidegger's philosophy, 
understanding cannot be separated from one's existence as being-in-the-world. 
Ramberg & Gjesdal (2007) explain this as follows: 
Understanding, in Heidegger's account, is neither a method of reading nor 
the outcome of a willed and carefully conducted procedure of critical 
reflection. It is not something we consciously do or fail to do, but 
something we are. Understanding is a mode of being, and as such it is 
characteristic of human being, of Dasein. The pre-reflective way in which 
Dasein inhabits the world is itself of a hermeneutic nature. 
Gadamer's notion of understanding is built on this Heideggerian notion of 
'understanding'. For, Gadamer, "understanding always implies a preunderstanding 
which is ... prefigured by the determinate tradition 
in which the interpreter lives and that 
shapes his prejudices" (Gadamerl987: 87). Gadamer refuted Dilthey as follows: 
Self-reflection and autobiography - Dilthey's starting point - are not 
primary and are therefore not an adequate basis for the hermeneutical 
problem, because through them history is made private once more. In fact 
history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand 
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we 
live... (Gadamer 2004: 278) 
Thus Gadamer criticised Dilthey's effort to assert the 'objectivity' of the human 
sciences in an attempt to measure up to natural science by a hermeneutic method. 
Gadamer argues that we are part of history, and that it is impossible to discover a 
viewpoint of a-historical objectivity but instead he sees historicity as an essential 
element in human sciences. Gadamer proposed here a different kind of knowledge for 
human sciences, which recovers the historicity and tradition which had been eliminated 
by Cartesianism. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is not restricted to the problem of Method 
in human sciences as Dilthey argues. It is given an ontological turn; "understanding, for 
Gadamer is a primordial mode of our being in the world" (Bernstein 1983: 34). 
Bernstein (1983: 118) also comments that 
Conclusion: Looking into the future 260 
Gadamer's critique of Cartesianism.... is radical in the sense of "getting at 
the roots. " Gadamer does not merely raise objections about the 
epistemological, methodological, or even the metaphysical claims of 
Cartesianism. The basis of his critique is ontological; he thinks that 
Cartesianism is based on a misunderstanding of being and in particular 
upon a misunderstanding of our being-in-the-world. 
Descartes made the fundamental philosophical assumption that res cogitans (the 
thinking being, i. e. the rational subject) is distinct from res extensa (the physical work 
or world) (See Ch. 3 1.1). This led to one of the modernist assumptions that the modern 
knower, who is an 'autonomous rational subject', claims to have access to neutral 
dispassionate knowledge about the world from a vantage point outside the flux of 
history. Gadamer has challenged this foundation of modernism through his 
understanding of our existence as 'being-in-the-world'. 
Gadamer's view of our existence as be ing-in-the -world and the ontological 
element in our understanding is very significant for politeness studies. It proposes that 
all the participants in social interaction are capable of perceiving only from within their 
own historical and hermeneutical situations. Bourdieu also embedded historicity as an 
essential element of his theory of practice. I will argue that historicity must be one 
important element to consider in our postmodern approaches to politeness, but before 
discussing this further, I will expound Gadamer's notion of 'understanding'. 
(b). Gadamer's hermeneutical 'understanding' 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer elucidated hermeneutical understanding, "the entirely 
different type of knowledge and truth from that which is yielded by Method and 
science" (Bernstein 1983: 168). Grondin (2002: 36) points out that 'understanding' or 
'interpretation' in Gadamer carries many meanings but all point to one phenomenon, i. e., 
understanding is "the original form of the realization of our existence", which originates 
in Heidegger's philosophy' 56 . Thus, as discussed earlier, understanding also 
has an 
156 Heidegger claims in Being and Tinle (1962) that knowledge of the world cannot be detached from 
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ontological orientation. In other words, our ontological being is always placed within 
our understanding. What Gadamer argues is a "primary consciousness of the 
hermeneutical situation" (2004: 301). "The very idea of a situation means that we are not 
standing outside of it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it" 
(ibid. ). Gadamer criticises the attempt to establish hermeneutics on scientific 
methodology. Instead he argues that the task of hermeneutics is "not to develop a 
procedure of interpretation but to clarify what are the conditions in which understanding 
takes place" (ibid. 295) 
Gadamer characterises understanding as an event or happening of being, 
which is essential to his hermeneutical understanding. To grasp this kind of ontological 
nature of understanding, Gadamer's discussion on the understanding of a work of art is 
helpful. A work of art is not thought of as a self-contained and self-enclosed object that 
stands over against the spectators, who as subjects, must purify themselves in order to 
achieve understanding of the work of art. But rather, there is a dynamic interaction or 
transaction between the work of art and the spectator who shares in it. Gadamer 
explains the complex nature of hermeneutical understanding from different angles just 
as Goffman used different metaphors to explain social interaction. 
First, Gadamer claims that "understanding is, essentially, a historically 
57 
effected event" (2004: 299)1 . In other words, "in all understanding whether we are 
expressly aware of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work" (2004: 300). Gadamer 
severely criticised Enlightenment thinking which discredited prejudice. Gadamer argues 
that historicity is part of human existence and rehabilitates prejudices as necessary 
conditions of understanding. 
being in the world. Human existence is being-there and being- in-the-worl d. Therefore it cannot transcend 
the world to become a pure consciousness. As long as we are historical beings, history cannot be 
transcended. Understanding is not an activity of the conscious subject, which can be independent of our 
historical existence but a projection of our existence as being-there. (Weinsheimer 1985: 161-2) 
157 Hermeneutical "consciousness' is the mode of being that is conscious of its own historical 'being 
effected', which is called 'historically-effected consciousness' (wirklingsgeschictliches Beii, uj3tsein) 
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This leads to the second point: Gadamer claims that our Prejudices' are 
conditions of understanding. Understanding involves "neither 'neutrality' with respect 
to content nor the extinction of one's self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of 
one's own fore-meanings and prejudices" (Gadamer 2004: 271). By 'prejudice' Gadamer 
does not mean it in any negative sense. 'Prejudice' originally meant 'pre-judgment'. 
Judgement is not possible without pre-judgement. Gadamer insists that all human 
beings approach the world with certain pre-conceptions, prejudgements or prejudices. 
Gadamer points out that in the spirit of rationalism of the Enlightenment, prejudices 
were mistakenly discredited. (For fuller discussion on this, see Appendix 6-A). 
Gadamer turns around the Enlightenment argument that discredited prejudice and 
affirms 'prejudice' as a precondition for understanding. 
In adopting this principle, modern science is following the rule of Cartesian 
doubt, accepting nothing as certain that can in any way be doubted, and 
adopting the idea of method that follows from this rule. In our introductory 
observations we have already pointed out how difficult it is to harmonize 
the historical knowledge that helps to shape our historical consciousness 
with this ideal and how difficult it is, for that reason, to comprehend its true 
nature on the basis of the modern conception of method. This is the place to 
turn those negative statements into positive ones. The concept of 
"prejudice" is where we can start. (Gadamer 2004: 273) 
Thirdly, Gadamer rehabilitates tradition. Gadamer, opposing Enlightenment 
ideals which discredited tradition, claims that "there is no such unconditional antithesis 
between tradition and reason" (2004: 282). He writes: "understanding in the human 
sciences shares one fundamental condition with the life of tradition" (ibid. 283). We, as 
historically situated beings, relate to the past and we cannot distance or free ourselves 
from tradition because we are always situated within some tradition or another. Thus 
"an element of tradition affects the human sciences despite the methodological purity of 
their procedures" (ibid. 284). 
Fourthly, Gadamer claims that understanding is inseparable from 
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application. 158 Gadamer (2004: 306-307) claims that "understanding always involves 
something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter's present situation". 
He also writes that "... the text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood properly - 
i. e., according to the claim it makes - must be understood at every moment, in every 
concrete situation, in a new different way. Understanding here is always application" 
(Gadamer 2004: 307-8). Just as the discussion of the law can be understood in the light 
of the situation to which it is being applied in a particular case, it is when we can apply 
what we have read or heard to our particular situations or relate the matter to our 
individual concerns that we are able to have proper understanding. Thus understanding 
and experiencing in real situations as a situated being are closely related. In other words, 
we need our own hermeneutical situation to understand because we can only see from 
that position. Our own hermeneutical situation is what Gadamer calls a 'horizon', which 
leads to the next point. 
Fifthly, Gadamer argues that understanding is ajusion of horizons. Gadamer 
explains the concept of 'horizon' as follows: 
Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" 
by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. 
Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of "horizon". The 
horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen 
from a particular vantage point. (2004: 301) [emphasis in the original] 
Our "hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices we bring with us" (ibid. 
304), so the horizon of a particular present is constituted by prejudices, our historical 
situated understanding and particular personal immediate concerns. Gadamer writes that 
this horizon is not fixed. 
... the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices.... this testing 
158 Hermeneutics was traditionallY subdivided into sublifitas intelligenti (understanding) and sublilitas 
explicandi (interpretation) and pietism added the third element, subtilitas applicandi (application). 
Subtilitas are "considered less as methods that we have at our disposal than as talents requiring particular 
finesse of mind" (Gadamer 2004: 306). Gadamer declared there are no divisions. It is one. 
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occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from 
which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without 
the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than 
there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. (Gadamer 
2004: 305) 
Any horizon is limited and finite but is open. 159 Gadamer claims that understanding is a 
fusion of horizons. Lawn (2006: 67) explains this: in the process of understanding, "a 
horizon can be brought into contact with another horizon. Instead of one obliterating the 
other a process of fusion takes place ... this happens both down and across time, 
diachronically and synchronically". This engagement of horizons is an ongoing one and 
never achieves final completion. Gadamer writes: 
the historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never 
absolutely bound to any standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed 
horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that 
moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the 
horizon of the past, out of which all human lives and which exists in the 
form of tradition, is always in motion. (Gadarner 2004: 303) 
This means that understanding or interpretation, as long as it is a fusion of these moving 
horizons, is inevitably always tentative, and open. Then the fusion of horizons is an 
ongoing and open dialogue. This is significantly different from modernist approaches 
characterised by Cartesian Anxiety, which try to find some stable Archimedean point. 
Modern politeness theorists also aimed to establish such a common universal ground for 
understanding politeness. Gadamer's fusion of horizons provides a basis for explaining 
understanding between people with different horizons. 160 
The sixth andfinal point is that Gadamer sees understanding as being circular 
and characterises understanding in terms of a hermeneutical circle. Cartesian thinking 
is linear, that is, it asserts that "every proposition must flow from a previous proposition 
until we reach an ultimate principle" (Grondin 2003: 82). Gadamer, on the other hand, 
159 Lefstein (2005: 180) explains that **a horizon is both limiting - in the sense of blind spots outside the 
field of vision - and enabling, without it, thinking and understanding would not be possible. " 160 Gadamer's hermeneutics is used for a framework for understanding cross-cultural understanding. (e. g. 
Pillay 2002) 
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sees that understanding is circular. By being circular, he means that our understanding is 
always subject to revision. Though we are not free from our tradition and prejudices, as 
we have a dialogue with what we wish to understand, we engage in "the constant 
process that consists of the revisions of the anticipations of understanding in light of a 
better and more cogent understanding of the whole" (Grondin 2002: 47). 16 1 Because 
interpretation is an ongoing dialogue with what we want to understand and constantly 
under revision, we cannot have definite absolute interpretations or understandings of 
something. For Gadamer, the process of understanding can never achieve finality, 
because we are always understanding and interpreting in light of our anticipatory 
prejudgements and prejudices, which are themselves changing in the course of history 
(Bernstein 1983: 139). Thus Gadamer claims that to understand is always to understand 
differently (2004: 296). This circularity is very significant in understanding the 
perception of politeness. In modernist approaches, researchers tried to establish 
something which is intrinsically polite, but we know that the same utterances can be 
polite or impolite depending upon differing situations. Here Gadamer goes further and 
claims that to understand is always to understand differently. If a person's understanding 
of politeness keeps on changing depending upon his/her hermeneutical situation and 
constantly under revision, this has a radical impact on the way we discuss the perception 
of politeness, because it means that we can never pin down precisely what is polite and 
what is not. 
1.3. How Gadamer is compatible with and complementary to 
Bourdieu and Goffman 
Gadamer's phronesis-oriented social science and his hermeneutical understanding are 
largely compatible with Bourdieu's and Goffman's sociology. It is my contention that 
16 1 Gadamer's hermeneutical circle differs from that of Heidegger. Heidegger's circle is the circle of 
understanding (Auslegung) and interpretation that guides it. Gadamer's circle is the circle of whole and 
the parts (Grondin 2002: 49,2003: 82-83). 
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Gadamer's role is to provide the epistemological bases for Bourdieu's and Goffman's 
sociological approaches through his philosophical hermeneutics. The combination of 
the three theorists can partially help to overcome weaknesses they might have 
individually. In this section, I will show that what Bourdieu and Goffman have also 
discovered in their research can be explained well in terms of Gadamer's 
phronesis-oriented social science. 
Bourdieu's 'theory of practice' deviates from an episteme-oriented approach in 
its recognition that practice generated by habitus cannot be separated from the 
historicity of the social actors, and this historicity is embedded in habitus as embodied 
history. Bourdieu also accommodates a plural sense of appropriateness, seeing this as 
dependent upon afield and on the positions that individuals occupy in the field. And 
just as phronesis is the knowledge that has to respond to the demand of the particular 
situation, Bourdieu is well aware that practical knowledge cannot be reduced to general 
truth or principles. In fact, Bourdieu explicitly acknowledges phronesis as one of the 
sources of 'practical knowledge' expressed in his notion of habitus. 162 
Goffman's elucidation of social interaction using his three metaphors is also 
very different from the episteme-based approach. Goffman does not explicitly mention 
phronesis, but his sociology involves phronesis. Rawls (1987) states that the issue of 
morality, particularly the notion of moral obligation remained a central underlying 
feature throughout Goffman's work: "Goffman seems to treat all obligations as moral 
obligations (Rawl 1987: 144)". Treviflo (2003: 12) explains that "[b]y moral obligation, 
Goffrnan, in essence, means that the individual, as well as the group, has an inherent 
duty to respect the other, and vice-versa. " People, who are wise in their own affairs, are 
162 "Habitus being socially embodied, it is '-at home" in the field it inhabits, and perceives it immediately 
as endowed with meaning and interest. The practical knowledge it procures may be described by analogy 
with Aristotle's phronesis ... " (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128). The other source Bourdieu mentions is 
orthe doxa of which Plato talks in Meno. Bourdieu calls it doxa in his theory of practice. It is the 'right 
opinion' 'falls right', in a sense without knowing how or why. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 128) (For 
discussion of doxa, see Ch. 4 2.5. (a)) 
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committed to maintain this moral obligation of the interaction order. At the heart of 
Goffman's elucidation of the interaction order, there lies phronesis, practical wisdom, 
which is also moral knowledge. 
Through reflection upon their ethnographic fieldwork, both Bourdieu and 
Goffman have come to realise that the application of general principles would not 
explain actual practice and thus focused on the social practices themselves. Gadamer 
has helped us realise that episteme is not the only valid form of knowledge and that 
human sciences fundamentally deal with the different knowledge which deals with 
praxis, phronesis. Though we exercise such practical wisdom (phroensis) in our daily 
lives, we have not learnt to do that in our academic research. A split between theory and 
practice is a direct consequence of episteme -oriented social science as reflected in the 
distinction of politeness] (the lay notion of politeness) and politeness2 (the scientific 
conceptual i sation of politeness). When we reflect on various characteristics of 
phronesis shown in 1.1., we recognise that politeness was essentially a matter of 
practical wisdom in the first place: how one behaves appropriately in various situations. 
Exercising politeness not only involves the practical wisdom of how to behave in each 
particular circumstance but also requires moral judgement and deliberation. Recovering 
phronesis in our social science and making it phronesis-oriented, as Gadamer suggests, 
will allow us to operate in an arena where politenessl and politeness2 are no longer 
held separate. Both Bourdieu and Goffman exemplify such phronesis-oriented 
approaches even though their approaches are very different from each other. 
Goffman and Bourdieu also recognise one of the important elements in 
Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding, that is, the historical nature of our existence - 
we are historical beings and we are all part of the tradition we belong to. Goffman and 
Bourdieu acknowledge that a social actors' practical knowledge is deeply embedded in 
the tradition they are part of, as they have learned a particular way of doing things 
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through socialisation. 
As briefly noted above, Bourdieu acknowledges historicity in our practice and 
tries to embed it into the notion of habitus, Habitus is similar to tradition in being 
handed down from generation to generation, and thus both infuse temporality or 
historicity into our perception and existence. They also both deal with the handing down 
of practical know-how rather than purely cognitive principles. We humans can never be 
free from tradition and habitus and our action/practice and perception are inevitably 
shaped by them. Tradition and habitus are intrinsic elements of our existence. 
Bourdieu's habitus and Gadamer's tradition both show that just as the person who 
interprets can never be free from habitus or tradition, habitus and tradition are always 
preconditions of understanding. Just as Bourdieu affirmed historicity embedded in our 
being, the sense of what is appropriate is deeply rooted in the historicity and traditions 
of all of us. 
Gadamer's tradition, however, shows some differences from Bourdieu's 
habitus. The most significant one is that Gadamer does not adopt a critical stance 
towards tradition (Lawn 2006: 128) and instead affirms its authority as 'legitimate 
prejudice', whereas Bourdieu argues that our roles within the social world are 
'legitimized' by symbolic power. Gadamer is non-critical about tradition partly because 
"his conception of tradition is of one homogenous power and he neglects the point that 
within traditions there are in fact counter-traditions" (Lawn 2006: 130). Bourdieu, on the 
contrary, recognises the heterogeneity of powers and argues that relationships between 
different powers pertaining to our culture have no necessary basis but have been 
arbitrarily constructed to reflect the interests of the dominant groups ("cultural 
arbitrary") (Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002: x). On this point, Bourdieu's critical 
stance against tradition through symbolic power overcomes Gadamer's weakness in 
accepting tradition as a legitimate authority. Other differences I observe between 
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Gadamer's tradition and Bourdieu's habitus are as follows: though we are inseparable 
from tradition and habitus, the ways we relate to tradition and to habitus are different. 
Gadamer places us within a tradition and argues that we all exist within a particular 
tradition. Bourdieu, on the other hand, places habitus within us as part of our disposition. 
Bourdieu creates the notion of habitus in order to explain the production and 
reproduction of social structure across generations, whereas Gadamer does not seem to 
have any particular interest in social structure. But despite such differences between 
them, both Gadamer and Bourdieu affirm that we are historically situated beings and 
this will play significant part in our understanding. 
Though not as explicitly as Bourdieu, Goffman also emphasises tradition and 
historicity in affirming that people have acquired different ways of maintaining the 
interaction order, for instance how to save face in different societies or sub-societies 
(See Ch. 5 2.2. ). Tradition constitutes our individual sense of how we ought to maintain 
the interaction order. 
Bourdieu and Goffman share and exemplify the phronesis-oriented social 
science that Gadamer claims that social science ought to be. Gadamer is not only 
compatible with Bourdieu and Goffman but takes us further into postmodern 
approaches to politeness. Gadamer comes into his own on an issue that postmodern 
theorists see as a particularly important agenda for their studies - the role of the hearer, 
which I will discuss in the next section. 
2. The Hearer's interpretation of politeness: a new focus 
After three decades of endeavour to establish a scientific conceptual isation of politeness 
as part of modernist academic enterprise, postmodern politeness researchers - Eelen 
(2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003,2004) - came back to the common sense 
realisation that (im)politeness is fundamentally ajudgement of others' utterances and 
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that the evaluation of (im)politeness is disputable. They argued that elucidation of the 
Hearer's interpretation of politeness would become a main strand of postmodern 
politeness research. It is also my contention that this should be the main strand in the 
next generation of postmodern politeness research. The Hearer's different perceptions 
and interpretations of politeness could reveal heterogeneous criteria for politeness 
perceived by different individuals. 
Modern politeness theories largely assumed that the Speaker's intention would 
be reconstructed by the Hearer unproblematically (Mills 2003: 90) and thus focused on 
the Speaker's production of politeness. As a result, the Hearer's perspective has been 
neglected (Eelen 2001: 104,246). The Hearer, however, is not standing on neutral 
ground passively reconstructing the Speaker's intention. Even when the Speaker has no 
intention of causing offence, the Speaker may still be misunderstood by the Hearer and 
perceived to be making an impolite utterance. This means there is always bound to be 
the possibility of a discrepancy between the Speaker's intention and the Hearer's 
interpretation. As postmodern politeness researchers argued, what is (im)polite is 
ultimately dependent on the judgement of the Hearer, so that the Hearer's interpretation 
of politeness is of utmost importance in politeness studies. Unfortunately neither of the 
two theorists, Goffman and Bourdieu, whom I used as my thinking tools, really focused 
on the Hearer's interpretation. In 2.1. and 2.2., 1 will explore what Goffman and 
Bourdieu had to say about the Hearer, even though the references may be sparse. Then 
in 2.3., 1 will return to my third thinking tool, Gadamer. Gadamer's notion of 
understanding discussed in 1.2 will move us forward in our elucidation of the Hearer's 
interpretation of politeness. 
2.1. Goffman on the Hearer's interpretation 
Goffman elucidates the individual's behaviour in social interaction in some detail but he 
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does not focus very extensively on the Hearer's evaluative activities in the writings on 
social interaction most relevant to this thesis. Only in a few places does Goffman discuss 
the evaluative activities of other participants but these are in contexts in which Goffman 
claims that the evaluation of other participants is fundamental to maintaining face and 
maintaining self image. Goffman discusses how individuals in co-present gatherings are 
committed to maintaining the interaction order. They cannot afford not to do so because 
their self-image or social self depends upon positive evaluation of them by other 
participants in the interaction. (See Ch. 5 2. L(a)) 
Goffman also claims that 'perceptiveness' is essential for employing one's 
repertoire of face-saving practices. 
If a person is to employ his repertoire of face-saving practices, obviously he 
must first become aware of the interpretation that others may have placed 
upon his acts and the interpretations that he ought perhaps to place upon theirs. 
In other word, he must exercise perceptiveness. But even if he is properly 
alive to symbolically conveyed judgement and is socially skilled, he must yet 
be willing to exercise his perceptiveness and his skill (1967: 13-14). 
Goffman's notion of 'perceptiveness' refers to the awareness of the interpretations that 
others may have placed upon his/her acts and the interpretations that he/she ought 
perhaps to place upon theirs. But he did not elaborate on this 'perceptiveness', nor does 
he discuss what criteria are operative in exercising perceptiveness. So Goffman did not 
explore the Hearer's interpretive practice in any detail. 
2.2. Bourdieu on the Hearer's interpretation 
Bourdieu discusses the Speaker's self-censorship when entering into the linguistic 
market in the production of oral and written discourse, but he does not seem to have 
directly discussed the Hearer's evaluative practice. In Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(1977) and Logic of Practice (1990), habitus is mainly discussed in the context of a 
Speaker's production of utterance and it is the Speaker who censors and modifies 
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his/her own utterances to meet the demands of the linguistic market in production. But 
in Reproduction: In Education, Society and Culture (1977), he describes habitus as "a 
system of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action" (1977: 40), and so 
here habitus can perhaps be seen as providing criteria for interpreting another person's 
behaviour as well as giving criteria for self-censorship. 
Bourdieu (1998: 8) claims that habitus not only refers to 'generative principles 
of distinct and distinctive practices' but also 'classificatory schemes'. By 'classificatory 
schemes' he means, "principles of classification, principles of vision and division, 
different tastes. They make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between 
what is right and what is wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar, and 
so forth... " (1998: 8. ). In Distinction (1984a) 163 , Bourdieu explores how habitus is 
related to judgment of taste. "Taste is an acquired disposition to 'differentiate' and 
'appreciate'.... to establish and mark differences by a process of distinction which is not 
(or not necessarily) a distinct knowledge ... since it ensures recognition (in the ordinary 
sense) of the object without implying knowledge of the distinctive features which 
defines it" (1984a: 466). Bourdieu claims that taste is related to a given place in social 
space. 
Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which makes it possible to 
sense or intuit what is likely (or unlikely) to befall - and therefore to befit 
- an individual occupying a given position in social space. It functions as a 
sort of social orientation, a 'sense of one's place' guiding the occupants of 
a given place in social space toward the social positions adjusted to their 
properties, and towards the practices or goods which befit the occupants of 
that position. It implies a practical anticipation of what the social meaning 
and value of the chosen practice or thing will probably be, given their 
distribution in social space and the practical knowledge the other agents 
have of the correspondence between goods and groups. (I 984a: 466) 
163 By 'Distinction' Bourdieu tries to argue that "what is commonly called distinction, that is, a certain 
quality of bearing and manners, most often considered innate (one speaks of distinction naturelle "natural 
refinement"), is nothing other than difference, a gap, a distinctive feature, in short, a relational property 
existing only in and through its relations with other properties. (Bourdieu 1998: 6)" People from different 
social positions have each a different habitus. A sense of distinction (refinement) or aesthetic sense, then 
is only relative. 
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"To each class of positions there corresponds a class of habitus (or tastes) produced by 
the social conditioning associated with the corresponding condition and, through the 
mediation of habitus and its generative capability, a systematic set of goods and 
properties, which are united by an affinity of style" (Bourdieu 1998: 8). Habitus, the 
sense of appropriateness (which can be seen a kind of aesthetic sense, or taste) has 
become embodied within us as a result of our socialization. So through habitus, the 
sense of what is polite may then also be understood as a kind of aesthetic sense, what is 
sensed as being tasteful or aesthetically pleasing. As habitus varies between one person 
or class and another, this aesthetic sense of courtesy also varies. 
Bourdieu claims that there is symbolic violence in taste or in the aesthetic 
senses as well. Though there are many varieties of taste, the aesthetic sense of the 
dominant social group tends to be accepted as the legitimate sense in any given society. 
The dominant view as to what is appropriate is accepted as being natural. In other words, 
the tastes of the dominating class are considered to be the dominant aesthetic and 
legitimate distinction (elegance, courtesy). Bourdieu claims that taste or the capacity to 
discern aesthetic values is a social necessity, which becomes second nature ingrained in 
the individual person. So, for instance, it is difficult for the working class to embrace the 
bourgeois class sense of aesthetics, though it may be seen as legitimate distinction, 
because the working class habitus is inscribed in their bodies. Bourdieu writes: 
So nothing is further removed from an act of cognition, as conceived by the 
intellectualist tradition, than this sense of the social structure, which, as is so 
well put by the word taste - simultaneously 'the faculty of perceiving 
flavours' and 'the capacity to discern aesthetic values' - is social necessity 
made second nature, turned into muscular patterns and bodily automatisms. 
Everything takes place as if the social conditionings linked to a social 
condition tended to inscribe the relation to the social world in a lasting, 
generalized relation to one's own body, a way of bearing one's body, present 
it to others, moving it, making space for it, which gives the body its social 
physiognomy. Bodily hexis, a basic dimension of the sense of social 
orientation, is a practical way of experiencing and expressing one's own 
sense of social value. (Bourdieu 1984a: 474) 
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So with habitus as 'classificatory schemes' or a 'system of schemes of thought, 
perception, appreciation and action', we can assume that habitus can be a sense of 
evaluation or interpretation of the others' actions or utterance. 
But can habitus sufficiently explain the Hearer's evaluative practice? Habitus 
explains that our sense of what is appropriate in production and evaluation of other's 
production is deeply rooted in our socialisation and historicity. Thus according to 
Bourdieu, people with similar socialisation tend to acquire similar habitus or sense of 
what is appropriate. Difficulties in cross-cultural communication can be well explained 
by different habitus. However, in real situations, it is not uncommon that we experience 
some discomfiture or difficulties in social interaction even among people who have had 
very similar socialisation. Obviously there is individual variability with regard to the 
evaluation of what is polite and what is not polite. Such individual variability cannot be 
explained by habitus. After all, Bourdieu's habitus was created to explain the 
production and reproduction of social structure across generations, because he was 
interested in explaining how people generate similar behaviours appropriate to their 
social positions. As discussed in Chapter 4, postmodern politeness researchers, who 
needed some constructs to explain how individuals make various different judgements 
about politeness in terms of their own production and assessment of others' utterances 
misinterpreted one of Bourdieu's articles (See Ch. 4 5.4) to support their 'discursive 
struggle over politenessl'. But Bourdieu does not help much in elucidating the Hearer's 
varying judgements. Besides individual variability, there is also variability within the 
same person's judgment. In other words, the same person might have different 
interpretation for the same utterance on different occasions. Contingency surrounding 
the Hearer is very complex. Bourdieu found no opportunity to explain such complexity. 
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2.3. Gadamer on the Hearer's interpretation 
Gadamer's notion of understanding discussed in 1.2 illuminates how we can approach 
this crucial issue of the Hearer's interpretation. 164 His starting point is, as discussed 
above, the realization of our existence as being-in-the-world. From there, Gadamer 
argues that understanding is an event or happening of being. Because we are part of the 
world and part of our tradition, Gadamer claims that the task of hermeneutics was not to 
establish some 'method' or 'procedure' but only to elucidate the conditions in which 
understanding happens. Thus I can only endeavour to elucidate the complex 
hermeneutical conditions of the Hearer in which interpretation takes place. Just to 
recapitulate what Gadamer argues about hermeneutical understanding, 
1) Understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event 
2) Our ýprejudices'are conditions of understanding. 
3) We are part of our tradition and thus tradition plays part in our understanding. 
4) Understanding is inseparablefrom application. 
5) Understanding is afusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung). 
6) Understanding is circular. 
Accepting these insights from Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding, I must abolish 
the common but problematic assumption that the Hearer passively reconstructs the 
Speaker's intention (See Mills 2003: 90). It is incorrect in two ways. First it is incorrect 
because it gives the impression that understanding is considered to be some kind of 
psychological process. Gadamer argues rather that understanding must be conceived as 
a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning (Bernstein 1983: 126). 
Secondly, it is incorrect because such a view of the Hearer ignores the Hearer's 
hermeneutical situation. The Hearer is not there just to reconstruct the Speaker's 
164 There appear to be some limits in using Gadamer's hermeneutical notion of 'understanding' to 
elucidate linguistic politeness, because they might at first seem to be somewhat remotely related. But 
what is involved in an interpreter's 'understanding' of written text seems to have much in common with 
comprehending a Hearer's act of 'understanding'. 
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intention, but the Hearer is part of his/her own tradition, as a historically situated being, 
and now situated in particular contexts in a particular time in history, with immediate 
particular concerns. Similarly, the Speaker belongs to his own tradition and is situated in 
particular historical contexts, with his/her particular agenda. Obviously the Speaker and 
the Hearer have their own horizons, which are different from each other. 
The Hearer's interpretation of the Speaker's utterance inevitably involves some 
prejudices (prejudgement), which, Gadamer claims, are preconditions of understanding. 
Prejudices may come from some previous knowledge or experience. For instance, if the 
Hearer has had negative experiences of interacting with the Speaker on previous 
occasions, it would become part of his/her prejudgement of the Speaker's utterance. The 
Hearer's interpretation is also closely linked with the traditions of which he/she is part. 
Tradition includes historicity. As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu's habitus also stresses 
historicity through his notion of habitus, as embodied history. Bourdieu's notion of 
'field' may explain the social actors' hermeneutical situation, to some extent. But 
Bourdieu discussed 'field' as an arena of struggle for control over valued resources, i. e. 
capital. Contingency surrounding the Hearer's interpretation arising from his/her (the 
Hearer's) ontological situatedness involves more than Bourdieu tried to capture in his 
theory of practice. After all, Bourdieu is weak in grasping what is changeable and 
agency role is limited in his approach. It is difficult to capture a hermeneutical situation 
which is moving and changing. 
Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding illuminates various conditions in 
which the Hearer's interpretation takes place. Employing Gadamer's view of 
understanding inevitably assumes divergence between participants in any conversation. 
The fact that historicity, prejudice and tradition constitute our being, means that we 
cannot stand on some alleged Archimedean point that we all share as common ground 
for understanding. How can we, then, achieve mutual understanding if we assume such 
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heterogeneity? Possessing different kinds of tradition and prejudice, we as modernists, 
feared that there might be an uncrossable gulf of incommensurability. Gadamer argues 
that participants enter some kind of dialogic encounter with each other and 
understanding emerges as a fusion of horizons. Gadamer claims that while diverse 
traditions exist, they must necessarily overlap at some points, although their points of 
divergence and convergence are contingently governed. The Hearer's interpretation is a 
complex matter. There is always the possibility of misunderstanding because different 
'horizons' 'prejudices' 'traditions' carried by different interlocutors all come into play 
during social interaction. Even an utterance with polite intentions could possibly be 
misunderstood as an impolite utterance. That is part of the very nature of social 
interaction. 
So how can we do research on Hearers' differing interpretation, when there are 
such great degrees of contingency surrounding each Hearer? We no longer attempt to 
establish procedures of interpretation as in modernist approaches. Even if we know that 
our task is to elucidate the conditions in which the Hearer actually interprets some 
utterances, how can this be done in practical research? I believe that the key might be to 
focus on 'negatively eventful behaviour'. Goffman in Behaviour in Public Places 
(1963: 7) claims that it is 'negatively eventful' behaviour "which gives rise to specific 
negative sanctions if not performed, but which, if it is performed, passes unperceived as 
an event". That is, politeness goes unnoticed until an utterance is perceived to be 
impolite. In fact, when we are upset about somebody's rude behaviour or utterance, we 
often want to tell friends or others. Sometimes such accounts come wrapped up in 
emotions. One possible research method I suggest is to collect accounts of such 
negatively eventful behaviour, by which people have felt offended or uneasy and 
experienced an utterance to be impolite. Such narrative approaches have been 
increasingly used in the interpretive branch of psychology (e. g. Sarbin 1986; Emerson & 
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Frosh 2004). Narratives of people who experienced impoliteness or negatively eventful 
behaviour, could be a useful source for this kind of research. 165 
3. Agenda for politeness studies in the future 
In this final section of the thesis, I will consider an agenda for politeness studies in the 
future. For this task, I draw insights from several resources: 1) from some theorists who 
have contributed to postmodern epistemology that I mentioned in Ch. 3 (i. e. Lyotard, 
Wittgenstein); 2) the three theorists I employed as my major thinking tools (i. e. 
Bourdieu, Goffman and Gadamer); 3) three theorists who have launched new 
postmodern paths in politeness studies (i. e. Eelen, Watts and Mills) and others who 
might help in our new passage into viable postmodern politeness research. 
In 3.1., 1 will first present the agenda that postmodern politeness researchers, 
Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) have proposed for future politeness studies 
and then in 3.2., 1 will show how and to what extent my work overlaps with these 
postmodern theorists' agenda, and then present my own proposal for future politeness 
research drawing upon what I have gained through the project of theoretical 
reconsideration conducted in this dissertation. 
3.1 Eelen's, Watts's and Mills's proposals for future politeness 
studies 
What do these three postmodern politeness researchers propose for a new agenda? Eelen 
(2001: 254-5) has suggested that because the emphasis is now on politenessl, research 
should involve actual investigation of ordinary people's conceptions of politeness. The 
questions he lists are "What kind of situations do they associate with politeness? Which 
165 1 had a personal experience that someone at the lunch table asked a question which I perceived to be 
impolite. Later I collected accounts of the same event from a few friends who were also Hearers. 
Interestingly these accounts revealed that the Hearers' interpretation of the particular utterance as impolite 
were due not so much to the contextual matters in the actual situations in which the conversation was 
made as to their own historical hermeneutical situations as Hearers. See Appendix 6-13 for a description. 
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interactional events elicit politeness evaluation? When is politeness deemed irrelevant? 
What are perceived as the most important characteristics of politeness? What forms can 
politeness evaluations take on - in terms of the terminology used? and so on" (ibid. 
244-5). Eelen (ibid. 245) also stresses the importance of the study of actual 
(im)politeness evaluations because of the natural situational embeddedness and 
argumentativeness of politeness. However he recognises the difficulty of obtaining this 
in actual conversation because in everyday interaction people seldom verbalise their 
evaluation (ibid. 255). Eelen argues that the focus must be on the discursive role and 
functionality of the evaluation itself. 
Because of the discursive nature of politeness, the data would also need to 
receive a different analytical treatment from traditional investigations. 
Instead of cataloguing the behaviours evaluated as (im)polite, the focus 
would be more on the discursive role and functionality of the evaluations 
themselves. (ibid. ) 
As a methodological tool, Eelen (ibid. 256) suggests the use of "informal interviews, 
where the whole interview text can serve as 'data"'. He argues that the interactional text 
of the interview as a whole can be discursively analysed as data. 
Watts (2003) also claims "that the only valid object of a theory of linguistic 
politeness is not a hypostasised, objectified abstract term 'politeness' but rather ways in 
which interactants classify social, verbal acts as realising their own personal 
conceptual isation of what is 'polite' and what is 'impolite"' (Watts 2003: 263). He 
(2003: 262) suggests a closer focus on verbal interaction and the differential attributions 
of (im)politenessl by participants. As Watts sees the linguistic expression of politeness 
as intricately tied up with the exercise of power, he considers the relation between power 
and politeness as an important research agenda, though as mentioned in Chapter 5, he 
tends to see power as something negotiable in emergent networks. (Ch.. 5 5.2. (b)) 
Mills (2004) also contests the assumptions among modern politeness theorists 
that politeness is the same for all groups within society. She argues that "at a 
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stereotypical level, politeness within English, particularly negative politeness, (which 
distances others and is mindful of imposing on others) is associated with white middle 
class women's speech (2004: 174)" She also points out the mutual exclusiveness of the 
evaluation of what politeness constitutes between middle and working class people. 
Working class people may often see middle class linguistic behaviour as 
impolite because they use distancing forms (which may be interpreted as 
stressing class difference and power difference), and middle class people are 
often uncomfortable with the positive politeness norms frequent in casual 
conversation with strangers within the working classes which may seem to 
them to be overly familiar. (2004: 173) 
Mills (2004: 173,184) proposes that rather than aiming to analyse politeness objectively, 
researchers should be aware that politeness is fundamentally a judgement of others and 
that stereotypes of other people's class, race and gender may impinge on both 
interactants' and analysts' assessments of linguistic behaviour. She (2004: 172-3) also 
argues that B&L's universal claim that indirectness is universally more polite than 
directness needs to be questioned not just as showing an Anglo-centric bias but deriving 
from particular stereotypes of class, race and gender hidden and underlying this claim. 
The direction of Mills's research also clearly exhibits characteristics of postmodern 
politeness research: she has accepted a plurality of narratives regarding judgement of 
politeness; and she distances herself from the dominant narrative that indirectness is 
more polite than directness, unpacking what is in embedded in this claim. 
3.2. My own proposals for future politeness studies 
I will now outline my own suggestions for an agenda of politeness studies as a 
postmodern field. There are some overlaps with the proposals made by the three 
postmodern politeness theorists, which I have already indicated, but my additional 
contribution, I hope, will be to provide a more solid theoretical and epistemological 
ground for future politeness studies, drawing upon the insights I have gained from the 
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various theorists considered in this dissertation. 
The epistemological foundation of politeness studies I propose for the future is 
"linguistic politeness beyond modernity" as in my dissertation title. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Lyotard (1984) defines postmodern as the end of metanarrative, and in the 
postmodern climate, a grand narrative or metanarrative is replaced by a plurality of 
small narratives. After three decades of attempting to establish politeness2 or some 
universal principle of politeness in the politeness field, Eelen, Watts and Mills now 
claim that it is impossible to establish politeness2, in the recognition that evaluation of 
politeness is ultimately disputable and that there are heterogeneous interpretations. 
Though these three postmodern politeness researchers have not argued philosophically 
why they now must move back to the study of politenessl as their object of study, 
probably they have experientially or intuitively recognised the impossibility of studying 
politeness using the episteme-oriented approach adopted in late modernity. What I have 
attempted to do throughout the thesis is to clear a path philosophically for our 
exploration of postmodern approaches to politeness, providing epistemological and 
theoretical backing for what Eelen, Watts and Mills have intuitively felt that they 
needed to do. 166 
In the movement from 'modernity' to 'beyond modernity' in this thesis, we 
have exorcised Cartesian Anxiety bent on finding the foundational order of the universe, 
which has marked modernist academic disciplines. The Cartesian assumption that the 
subject as the 'autonomous rational subject' can have access to neutral dispassionate 
knowledge from a vantage point outside the flux of history is no longer the foundation 
of our 'beyond modern' theory construction. Instead, the Heideggerian-Gadamarian 
understanding of our existence as 'being-in-the-world' reminds us that we, as 
historically situated beings, are part of our traditions and prejudices and that historical 
166 So far, among the three, only Watts (2005) has briefly discussed the movement toward a postmodern 
approach to politeness. He has not discussed extensively the epistemological issues. 
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effective consciousness and our hermeneutical situations always come into play in our 
understanding of the world. Upon such new epistemological foundations, what kind of 
agenda can I propose for future politeness studies? 
First, as discussed throughout this thesis, postmodern politeness research will 
no longer attempt to establish universal, ahistorical and timeless principles. Instead 
postmodern politeness research attempts to investigate different realities of politeness 
rather than establishing a grand narrative. 167 As I discussed earlier, we can now see 
Bourdieu's and Goffman's unique sociological approaches as being phronesis-oriented. 
Each, approaching from different angles, succeeded in elucidating some aspects of 
politeness phenomena. Goffman's micro approaches and Bourdieu's macro approaches 
revealed differing narratives concerning politeness but both were elucidating some 
aspects of politeness, even if sometimes partially. 168 Our temptation or urge to attempt 
to establish one unifying universal theory or principle or 'method' comes from our 
episteme -oriented mode of thinking. However, in phronesis-oriented social science, just 
as Gadamer explained in his hermeneutical circle, we can perhaps partially grasp some 
aspects of politeness, although understanding the part will help us to see the whole 
more cogently. We must get used to this hermeneutical mode of knowing in our 
phronesis-oriented social science. The three postmodern politeness researchers' 
proposals may develop in diverse directions. For instance, from Mills's proposal, 
167 Proponents of postmodernism argue that the legitimation of particular narratives as metanarrative in 
modern academia has to do with the dominant view of the world. Alvesson (2002: 54) states 
"[floundations and legitimating narratives have always been a hoax. They have been used (usually 
unknowingly) to support a dominant view of the world and its order". Foucault argues "power and 
knowledge directly imply one another, that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitutions of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations" (Foucault & Gordon 1980: 27). In the postmodern 
climate, a grand narrative or metanarrative is replaced by a plurality of small narratives. Yet among many 
narratives, some narratives which represent the dominant view are still more powerful than others. 
168 In Bourdieu's macro approach, Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power behind the production and 
reproduction of structure through habitus helped us to explain hegemonic reality in politeness, where the 
dominant party's view tends to be normalised. However, agency's role was minimised in Bourdieu's 
framework. Goffman's micro perspective, on the other hand, helped us see the interplay of structure and 
agency from a social actor's viewpoint. Goffman recognised the need of plural narratives to elucidate 
social interaction 
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research unpacking different notions of what is polite according to class, race and 
gender may emerge. Watts's interest may lead into research on the relation between 
politeness and power negotiated during the interaction. Each line of research allows us 
to see only parts of the complexity of politeness in practice, but understanding of the 
part will lead to a more cogent understanding of the whole within the hermeneutical 
circle. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, postmodern politeness research will involve 
consideration of historicity as a fundamental element. Gadamer argues that we can never 
be free from our prejudices (pre-judgement) and that they are preconditions of all 
understanding. Just as Gadamer claims that historicity is essential in human sciences, 
historicity is fundamental also in ourpostmodern politeness research. Both Bourdieu and 
Goffman recognised that our practical sense of what is appropriate is embodied history, 
inculcated through our socialisation process. Our cultural background and historicity 
inevitably play a significant part in our perception of politeness. Eelen, Watts and Mills 
incorporated historicity to some extent, by adopting Bourdieu's habitus (in spite of the 
alterations and modifications they have introduced to the concept), and Mills, in 
discussing community of practice norms, seems to acknowledge the element of 
'tradition'. At the same time, neither Bourdieu and Goffman nor these three postmodern 
politeness researchers have fully recognised the depth of Gadamer's claims for 
historicity - our mode of being is historically effected, so our understanding is 
essentially a historically effected event; our prejudices and traditions are preconditions 
of our understanding; we can only understand from within particular hermeneutical 
situations. 
Thirdly, as politeness involves phronesis -a mediation between the universal 
and the particular that requires deliberation and choice in each particular circumstance - 
all postmodern approaches will focus on particular practices in specific contexts as 
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important objects of study. For phronesis-oriented research, the social and historical 
contexts are of prime importance. Thus, we shall take small case studies very seriously, 
because politeness cannot be explained as simply the application of general principles 
to all particular practice. Eelen, Watts and Mills are also moving in this direction 
focusing on particular situated politeness discourses. 
Fourthly, as phronesis-oriented study, we will recover those moral values 
which have been eliminated in modernist research. As mentioned in footnote 155, 
phronesis is closely related to synesis, which means 'empathetic understanding' or 
'fellow-feeling' A person exercising phronesis does not think about his own situation 
alone but is prepared to consider the particular situation of the other person, too. Thus 
phronesis displays a practical communal character. This is different from 
methodological individualism, which cannot accommodate collective action or 
altruistic actions. This kind of empathetic understanding is needed for life in society. 
Aristotle points out thatphronesis is a required virtue for political affairs. Politeness is 
also part of diplomatic wisdom. Goffman accommodated such elements as moral 
obligations, solidarity and empathy in his elucidation of interaction order. We need to 
recover such notions in postmodern politeness. Eelen, Mills and Watts do not explicitly 
discuss moral values. However, communal elements of politeness are evident in 
Watts's and Mills's understanding of politeness: Watts affirms Goffiman's more 
communal notion of face. Mills's community of practice seems to imply that she 
acknowledges communal character. 
Fifthly, postmodern politeness research could explore the interplay of power 
reflected in the legitimization of what is polite and in the interpretation of politeness. It 
is far more difficult for the less dominant to have their interpretation of what is 
appropriate acknowledged because what is deemed appropriate is linked with the 
dominant party's view of the world. In postmodern politeness, we could study how some 
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perceptions of politeness are affirmed or normalised over against others as one strand of 
study. Sometimes it is difficult to see the interplay of power in the actual interaction 
because the social order which is favourable to the dominant is perceived as normality 
both by the dominant and by the less dominant. Bourdieu's theory of practice can be 
used as a tool to elucidate such symbolic power. 169 Mills's interest in the issues of 'class 
and politeness' and 'gender and politeness' involves such interplay of power in a 
normalised sense of what is polite. 
Sixthly and finally, as postmodern politeness researchers Eelen, Watts and 
Mills all unanimously point out, in postmodern politeness research we should focus on 
the elucidation of the Hearer's interpretation of politeness. All three theorists declared 
that the nature of what is polite or impolite is disputable because ultimately it depends 
on the Hearer's perception, interpretation and evaluation. By asserting that there are 
multiple evaluations of what is (im)polite, they made a postmodern claim. As Eelen 
(2001: 255) rightly pointed out, in everyday interaction people seldom verbalise their 
evaluation. Goffman points out that we are good performers in the drama of social 
interaction. Even when we experience impoliteness, we often hide our reactions and 
perform as if nothing has occurred. As mentioned in 2.3., 1 think collecting Hearer's 
accounts of perceived negatively eventful behaviour could be a valuable source for 
illuminating Hearer's complex hermeneutical situations (See Appendix 6-B). Eelen's 
suggestion of the informal interview may be similar to my narrative approach. 
169 1 believe that reproduction of the dominant mode of expression as symbolic power happens across the 
historical spectrum. Through pedagogic action, people came to accept the dominant mode of expression 
as normality or second nature (See Ch. 4 2.4 ýb)). If I use Gadamer's language, it becomes part of their 
tradition. Thus legitimation of power and historicity is closely related. Similarly, I believe that the 
legitimation of power is intimately related to the field or social space. In other words, the particular 
hegemonic reality in any given society is locally defined. People who are socialised in different societies 
would not recognise that hegemonic reality. In the era of globalisation, people move around different 
social space with people who have a different habitus within different historical traditions. Historicity, 
power and field (social spatiality) need to be studied not separately but as in a complex dynamic 
interrelationship. 
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4. Final Remarks 
This dissertation has concentrated mostly on a theoretical reconsideration of modern 
politeness theories (in Chapters 1,2 and 3) and on an attempt to find alternative ways of 
understanding politeness, employing Bourdieu, Goffman and Gadamer as thinking tools 
(in Chapters 4,5, and the Conclusion). I have only started to envisage viable 
post-modern politeness studies in this Conclusion, outlining possible characteristics in 
very general terms. It is only a preliminary consideration of what post-modern 
politeness studies might look like and how actual research should be carried out. All 
this obviously needs further consideration, and may be explored in future research. But 
what I hope to have established is that there are diverse approaches in postmodern 
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Grice's Cooperative Principle (Rules of Conversation) 
The Cooperative Principle (CP) is based on Grice's (1975) claim that "[o]ur talk 
exchanges.... are... to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant 
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or sets of purposes, or at least a 
mutually accepted direction. (1975 [1989: 26])" Thus Grice has formulated "a rough 
general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, 
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged (ibid. )". 
RULES OF CONVERSATION 
1. Quantity: Be as informative as required 
Be no more informative than required 
2. Quality: Say only what you believe to be true 
3. Relevance: Be relevant 
4. Manner: Be perspicuous 
Don't be ambiguous 
Don't be obscure 
Be succinct 
Lakoff earlier proposed her version of 'rules of conversation' in her 1972 paper. 
Rule 1. What is being communicated is true. 
Rule 11. It is necessary to state what is being said: it is not known to other 
participants, or utterly obvious. Further, everything necessary for the hearer to 
understand the communication is present. 
Rule 111. Therefore, in the case of statements, the speaker assumes that the hearer 
will believe what he says (due to Rule 1). 
Rule IV. With questions, the speaker assumes that the command will be obeyed. All 
these assume, in addition, that the status of speaker and hearer is appropriate 
with respect to each other. (Of course, there are special situations in which all 
these are violated: lies, 'small talk', tall stories, riddles of certain types, and 
requests as opposed to commands. But in general these conditions define an 
appropriate conversational situation. ) (Lakoff 1972: 916) 
Appendix I-B 
Halliday's three functions of language (Leech 1983: 56) 
a) The ideational function: language functioning as a means of conveying 
and interpreting experience of the world -subdivided into 'experiential' 
and 'logical' functions 
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b) The interpersonal function: language functioning as an expression of 
one's attitudes and an influence upon the attitudes and behaviour of the 
hearer 
c)The textual function: language functioning as a means of constructing a 
text , i. e. a spoken or written instantiation of a language 
Appendix I-C 
Discourse 6 
------------------------ ýhifeCO-Crýbh7alj -------------------------- 
2 Message-transmission 5 








Figure I -C. A process model of language [title not in the original] (198' ): 59) 
In Figure I-C, a linguistic act of communication (or an utterance) is described as 
constituting a transaction on three different planes as (a) interpersonal transaction 
(discourse), and (b) ideational transaction (message) and (c) a textual transaction (text). 
The ordering is as the arrows indicate: discourse includes the message and the message 
includes the text. Thus the whole utterance may be described as I DISCOURS7SE by 
means of I MESSAG by means of F-T-EXT-1. 
Appendix I-D 









ý Expressivity Principle (maxims) 
Figure I -D Textual Rhetoric [title not in the original] (1983: 16) 
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Appendix I-E 
Leech's adapted version of Grice's CP 
Leech's (1983: 8) adapted version of Grice's Cooperative Principle is as follows: 
QUANTITY: Give the right amount of information: i. e. 
1. Make your contribution as informative as required; 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than required 
QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true: i. e. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
RELATION: Be relevant 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression 
2. Avoid ambiguity 
3. Be brief and (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
4. Be orderly 
Appendix I-F 
Seale's categories of illocutionary acts(Leech 1983: 105-6): 
ASSERTIVES commit S to the truth of the expressed proposition; e. g. 
stating, suggesting, boasting, complaining. Semantically, ASSERTIVES 
are propositional. Such illocutions tend to be neutral as regards to 
politeness, i. e. they belong to the COLLABORATIVE category above. But 
there are some exceptions such as boasting which is generally considered 
impolite in most cultures. 
2. DIRECTIVES (or IMPOSITIVES) are intended to produce some effects 
through action by the hearer; e. g. ordering, commanding, requesting, 
advising, recommending. They frequently belong to the COMPETITIVE 
category above, and therefore comprise a category of illocutions in which 
negative politeness is important. Some directives (such as invitations), 
however, are intrinsically polite. To avoid confusion in using the term 
'directive' in relation to 'direct and indirect illocutions', Leech prefers the 
term IMPOSITIVES to refer to competitive illocutions in this class. 
3. COMMISSIVES commit to some future action; e. g. promising, vowing, 
offering. These tend to be CONVIVIAL rather than competitive, being 
performed in the interests of someone other than the speaker. 
4. EXPRESSIVES have the function of expressing or making known the 
speaker's psychological attitude towards a state of affairs which the 
illocution presupposes e. g. thanking, congratulating, pardoning, blaming, 
praising, condoling. They also tend to be CONVIVIAL, and are therefore 
intrinsically polite. The reverse, however, is true of such expressives as 
'blaming' or 'accusing'. 
5. DECLARATIVES are illocutions whose successful performance brings 
about a correspondence between the propositional content and reality e. g. 
resigning, dismissing, christening, naming, excommunicating, appointing, 
sentencing. These actions, as Searle says, are 'a very special category of 
speech acts': they are performed, normally speaking, by someone who is 
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especially authorised to do so within some institutional framework. As 
institutional rather than personal acts, they can scarcely be said to involve 
politeness. 
Appendix I-G 
Leech's politeness Maxims (excluding Tact Maxims) 
9 Generosity Maxim (in impositives and comissives) (Leech 1983: 133-134) 
The Maxim of Tact is other-centred but the Maxim of Generosity is self-centred: a) 
Minimize the benefit to self, b) maximize cost to seýf The following are some of 
Leech's examples. 
(A<B indicates that B is more polite than A and T indicates that the utterance is impolite. ) 
1. T "You can lend me a car, " 
2. "1 can lend you my car. " (benefit to H and cost to S) 
3. "You must come and have dinner with us. " (benefit to Hand cost to S) 
4. T "We must come and have dinner with you. " 
5. "Could I have some more X? "< "Is there some more XT' (reference to S 
as beneficiary is omitted) 
6. "Could I borrow this electric drill? " > "Could you tend me this electric 
drill? " 
7. "1 wouldn't mind a cup of coffee. " > "Could you spare me a cup of 
coffee? " 
8. "You could borrow my bicycle, if you like. " > "I could lend you my 
bicycle, if you like. " 
9. "Would you like these pencils sharpened? " > "Would you like me to 
sharpen these pencils? 
0 Approbation Maxim (in expressives and assertives) (Leech 1983: 135-136) 
The Approbation Maxim is a) Minimize dispraise of other; b) maximize praise of other. 
Flattery is a form of insincere approbation. This maxim says "Avoid saying unpleasant 
things about others and more particularly about H. " e. g. "What a marvellous meal you 
cooked! " but never T "What an awful meal you cooked! " Lack of praise could implicate 
dispraise. e. g. Reference letter for Mr. X who is applying for a philosophy job. "Dear Sir, 
Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been 
regular. Yours, etc. " (Grice 1975: 52) Grice claims that this is a violation of the Maxim 
of Quality, but Leech (1983: 136) argues that it is due to not using his Approbation 
Maxim. 
0 Modesty Maxim (in expressives and assertives) (Leech 1983: 136-138) 
The Modesty Maxim is a) Minimize praise of self, b) maximize dispraise of self. The 
following are some of Leech's examples. 
I. A: "They were so kind to us. " B: "Yes, they were, weren't they? " 
2. A: "You are so kind to us. " B: t "Yes, I was, wasn't IT' 
3. "How stupid of me. " t "How stupid of you! " 
4. "t How clever of me! " "How clever of you! " 
5. "Please accept this small gift as a token of our esteem. " t "Please accept this 
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large gift as a token of our esteem. " 
I and 2 show that it is felicitous to agree with another's commendation, except when it 
is a commendation of oneself. 3 and 4 shows that self-dispraise is regarded as benign. 5 
shows the understatement of generosity. Leech (1983: 137-8) gives some examples in 
Japanese. It is common for a Japanese to say "Ohitotsu dozo (Please [have] one)" in 
offering food to a guest, whereas an English-speaking host might say "Have as much as 
you like". The Japanese utterance makes it appear that S is minimising generosity. But 
in this case, a Japanese speaker is paying more attention to the Modesty maxim: to offer 
more than one is to suggest that one's food is worth eating. Similarly an English person 
may call his gift 'small' in giving a present as an understatement. In Japanese, there is a 
conventional expression: 'Tsumaranai mono desu ga... [Japanese version not in the 
original] (This is a gift which will be of no use to you, but ... ). " When offering 
food, a 
Japanese may even appear to deny the existence of the food he is offering out of 
modesty: "Nani mo (meshiagaru mono wa) arimasen ga, douzo. (There is nothing (to 
eat), but please have sorne. )" In these instances, the Maxim of Modesty overrules the 
Maxim of Quality. 
Leech (1983: 137-8) also mentions that when a compliment is given, many 
Japanese, particularly women, often insist on denying it. The Modesty Maxim is more 
powerful than it is as a rule in English-speaking societies where it would be customarily 
more polite to accept a compliment graciously. In this example in Japanese, the 
Modesty Maxim overrules the Agreement Maxim. English-speakers would be inclined 
to find some compromise between violating the Modesty Maxim and violating the 
Agreement Maxim. Thus there is a trade-off between different maxims of the PP. 
0 Agreement Maxim (in assertives) (Leech 1983: 138) 
The Agreement maxim is a) Minimize disagreement between self and other; b) 
maximize agreement between self and other. The following are some of Leech's 
examples. Disagreement is considered as impolite and agreement as polite. Partial 
agreement is often preferable to complete disagreement. 
I. A: "It was an interesting exhibition, wasn't it? " TB: "No. Itwasvery 
uninteresting. " Disagreement. 
2. A: "A referendum will satisfy everybody. " B: "Yes, definitely. " Agreement 
3. A: "The book is tremendously well written. " B: "Yes, well written as a whole, 
but there are some rather boring patches, don't you think? " Partial agreement 
0 Sympathy Maxim 
' 
(in assertives) (Leech 1983: 139) 
The Sympathy maxim is a) Minimize antipathy between seýf and other; b) maximize 
sympathy between setf and other. Congratulations and condolences are courteous 
speech acts, even though condolences express sentiments, which might appear negative 
with regard to the hearer. 
1. "1 am terribly sorry to hear that your cat died. " 
2. "1 am terribly sorry to hear about your cat. " 
2. is preferred to 1. Without information content which is unfavourable to H), the hearer 
can interpret that it is a condolence, i. e. as an expression of sympathy for misfortune. 
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Appendix I-H 
The Irony Principle and the Banter Principle 
The Irony Principle (IP) enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming to be polite; it 
does so by superficially breaking the CP, but ultimately upholding it. The IP is 
dysfunctional; it enables the interlocutor to bypass politeness and promote an anti-social 
use of language. Irony varies from more comical irony to the more offensive kind. 
Although the IP appears to be dysfunctional, in providing a method of being offensive 
to others, it may well have a positive function in permitting aggression to manifest itself 
in a less dangerous verbal form than direct criticism, insults, threats, etc. If the 
Politeness Principle breaks down, it is liable to break down on both sides: direct 
accusation leads to counter-accusation, threat to counter-threat. But because irony pays 
lip service to the PP, it is less easy to break the PP in one's response to it. Hence the IP 
edges aggression away from the brink of conflict. 
The Banter principle has the opposite effect to the Irony principle. While irony 
is an apparently friendly way of being offensive (mock-politeness), the type of verbal 
behaviour known as 'banter' is an offensive way of being friendly (mock- impoliteness). 
This principle might be expressed as follows: 'In order to show solidarity with H, say 
something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to H (1983: 144). ' 
The Banter Principle can be called a 'third-order principle', because it may itself exploit 
irony. The PP complements the CP (See 2.1. (b) in this chapter), but other principles 
such as the Irony and Banter Principles further supplement the maxims of the CP and 
the PP and help to account for the indirect relationship between sense and force (Leech 
1983: 149). 
Appendix 1-1 
First-order principles Higher-order principles Contributory maxims 
Cooperative Principles (CP) Quantity, Quality 
Relation, Manner 









Table 1-1. Summary of the Interpersonal Rhetoric (Leech 1983: 149) 
' Interest Principle (Leech 1983: 146): 'Say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting'. 
2 The Pollyanna Principle came from the too good to be true heroine of Eleanor H. Potter's novel 
"Pollyanna". The participants in conversation prefer pleasant topics of conversation to unpleasant one. 
The negative aspect of this principle is euphemism; one can disguise unpleasant subjects by referring to 
them by means of apparently inoffensive expressions (e. g. workers are 'made redundant' instead of being 




Formalists and functionalists 
(a) Formalists (eg Chomsky) tend to regard language primarily as a mental 
phenomenon. Functionalists (eg. Halliday) tend to regard it primarily as a 
societal phenomenon. 
(b) Formalists tend to explain linguistic universals as deriving from a common 
genetic linguistic inheritance of the human species. Functionalists tend to 
explain them as deriving from the universality of the uses to which language 
is put in human societies. 
(c) Formalists are inclined to explain children's acquisition of language in terms 
of a built-in human capacity to learn language. Functionalists are inclined to 
explain it in terms of the development of the child's communicative needs 
and ability in society. 
(d)Above all, formalists study language as an autonomous system, whereas 
functionalists study it in relation to its social function. 
(Leech 1983: 46) 
Chapter 2 
Appendix 2-A 
Four way cross classification of FTA 
A. Those acts that threaten H's negative face: (B&L 1987: 65-66) 
(i) Those acts that predicate some future act A of H, and in so doing put some 
pressure on H to do (or refrain from doing) the act of A: 
(a) orders and requests (S indicates that he wants H to do, or refrain from 
doing, some act A) 
(b) suggestions, advice (S indicates that he thinks H ought to (perhaps) do 
some act A) 
(c) reminding (S indicates that H should remember to do some A) 
(d) threats, warnings, dares (S indicates that he - or someone, or something - 
will instigate sanctions against H unless he does A) 
(ii) Those acts that predicate some positive future act of S toward H, and in so 
doing put some pressure on H to accept or reject them, and possibly to incur a 
debt: 
(a) offers (S indicate that he wants H to commit himself to whether or not he 
wants S to do some act for H, with H thereby incurring a possible debt) 
(b) promises (S commits himself to a future act for H's benefit) 
(iii) Those acts that predicate some desire of S toward H or H's goods, giving H 
reason to think that he may have to take action to protect the object of S's 
desire, or give it to S: 
(a) compliment, expression of envy or admiration (S indicates that he likes or 
would like something of H's) 
(b) expression of strong (negative) emotions toward H-e. g. hatred, anger, lust 
(S indicates possible motivation for harming H or H's goods) 
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B. Those acts that threaten H's positive face: (ibid. 66-67) 
(i) Those acts that show that S has a negative evaluation of some aspect of H's 
positive face 
(a) expression of disapproval, criticism, contempt, or ridicule, complaint and 
reprimands, accusations, insults (S indicate that he doesn't like/want one 
or more of H's wants, acts, personal characteristics, goods, beliefs and 
values) 
(b) contradictions or disagreements, challenges (S indicates that he thinks H is 
wrong or misguided or unreasonable about some issue, such wrongness 
being associated with disapproval) 
(ii) Those acts that show S doesn't care about H's positive face: 
(a) expressions of violent (out-of-control) emotions (S gives H possible 
reason to fear him or be embarrassed by him) 
(b) irreverence, mention of taboo topics, including those that are inappropriate 
in the context (S indicates that he doesn't value H's values and doesn't 
fear H's fears) 
(C) bringing of bad news about H, or good news (boasting) about S (S 
indicates that he is willing to cause distress to H, and/or doesn't care about 
H's feelings) 
(d) raising of dangerously emotional or divisive topics, e. g. politics, race, 
religions, women's liberation (S raises the possibility or likelihood of 
face-threatening acts, such as the above, occurring; i. e., S creates a 
dangerous-to-face atmosphere) 
(e) blatant non-cooperation in an activity - e. g. disruptively interrupting H's 
talk, making non-sequiturs or showing non attention (S indicates that he 
doesn't care about H's negative- or positive-face wants) 
(f) use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial 
encounters (S may misidentify H in an offensive or embarrassing way, 
intentionally or accidentally) 
Some FTAs such as complaints, interruption, threats, strong expression of 
emotion, requests for personal information threaten both negative and 
positive face. 
C. Those that offend S's negative face: (ibid. 67-68) 
(a) expressing thanks (S accepts a debt, humbles his own face) 
(b) acceptance of H's thanks or H's apology, (S may feel constrained to 
minimize H's debt or transgression, as in 'It was nothing, don't mention 
it. 1) 
(c) excuses (S indicates that he thinks he had good reason to do, or fail to do, 
an act which H has just criticised; this may constitute in turn a criticism of 
H, or at least cause a confrontation between H's view of things and S's 
view) 
(d) acceptance of offers (S is constrained to accept a debt, and to encroach 
upon H's negative face), 
(e) responses to H's faux pas (if S visibly notices a prior faux pas, he may 
cause embarrassment to H, if he pretends not to, he may be discomfited 
himself) 
(f) Unwilling promises and offers (S commits himself to some future action 
although he doesn't want to; therefore, if his unwillingness shows, he may 
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also offend H's positive face) 
D. Those that directly damage S's positive face: (ibid. 68) 
(a) apologies (S indicates that he regrets doing a prior FTA, thereby damaging 
his own face to some degree -especially if the apology is at the same time a 
confession with H learning about the transgression through it, and the FTA 
thus conveys bad news) 
(b) acceptance of a compliment (S may feel constrained to do denigrate the 
object of H's prior compliment, thus damaging his own face: or he may feel 
constrained to compliment H in turn) 
(c) breakdown of physical control over body, bodily leakage, stumbling or 
falling down etc. 
(d) self-humiliation, shuffling or cowering, acting stupid, self-contradicting, 
(c) confessions, admissions of guilt or responsibility -e. g. for having done or 
not done an act, or for ignoring of some that S is expected to know 
(f) emotion leakage, non-control of laughter or tears 
Appendix 2-B 
Positive politeness strategies (from Brown and Levinson 1987: 103, adapted by 
Sifianou 1992: 35) 
Claim 'common ground' 
I. Notice, attend to H 'his interests, wants, needs, goods) 
2. Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H) 
3. Intensify interest to H 
4. Use in-group identity markers 
5. Seek agreement 
6. Avoid disagreement 
7. Presuppose/raise/assert common ground 
8. Joke 
Convey that S and H are co-operators 
9. Assert or presuppose Ss knowledge of and concern for H' 
10. Offer, promise 
11. Be optimistic 
12. Include both S and H in the activity 
13. Give (or ask for) reasons 
14. Assume or assert reciprocity 
Fulfil H's want (for some X) 
Give gifts to H (good, sympathy, understanding, co-operation) 
Appendix 2-C 
Negative politeness strategies (from Brown and Levinson 1987: 131, adapted by 
Sifianou 1992: 35) are summarised as follows: 
Be direct 
Be conventionally indirect (clash) 
Don't presume/assume 
Appendices 319 
2. Question, hedge 
Don't coerce H (where x involves H doing A) 
(both 1. and 2. are included here, too) 
3. Be pessimistic 
4. Minimize the imposition 
5. Give deference 
Communicate S's want to not impinge on H 
6. apologize 
7. Impersonalize S and H: Avoid the pronouns I and you 
8. State the FTA as a general rule 
9. Nominalize 
Redress other wants of H's, derivative from negative face 
10. Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H. 
Appendix 2-D 
Off record strategies (from Brown and Levinson 1987: 215) 
Invite Conversational implicature, via hints triggered by violation of Gricean 
Maxims 
Violate Relevance Maxim 
1. Give hints 
2. Give association clues 
3. Presuppose 
Violate Quantity Maxims 
4. Understate 
5. Overstate 
6. Use tautologies 
Violate Quality Maxim 
7. Use contradictions 
8. Be ironic 
9. Use metaphors 
10. Use rhetoric questions 
Be vague or ambiguous 
Violate Manner Maxim 
11. Be ambiguous 
12. Be vague 
13. Over-generalize 
14. Displace H 
Be incomplete, use ellipsis 
Chapter 4 
Appendix 4-A 
Watts's social model of politeness 
Watts mentions that his model of (im)politeness "makes no claim to describe and/or 
explain what types of human social behaviour are polite, but rather to offer ways in 
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which we as researchers can show when, and perhaps why, individual users of language 
in socio-communicative verbal interaction classify utterances as polite or even express 
utterances politely, and to allow both politeness and impoliteness to be evaluated by 
individual users (Watts 2003: 160). " He claims that his theory of (im)politeness can 
never be predictive, but it can help to open up and display social processes at work. 
(Watts 2003: 25). Watts's model of (im)politeness consists of two major concepts: 
a) Politic behaviour: this is related to habitus in Bourdieu's theory of practice. It 
accounts for the knowledge of which linguistic structures can be forecast in a 
specific type of interaction in a specific social field. Behaviour which is not part of 
the politic behaviour of an interaction type is 'inappropriate' and open to 
classification as 'impolite'. 
b) Linguistic politeness: any linguistic behaviour which goes beyond the bounds of 
politic behaviour is open to potential classification as being 'polite', which includes 
potential irony, aggressiveness, abuse, etc. It is open to dispute. The imputation of 
politeness to linguistic structure does not automatically mean it will be given a 
positive evaluation. The opposite might occur. 
(Watts 2003: 161) 
Taking Werkhofer's analogy of money further, Watts explains politic behaviour and 
linguist politeness as linguistic 'payment': as long as the exchange proceeds within the 
accepted framework of politic behaviour, the linguistic 'payment' will go largely 
unnoticed, but if it is not 'paid' it will certainly be noticed. Linguistic 'payment' in 
excess of what is required is open to interpretation as 'polite' (Watts 2003: 161) Matts 
elaborates on his model by adding aggressive jacework and supportive jacework. The 
diagram below that Watts provides shows how jacework, linguistic politeness and 









Fig. 4-Al Facework, linguistic politeness, and politic behaviour (Watts 2003: 260) 
3 Though Watts is using 'facework' in his model, he argues that "Politeness Theory can never be fully 
equated with Face Theory" (2003: 117). Goffman's 'facework' will be discussed in chapter. 5. 
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The oval with the thick border around it represents the totality of forms of 
social practice, which can be posited as polite. Politic behaviour is largely predictable 
on the basis of the objectified social structure of the field. Aggressive facework in the 
diagram above lies on the boundaries of expected politic behaviour for the particular 
interaction and is highly unlikely to use linguistic structures that might be open to 
interpretation as polite. Supportive facework, on the other hand, lies closer to that 
arena in which linguistic behaviour might (but need not) be associated with potentially 
polite behaviour. Outside the borders of politic behaviour, on the left we have 
non-politic behaviour that is unsanctioned. The shaded oval indicates the zone in 
which it is disputable whether verbal structures of politic behaviour are interpretable as 
polite or not. The closer we get to the centre of the oval, the more likely it will be that 
the utterance will go beyond the payment that is regarded as obligatory for politic 
behaviour. Some polite behaviour lies beyond the border of what is politic, and although 
it might appear superficially polite, it will almost certainly be evaluated m4atively 
(unnecessary linguistic politeness). (Watts 2003: 259-60) 
In 2005 papers, Watts develops his model of politeness further. He contrasts 
modernist and postmodernist theory and presents his model as a postmodernist theory. 
Watts (2005: xlii) wrote: 
A modernist theory tends to isolate language from the set of language 
users, even in speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics, and it leads to a 
denaturalisation of language. A postmodernist theory starts from the 
assumption that language is within the individual as a social being and 
therefore that talk instantiates social interaction... Through discourse in 
social interaction we create common worlds, the most significant being 
our interpersonal relationships with others. 
,4 As a postmodernist conceptualisation of politeness, he proposes his 'relational work , (Watts 2005; Locher and Watts 2005), i. e. the work "individuals invest in negotiating 
relationships with others, which includes impolite as well as polite or merely 
appropriate behaviour" (Locher and Watts 2005: 9). Figure 4-A2 is Watts's new attempt 
to represent the total spectrum of his 'relational work' in diagrammatic form. 
When behaviour is unmarked, i. e. in a state of equilibrium, he calls this 
'politic/appropriate' behaviour, which he labels 'non-polite'. The dotted line separating 
'unmarked politic behaviour' from 'positively marked politic behaviour' that is open to 
interpretation as 'polite' shows that the boundary between the two is not absolute. It is a 
moveable area in which one type of behaviour shades off into the other. The point at 
which speakers perceive politic behaviour to be 'polite' may vary considerably from 
speaker to speaker, from one situational context to another. When the relational work in 
interaction is unmarked and goes unnoticed, it would be a 'politic' behaviour, which is a 
sort of equilibrium. Positively marked behaviour is open to an overt interpretation as 
'polite'. Negatively marked behaviours may be interpreted as 'over-polite' (right), 'rude' 
or 'impolite' (left) (Watts 2005: xliii). 
Eelen was already using 'relational work' in his 2003 book.. 
Appendices 322 
Politic/appropriate 
--4-, 14polite" 11 
unmarked behaviour 
,, Positively marked behaviour 
------------------------ --------------------------- 





Fig. 4-A2 Watts's 'relational work' (2005: xliii) 
Appendix 4-B 
Giddens's structuration theory 
Giddens's structuration theory was first developed in the late 1970s in New Rules of 
Sociological Method (1976) and Central Problems in Social Theory (1979) and 
subsequently in more complete form in The Constitution of Society (1984). (King 
2005: 218) Giddens redefines basic concepts such as agent, action, power, structure and 
system in order to create the foundation for a new social ontology. Giddens develops 
and redefines these concepts so that the traditional actor/structure dualism is instead 
conceived as duality. Society is viewed as a structuration process, whereby human 
actions simultaneously structure and are structured by society. Giddens (1984: 25) 
writes: "[t]he constitution of agent and structures are not two independently given sets 
of phenomena, a dualism, but represents a duality. According to the notion of the duality 
of the structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and 
outcome of the practices they recursively organize. Structure is not 'external' to 
individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain 
sense more 'internal' than exterior to their activities in a Durkheim sense. Structure is 
not to be equated with constraints but is always both constraining and enabling. " 
"Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agent have about what 
they do in their day-to-day activity (ibid. 26)". "The social system in which structure is 
recursively implicated.... Giddens tries to explain the active reproduction of the social 
system through agent's knowledgeability. For further details, see Giddens The 
Constitution of Society (1984) 
1 summarise how Giddens tried to overcome the structure/agency dilemma as 
follows: Giddens, unlike Bourdieu, emphasises the agent's knowledgability in his way 
of overcoming the structure/agency dilemma: "All human beings are knowledgeable 
agents. That is to say, all social actors know a great deal about the conditions and 
consequences of what they do in their day-to-day lives. Such knowledge is not wholly 
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propositional in character, nor is it incidental to their activities" (Giddens 1984: 281). 
Such knowledge is expressed as 'practical consciousnesses', 'discursive consciousness' 
and 'unconscious motives'. 5 Knowledgeability embedded in practical consciousness 
exhibits an extraordinary complexity. " The predominant form of day-to-day social 
activity is routine, which is not directly motivated but merely the repetition of everyday, 
mundane activities and such repetition of activities by individuals result in reproduction 
in society. 
Giddens (1984: 282) explains the connection of routines and ontological 
security: "Routinized practices are the prime expression of the duality of structure in 
respect of the continuity of social life. In the enactment of routines agents sustain a 
6 sense of ontological security". Through what Giddens calls, the 'reflexive monitoring 
of actions', Giddens can explain transformation as well as reproduction. The 'reflexive 
monitoring of action' refers to the intentional or purposive character of human 
behaviour. Parker (2000: 60) shows how Giddens's agents have freedom to bring 
changes: "Reflexive monitoring involves evaluation, critical appraisal and comparison 
of rules and resources; Giddens's agents can learn from mistakes and appropriate useful 
knowledge whenever they find it. " 
Chapter 5 
Appendix 5-A 
Multiple roles that a 40 year-old primary school teacher plays 
Japanese change the words used to address persons depending on the roles that the 
person takes in different situations. Suzuki (1973) gives an interesting example of a 40 
year-old primary school teacher's position as shown in the diagram on the next page. 
' Kaspersen (2000) lucidly explains three levels of Giddens's 'knowledgeable agent'. The majority of our 
day-to-day activities are routinized and automatic and they take place at the level of practical 
consciousness. The vast majority of our activities such as getting up, brushing teeth, taking a shower are 
routinized, (which have almost ritual character). The knowledge of these actions is seldom formulated 
explicitly. It is a tacit knowledge. Practical consciousness then comprises the non-discursive framework 
of cultural competencies necessary for a social act. Whereas the level of practical consciousness 
encompasses the knowledge for which we cannot immediately account, discursive consciousness refers 
to the understanding or knowledge which the agent achieves by reflecting upon his/her actions. In other 
words, we explicitly express our activity. (e. g. "I like biking because I am opposed to automobile 
pollution. "). However, not all motives for actions can be found at the conscious level. Unconscious 
motives, tied to memory, operate below the non-discursive level as an indirect motivation for action and 
belief. Out of the three levels, Giddens claims that the critical level is practical consciousness, because 
we generally experience our social activities as the continuous flow of conduct and not a series of 
rationally cognised discrete acts (Kaspersen 2000: 35). 
6 Ontological security is defined as -[c]onfidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they 
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Fig. 5-A different roles and terms for addressing people (Suzuki 1973): 148) 
Words beside the single line arrows (in Italics) indicate how this person addresses 
different people with whom he is in relationship: headmaster, his father, wife, older 
brother, younger brother, son, students, colleague, students and a boy in neighbourhood. 
Words beside the double line arrows (in bold) shows how he speaks about or addresses 
himself when he talks to these different people. 
Watashi, boku, ore are all variations of "I" the first person singular pronoun. 
Watashi is a semi-formal version of "I", which he uses when he talks with his superior, 
the headmaster of his school. Boku is a casual variation of "I" which is often used by 
young boys and male adults in informal situations. He uses this "I" toward his father, 
his colleague, and to his older brother. However, to his wife, he uses ore a rather bossy 
male ('macho') variation of "I". On other occasions, he refers to himself with his role 
names rather than "I". For instance, to his younger brother, he addresses himself as 
niisan (your older bother); to his son as otoo-san (your father); to his students as sensei 
(your teacher) and to his neighbour boy as oji-san (your neighbour uncle). Such explicit 
indication of particular roles and status entitlements in ordinary interaction in Japanese 
language reveals that the Japanese man must constantly be reassessing his roles in 
relation to others with whom he is in contact. Brown and Gilman (1960) have analysed 
the T/V system of European languages and concluded that power and solidarity are the 
parameters in distinguishing these pronoun variations. Japanese address terms convey 
something much more complicated than power and solidarity. Various connotations are 
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7 implied by this range of terms of address. The variety of terms of address for this 40 
year-old primary school teacher shows how diverse are the roles he has to take in 
performance with different team-mates, headmaster, colleagues, students, wife, younger 
and older brother, son and boy in the neighbourhood. 
Appendix 5-B 
Other moral obligations of team members 
0 Dramaturgical discipline: 
each member of the team must also possess dramaturgical discipline and exercise it in 
presenting his/her own part: "while the performer is ostensibly immersed and given 
over to the activity that he is performing and is apparently engrossed in his actions in a 
spontaneous, uncalculating way, he must nonetheless be affectively dissociated from his 
presentation in a way that leaves him free to cope with dramaturgical contingencies as 
they arise" (1990[19591: 210). The dramaturgically disciplined performer is someone 
with 'self-control' who can suppress his/her spontaneous feelings in order to give the 
appearance of sticking to the affective line. Goffman (1990[1959]: 210-1) lists other 
attributes of a performer who is dramaturgically disciplined: "someone who remembers 
his part and does not commit unmeant gestures orfaux pas in performing it", "someone 
with discretion; he does not give the show away by involuntary disclosing its secret", 
"someone with 'presence of mind' who can cover up on the spur of the moment for 
inappropriate behaviour on the part of his team-mate, while maintaining the impression 
that he is merely playing his part. " Management of one's face and voice is also an 
important element of dramaturgical discipline. For successful impression management 
of performers, it is vital that team-mates are dramaturgically disciplined. Undisciplined 
behaviour may be judged as impolite and cause embarrassment to other team members. 
40 dramaturgical circumspection 
Goffman claims that besides loyalty and discipline, dramaturgical circumspection must 
be exercised (1990[1959]: 212): the members of the team should exercise foresight and 
design in advance how best to stage a show, preparing in advance for likely 
contingencies and exploiting the opportunities that remain. One technique may be to 
choose members who are loyal and disciplined, and if possible also attempt to select the 
kind of audience that will give a minimum of trouble in terms of the show that 
performer wants to put on. (1990[1959]: 213). Even if teams select the right team-mates 
and right audience, when they come into each other's immediate presence, a host of 
minor events may occur that might accidentally convey an impression that is 
inconsistent with the fostered one. Thus they should always prepare in advance for all 
possible expressive contingences. (1990[1959]: 213) 
' Self "I": watashi (standard, semiformal); ivatakushi (formal): alashi (used by woman); boku (male; 
boy); ore (rough; male; toward someone equal or lower in status); wagahai (man; pompous); jibun (male; 
old military) Other variations are oira, uchi, ivashi, asshi, ore-sama. 
"You"(singular). anata (toward someone equal or lower in status; wife calling husband); omae (rough; 
used by male toward someone lower in status; husband calling wife); kimi (used by male; to someone 
lower in status); temee (very rough; used by male); kisama (very rough; used by male) Other variations 
are anta, omee. 
"You"(plural): anala-tachi / anala-gala (used toward those who are lower in status; often by teacher 
toward students); kimi-lachi (used by male toward those who are lower in status); oniae-tachi (rough; 
toward those who are lower in status): omae-ra (very rough; toward those who are lower in status) Other 
variations are anta-lachi, anta-ra, temee-ra 
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Appendix 5-C 
Goffman in Watt's social model of politeness 
Watts (2003: 130) sees that politeness and impoliteness are part of the construction and 
management of everyday life and considers the individual's development of a concept 
of self is the most important part, which can only occur through the medium of 
socio-communicative interaction. He labels this concept of selfface and suggests that it 
can be only developed through repeated socio-communicative verbal interaction with 
others and "the construction of our own concept of self and the work we do in social 
interaction to enable others to construct, reproduce and maintain their self-concepts" 
(2003: 130) he calls jacework. He claims that all human social interaction consists of 
facework of one kind or another and that linguistic politeness is one of its aspects. 
Watts (2003: 259) argues that "we can be assigned different faces on different 
occasions of verbal interaction" and that "all social interaction is predicted on 
individuals' face needs. i. e. that we can never get away from negotiating facework". 
Some interaction type allows for facework which aims at damaging or destroying the 
face which has been attributed to a participant. If the interaction sanctions the display of 
face threat he calls it aggressive jacework. If the interaction requires particular care not 
to damage another participant's face, the participants do everything to circumvent face 
threat, he calls it supportive jacework. (ibid. ) Watts gives a more detailed explanation of 
supportive work: 
When one of the interactants is about to fall out of line or immediately 
after s/he has fallen out of line, that interactant may take measures to 
indicate to the other participants that the overall attribution of face for the 
interaction is still valid. This is what can be called supportive facework, 
supportive because it contributes towards the overall facework of the 
interaction. (Watts 2003: 132) 
Watts (2003: 260) made a diagram showing where 'politic behaviour' and 'linguistic 
politeness' and 'impoliteness' is placed in relation to supportive jacework and 
aggressive jacework, (See Appendix 4-A) but he presented another diagram in 2005 
(Fig 4-A2 in Appendix 4-A), in which the notions of supportive and aggressive 
jacework are no longer used. I find Watts's notions of 'face' and 'facework' is largely 
compatible with Goffman's original notions of 'face' and 'facework'. Watts's main 
concern seems to be how some behaviour is interpreted as 'polite', 'not polite', 'politic' 
or 'impolite', while Goffman seems to be more interested in the ways participants 
engage in interpersonal ritual behaviour. Goffman's notions of 'face' and 'face-work' 
were theoretical tools that he employed for elucidating such interaction ritual. 
Conclusion 
Appendix 6-A 
Prejudice and the Enlightenment 
"The history of ideas shows that not until the Enlightenment does the concept of 
prejudice acquire the negative connotation familiar today. Actually "prejudice" rneans a 
judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been 
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finally examined. In German legal terminology a "prejudice" is a provisional legal 
verdict before the final verdict is reached. For someone involved in a legal dispute, this 
kind of judgment against him affects his chances adversely. Accordingly, the French 
prýjudice as well as the Latin praejudicium, means simply "adverse effect" 
"disadvantage", "harm". But this negative sense is only derivative. The negative 
consequence depends precisely on the positive validity, the value of the provisional 
decision as a prejudgment, like that of any precedent. Thus "prejudice" certainly does 
not necessarily mean a false judgment, but part of the idea that it can have either a 
positive or a negative value. " (Gadamer 2004: 273) 
Appendix 6-B 
Negatively eventful behaviour: 'How much did you pay for the flatT 
The following vignette is part of my own recent personal experience. How would you 
feet if someone you had never met before asked you "How much did you pay for your 
flat" in front of a whole group of people? I was invited by a Hong Kong Chinese friend 
Cathy to go to a dim sum lunch at a Chinese restaurant, eight of us all together. Most of 
us were from our hall of residence apart from a Hong Kong businessman and his wife 
that Cathy had invited. Cathy, who had invited us all, congratulated Nadia, a South 
African lawyer, who had just bought a flat of her own. Then the Hong Kong 
businessman who was there, previously unknown to Nadia suddenly said, 'How much 
did you pay for the flatT At that point, everybody looked uncomfortable and tried to 
change the topic. Then Cathy stepped in and said 'It is such a difficult question'. We all 
thought that she was trying to avoid the question, but to our surprise, Cathy said. "Why 
don't you ask how much she has to pay per month? " Everybody was silent. Eventually 
we changed the topic and Nadia did not have to answer the question. 
It seemed to me quite rude and improper to ask this question of somebody met 
for the first time in front of a whole group of strangers. Clearly this businessman did 
not perceive it as being out of place. But I and several others thought it quite improper. 
Later, I had opportunity to ask how other people felt about the Hong Kong 
businessman's rather crude question. I asked three friends, one Singaporean and two 
South African friends to express how they thought about this Hong Kong 
businessman's question. Though these were not intended as data, I actually recorded the 
conversation. Below are excerpts from my conversation with two South Africans, Clare 
and David. (Clare describes herself as a coloured South African and David of Italian 
descent describes himself as a white South African in this brief vignette. ) I report on 
just two short segments of our conversation. 
(1) 
Clare: Yap! IIA would think it wouldn't be. polite then again it would seem... a 
person's level of politeness depend on your socialization.. /' your country, /7 for 
example, for example, I come from a culture where you know ever3lhin 
is ... everybody is trying to (inaudible). because we emerge from such a segregated 
society. 
Noriko: mmm 
Clare: and everybody wants to be politically correct, so we are being oversensitive by 
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perceiving that to be just impolite, we are proposing opposition to political 
incorrectness. It's rather a big thing. You know.. Just such a question.. opens..... a 
question A don't perceive that just to be.. just to be impolite. 
David: But in South Africa first of all... 
Clare: In South Africa, we might NOT, We ... (indaudible) 
Noriko: So in the climate of South Africa, it would be inappropriate. but do YOU you 
yourself you yourself ... would you ask such a question? 
Clare: NOoo..., because as I was saying to you. I would consider that to be rude, 
lacking... Yeah rude... beyond being impolite, just being rude... but I am saying 
that me perceiving it to be impolite is influenced perhaps by by my socialization. /' 
by my cultural history, by that I mean.. ehm. because as I'm saying to you, we've 
emerged from such a segregated ... from such segregated communities you know 
maybe ... we've been oversensitive in terms of what is seen polite and impolite. 
(2) 
Clare: But also I think you know... if you had asked the question probably TE 
YEARS ago (inaudible).... it would have made a difference, because NOW... 
post ... post-Apartheid... 
David: Ummm mm 
Clare: You know ... that type of.. you wouldn't ask that type of question, because ... I 
think people nowadays back home, we come from ah.. more politically correct, they 
don't Want to ask.. and to be perceived, because if if .. if if David from white descent, 
of white descent, ask me that question, I would like to ask Myself.... "Why would 
he ask me that for, giving me that type of question? " 
Noriko: you mean Ahat.. I'd think why can a white person ask me that 
Clare: YEAAAH. 
David: AND even ... a Black person askinR another black person ... could be 
Clare: Yeah.... 
David: Let' say ... you're from a LOW-class eh POOR black eh community and you ask 
someone who ... had benefited from black empowerment.... 
Clare: OH yeah. 
David: we have SUCH a wealthy Middle class even in that community, and that... I 
think it would leave the black person dismayed ... if it was asked by maybe someone 
who used to be in the same community but he's still in the poor position 
Interestingly, as you can see from above, when these people evaluate the Hong Kong 
businessman's question, both Clare and David mentioned various matters related to the 
culture and society they come from such as the political history, cultural history, class 
and racial issues in present day South Africa (see underlined parts). In fact, rather than 
Appendices 329 
the immediate contextual situation of the actual conversation itself, they introduced their 
own cultural history and tradition and preunderstanding into their interpretation and 
evaluation of the utterance as more crucial factors. I can see that these are all part of 
their hermeneutical situation, from which they interpreted and evaluated the Hong Kong 
businessman's question. 
This account shows that what goes on in the Hearer's interpretation of 
utterances truly involves history, tradition and prejudgment (prejudices) of the Hearer as 
Gadamer suggested. Only from their own hermeneutical situations, could these people 
interpret the Hong Kong businessman, because these historical situations are part of 
their existence. A narrative approach seems to be one way to have some access to the 
complex hermeneutical conditions of the Hearer. 
